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ABSTRACT
It is argued in this thesis that over the past 15 yearsplanning and in particular expenditure planning - has
had three main functions in New Zealand centralgovernment: as a survival mechanism for elitesi as a
means to cope with the problems and deficiencies of
organised knowledge; and as a symbolic act of
.reassurance in the face of economic and fiscal
uncertainty.
Expenditure planning is regarded in this work as alearning proeess. However, the thesis describeshistorical developments which illustrate that the
imperative need to contain and manage conflict inside
central. government is such that real executivelearning is effectively precluded. Dissonance
between the political implications of significant
i-nformation and the rational action that might bedictated by that information inhibiLs effective
communication and control. The cybernetic
malfunctioning of the central system arises not so
much from political debate over the fiscal issues
as from the need of certain elites to retain their
pre-eminence in Lhe planning process - most notably,the Treasury and its associated ministers.
It is concluded that a less historically-bound system
of power-sharing is cal1ed for if the executive
agents officials and ministers - are to react more
sensitively to adverse fiscal circumstances and
prepare more efficiently for future uncertainties
than they have in the past.
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PREFACE
The badcground to tlris study
For a nunb.er of years, members of the staff of Victoria University
of Weltington have been actively interested in governmental experiments
in national planning. In the School of Political Science and Public
Administration, the rate Dr Aran Robinson, Dr Les cleveland, the rate
Professor Ralph Brookes and Professor ,John Roberts lrere among those
involved in planning developments as consultants, researchers, advisers
and conunentators. In the Department of Economics, Professors Brian
Philpott and Frank Hormes, and several of their corleagues, took part
in setting up research facilities used by the Government in economic
planning. Sir Frank Holmes was appointed as the first Chairman of the
New Zealand Planning Council in 1977.
At the School of Political Science and Public Adrninistration, a
new post-graduate degree 
- the Master of public policy (Mpp) - sras
estabrished in 1975. Among the purposes and achievements of this
academic progranme was the education of mature students for advisory and
consultancy work in national ptanning and public policy naking.
As the research was being completed, University Staff were holding
discussions on the establishment of an fnstutute of Public Po1icy, with
a documentary collection of papers, theses and research projects relevant
to pubric planning policies and processes. such an rnstitute would
support the activities of organisations such as the New Zealand Institute
of Public Adrninistration, which has a long-standing interest in the subject
of this study.
The invol-vement of the academic staff and students of Victoria
I
university in nationar, social and economic planning is not entirely
coincidental. The university's proximity to central Government,
Parliament and the head offices of government departments and other
government agencies helps to explain the academic interest. Wellington's
importance as the seat of government, and its central geographic location
(ii)
mean that most major planning exercises take place in the capital city,
thus stimulating and encouraging research among students of the political
proces,s.
There are probably few officials in Wellington, at least in the
middle to senior levels of public administration, who have not at some
time corne into direct contact with the work carried out at Victoria
University on planning and public policy making. Many no$r occupying
influential positions in central government are graduates of Victoria;
others are exposed. to academic influence, direct and indirect, in a
variety of formal and informal ways. The public sector orientation of
several schools of Victoria, notably those in the Commerce and Arts
faculty, is a striking feature of the University itself and has had a
marked effect on the intellectual and political environment in which
government officials work.
It was in the general climate of academic invoLvement in governnent
planning that the following study was conducted. The idea arose from
the author's initial interest in the Government's reasons for setting
up the New Zealand Planning Council. However, on the advice of
Professor Brookes, in 1978, the nature of the inquiry shifted and
in public expenditurefocused on the narrower topic of recent developments
planning in New Zealand.
Although the research began in mid-1978. its progress was interrupted
for various reasons over the next four years, including the authorrs
leaving Victoria University to take up full-time employment in a govern-
ment department. Subsequent work on aspects of resource and policy
planning has provided new insights into the government planning process.
Among other things it indicates a future need to revise some of the
material.included here, where the cut-off date for historical data was
1980.
Therefore, this thesis is submitted as an initial exploration of
aspects of public expenditure planning in New Zealand- It is proposed
(iii)
to continue with research into the topic, based on the work reported
here. A wealth of data collected over the past few years remains
virtualry untouched. For exampJ.e, tJ.e hope of including a detailed
analysis of earlier formal planning mechanisms such as ttre National
Develo;ment Conference (195s) and an account of ttre relationship between
public education and other areas of the governmentrs planning process
was barery realised. Education is referred to mainly in order to
illustrate specific develo;ments in the wider expenditure planning system.
Tlrese and other tasks remain to be done. Despite the upsurge in
research and pr:blic poLicy analysis, we do not yet have a comprehensive
picture of the most significant social and economic determinants or
political influences on government planning in Nehr zealand. Until thenl
this ttresis is sr-rbmitted as the first part of a more sr:bstantial analysis.
rt is hoped ttrat even in its present for:ur it wirl provide a minor
contribution to scholarship in this areal and, perhaps, to officiarst
understanding of their function in the New Zealand pubric sector.
(iv)
A guide to ttre contents
Itle rnttoduction sunmarises the concerns that lay behind tl.is
study of planning in New Zealand. Chapter One includes a definition
of planning, and disstrsses various ttreoretical and rnethodological
problems associated with tl'is inquiry, which focuses on p'blic
expenditure. pranning by centrar governrr*nt agencies in New ZeaLand.
chapter l\ro briefly surnmarises the main lines of developurent in govern-
rent planning in New zealand since the r95os. chapters Ttrree-six
provide a detailed account of the style and behavior:r of various govern-
rEnt agencies operating inside the central information networks- At
tttis point tie work summarises ttre main l-ines of current research and
indicates where futrrre deveropnents in expenditure planning may occur.
chapter seven tl.en concrudes witl. a discussion of the probrems of
expenditure planning as a form of gorrernnental learning.
A rist of appendices forlo, the concruding chapter. Ttre first
(Appendix 1) descrijces how access to data sources for the project was
obtained- Appendix 2 rists the data sources and their rocation.
Appendices 3-4 include docurents cited in this study. Ttre materiar in
these appendices is all classified as rRESTRrcrEDr and is only abre to
be read after written approval has been obtained from the author and
various officials in Governnent. Details of ttre location of these
appendices is included. Appendix 5, initialty intended as part of ttre
main study, discusses aspects of parr-iament's interest in ttre expen-
diture planning prooesa.
A selected bibliography
publications cited or of use
follors, comprising New Zealand and other
in preparation of tJlis study.
I.
INTRODUEIION
Planning in New Zealald
Apart from three years when Labour was in office (Lg72-Lg75), the
National Party has formed the government after each general election
since 1960. During this time, a nurnber of developments indicate that
in government circles there has been a continuing interest in guiding
New zealand's development along somewhat more deliberately planned lines
than previously had been the case. various national planning conferences
were herd t for example, on industry (1960) , exporting deveropment (1960) ,
agriculture (1963-64) I in 1968-69 the Nationar Development conference
was he1d, with a nurnber of satellite sector councils, including the National
Development council (NDc) itself, established to promote the objectives
of the conference- rn Ig74, the cabinet cormnittee on policy and priorities
replaced the centrar machinery of the NDC, only to be replaced again,
with the change of governrnent in Ig75, by the New Zealand planning Council
and a nurnber of other government-established pranning bodies.
rn addition to these more or less broadry consultative pranning
agencies, developments inside central government (particularly in the
fierd of public expenditure pranning) suggest rong term political
dissatisfaction with a centralised system of government in which national
goals tended to be defined and promoted in terms of short term erectoral
futures, and adapted or abandoned whenever pressing considerations
intervened.
The National Development Conference (NDC, f96g) was an attempt
at consurtative planning 
- sharing infonnation, attempting to reach a
broad-based consensus on the kind of future New zealanders could and
should aim for, setting industriar and other targets. Like the NDc,
the contemporary planning Council (Ig77,) is far from being a coercive
instrument of central government. where pranning endeavours of this
kind have been attempted, centrar government has avoided any overt
claims for centralised direction. rndicative planning, in which the
9overnment assumes the role of co-ordinating convenor and educator, has
2.
been emphasised. The question is whether or not this preferred style
has been supported by forrnal procedures, planning rnachinery and information
systems which could effectively contribute to, or gluarantee, agreed
objectives in social and economic development.
There appear to be a number of general causes of national planning
failure in New Zealand and elsewhere: political or economic irmnaturity;
insufficient regard for the undesirable consequences and side-effects of
carefully implemented plans; a breakdown in the relationship between
technical planners and the establ-ished commanders of political pokrer,
so that formar prans become distorted by the demands of expedience
rather than adaptive to change; and the seemingry inevitable gap
between private ideals and public utopias. Numerous writers have corunented
on these general factors. Some have claimed that they are so forceful
that it should be admitted that planning is an ineffectual government
'l
activity.- They point to the fact that there is no country where actual
social and economic events bear such a convincing relationship to targets,
objectives or guiderines set by pubric planning agencies that formaL
national planning itself could be claimed as the most effective means to
modify experience. This appears to be true whatever kind of planning 
-
indicative or command, educative or coerciu"2 
- 
is under discussion.
There are, however, aspects of national or governmental planning
failure and success which can be identified only through detailed
investigration of particurar cases, such as stephen cohen's account of
Francers post-war planning experience.' ,hi" highrights structural
problems which may perhaps be avoided ersewhere. The folrowing case
study of a limited aspect of New Zealand government planning may perform
a similar function. ft examines whether there are specific problems
in relating certain kinds of information to political action.
Planning inforrnation presents itself in the form nf historical
analysis and future prediction, usuarly over the ronger term. other
3.
politically interesting information, such as electoral behaviour, is
relevant but not predominant. Without appropriate networks for receivingt
processing and acting on the basis of planning (rather than exclusively
politieal, electorally-biased) information, centralised systems may have
specific systemic disabilities which reinforce or accentuate other more
general difficulties in successful planning.
Planning failures (such as failure to realise the growth targets,
and planned social and economic benefits consequent to these) in
New Zealand are frequently attri-buted to uncontrollable factors in the
external environment. This study questions how far such failures are
in fact a function of external influences. It points to the significance
of deficiencies in the networks of information in central government
itself. Such deficiencies may be susceptiJcle to remedy and may enable
planners to modify the impact of environmental factors over which New
Zelaanders have little, if any control or influence.
NOTES
I. See, for example, Aaron Wildavsky, "If Planning is Everything,
Maybe it's Nothing", Folicy Sciences (4, 1973).
2- Stephen Cohen, Modern Capitalist Planning: The French
Experience, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
rev. editi>n, 1977 ), pp 3-27.
3. Cohen, French Experience.
4.
CI{APTER ONE
A definition of planning
Planning is a form of behaviour. As suctr, it is not an exclusirre
function of governnents, sinc-e individuars, commerciar firms, sociar
organisations and corununity groups are constantly engaged in planning 
-
making choices about t}re future, and taking action on the basis of those
choices. At all levels of personal and pr:blic life, however, t;le influence
of central, national gorrernrnents is increasingly strongly felt. For this
reason, the motives and procedures for government planning are of
considerable signri ficance .
In many modern states, both those witJl mature political systens, and
those characterised as developing nations, planning has become slmonyrrpsst
with systematic, conqrrehensive governmental'intervention in social and
econornic life in order to attain longer term goals than other political
processes (such as group conflict, class struggle, elite decision-making
or rmutual partisan adjustmnt') seem capable of actrieving.
Planning is, however, notoriously difficult to define, at least insofar
as it is viewed as a specific variant of pr:lclic poricy-makirg.r Even if
a single meaning could be extracted frorn its chequered historT of opprobrir:m
and praise, its function and purposes are r-urlikely to be the spbject of
general theoreticar agreement. rn this study, planning is regarded not
only as a normal prudential activity, but as a form of learning throuqh
which goverrurcnts aim, e:q>Iicitly, at quided national developr€nt in an
environtrpnt of social, econonic and technological chanqe. Among t6e various
nuances of this definition are questions of improved skitls in economic
and public erq>enditure managenent, inprorrcd coordination in industrial and
social developrent, and a nore pur?osive approactr to the longer-term future
than is generally the case where political po\,trer depends on gaining and
holding eLectoral office
5.
Ihe focus of this study
In New Zea1and, a great deal of political research has focused on
aspects of the electoral system, and on tJle political and econornic
motivations for tJle developnrent of the welfare state. The sociological
bases of specific party adherence, the influence of rnajor interest groups
such as farrners and donestic manufacturers and ttre constitutional balance
between tlre tegislative, executive and judicial functions of the state
have been tJle subjects of studies in various conventional academic dis-
2c].pIrnes.
Only in recent years has much acadenic attention been given to the
sigrnificance of political corrnodities such as scientific and tedrnical
information in tJle distribution of political power, ttte poliry making
processes of central gorrernnent or in national planning e:<perirents.3
fn various universities, the study of pubtic administration and public
policy making, usually in association wittr an established school of
political science, has begr:n to inprove this researctr situation.n ,h.
introduction of computer-based managenlent information systems in bottr tlte
public and private sectors has also stimulated scholastic interest in
systemic, rather t}an constitutional and structural, models of governrent.5
ltre influence of theorists like Karl Deutsch has encouraged the application
of rybernetic ttreoq/ to fields outside, or only indirectly associated witlt,
informatior, 
=.ien"" . 
6
By ttle late 1970s, it seened timely to begin an inquiry t'rhictt focused
on the potitical usage of significant planning information, vievring the
New Zealand governnrent as a qlbernetic system, rather than a constitutional
or administrative structure. During tlle 1950s and 1960s, governr€nt-
led initiatives in indicative planning had culminated in tJ:e establishnent
of the 1968 National Ebvelopnent Cogncil (NDC) . Within ,six years, the
NDC had been disbanded, although many of its satellite bodies, particularly
its sector cor,ncils , were retained, and sore remain in existence at
6.
present. During the Labour administration (L972-L975') a small inner
Cabinet body - the Cabinet Committee on Policy and Priorities (CCPP)
took formal public responsibility for national planning developments, in
place of the NDC. When Labour lost office in the General election of
L975, the incoming National party goverrunent chose not to follow its
predecessorrs exampie, but instead established the New Zealand Planning
Council (NZPC, Lg77) with specific, statutory responsibility for certain
planning functions.
There have been very few academic studies of these three developments,
and little analysis either of the reasons for their establishment, their
impact on political behaviour and economic activity, or, in the case of
the NDC and the CCPP, their apparent failure in terms of the objectives
those agencies espoused at the time of their creation. Where they do
exist, most analyses concentrate on the econornic environment in which the
NDC and its successors operated, and the effects on them of New Zealandrs
characteristic balance-of-payments vulnerability and trading depend.rr.".7
Since, by 1978, the need for effective development planning appeared
even more acute than in the relatively halcyon days of 1968' it seemed
appropriate to regard central government as a cybernetic system,
asking whether problems in information processing inside that systern
r^rere not at least as significant as environmental influences in explaining
planning failures and successes, past and present.
The purpose of this study of public expenditure planning, therefore,
is to describe aspects of the learning capacity of New Zealandrs central
government as a system, on the grounds that learning is a critical factor
in recent and current attempts at national development planning.
Problems associated with planning in New Zealand
For contemporary New ZeaLanders, planning is a word which strikes
few of the ideological chords it set quivering when Hayek, Popper
7.
and Jewkes \.trote their forceful critiques in the lg4Os.8 Recent editions
of the New Zealand official Yearbook, for instance, include brief and
somewhat stolid. historical accounts of national planning developrr=rrts.9
Possibly pragrmatic New Zealanders accept the idea of, and the rechanisms
for, national planning because they recogniser as Karl Mannheim argrued,
that people do not have a ctroice between planning and non-planning, but
onry betveen good and bad plar,rring.l0 certainly a lively pr:bric debate .
conducted,for exampre, late in tJle 1979 parlianentary session, on regal
instrurcnts for governrent-led planning denpnstrated ttrat it was not
pranning as such, but t}te steady accretion of regulatory porer to the
centralised state that bothered rpst articulat" citi"errs.II rn any calre,
the fact remains tJ:at nowhere has planning on its o\dn pro\Ed to be the
principal instrument of political or econornlc oppression - any rnore than
it has provided a unigue rr€ans to enduring prosperity or social hanrony.
Nonetheless, horrever favourable their attitudes towards planning in
general, it is not yet apparent hovr far tlre New Zealanders and their
governnents are prepared to go toqrards either a rpre considered or a npre
imaginative entry to tlre future. Aaron Wildavsky's sardonic observation
that "the present may be reructant to give birth to the future"l2 uppri""
particularly well to the New Zealanders, who view tlle 1950s and 6Os with
sentirental nostalgia, the 1970s wittr dismay, and the I98Os with apprehension.
rt remains to be seen - and this study aims to provide sore insi$ts 
-
whether New Zealand governrents possess the learning capacity to guide
and control inevitable historical ctranges so as to ninimize the darnage
of both predicted and as yet unforeseen events.
It may well be the case that without effective governrent planning,
the New Zealand electorate, and the individuals who comprise it, will lacJ<
the po*er necessary to nake socially responsible and econonrically advan-
tageous choices in the fac.e of uncertainty and change for sone,
the fact that "successful husbandry for the
8,
future requires the slaughtering of the sacred cow in nearly every back
't?
yird"-- may be an unacceptable price to pay for a moral obligation
to the future. Their capacity for innovation and informed risk-taking
rnay have been so far prejudiced by the past that they remain alienated
from any positive or experimental national planning endeavour. People
formally entrusted with ihe task of government face inevitable problems
in any "Ieap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice"r14 and
some may strenuously avoid any situation in which the outcomes of
experimentation cannot be defined in advance in terms favourable to them
or their preferred interests. Knowledqe about the uneven value placed
upon planning, as an appropriate political activity, is part of the
coLlective political experience which constitutes any national- planning
endeavour. This study is interested in how far central government
agencies identify and give emphasis to political consent for particular
planning developments.
Effective planning depends upon the political use of certain
kinds of information. Yet planning failures may not be synonymous witlr
political failure, since each depends upon the application of power to
purposes which may be widely separated, both in intent and practice. The
central policy-rnaking sectors of democratic governments provide a unigue
working environment. Unlike the atmosphere in which private sector business
managers and other such decision-makers operate, the "constitutional fusion
of the politician and the state machine"Is is not primarily dedicated to
profit-making or to productive output of some other kind, but to the
achievement of a given distribution of political power. In its most
obvious form, this means the maintenance in office of a group of people
who depend on re-election through a democratic process of public support,
Political learning, therefore, is an experimental process of establishing
what the voters will and will not support with their votes.
9.
This is quite different from the sort of learning reguired of planners,
whether they work in a democratic setting or not. A broad planning goal,
suclr as "guided societal- development through the application of technical
intelligence to organised action"l6 does not necessarily give much
consideration to those who hold particular political offices at any one
time 
- although such a goal may very well reguire specification and eventual
democratic validation, such as electoral consent, if it is to be pursued.
Learning to keep control over political events, with a view to staying in
office (which is the motivation of elected politicians) involves a different
set of skills from learning to anticipate future events with a view to
moderating boLh the rate and the impact of dynamic social and technological
change (which is the theoretical objective of most planners).
Cybernative theory identifies feedback as the critical dynamic of any
information systetn; with limited or defective feedback, the }earning
capacity of any information system, such as a political party in office, is
severely reduced.lT But the kind of re-cycled inforuration which persuades
politicians to nodify, abandon or initiate certain policy positions -
information gained from wittrin the central government system, from the
extra-parliamentary party, from the newsmedia, from the extent and kind of
Pressure groups activity and so forth - is not, necessarily the sort of
infornation which is heJ-pful, or applicable, to the pursuit of certain
planning goals such as accelerated economic arowth or better coordinated
social and industrial systems.
These sorts of problems are now acute in New Zealand. Where planning
is regarded as meaning more than demand management or some other irregularly
applied fiscal or monetary teehnigue, and is extended to include comprehen-
sive intervention by central governrnent agencies in diverse social and
economic activities in the pursuit of national goals (or plans), the
reconcilia-tion of electoral politics and planning by politicians and
planners has become very difficult indeed.
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If the poli{y is regarded as a complex system, and if planning
depends on the effectiveness of feedback in that systen, the critical
question becomes: What counts as feedback? The planner may consider that
feedback foltowing the introduction and adoption of some plan, InBY
be reassuring when'it in<licates, for instance, that the economy is
working more smoothly, income is more equitably distributed, various
industrial sectors are functioning in a better coordinated manner,
and so forth. Politicians, on the other hand, while interested in such
information, may be more concerned with whether the approved plans, in
operati-on, are acceptable to certain significant publics. They need to
know whether certain critical voting lobbies are tolerant of the plans' or
whether their electoral support is being eroded significantly by the planned
coordination of industrial activities, planned income controls, and
rationally designed economic progranmes.
In this inquiry, therefore, we are particularly interested in how an
electi-ve government learns to plan. Where the implications of planning
information have apparent (or even suspected) short term political
costs (such as electoral defeat) whY, and how' should politicians be guided
by such information? Under what sorts of conditions are politicians likely
to abandon national development plans in favour of immediate electoral
advantage? Are there any aspects of the democratic welfare state (such as
the publj-c education system) which could, or alreadY do, promote the sort I
of feedback upon which effective planning depends, particularly when there
is a marked divergence between what is good for political parties now, and
what may be good for the national community in the medium or long-term
future?
Attention has been paid to governmental attempts to
,'formalise, structure and control the informal and external in-
formation frows"rS which provide much of the essential feedback to the
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control networks of conmunication in government. The effectiveness of any
governmental effort to influence, modify, restructure, block or redirect
information flows within the national planning environment will depend on
the quality of feedback, and governmental adaptiveness to what ilohn
Freidmann calls "hitherto'unthinkable' t.stron="s".19 what governments
learn when they adopt a formal planning mode of infornation managenent has
prcfound consequences for the degree of political will (that is, the amount
of power) they are prepared to exert in any subsequent planning effort.
Abrupt political shocks experiences through systematic sensitivity to new
information, or unforeseen traumas (such as the ubiquitous oil crisis of the
early 1970s) may not only explain significant planning difficulties (which
may result from failures of political nerve), but the spasmodic, apparently
incremental character of many planning experiments.
As with individual learning, however, learning to plan in order to I
i:nprove the guality of future experiences may proceed aL a tate and degree of
variability that ternpts the judgrnent that the individual - or the government -
is retarded, a slow learner, or an intractable idiot. In the case of central
governments, this view (i.e. thet little is being learned) is likely to be
accurate where there is no consistent or rigorous evaluation of past
mistakes and advances. If no comprehensible, politically relevant analysis
of past planning endeavours is available, further attempts by decision-
makers to foster developmental planning may remain arbitrary and ineff""to"fo
If, on the other hand, forrnal planning is attempted without sirnultaneoug
review. and, if necessary, reform of the established structures of political
power, and the traditional systems for information management, many
potentially useful opportunities for learning may be ignored. Some
criticalty important contributors may be left powerless to provide feedback
to planners and politicians in central government.
Planning is invariably "a hard test of causal knowledge".2I
In a democratic context, such as New Zealand, if government planning is not
based on a broadly participant political style, with societal knowledge
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filtered through a permeabte planning.system which itself demonstrates
the application of educated intelligence, the chances of predictive error
will be enormously nagnifi 
"d.22 A government which ignores all but the
habitual, entrenched forms and habitual mod,es of feedback denies essential
nourishment to the national planning endeavour.
rn this study, an attempt has been made to map the networks of
communication through which sigmificant planning information flows, to
identify the principal gatekeepers, and to assess the learning capacity
of that phase of formal expenditure planning when inputs (existing
prograrunes' new policies and developmental plans, financial forecasts and
so forth) are translated into outputs such as legislation, regulations,
money paYnents, incentive payments, subsidies, programme objectives and
other explicit declarations of future intent.23 The feedback (information
about actual fiscal out-turn, behavioural changes identified as occurring
in the relevant social or economic population, political responses, target
failures or achievernent and so forth) witl affect not only the precision,
but also the extent, to which the future decisions and actions of government
agencies (both elected politicians and technocratic ptanners in the central
government system) are modified. Effective planning is critically
dependent on the sensitivity of internal networks of comnunication within
government, and the capacity of this centralised system to learn from its
own experience.
Tt*o final points should be noted anong the various dimensions of this
study. while neither is pecutiar to New zealand, the first - the con-
fidential nature of infor:uration circulated in the central planning systen 
-
became a matter of growing public interest during the 1970s.24 the
inforrnation output from central government falls into seveqal more or
less distinct crasses of confidentiality, For exampre, although the
annual Estimates of government expenditure are published annually, detailed
justifications for these appropriations of public money are nowhere
comprehensively or publicly stated.
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Parliament annually approves in full executive proposals for the
funding of programnes which almost. invariably have cost implications
stretching far beyond the current year. However, there is no published
statenent of the Goverrunentrs future expenditure predictions. Further,
although annual budgetary decisions made by the executive are decided on
the basis of a three year forward projection of the costs of current
government policies, the justifications for these projections are accessible
only to a small grouP of ministers and senior pr:blic servants. Although
some legisLation reguires the Government to declare its future policy
intentions 
- for exanple, the Town and country pranning Act (r9z7l
other regisration, such as the National Development Act (19?91 permits
investment decisions by the executive to override most other statutes.
Although in the case of the National Development Act the Government is
required to declare that specific investments or developments have pre-
emptive significance in the national interest, there is no corresponding
necessity for wide public discussion, or consultation on such natters.
Apart from these considerations, the J.egal obligations of eaeh pubtic
servant, in the terms of the Official Secrets Act (1951) have traditionally
been so biniling that constitutional proprieties, such as ministerial
responsibility, were mechanisns for drastic limitation upon the flow of
information from the central government networks. At the time this research
was being carried out, a committee of inguiry into this restrictive aspeet
of executive power was examining the feasibility of its relaxation under
certain circumstan..t.25 New legislation aimed at institutionalising
greater public access to official infornation 
- the OfficiaL lnformation Act,
L982, becomes effective in l9g3 and will undoubtedly have far-reaching
consequences in central government. However, the kernel of planning de-
cisions 
- advice and exchanges between officials, and ministers 
- 
remains
heavily proscribed.
Critical ecomomic and other planning decisions are limited both in their
formulation, and, often, their subsequent release, to groups which have a
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partisan interest in developments, rather than the public at large.
Despite the massive consequences of capital investment by the state in
energy develcpment, for instance, only a partial release of the factors
considered, and the anticipated socio-economic impact of these decisions,
has been permitted by the executive.26
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Discussion docurents pr:lclished by quasi-government agencies such as
tlre New Zealand Plarrning Council are not supplenented by formal procedures
to ensure that pr-rblic discussion occurs. Nor, indeed, do topics raised
't1in such NPC docunents as Ttre Welfare State? Sociat Policy in the I980s-'
appear to invite pr:blic debate so much as ttrey seem merely to confirm
current executive policy decisions announced coincidentally in pr:blic
dosunents like ttre annual gudget.28
The context in which central government planning occurs in New Zealand
therefore, is one of confidentiality, if not extrene secrecry - an environ-
ment whidr invites information dispersal by ad hoc leak , news nedia
speculation, and pressure group disclosure.
The second point to be noted at tbis stage concerns the costs of tinn.
To the politician, tire carries witl. it a specific urgency dictated by the
electoral cycle. Ttre framework for decision-making is dominated by tJle
three-yearJ.y cycle of general elections, with consequences that har,re been
widely criticized but not, so far, the subject of reform. Ttre tine-scale
within whidr the public servant works is frequently frustrated or stimulated
by this political preoccupation. However, the permanent pulclic servant,
who is not liable for re-election (nor indeed any specific procedure of
public accountability) places a different value upon the question of tine.
Hisfrer horizons may be just as short-term as those of tJ:e politician, but
tttey are not dorninated by ttre necessity to fulfil manifesto and other
commitrents to the sane critical extent. The plarrner, either co-opted
within tlte central government system, or consulted by executive agents on
an ad hoc basis, is free of the administrative burdens of the public
servant, and the electoral worries of t}re politician, but is nonetheless
expected to have a similar regard for short-term crises (as well as redium
and long term perspectives), if only to ensure hisr/her continued access to
and participation in the governrrent system.
a.
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The multi-dirensional influence of these varied interpretations of
the significance of time has a marked effect on the behaviour of people
working inside the central nebuorks. Along with tJ:e guestion of confi-
dentiality, the uneven value placed on tire is probably one of the sost
criticaL aspects of any national plarrning developmerrt.29
Dimensions of planning: some thegretical questions explored in this stPdy
In a useful account of ttre state of planning in Europe in the 1970st
Jack Halmard suggested that
planning goes beyond a rational calculation of what is
collectively possible,/probable, as revealed by projections
or forecasts, to a govet:nntental endeavour to reconciLe such
forecasts with what is politically preferred. this is
attempted through tJre strategic use of instrulents of
econornic and social policy by tJ:e governllent, in concetrf
' with other econornic and social organisations, to attain
e>rplicit quantitive and/or qualitative objectives in t}te
short, nedium or long term.3O
Since the 1940s, in various democratic and social-ist states, there
have been a number of such governrEntal endeavours. What characterizes
tlre widespread introduction of rnErnagerent tedrniques suctr as Planningt
Programnuing and Budgeting Systerns (PPBS) ; the establishrmnt of new organisation:
such as tlle Department of Econornic Affairs (Britain, 1964\ or the Canadian
Econornic and Science Cor:ncils; the modification of high-level advisory units'
such as tl:e New Zealanil Prime lrtinister's Departnent, or the British Central
Policy Review Staff (CPR^S) ; tlee appointnent of various conunissions of
inquiry and task forces such as the Canadian Royal Conunission on Financial
Managernent and Accountability (kno'wn as t}re Lambert Report, 1979) or the
New Zealand Task Force on Economic and Social Pl-anning (1976); and the
publication of various fo:*rard-looking documents such as the British White
Paper on public er<penditure or t}re French plans (1946 on) is that ttrey alL 
,
represent govelnmental attempts to develop strategic objectives which will
"take prec"edence over annual tactics!'.
!*te motivation and procedures adopted during such innovative efforts
raise a number of theoretical questions of interest in ttris study. Three
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have particular relevance in the development of planning in New Zealand
in that planning nay be viewed from these differing perspectives:
(i) planning as a survival rrcchanism for elites in central government;
(ii) planning as a function of modern knowledger and
(iii) planning as a symbolic act of electoral reassurance in the face
of dynamic environnental uncertainty.
Since eadr of these has some explanatory por$rer in relation to ttre recent
political history of planning in New Zealand, ttrey are used in this inquiry.
(i) Planning as a surwival mechanism for elites in central governrent
What enli\rens governrnental attempts at national developnrent planning,
viewed in the light of Halruard's normative definition, is tJ:e question of
political preference. Electoral systems, for example, have proved a crude
if durable system for the rrNeasurerrent of pr:blic satisfaction and latent
need; much of the time decision-rnakers either fly by the seat of their
Pants, or conoentrate principally on satisfying t}re polilical strat,sr3l
and its established elites. Any innovative reform of established networks
of conununication, such as effective planning wourd necessitate, has
threatening implications for such elites.
Kjell Eide suggests that the relative inftuence of sourc€s of infor-
mation may be gauged by exarnining how far certain participants succeed in
inposing their way of stmcturing information and problems on others dealing
wittr tlte sane issu.".32 Powerful individuals and elites in the central
networks tend to present t}te data ttrey control so as to sustain a 'given
definition of [a] situation".33 Treasury officers, and senior officials
in, say, ttre (Nz) l4inistry of works and Developrent not onry structure
formal informational inputs in a certain way, but deploy "teams" with tJle
specific intention of maintaining ttre st-ability of sone definitions of
planning options, while playing down or concealing certain facts in order
to do ttis.34 rf survival depends upon how successful elites are in this
technique, ttren their conmitnent to pJ-anning will vary according to their
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interpretation of the degree of danger invol-ved in any attempt at guided
development.
ftrus, officials in the (Nz) Departnent of Education, for exalq>le,
maintain a higher collective profile of themselves as an integrated tean
of ex-teachers, than a hierarchy of pr:blic service adrdnistrators. lltris
behaviour has important implications. lltre advice they sr:brnit to rninisterg,
their receptivity to informational inputs from satelLite advisory and
consultative agencies, their techniques for processing data entering the
networks they control from the external environment, the inforrnational
outputs (ranging from in-house pr:blications of "Education News"r s€mi-
academic publications such as Education, regulations, Iegislative anend-
rents, circulars, public statements and speeches by departnental officials)
al-l these are predicated on tJ:e assumption that tfre "educational faniLy"
is led by a professionally-trained elite of ex-teachers, whose survival
is regarded as critical to the best interests of the public education system.
Officials in tJle Cabinet Office, on the other hand, process infor-
mational inputs to their netvorks according to their perception of thernselves
as vestal priests, keepers of ttre constitution against the forays of
secular bandits (who include ministers as well as pubJ-ic servants). this
self-regarding role takes precedence over the alternative image that they
are nerely secretarial functionaries whose responsibiLity it is to ensure
that a ministerial agenda includes all the relevant planning inforrnation.
Specific individuals, such as the secretary of Treasury, the Director
of t.tte Progranuning and Development division of tlre l4inistry of Works and
Development, econonrists in the Department of Trade and Industry, or senior
officials in the Audit Office ancl the Reserve Bank have the prerogatirn of
developing or authorising the developnent of fornal npdels relating to
decision-making, or prograrmning information systems as ttre basis for
strategic planning decisions. The way tJ:ey choose to use these policy
instrunents to ensure their own survival (and pre-erninence) has profound
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consequences for tJ:e rate, dnd the quality of planning infomation
flowing into and around the central networks. Shifts, over tinre, from
ttre predorninant use of policy outputs sucih as legislation to a variety
of executive instrutents including public discussion docunents (such as
the NZPCTs reports) or pr:blic conferenc€s (such as tlle Education Develop-
rnent Conference) 35 
"lrng"=t tJ:at elites ailapt their techniques for survival
to acconunodate waves of politicat interest in planning. !{hile governnent
in New Zealand remains closely tied to traditional structures suctr as
political parties (a source of elite recruitnent), and hierarctrical
institutions such as government departrents (sources of e:pert advice),
a commitrnent to planning nay not be scaled high arnong the sunrival needs
of elites who must constantly defend themselves and tbeir interests against
other contenders for political patronage.
(ii) Planning as a fi:nction of organised knowl_edge
The systematic possibllities of nrodern knowledge have offered gove:rn-
nents t}te hope ttrat explanations are discoverable, and tJ:at these will
offer solutions to political problems. Ttrus national planning endeavours
may be predicated on the scientific assurance that tlrere are tedrnical
explanations for econornic and social behaviour, anrd that governrents should
be in tie business of understanding the systerr-ic relationships betr.reen
events and behaviour in tJ:e political environment, with a view. to controlling
these, and guiding then towards ttre achieverrent of certain longer-tem
?A
objectives. --
Hoetever, for governrents which adopt a plaru:ing node in ttre light of
this arguu€nt, there are a number of difficulties which derive from the
general problems of knowledge. tike scientj-sts, goverrurEnts may be faced
with the paradox of conflicting explanations. On the one hand, for exarqrl-e,
are scientifically deduced laws which descri5e alJ. energy as essentially
entropic 
- that is, aI1 systems tend towards fragmentation, diffusion and
??disintegration."' On the other hand, there is evidence that 'certain
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processes associated witl- life appear to run cor:nter to tlris current [of
inevitable entropy], I{ithin living organisms proteins are synttresised,
as well as broken-down or denatured; specific structures are created,
behaviour tends to go from ranclom to specific in many Iearning proeesses,
and on the grarrd scale biological evolution seens to give rise to e.ver-
increasing ordered conplexity in the developnent of higtrer species".38
Thus, it must be seen, certain attributes of existence are negFentropic.39
Attempts to develop general systens theory in recent years constitute
a massive inteLlectual effort to reconcile such parado*.".40 lihile ttris
effort may obtain political endorserent (in that scientific research is
both fostered and funded by national governnrents), the lag in many fields
between theory and e>rplanation, conflict and isonorphy, is not helpful to
elected office-holders for whom tire has a particuLarly finite neaning.
Governments cannot, therefore, be confident that a major redirectional
entphasis in, for instance, investment (which they rnight hope to justify, in
planning terms, as intended to promote the attainrent of desired long tern
Plans) could be sustained over the necessary time period. If entropic
tendencies inevitably affect both tJ.e consistency and the integrity of
social and econornic structures, and neither they nor intellectual paradigrns
whictr erplain them are capable of cohesion or maintenance intact over titre,
t.he political costs of present sacrifice for future benefit will be ur-
acceptable 
- and, indeed, unnec€ssary. rf, on the other hand, the dynarnic
er<perience is not one of entropic disintegration, but of evolutionary
comp].exity and improvernent, then innovative and massive invesbnent, or
other irurediately dysfi:nctional executive acts may be presented as botlr
benignr and scientifically authoritatirrc.
Governments must also face the r:npalatable fact that present knorledlge
is unable to account for t}te intractable nature
"lilhen the protagonists of intellectual guidance
scientists, economists, denographers and others)
of critical variables.
(including physical
attempt, but fail to
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surpass an a pasteriori understanding of the turbulent environrnent"r4I
the probtems for ttreir political sponsors become acute. llhe possibilitlz
that "we are the sorc€rer's apprentice, but there is no sorcerer"n'rr 
"
not deter the scientist, but it is both frustrating and disconcerting for
executive decision-makers and plarurers inside central governrnents.
Scientific confirmation tllat the critical variables of social and
economic experiene are beyond the control of those who attelpt to manage
the processes of social and tectrnological drange may effective,ly paralyse
political decision-makers. Ttrey may react by entertaining the bleak hope
of "moving equilibriurn"43 - a possibility explicitly denied by the logic
of entropy. Deterrnined, e'ven desperate efforts to control and limit, for
instancre, public expenditure in tle interests of national plans, right t4r
to ttre point of ::eally testing electoral tolerancer miy appear to adrieve
tenporary inertia (if ttre electoral risk proved justified), but in fact
may nerely defer critical decisions r:ntil such time as different and even
more perilous action becomes imperative.
Again, planners, and their political sponsorsr mEty react to the
linitations of present knowledge by attempting to devise an "institutional
sr:bstitut""44 to overcorne inertia, to muscle through the r.:ncontrollabLe
and force a temporary shape upon reality ttrrough the assertive use ot
authoritarian pr:blic porer. In New Zealand, the passage of a National
Developnrent gill through the legislature late in 1979 illustrated this
kind of r.action.45
Again 
- and probably more tlpically - govefiunents may retreat, in
the face of scientific confirmation of the intractable nature of politically-
significant variables, to a posture of pragrmatic fataLism, or some other
dramaturgical role. Under the guise of planning, goverrunents may continue
to intervene in social and econonic Life onJ-y in response to ad hoc
situations; the urgent defeats the imporb"rrt,46 and timing is dictated
a'1by crisis. -' Much of ttre behaviour of the New Zealand CCPP' the NZPC and
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governrnent departnent officials at very senior levels, for exasq)Ie,
denrcnstrates ttris reaction. NZPC publications and public consultations,
for instance, are timed to c-oincide with conventional political and
adninistrative tinretables: the annual budgetary crycle, the triennial
parlianentary crycLei or specific symbolic events such as tJle visits to
New Zealand of prospective buyers of New Zealand e:cportsrnt ot inter-
national nanagers like tJ:e review staff of ttre InternationaL ltonetary
FJnd.
A further difficulty for those who adopt planning as a finction of
knowledge is tJ:e elaboration of theoretical models. KarL Deutsch described
this probLem as bottr philosophically urgent anC historical"ly critical:
"Accelerating processes of change, we feel, have been carrying us ever
closer to the edge of the arena in which our traditional intellectual
equipment has been adequate."4g In various fieLds attention has focused
on "tlte classic anal-ogiues or models of tedranism, organizm irnd process
which so long have dorninated so much of scientific ttrinkinn.'50 Ancng
the conceptual alternatives is t}re general cybernetic npdel, with
applications (it is argued) for all systens, including those within the
social sciences. Ttris rnodel has substantial attraction as the basis for
planning in a li-beral dernocratic state - there is tikely to be nnrctr
theoretical and academic approval (if not popular appeal) for a planning
system which emphasises the significance of feedback - ttre "notion tllat
ttre flow of inforrnation has reciprocating effects on behaviorrr."5l
There are, hoqreve!, nulleror:s difficulties in this rcdel. - discussion
of them is one of the c*rief t.l.enes of this study. Ttrey include what
Kenneth Boulding has called "the entropy trap", in which the difficulties
of cormunication and data retrieval rrcnopolise all avail-ab1e energy, It
is quite easy, Boulding suggests, "to visualise a situation, perhaps in a
100 years, in whictr tlre stock of knowledge wiIJ. be so large that the whole
effort of ttre knowledge industry will have to be devoted to transnitting
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it from one generation to anothet."52 It may not, indeed, be necessary
to endure the century to recogorise the truth in this prediction, rn New
Zealand, for instance, the relatively small population to be dealt with
administratively by the state has not conrpensated for the rapid post-
war growtl in the complexity and apparent randonmess of information
flowing through ttte central networks. The pool frorn whidr knowledge-
processors is drawn is necessarily small (if only as a function of population
size), and the possibilities for non-computerised institutional merpry-
banks (i.e. what is remembered in the heads of individuals and on manually
conpiled files in state organisations) are increasingly outrnoded. Conse-
quently, data classification, storage, and retrieval derpand the attention
of npre anrd more skilled knowledge-processors, while the number of exPert
persons available for political analysis of t}re data reduces, as does the
time allocated to analysis. One commentator has gone so far as to assert
tlrat "the. claim of systems analysis to operate as an heuristic device a't
the poliry-making level appears, in large nEasure, to have been bogu"."53
In addition, there are problems inherent in the sytematic adoption
of procedures for evoking feedback as a cybernetic planning technique.
"Entropy is measured in terms of ttre inforrnation required to eliminate
the uncertainty or randomess from a situation witltin a system or an
evolving systs6"54 
- an injunction whictr Norman Wiener stated as the
argument that information and negative entropy are synonyrrrorr".ss
Hohrever, a structured provision for feedback in itself reduces the random
pool of potential inforrnation. As l{ilbur Schrarsn noted over tvtenty years
ago, the danger of "working with stochastic processes in functional systems
(such as central governnrents) is ttrat tJle functional syst€m may learn, and
therefore change ttre possibilities. "55
Scientific inquiry suggests that although there is botlr an apparently
infinite multiplicity of systems, and enonnous conplexity in their inter-
relationships, none appears to be entirely random. On the other hand, the
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elponential growth of systers also appears to be essentially entropic -
that is, tending towards randonness and anarchy. In tbe face of this
dilenuna, one scientific response has been an attenpt to describe a
paradigm whictr will perforin an isonorphic fr.rrction. In the face of tJ:e
sane d':iLenma, governrnents may adopt a planning trcde because ttrey see it
as perfornring an integrative fr:nction. The rnanifest staterent of future
objectives, the systernatic concert or societal energy towards tlre
achievenent of these, is a neg-entropic response to uncertainty. At ttris
dinension, planning acquires normative force because of the optimism of
hunan thought - the belief that it is possible to survive, ttrrough the
exercise of reason. As Gunnar ltyrdal wrote, planning is "an exercise in
a non-deterministic conception of history, though it recognises tlre
Iimitations put up by existi-ng conditions and forces and their causal
inter-re lationship 
. " 
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(iii) Planning as a slrmboU.c act of reassurance in the face of r:ncertaintry
Anong ttre "existing forces and conditions'! which constrain government
planners is the need of a dernccratic conununity for forms of reassurance
which only a legitimate go\rernrrEnt can p"o*rid".58 Ttre electorate e)q)ects
that its elected rulers, and their adninistrative advisers, will adopt a
prudent attitude tcnrards the future, tiat they will recogni.se certain
cottuttunity needs as inperative, and will order social and economic relation-
ships so that these needs can be uet. Since it is not possible to act
rational-ly in tJ:e world if you have no idea how it will respond to your
59actions t d successful government is one which increases tlre predictive
capacity of ttre political. corununity.
Governments cannot guarantee desired social or econornic outcomes,
even where these are based on irproved predictive and other managenent
skills. Ttrey may, however, ttrrough skilful use of political ruyths and
symbols, persuade the corununity to believe that they have both present
knowledge and accurate foresight. As social and technol-ogical. changes
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disrupt established patterns of behaviour, governments find it increasingly
ilifficult to identify levels of political tolerance, and in this situation
may adopt a planning mode as a symbolic rneans of reassurarcer
Plarning in this sense is not an activity which provides the electorate
with "the raw material for decisions in terms of clearly formulatecl priority
choices and alternative lines of action, their inplications worked out and
e:<plicitly stated".60 rt is, rather, a syrnbolic act of reassurance for
populations facing futures in whiclr there are no clear priorities, and
all the inpl-ications are r:ncertain.
In a ritual act, governrrsnt nembers (such as ministers) may decide to
undertake the planning role tlremselves 
- as happened in New ZeaLand in
L972r. when the Cabinet Comrnittee on Policy and Priorities was set up by
the Labour governnent. Alternatively, the governrent may syrrbolically
invest otlter persons, outside ttre imnediate exesutive range (but well
within ttre acceptable elite-recruitment sources) as planners, as happened
in 1977 when the New ZeaLand Planning Council was set ug by a special Act
of Parlianent. The establishnent of special planning bodies, the pr:blication
of nationaL planning docunents, or the positioninq of select planning
e:<perts close to governrent are acts which represent, in ritualistic form,
a symboLic move by governments away from reaetive incrernent"lisrr.Sl
Governnents nurturing myths of reassurance may elq)ress a preference
for one nrethod of planning, rather than another. "Indicative plaruringn,
in which "eactl sector of industry is given a series of mutually consistent
demand projections and the appropriate facilitating actions are suggested"r62
sustains t.lle symbolic role of denocratic aovernments as supportive, rather
than coercive.
Alternatively, socialist governments, whi.ch depend on different
political nyths for their authorityr rrdy institutionalise planning in order
to symbolise their commanding po?rer over social and economic inequities.
Geoffrey Vickers has described such ptranning as "a revolutionary nethod
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whose puryose is to btrild up a netr schemata of fact and va.trre, insulated
by eveqg means from those they are desigrned to replace; to accentuate
their difference, and to reject every invitation to conpromise.,'63
Successfully realised, such planning would symbolise the poner of ideo-
Iogically- consis tent action over dynarnic r:nce rtainty.
Whether or not technoerats who undertake to plan on behalf of govern-
nrents, or from some location inside central governnent systens, are held
accountable for the consequences of policy changes, their co-option provides
a sigmificant ritual through which governments nay re-state their capacity
to contror the future. whether planning is carried out, for exarqlle, by
a body like the l.Iew Zealand Planning Cor:ncil which is later denigrated
as cosmetic, a nere public relations exercise which "Iends a spurious air
of rationality to a series of political e:<pedients,, ,64 ot applauded as
purposeful and educative, it may in any case have sone cohesive force.
1t may offer a symbol of reassurance to ttre electorate. Indeed, the very
existence of plans and planners may make the conunrrrrity more receptive to
other chanrges in polidlr direction!
Planning has a further symbolic value in thaL in sone institutionalised
fonrr it offers governments a new token of communication. ftre planning node
has entrepreneurial value, nuch like some localty-developed scientific
research 'break-tltrough', or cultural displays of ethnic diversity. Once
adopted, planning, as an official governrrentaL activity, becones a symbolic
comnodity whidr provides access to previously ctosed areas of action. fhis
is a critical consideration in tJ:e case of New ?ealand, where trade and
other barriers (not the least of which are an inevitable consequence of
global geography) cause continual potitical difficulties. As a soghisticated
status symbol, planning enables certain government agrents to partieipate
in international cliqr:es such as the Worl_d Bank, or to forge new links with
desirable economic partners, such as j-nternational investors. ttre price of
entry to such circles is tl:e public demonstration of a national cornniturent
27,
to future managenent, a synbolic denial of mere ad hoc reaction to suc.h
crises as the international shortage of energy fue1s. Further, the
adoption of a plaruring mode adds to a government's dramaturgical t*n .6t
As old mytlts lose their potenq/, ltovelnments seek ritual victinr.s to take
responsibility for poliql failure. Planning bodiesr set up to perforo
specific tasks of future guidancer rndy be bl-aned when programne objectives
are not realised, Itreir failures may be regarded by the electorate as
less reprehensible tJ:an those of their political sponsors. When governnents
face intractable problems, apparently incapable of remedy by incr6rental
(and politically convenient) neans, the sr.uunoning of planners nay acquire_
considerable significance as a form of electoral reassurance. When plans
and planners fail in their attempts to exorcise "wicked problems"166 tlr"y
may also serve as sacrificial victims to the st€ggg.
The rnettrodology for this study
To a considerable extent, how and for what we plan depends upon
what we know. I{hat we know depends in turn on what we can learn. Planning
is a consequence of learningrin that experience is translated into decisj-ons
to act (or not to do so) in certain vrays in the future. There can be little
question that central government is a learning system 
- what is at issue
is how good or bad, effective or limited, stimulating or sedative is that
experience for governnent agencies.
Tlrus, the rrethodology of this inquiry was largely detenrined by tJle
need to answer ttrese sorts of questions: How do the plarurers and the
politicians know what they know? What information enters the central
networks' and from what sources? What changes in the behaviour of planners,
politicians and public servanls can be detected as a consequence of
communication inputs relaying sigrnificant planning information? Clearly,
th-i.s inquiry could provide only a limited series of answers to these
quest'ions, and first, it was decided to concentrate principally on those
networks which handre information about pr:blic e:<penditure. Thus, for
28.
some sections of the inguiry, the generaL rule of thumtt was to I'follow
the money". This should not be interpreted as a particular interest in
the econonics of expenditure planning, but as a tracking deVice to locate
and identify the role of certain "information brokers", agents located at
specific nodal points in the central networks of information flow. lthe
device had the additional ad,vantage of telling us something about hort
political actors regard the costs of planning, as'well as the costs of
a particular plan, policy or prograrune.
Second1y, although the networks for processlng public expenditure-
related information coul-d serye as a proxy for the national planning
system, it was decided to refer also to education planning, not only
as a specific function of central government, but also as one potential
tool for public learning during any serious, long-term planning endeavour.
This study, therefore, maps the mainstreams of a complex couununication
network deal-ing with public expenditure in general. Among the possible
range of inputs (and subsequent sources of feedback) are complex elernents
such as the overt statements of political intention found in rnanifestos,
ministerial statements, published reports, personal declarations and
formal interviews. Added to these are a wide range of infotaal eleroents,
such as the behavioural norns, personal value systems, and organisational
mores of participants in central government planning. Further, there are
tangi-ble factors such as published laws and regulations, docluents,
reports, agendas, minutes, recorded statements, and other inputs more
difficult to track, such as telephone conversations, private chats, books'
read, public and private meetings, news media conunents and so forth. These
elements are part of the environmental "climate of opinion" wtrich not only
encompasses, but has varied influence on, the central networks of
comrnunication, Clearly this dissertation could hope to take account
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of only a part of this J.earning situation.
The methodological premise adopted, therefore was
that the best way to examine how people learn is to rilatch
them doing it, and to identify and evaLuate as much as
possible of the oral- and written information which reaches
them in their daily work. It rnay be too simplistic to
arguer €rs John Jewkes did, that "planning is what planners
think and do'r. Nonetheless, it was decided to lisrit
this study of the Iearning experiences of pJ.anners and
decision-makers to those persons (and data banks) located
within a few hundred yards of the New Zealand House of
Representatives and the executive wing, popuLarly known as
"the Beetrive": members of the central executive of the
67LiOVernment.
Much of the investigation for this study was conducted
in what is normally a closed area of government, where
there is direct interaction between the executive ministers,
elected members of ParLiament and the public service
bureaucracy. Students of government often find that their
choice of research methodology is c"onditioneil by the exclusive nature
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of most centralised systems. Access to ttre inner workings of the
Cabinet system, for exarple, is usually severely limited. fn countries
like New Zealand, modelled on the Westminster syst€nf the doctrine of
ministerial responsibility and bureaucratic anonymity are effective
barriers to much primary research. The choice between direct observation
and interviews, or close study of primary data such as Cabinet ninutes
and departnental files is usually less a matter of nethodological pre-
ference than a conseguence of flat refusals by ministers and others to
depart from their habitual secrery. Appendix I explains in detail how
access to raw data for this study was obtained. In part, that account,
which describes a relatively unusual degree of accessr ody suggest a
research path for others; in part it reflects the often quite intense
desire of tJle principal actors of ttre study to find a better way to cope
with hard decisions whicfi must be taken today, but which may feel
extreme ly uncomfortable tonprrolr .
Many of the theoretical, heuri-stic and operational problems whidr
occupy the attention of students of public policy also present themselves
to planning researchers, Ttrere is, for exangrle, Little theoretical agree-
trEnt on what constitutes national developrent planningr6S and many
researchers avoid any attenpt to formulate a general theory of planning,
concentrating instead on studies of specialised forrns of planning, such
as regional, urban or rede\relopnrent planning, or historical experirnents
in national planning in developing countri"".tn
Simllarly, there is llttle agreennnt over what constltutes the most
effective rrcthodology to adopt in studying planninq behaviour. Is survey
research, for instance, like1y to contribute more to our understanding of
planning ttran, say, interviewing, or aggre€late data analysis? How far
can case studies which examine "the evolution of policies (or plans) in
a particular field of goveinrent activity... or the struggle surrounding
the selection or non-selection of a specific policy (or p.lan) take us past
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the stage of data collection and into the field of analysis?"7o
This study combines several methods of investigation into the fotm
and style of planning information, and the networks through which it flows'
in order to examine the communication system on which government planning
depends. Of the array of factors which affect tJ'-e political- usage of
significant planning information - such as "internal administrative
efficienry (and) the strength and stability of representative
institutions such as ca.binets and parliament""r7l prevailing economic
conditions and electoral behaviour over time, one of the most salient
elements is info::uration itself: the form in which it presents itself, tlre
capacity of its receivers, the extent to which it is relevartt to perceived
problems and past experiences, and the pu4)oses for which it is subse-
quently transmitted. Thus, guestions of the style, relevance and purpose
of specific exanples of planning information r,rere of considerabfe interest.
Methodologically, this meant reading and cross-referencing official.
documents, and maintaining records of observed behaviour, for example,
during parliamentary select committee and other meetings.
Access to a range of prinary documents in Cabinet office and
Treasury archives supplemented public records of planning developments
since the early 1970s. Appendix 2 includes an index of docunentary
material read or copied frorn official sources, and an indication of where
this is located. Permission was obtained to read the unexpurgated records
of relevant Cabinet conunittee meetings from l-972-1979. Much of this
material is highly confidential, hcwever, and cannot be included in the
appendices bound to this thesis. Access to certain items is restricted.
Although docurnentation provided the historical frarnework for
inquiry, direct observation of the behaviour of currently-serving
ministers, parliamentarians and officials supplemented this information.
With few exceptions (noted in Appendix 1) reguests to observe selected
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meetings were officially approved. Permission was given to attend
meetings of the PubLic Expenditure Committee (a select conunittee of the
House) from mid-1978 to the end of the parliamentary session. This
opportunity was limited only by the research objectives of the inquiry'
and the generous interpretation of Standing orders of the House of
Representatives by parliamentarians and their administrative staff.
Early in 1979, permission was granted by ministers to observe relevant
meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure. Although under ttre
Standing Orders of the House of Representatives this applies only to that
part of meetings when oral submissions were being made by officials to
ministers, the chance occurred to observe the deljlcerative phase of a
planning discussion 
- a rare opportunity, if not in the event the
occasion of dazzling insights into the executive process.
Research based on classified documents, and personal observation
of political actors are intellectually riveting, but problenatic
for the student. Other scholars- may not be entitled to corroborate
the analysis by direct reference to the initial data. Thus, responsibility
rests with the primary researcher to provide alternative forms of
verification. To this end, the manuscript was submitted, where relevant,
to officials and other persons with diiect experience in central government,
for confirmation of matters of fact, and to ensure that both the
"mapping" of the networks of communication, as well as the technical
infonnation included in the planning record, were as accurate and reliable
as possible.
Since this study of the learning capacity of a systeu is
prinarily a study of political behaviour, quantitative variables
(such as the particular sums of money allocated to various purposes)
were regard.ed as having df less relevance than qualitative
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variables such as the positioning of certain el-ites, styles of
conurunication, the effect of organisational norms on both individual
behaviour and the structure of info:mation access and control, the use
of political synbols, the management of conflict and "the art of getting
things done".
A major premise of this inquiry, noted earlier' is that what
governments learn when they adopt a fonnal planning mode of information
management will influence the degree of potitical effort they are prepared
to apply to any sr:bsequent planning effort. Since, on oecasions, ttris
power takes the form of money and j-ts distribution, attention is given
to fiscal information. on other occasions, however, resources such
as time or political reputation will have a more compelling or detenrining
behaviouraL influence. Accordingly, attention has also. been given to
recording the informal processes by which expenditure choices are made
in central government during formal fiscal planning exercises.
1.
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CHAPTER TWO
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES IN SOCTAL AND ECONOMIC PI,ANNING
A summary of various types o-[ planning in New Zealand
The New Zealand government has had a fluctuating interest in planning
since the 1930's. The opportunities and necessity for policy co-
ordination and planned resource management during the second world war
remained obvious after 1945.
The post-war history of multi-functional government departments like
the Ministry of Works and Development, the l4inistry of Agriculture and
Fisheries, the DSIR and the Department of Trade and Tndustry indicate
that the Government recognised the importance of co-ordination in the
development of capital investment policies and other physical plans.
The continuous influence and varied roles of the control departments,
Treasury and the State Services Commission, demonstrate that successive
Governments accepted responsibility for forward planning and the co-
ordinated allocation of major resources such as money and skilled people.
The implementation of complex social policies in fields such as
health and public education, and the necessity to provide services such
as roads, electricity, and other physical facilities encouraged con-
tinuing interest in planned resource management by government agencies.
Recent attempts to combine executive responsibility for health and social
welfare, and electricity, mines and other energy-related activities, under
single ministerial portfolios suggest not only a desire for greater
administrative convenience, but improved cross-referencing in related
planning fields.
Various t\rDes of planning have been identifiecl in New Zealand and
other similar countries. They include administrative planning, financial
planning, indicative planning and national development planning, as
welL as planning conducted by individual guasi-governmental and govern-
mental agencies. A great deal of information appropriate to planning
is generated wherever these forms are institutionalised, and brief mention
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is made later in this chapter of economic forecasting and international
sources of data for New Zealand planners.
Adminis tra.tive pljLnning
one typical form of government planning occurs when the allocation
of resources and the co-ordination of sigrnificant economic and social
variables is determined by administrative action. Quantitative progranmes
are developed and various physical controls are applied as a result of
adrninistrative order, to achieve a desired future result- The inposition
of import controls, the control of industrial labour, the allocation of
specific resources to licensed users, the imposition of legal restrictions
on specified populations (eg children aged between 5 and 15 years) are
anong the administrative devices used.
The force of such planning derives from the legal authority of the
State itsel-f. Sanctions are apptied to those who operate outside areas
approved by licence or regulation. Administrative regulation of this
sort has been a marked feature of the New Zealand governmental process'
It is the subject of frequent political debate, and current controversy
arises from uncertainty as to whether extensive administrative intervention
is synonymous with effective social and economic planning.f
Ei'tenglel_4e""i"s_
Here the availability and demand for the main components of the
national product are estimated: private consumption, public expenditure,
exports and imports. Plans are developed in macro-terms, mainly in
the Treasury and Reserve Bank, and are inplemented primarily by fiscal
and monetary policies e.g. by variations in the rate and level of
government spending, the availability of money. the level and impact of
different types of tax, and so forth. Such plans are usually indicated
in the annual Financial Statement of the l"linister of Finance and partially
elaborated in the annual Estimates-"! q"ggl{tf:9.
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In general, the scope of such planning is short term and concerned with
the broad aggregates of the economy. the implementation of financial
planning depends not so much on lega1 compulsion as on incentive: for
example, the Government alters its own rate and levels of expenditure
in order to encourage consumers to buy more or fewer goods and serviceS;
the provision of subsidies, tax incentives and other inducements is
intended to encourage private action in certain <lirections; the manipulation
of interest rates is aimed at influencing the direction of credit and
funds that may be borrowed for certain economic activities.2 Over the
past 20 years, much official effort has been put into ninimizing fluc-
tuations in the New Zelanad economy through improved financial planning'
Considerable work has gone into devising methods for improved planning
and control sf public expenditure, as a major variable in fiscal policies'
During the 1960,s deficiencies in central Governmentrs financial
inforrnation systems and the limitations of procedures and technigues for
financial policy analysis and evaluation encouraged the Government to
adopt a planning technique developed in the United States: Planning-
prograruning-Budgeting Systern (PPBS). The introduction of this output-
oriented approach to the allocation and management of public resources
absorbed considerable energy in the central Government system, particularly
in the Tre.suty.3
Its adoption was accompanied by the introduction of a revised
accounting system (System of Integrated Government l'tanagemept Accounting'
SIGMA), intended to improve the quality of information required by
Parliannent (in its exannination of the annual Estrtates o.f ExPenditure)
and the Treasury (as the Goverrunent's main accounting agent).4
procedures for budget planning, particularty in capital works
progranrmes, were extended to include three-year fonrard forecasts of
the costs of existing Government policies and estimates of the cost of
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proposed new policies. fn L970, a new budgetary system, centred on the
Committee of Officials on Public Expenditure (COPE), was set up to advise
the Government on the costs of existing policies and progranmes projected
forward for three years. COPE's report provided the financial 'basel
which was then adjusted for existing grclicy changes and new policy
approvals. The first year of the COPE forecasts, amended by these
figures and expressed in cash terrns. became the annual Estinates of
Expenditure, presented in the form of departmental Votes of supply.5
During the 1970's the PPB approach to budgeting encouraged managers,
particularly departmental accountants and senior staff, to focus on the
intended outcomes of current and proposed policies and prograrures.
However, most departmental and ministerial attention remained concentrated
on what could be obtained, by way of Parliamentary appropriation, for the
immediate budget year (i.e. the first year of cOPErs forecast). Despite
attempts to rroll forward' the three-year COPE-based estimates and
consideration of the publication of forecasts as an aid to planning and
performance evaLuation, this remains an area of major planning difficulty.
Several significant deveJopments in the Cabinet system for control
over expenditure policies have occurred during the past 12 years. A brief
experiment with the Cabinet Committee on Government Expenditure (CCGX,
I97L-72) indicated what might be achieved with improved procedures for
policy exarnination and review. Between 1972-75, a new cabinet group,
the Cabinet Conmittee on Policy and Priorities (CCPP), attempted to
replicate some aspects of procedures and fiscal techniques already in
use, or the subject of experiement, in the CPRS in the UK, and in Canada
and Australia.6
Frorn early 1976 on, a new Cabinet committee, the Cabinet Comnittee
on Expenditure (CCEX), whose genesis lay in the earlier CCGX and CCPP,
became the main fil-ter for expenditure policy examinations. It complemented
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the policy considerations of the long-established Cabinet Economic
Comrnittee, and the two other maJor planning sub-systems of the Cabinet -
the Cabinet Conunittee on the State Services and the Cabinet Works Committee.
During the l97Ors the various phases of the budget cycle were tightened
up in a continuous effort to co-ordinate the financial implications of
policies and progru#"", and counter the inherent incrementalism of a
system where new policies were continuously added to a virtually unexanined
expenditure base.
Parliament's increasing concern over the efficiency of financial
control and management procedures was shared by the Controller and Auditor
General, and the Treasury itself. Public Expenditure Committee reports
also guestioned the effectiveness of spending policies, and they were
supported in 1978 by a far-reaching report by the Audit office on
deficiencies in the Government's financial management system.t ,hi=
led to several experirnents in financial planning and resource allocation,
such as'rbulk allocations", 'rrevolving fundst and a greater emphasis
on costing and charging for various government services, not only those
available to the pr:blic but between departmerrt" .8
During the rate l97o's, interest in planning and the development
of systems to sustain a relationship between national- development objectives
and current policies for resource management shifted significantly. In
colltrnon with most other similar economies, New Zealand vras experiencing
extreme difficulty in sustaining the welfare state in a prolonged period
of international and domestic recession. The Governmen!.had to address
itself not to the supervision and control of growth, but to the management
of zero-growth, if not, in some areas, actual decline.
The New Zealand Planning Council and other connentators argued that
structural changes were needed not only in the private sector, to take
account of shifts in the international market for New Zealand exports and
changes
sector,
in
to
the supply of imported cornmodities,
ensure that government intervention
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but also in the public
in the economy, and the
and services contributedprovision of publicly-funded and managed goods
to national social and economic objecti.r.".9
From 1979 on, the COPE-based financial system was reviewed by the
Treasury, in consuldation with other departrnents and sofe informal
assistance by the Planning Council. llost departmental estimates had
been computerised, as part of SIGMA, by L978/79. This had generated
more data than had been availabler sdy I0 years earlier. It also
suggested opportunities for improved co-ordination of expenditure policies
in the interests of planned resource management during a period of restraint.
Finance ministers and control departrnents adopted technigues already
used or under investigation overseas, such as imposed controls,on staff
numbers (the 'sinking lido); compensatory savings ("tit for tatr') .
reguirements to force departments to make explicit trade-offs between
existing and proposed new policies; "cash limits" and renvelopeh
budgeting systems were actively considered. In 1980, the Treasury
initiated an inter-departmentat study of the financial management information
'lr\
system.^" Although the initial report (1981) of the review team was
not accepted by the control departnents in full, discussions focused
attention on critical deficiencies in the Government planning, prograrrning
and budgeting systems, where these depended on managerial use of financial
information and analysis. Currently, it is agreed that apart from the
short-term necessity to obtain "value for money", the Government's general
ability to control public sector spending in the interests of longer term
social and econonic interests is inhibited by present management and
accounting systems.
Other specific techniques for financial planning, such as zero-based
budgeting, cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis, and corporate
management/planning, remain very much the subject of individual departmental
5I.
preference. There is no explicit requirement that policy plans and
resource management systems across all government agencies be evaluated
by the use of such techniques. Some functions, such as those performed
by the Ministry of Defence, appear to lend themselves to such technical
quantitative/evaluative techniques; others, such as those of Education
or Social Welfare, 
='rft.r the universal difficulties of applying quantitative
measures to policies and programmes where the outcomes cannot be predicted
with any degree of precision.
Indicative planning
Neither administrative nor macro financial planning has been used
exclusively in New Zealand; each overlaps, and both have apparent
deficiencies. Since the late 1960s, the Government has been interested
in other methods, such as the indicative planning mcldel developed in post-
hrar France, as a means to provide a strategic framework for both pttblic
and private sector activities, especially in the economic field. In
conmon with France and Britain, for example, the New Zealand government
considered that the utility of indicative planning Iay mainly in the
promotion of economic growth.
In contrast to the imperative or sommand planning practised
in some socialist econornies, where centrally-determined orders and
directives must be obeyed, indicative planning involves consultation
between various economic and other agents, including the Governiment itself'
and the identification of programmes for each industrial or. economic
sector, making these consistent with the main aggregates of outPutr con-
sumption, investment, 
"t".11 such programmes usually aim at increasing
economic Arowth rates and ensuring balanced social and economic development'
often with a special emphasis on regional development.
The scope of planning is usually the mediun to longer-term, and it
involves a relatively detailed analysis of the activities of various
economic sectors. However, unlike administrative planning, indicative
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planning lacks the physical controls and sanction of legal compulsion.
lts force derives from the extent to which agreement is reached between
different economic and social "actorsI about desirable future objectives,
and the way organisations and firms voluntarily nodify their own behaviour,
individually and in concert, because they accept that it is in their own
best interests to do 6o. This form of planning usually has considerable
symbolic importance in the dernocratic context: po1-itical rhetoric and
exhortation replace (or are used alongside) coercive directives such as
import licensing or centrally-determined changes in the availablity of
money.
Various institutional means have been used by the New Zealand Government
in its attempts at indicative planning. During the f950s-60s, a series
of key sector conferences was held; the National Housing Conference
(1953); the Industrial Development Conference (1960); the Export
Development Conference (1963), the Agricultural Development Conference
(1963-64), culminating in the 1958-69 National Development Conference.
Various sector councils were seL up (some of which are still extant, in
modified form), with a Targets Advisory Group and a permanent secretariat
(both, significantly, in the Treasury)
' In L974, the Labour administration established the Calrinet Committee
on Policy and Priorities (CCPP), which .rmong other things took over the
planning responsibilities of the National Development Council. Ministers
hrere made responsible for different sector councils, and reported
directly on their activities to the central Cabinet group. Conununity
conferences' were held, not unlike the British Governmentts attempts to
achieve a "social contract" with major economic interests. They were
geared towards the formulation and adoption of an overall economic growth
strategy. During the same period the Government sponsored a series of
national meetings on education - the Educational Development Confer.rr"".t2
The National Government assumed office at the end of L975 
' 
and
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discontinued the CCpp, shifting its responsibility for national development
planning outside the inmediate range of ministers' except for those
matters conventionatly controlled by the central Cabinet through its
committee system. After the report of a special Task Force on social
and economic planni.g,l3 the New Zealand Planning Council l^tas set up in
L971 Xo assist in the co-ordination of government and private sector
planning, and to act as a focal point for public consultation and debate
on planning issues. The scope of the Planning Council's attention was
the nedium term; at the same time the Government established a Corrrnission
for the Future to scan the more distant social and economic horizon,
and encourage public interest in the long-term implications of developing
current trends. This body was disbanded in 1982, apParently as an
economy measure.
N"tig""! 11e"" IoEUgnt_ pl ann i ng
Despite the existence of the Planning Council and several important
planning tools such as the (L977) Town and Country Planning Act and the
(f979) National Development Act (both administered by the Ministry of
Works and Developrnent), there is no effective machinery at the political
level for the development, adoption and continuing review of an overall
strategic planning framework which is legitimated by the explicit agreement
of both public and private sector interests.
The most obvious areas where relatively comprehensive developmental
planning occurs are still much as W B Sutch descrilced them in 1965: in
capital works and physical resource develop*"rrt.14 Where there is a
high level of investment in physical plant or indigenous resource
development (particularly in forestry, mineral exploitation and energy
fields), and where investment has several serious environmental implications,
formal planning machinery and procedures exist. Such government agencies
as the Environmental Council, the Land Use Advisory Council and the Town
and Country Planning division of the Ministry of Works include planning in
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their statutory responsibilities, The publication of such documents as
'lq
the l98O Energy Plan (Ministry of Energy) ^" suggest that in this complex
fie1d, where investment has profound future implications, the need forGlt
co-ordinated framework for public and private sector decisions is recognised.
By the 1980s regional planning authorities in Auckland, Levin,
Invercargill and Wellington, and I'united councilsh appointed elsewhere by
Iocal authorities, had acquired planning responsibilities under the Town
and Country Planning Act and other legislation. The 1981 Official Year
Book reported that "the regional planning process offers a means by which
local and central Government representing the regional conununities and
national interest respectively, can reach agreement on develoSrment and
welfare policies and priorities for the allocation of resources for each
region. Agreement can be expressed in the regional planning scheme, and
changes in policy can be worked out within the process of changing the
s-cheme. "]6
However, while national policies on such matters as energy development,
transportation, afforestation and housing, and the allocation and control
of public resources to these, are centrally-determined in aggregate terms
through the Treasury-based financial system; and regulated by the administ-
rative intervention of government departments, the effectiveness of this
decentralised planning process has yet to be demonstrated.
Oepg$lntal pla""i"g
Individual government departments such as the New Zealand Forest
Service, the Departrnents of Health and Labour, and the Ministry of
Transport now include units with specific planning functions. In large
government departments such as the t'linistry of Works and Develotrrment and
the New Zealand Post Office, attempts have been made recently to adopt
the corporate management ethos favoured by many large private firms.
In fields such as education, health, social services, police work
and penal provisions, inter-deparBnental consulation occurs intermittently
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in a number of overlapping policy areas. There is, however, no machinery
below that of Cabinet and the cabinet committee system for continuous
long-range inter-departmental planning. This is complicated further by
the historical role and management functions of education and hospital
boards. They have power to allocate resources to major $relfare services,
needing public and private investment and conpeting for resources ranging
from tertiary education services to construction materials. Despite
attempts to relate these functions through regional planning and administ-
rative systems, and at the national level through Lhe CCEX-Treasury,/SSC
financial control system, forward planning for the social services, the
distribution of energy, housing and other important fields is poorly
co-ordinated.
Predictably, there are varying strengths and planning styles in the
different government departments. The Departrnent of Scj-entific and Indust-
rial Research, for example, makes a significant contribution to the
knowledge base for national government planning through its management of
specif ic pranning projectsr €.9. the rgza rrs5pgtt Fuel-s sttdyfT. The
Computer Services Division of the SSC, which has responsibility for the
development and management of EDP systerns in the state sector, has a
valuable opportunity to influence the technical information systems on
which effective planning depends. The introduction of the SPECTRTM
lFlSystem,to with its emphasis on a logical methodology for planning, project
managernent and costing suggests how dissatisfied the control agents of
the Government have been lrith the formal procedures adopted by public
service managers in the past. The Education department, for example,
lays considerable emphasis on consultative planning , in which the public
education system is described as a wheel driven from the rim, with the
administrative department at the hub.19 Whether the departmentrs
demonstrable responsiveness to environmental pressure, expressed nainly
through teachers' unions and statutory education authorities, actually
constitutes planning, as contrasted with increnental policy-making, is
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questionable.
Planning activities at the margin of the Government
outside the immediate perimeter of central Government are a number
of organisations whose activities involve planning, and potentially at
Ieast, contribute to the Government's general planning capability The
Development Finance cOrporation, for example, is actively interested in
supporting developmental needs where the long-term benefits of industrial
or commercial activity are regarded as consistent with the Government's and
the country's general future objectives. The Petrocorp Group of companies,
with substantial interests in investment in various energy fields, takes
account of latour force and other future projections affecting its
investment and operational activities. The Industries Development
Commission (196I, administered by the Department of Trade and Industry)
has recently conducted far-reaching reviews of the structure of several
major New Zealand industries. In every case so far its rePorts suggest
major planning issues and the need for improved management systems, both
in the public and private sectors.
Innumerable quaSi-government and non-governmental agencies, such as
voluntary social service,/welfare groupsr are in receipt of various forms of
government assistance, including direct money grants. Ho$tever, there is
no machinery for the continuous oversight of the implications of spending
and resource deployment by such groups, despite the well-documented
evidence of the inter-sectoral impact of economic and social activities,
whether carried out by private or public aqencies'
Sources of planning data
Economic forecasting
Forecasting, which is a basic tool in any planning endeavour' i-s
carried out by a number of departrnental and government-supported agencies'
In 197I, for exampl-e, the Project on Economic Planning (PEP) was established
to carry out work on models for economic planning. The initial aim was
to provide the conceptual and computer framer,.rork for the work of the
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Targets Advisory Committee of the NDC - later the Planning Advisory
Committee. Research funds were provided by the Treasury, and Victoria
University of Wellington staff and facilities made available. Since
1978, funding of PEP has been through the New Zeafand Planning Council'
The results of th'e Projectrs research are published in various occasional
tf1
and discussion papers and special Internal Papers for government officials''"
Since 1978 the Economic Monitoring Group of the Planning Council
has carried out the work of the earlier ltonetary and Economic Council,
monitoring economic trends and policies. A series of public discussion
papers has been published since L978.2L Private groups such as the
New Zealand Institute for Economic Research and university researchers
contribute economic data and analysis for both public and private use
on planning and resource management.
InterttSt iolo q1 
_f .c tol s
Trading activities monitored, supported and performed by the Govern-
ment, and its involvement with international funding agencies such as
the World Bank and the Internatlonal Monetary Fund (IMF) have contributed
substantially to the pool of information available (and necessary)
for cornprehensive nationaL planning, as well as planning carried out by
departments such as the Treasury and Trade and Industry. Chanqes in
trading patterns resulting from international events such as Britainfs
entry to the EEC, or international defence and other aqreements have
reinforced the administrative planning role of the Government, and
continue to suggest that the type of indicative/consultative planning
embodied in the NDC (1968-?4) is potentialty beneficial'
Government particiPation in the United Nations and its subsidiaries'
and in the oECD also contribute to its planning capability. New zealand
has the benefit of regular reports and examinations of its social and
economic systems, as well as sharing in international discussions about
national development problems and public administrative reform'
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Continuing participation in the Comrnonwealth, where other member countries
operate similar constitutional and economic systems, as well as sharply
different political and management styles, provides comparative planning
data and a source of consultation and experience for any planning effort
by the Government.
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CHAPTER THREE
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PLANNING SINCE THE 1960'S
New Courses for Budgetary l,lanagement
Introduction
During ttre 1960s, in a nunilrer of Western democracies like New Zealand,
various attempts were made to redefine the role of central governments in
social and econonic life. French e:rperirnents in indicative planning had
been widely observed, and this influence could be seen, for example in
Britain and New Zealand, where central governments attelpted to identify
an appropriate contenporary role for themselves in relation to other major
social and econornic agents concerned about guided national developnent.
Widespread post-war experiences, including major demographic changes,
the growth of pluralist political forces, and the inpact of econornic
internationalism encouraged and obliged elective governments to intervene
more directly and npre comprehensively in commtrnity activities. Not only
did this generate large bureaucracies to adrninister the policies of central
governments which were acquiring welfare functions. It stimulated con-
siderable national and international debate over the kind of leadership
such governments could provide without endangering essential aspects of their
elective character, or the denocratic principles to which ttrey and their
constituencies had regard.
Ttris debate, which in New Zealand accelerated during the l96Os continued
through the 1970s in various forms. From the perspective of twenty years
of hindsight, it has constituted a relatively traumatic endeavour to resolve
the problems of nationhood. New Zealanders have been forced to review
their colonial status of dependent relationship with a predominantly
European comrnunity, and conre to terms with their ohtn geographical location,
their uneven capacity for productive econornic performance, and the costs
and consequences of realising their own social and economic expectations '
part of this debate has been about the kinds of central political and
administraLive systems that are appropriate to national developrent' In
the field with which vre are here concerned - ttre public e:<penditure systern -
there have been continuing efforts to change the 'conceptual framework' in
which government agents develop, cost and implement pr:blic policy' These
efforts, directed as they have been towards existing systems for the
alfocation of scarce resources by the State, are significant because they
have been carried out at the very heart of political life' Where individuals
and groups acquire po$ter to make deternining allocative decisions wittr
national implications, they are operating at the political centre of the
modern wel-fare community. Any verifiabLe indication that such groups are
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seeking to exercise that por.rer in an overtly rational nanner, voluntarily
subnitting to restraints upon purely sectoral self-irrterest, as has been
recorded in New Zealand, Britain, the USA, Canada and elsewhere, must
be regarded very seriously.
It may be contended that behind the numerous planning theories
and management information techniques which gained favour and were
experimented with dgring the 1960-80 period, there was a genuine govern-
mental intention to identify and serve public interests on a broadly
democratic basis. The history with which this study is concerned,
namely the process of central budgetary management, may thus be
seen as part of a wider attempt by New Zealanders in government to adopt
a more rational approach to their political and economio responsibilities.
Government agents have persistently tried to apply the findings of modern
scientific and technological knowledge to forecasting resource availab-
ility, and to the allocation of resources through public institutions..
Efforts have been rnade to systematize the growing mass of information
about the behaviour of the social and econornic community, and to order
such information more usefully through the application of techniques
such as PPB, or by weighing up costs against benefits after both
have been defined, as far as possible, in quantitative terms. There
have been repeated attempts to regrularise governmental processes for
public policy review, and neutralise the mere grossly inequitable aspects
of cost and benefit sharing between different publics whose diverse
needs and interests are not necessarily best expressed through the
electoral machinery.
Such endeavours cannot, however, be regarded as constituting
anything like a Kuhnsian revolution in political knowledge and action.l
The ernergence of a crisis - Kuhnrs first criterion for a radical advance
in knowledge 
- has been undeniable. After the mid 1950's, when the overall
rate of growth in the New Zealand post-war econony began to slacken,
it became apparent that if growth was to be assured, sigmificant changes
l-n the economic structure would be requlred. The reall-ty of a chron{c
"crisis" did not inpinge too forcefully upon the government until the
recession of 1967,2 and even then it l^ras not until the dramatic
international revelation of the povrer of the oil producing nations in
1973, that the profound implications of underlying economic instability
were more widely recognized. Hovrever, it hras, and remains, assurned that the
crisis riras essentially economic in character, susceptible to improved
political nanagement but not necessarily indicative of radical political
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change, either to existing political structures or to existing assumptions
about the roLe of central governments alongside other major interests in
the communitY, and outside-
The second Kuhnsian imperative is the availablity of an alternative
paradigrn, and here the incrementalist nature of the past twenty years is
most readily observed. It may be argued that, with' say the Industrial
Development conference of 1960, a serious search had begun for a nelr model
3of government. Hovrever, the westminster model is deeply embedded in the
consciousness of New Zealanders, reinforced by several generations of
electoral stability and relatively benign two-party government' The
constitutional iystem may have been modified, but has not been radically
re-shaped by changing knowledge and experignce in fields such as resource
aLlocation and expenditure planning. The objective in developing an
appreciative framework in which governmental policy and decisions become
more rational was, and rernains, narrowly interpreted, primarily in
electoral terms. The alternative paradigm of guided national development
based on collective sensitivity to identified and unforeseen social and
economic needs has not been able to compete successfutly for political
attention against other forces.
rn countries like New Zealand, Britainr and canada, which share similar
political and constitutional models of central government, the ruling
communities have been incapabre of either modifying the inherently centralist
features of their own character, upon which their survival as elites depends'
or reducing their own reliance upon historically embedded forms of symbolic
electoral reassurance. TO subsume narrow sectoral interests to a wider and
more democratic interpretation of the public interest would require the use'
for example, of allocative Power to effectively transfer the means of
independence to the powerless. This manifestly cannot be done only by
public rhetoric or the growth of technical intelligence, adninistrative
and political, inside central government'
The material included in the following chapters is intended to
demonstrate that major problems of expenditure pJ-anning result from inherent
deficiencies in the networks oF communication in central government' These
deficiencies include both the political style of central agents and elected
politicians and the processes of planning, which are at least as siqrnificant
in planning failure, as accuracy in predictive knowledge or unrealistic
goal setting. Further, both the style of aqents in the central
networks and the processes by which they plan are more signifi-
cant in planning failures than external, environmentally induced
economic or other crises, which exacerbate planning problems but
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may not be regarded as their primary cause. By the I980s, officials
were arguinq that a planned dismantling of the welfare state was An
essential feature of guided national developrnent" It may be, however,
that the pursuit of this intended objective may not only prove to be as
painful as the unwrapping of bound feet, but entirely fictitious in its
declared purpose of providing increased social and economic stability, or
an improved capacity for rational adaptation to changing situations, which
is the essence of effective planning.
Evolution of reform:
In 1953 and again fess comfortably in 1956, the National party was
elected as the government of New zealand.  The party had entered office
"in a phase of economic prosperity, and [had] presided over an econon]t
which prospered and expanded rapidly through 1964 and 1965." Gross national
product rose by 44 percent between 1952 and 1966 - "the largest single rate
of increase for over a decade."5
Hence, neither the C,overnnent nor the Opposition tras prepared tO
anticipate the severity of the recession e)q)erienced in 1967. In his
Economic Review that year, the }tinister of Finance, R.D. lluldoon, began on
a sombre note:
The New Zealand economy in the past year has been subject to
severe strain emanating from an excessive level of domgstic
expenditure in rel-ation to available resources and frorn
depressed prices for wool exports. The economy has again
shown its sensitivity to changes in world demand and now
appears to have entered the downward phase of one of those
periodic rycles of economic activity which bave characterised
our economic histott. 6
The l.linisterrs Budget speech in June that year had described the current
recession in the light of the British decision to apply for membership of
the European Econornic Community, an internal economic crisis, and the balance
of payments emergency which had resulted from a "sudden and unforeseen
deterioration" in New Zealandrs trading situation, caused by a "collapse in
the [external] demand for wool". The I'finister stated that "in uncertain
and changing circumstances, we cannot say what further action may be needed
in the months ahead. It is of the utmost importance that we should maintain
a flexible approach to developrnents as they occur". Among the actions which
had been taken in ttre past fiscal year, and were proposed in the Budget for
the coming fiscal period, was an attempt by the Governr€nt to "augment
public revenues and to linit the growth of Government expenditure..- Their
principal aim is, and must be, to induce a slower rate of increase in total
expenditure. While this necessarily inplies a sollE\Athat slower rate of
economic growth, there is no alternative if we are to stabilise the econolTty
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and maintain a firm basis for future expansion."T
It was against this backgror:nd that Treasury officials began to
accelerate their efforts to find new and more effective ways of "looking
atread." In general terms, questions of macro-economic and rnacro-
financial managenent by the government had conformed to patterns observed
elsewhere. G. Bruce Doern, for example, discussing ttre Canadian elperience'
observed three overlapping trends in post-war history:
(a) from the mid-1930s to the Late I950s, governments were prinarily
occupied with "frugality and regularity of spending and
financial management was predominant," ;
(b) early in tlle 195Os and throughout the 196Os, the influence
of Keynsian econorulcs vras marked. Government e>rpenditure
was viewed as t'an instrurnent of dernand management in fiscal
policy making..."1
(c) The Glassco Report (Canada) and the Plowden and Fulton reports
in Britain, presented in the early 1960s, demonstrated the
development of a third set of attitudes towards fiscal
managerrEnt. E
During ttre 1960s, government spending $ras escalating rapidly, and the
potentiality for grow*r in the economy to support the continued er<pansion
of the State appeared to require verification. An extension of the tirne-
franre of governrnentst er<penditure plans r^ras attempted. In New Zealand,
for example, not only was the economic horizon now to be scanned more
carefully, the component elenents of economic and fiscal policies Itere more
comprehensively reviewed, principally through activities associated wit-l.
the National Developnrent Conference, before and after 1958.9 The climate
of economic and fiscal opinion in central government circles in Wellington
in ttre late 1960s thus predisposed politicians and officials to iilentity
certain systemic disorders, and attenpt to learn from international
experiences how these might be dealt wittr. We begin to trace the evolution
of the COPE-based budgetary system from this tine.
A new way of looking atread: PPB and AII That
In 1966, New Zealand Treasury officers began work on a study of the
centraL budgetary system. Their final report, published in February 1968,
was entitlsfl Financial Planning and Control: the RePort of the StudY GrouP
on Treasury Procedures, December 1967. Among its various terms of reference,
the Study Group was direeted "to pay particular attention to the link whictt
will need to be established between planning and progranuning over a longer
period for both capital and current expenditure and the present proc-edures
for approvals, delegation of expenditure authorities and investigation of
financial approvals by Treasury."
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It was invited to "consider and reconunend
ne\^r or modified methods and procedures where these are needed to better
achieve objectives... (and) to ensure cooperation and understanding of
what is required, particularly in longer term planning by officers in
other departments (i.e. outside the Treasury itself) -"10
Sone of the overseas influences on the writers itere specified in tJlis
seminal docurnent. An appendix briefly sketched the history of budgetary
reforms in ttre United States, beginning with the Taft Commission on Econony
and Efficiency (lrgL2), the 1949 Hoover Conunission, and the eventual intro-
duction of the Planning Progranun:ing and Budgeting System (PPBS) in 1955-
The Canadian e>rperience was quoted, with a note that "the Canadians always
keep an eye open for what is going on over ttre border. In 1952 they felt
that sonething sirnilar (i.e. to PPB) was needed, and a well-krpwn Canadian
management consultant, J- Grant Glassco, was conunissioned to report on
governrrent organisation, including financial management." Various features
of the British Plowden Report (f96U were favourably described. It was
further reported that in a number of other countries - tlre Phillipines and
India, for exarnple - budgetary reforms had been introduced, while tbe
United Nations, particularly through ECAFE' was a useful repository of
learning e:rperiencesrwi-th a large body of literature availableto ttrose
interested in change and t"fot*.11
lltre establishtent of Ltre Study Group had been announced by way of an
internal Treasury rnemo dated 14 Norrember 1966. Although ttre S-man gtoopl2
was chaired by a senior Treasury official, A.C. Shailes (later to becore
Controller and Auditor General), most of the work in preparing and finally
producing the Report was done by R. Laking, a young and highly capable
official who enjoyed considerable trust and respect from his more senior
colleagues. Shailes and Laking, along wittr three or four others including
J.R. Battersby, R. de Jardine and H.G. Lang (Secretary to the Treasury from
Decernber 1968 to January Lg77') were the rnost influential nembers of the
small coterie of PPB advocates inside the New Zealand Treasury at the end
of the I950s. Their influence on the central budgetary system was profound,
and, as we shall see, cautiously enthusiastic, intimately consultative, and
based largely on their direct personal observations of what had worked
elsewhere, in sirnilar political systems.
Ttre Siudy Group did not give full-tine attention to the investigation'
which was carried out "in addition to their normal duties".l3 lltris appears
to be a sonewhat typical rnode <.rf political behaviour i n the New Zealand
bureaucracy. We may at this staqe only speculate on whether or not govern-
rental decisions would be different, and taken differently, if full-tirc
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professional attention were Eiven to such questions as budgetary system
planning and design. On the one hand it is possibLe that the quality of
analysis, and the evaluation of relevant data, may improve if planners
concentrate exclusively on their planning tasks. Ho\dever' it is also
possible that ttris tends to intensify ttreir propensity to construct
theoretical models that are sonrewhat unrelated to the daily realities of
administration. In any case, it is part of the New Zealand character for
a person to be a jack of several trades, a do-it-yourself enthusiast,
pragmatic in style, and both more socially and professionally acceptable
if able to avoid any charge of intellectual rarification or 'ivory-tor.rer'
spe ci alisation.
Ihe Report, in both its interirn and final forms, lras never intended
for general distribution and discussion throughout the central governnent
systern. As was pointed out in the Preface, the Report was "basically for
internal consumptior,".14 The terms of reference for the Study Group ltere
comprehensive in their scope, but gave little indication of how far the
Treasury officials involved in the exercise should extend their investi-
gations. It was cl-early a matter for the Group's own discretion and
judgement. One specific lirnitatiorl however, vras provided: "The Treasuryrs
role as economic adviser (and the servicing of the Cabinet Economic
Committee) is excluded for the purpose of this study except in so far as
it over-laps with fiscal poliry generally and investigation and control of
expenditure in particular. (The work of Superannuation, stores and t.tte
Actuarial Divisions is also to be excluded)."15
The exclusion of the economic advisory role of the Treasury demonstrates
something of the political character of this and subseguent revisionary
exercises- It is sornewhat ironic, given the Reportts eventual advocacy
of a PPB system, to docurnent the style favoured by powerful interests in
central government 
- a style which was politically logical in L965/67 (as
again i,n L979/80, when the COPE-based system was partially disnantLed), but
conceptually arnbivalent, if not inherently contradictory, in planning ter:ns'
In 1978, for instance, S. Harvey Franklin, commenting on the apparent
deficiencies of the New Zealand welfare state, observed that "The problem
with much of public expenditure is its inertia and inflexibility. No satis-
factory way has been discovered of relating it more directly to the creation
of exports, which if created ought to lessen the constraints imposed by
import bottleneck and rnight therefore reduce the swings in activity to wh.ich
the [uew Zealand] economy has been subject... [Indeed, welfare e:<penditure,
rising continuousty], may worsen overall economic circumstances by creating
16
new forms of social injustice associated with hyper-inflation-"'
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The inability to find a "satisfactory way" to deal with complex relationships
between economic and fiscal matters is clearly, in part at least, a
Micawberish question. If persons such as l{inisters who authorise the
expenditure of funds choose to formally dissociate ttris activity from
their simultaneous attempts to control their overall economic circurn-
stances, it can hardly be a matter of great surprise if this results in
systernic dissonance, of the sort Franklin referred to. As we shall later
argrue, the choice of means to ends is a matter of poJ-itical values and
political sty1e, and in L966/67, as in L979/80, the preferred style of
central governrnent was to attempt to insulate various significant netr^rorks
of communication from each other, for reasons which are political rather
than anything else.
The 132-page Report incl-uded a large number of reconunendations, some
of which had been adopted, in part at least, by the tine the Report $tas
printed. The exercise evidentty had not been without its frustrations.
There was, for example, a slight note of grievance in the Introduction.
The auttrors pointed out that atthouqh their first Sunnary had been discussed
wj.th Treasury Secretaries and Directors in May 1967, and written comnrents
invited from these colleagues, no such comnrents had been received nearly
a year Later. Hordever, although this aspect of the Group's inquiries, which
had discussed Treasury's general responsibilities and role in central
government and included reconmendations for reform of the overall financial
management system, had apparently not struck a rich vein of collegial
approval, the second Summary had proved more fruitful. A report on
functional re-organisation inside Treasury itseJ.f, presented initially to
the Treasury Secretaries and later "after modification by tlrem" to the
Senior Treasury Officers, on 24 August L967, gained almost imnrediate
approval. Conprehensive reorganisation of the Treasury, specifically
intended to improve the existing internal machinery for the production of
financial and other information, the investigation and evaluation of
departmental spending proposals and requests for financial approval, and
to clarify wittr greater precision the specific responsibilities of each
Treasury division, was announced by Lang , then Assistant-Secretary,
in Auqust 1967. As part of this change, a Budget Systems Section (BSS)
was established, with responsibility for "the planning of @vernrent sector
e4>enditure, budgetary systems, perforrnanc€ measure[€nt, and cost reporting."
Ttre Study Group, noting tlris innovation, comnented that their interest nour
(f968) lay in reporting as fully as possible on the background to the BSS'
and their own proposed reforrns, with the comnrent that these should be
introduced by a full-tinre "operating" section of the Tt"""ury.17
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In general, members of the Study Group had adopted a systems approach.
fhey argrued that the central machinery should be regarded as a system'
rather than a series of inter-related structures, and ttreir "general thenE"
was couched in rybernetic terms of better communication and improved control.
Ihe netvorks of information (of which the Treasury was to remain central
designer, predorninant source of energy, and principal data recipient) were'
they argued, to be seen as the nreans to facilitate and teach preferred
behaviour, rattrer thin channels for the flow of authority to enforce
rigiqly codified behaviour. Distinctions between functions inside the
Treasury (such as poLiry formulation and delegated controls) were to be
broken down as far as possibJ.e; officers vrere to be rrore "project oriented",
responsible for seeing an item of er<penditure as part of a planning proessl
rather ttran sirply providing a surveillance role, like component line
assemblers. Greater attention 
- 
and nucre official tine - was to be given to
"looking atread", and to ttre relationship between allocated funds (which_
must be investigated and approved annually) and fonrard estimates of future
costs, which were to be npre comprehensirrcly exarnined, and rtpre specifi-
cally evaluated, outside the annual budgetary cycle. Investigating officers
(TIOs) were to becore more familiar with their departrental charges , to
survey all available departrnental output, such as special reports, and in
general to approach deparfurents in a more critical and better-inforned
manner. Ttrey should be assisted in this by greater efforts at coordination
by Assistant Secretaries. AIl docurmntation, such as circulars and Cabinet
memos, relevant to the work of an active, inquiring and critical TIO or
any other Treasury officer should be circulated as widely as possible
inside the organisation, both to promote the general objectives of the re-
organised Treasury, and to increase its overall efficienry.
Most Group attention was given to introducing a PPB system. It htas
recomnrended that "attention be given to classifying public e:<penditures by
function with a view to developing functional progr€rmn€s of government
activity and systems for controlling costs and performance in those
programres." fltrere should be greater standardlsatlon in data collectLon,
to enable economic data to be reconcil"ed more readily with financial
information; goals and objectives for departrents were to be more explicitly
stated, not only to provide the focus for the developnrent of departrental
prograrrunes of activityr but to provide a frarework for the development of
m.rnagement information systems, both computerised and conventional. The
Government Accounting system should be standardised, and the format of the
Estimates modifiedi a glossary of terms should be prepared to clarify and
standardise the often-confLicting definitions applied in ttre past to words
such as "governflEnt expenditure" and "capital"i departrental officials,
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service-wide, should be educated to accept the necessity for financial
reform, to exanine their or^rn rnanagement and control practices, and to
share the benefits of a standardised manual- of financial managenent, which
vtas recomnended for preparation and distribution throughout Lhe public
sector.
Permanent heads were given special attention. Their statutory
obligations to ensure the "efficiency and econortqr" of their departrnents
were set alongside reform proposals for goal and output-oriented progrannes
as the basis for resource allocation and financial expenditure. It was
suggested that senior officiaLs who could successfully apply a longer-term
perspective to policies organised on a prograrurE basis while at the sare
tinre fulfilling their conrrentional responsibitities for annual budgetary
managenent could gain greater autonomy, in that ttrey could have greater
control over policy choices and the particular components of approved
pro€Jralrunes. Sanctions were suggested 
- 
departnental managers (i.e. permanent
heads) couLd be given npre, and possibly more public, responsibility for
what they and tlteir departurents wanted to promote, where this was approved
by the Government. With greater responsibility, and the hint of greater
public e:(posure, it was suggested, officials could becorne more "accountable
for their financial stewardship.'18
Although only minimal attention was given to ttre role of Cabinet and
its sub-comrnittee system, in relation to a PPB approach, the role of
Parliarnent was considered wittr some care. It tras reconrnended that the
Public Expenditure Committee, for exarple, should becorne much more closely
involved in the networks for exchange and evaluation of fiscal information.
The Committee should be provided not only with an extended research capacity
and more information, but that information should be presented in a more
digestible form, and be far more comprehensive in scope. Furtber, it was
suggested that the PEC, in conjunction with the Controller and Auditor
General, should be empowered to comtent more extensively in any area where
ehanges in budgetary procedures or aceountlng syetems could be thought to
have inplications for the parlianentary system of expenditure review and
financial appropriation. 19
On August 19, 1968 a letter was sent to alL Ministers from the Office
of the Prirne Minister (Rt. Hon. K.J. Holyoake, later Governor Ceneral of
New ZeaLand) informing them briefly of current proposals to introduce the)o
PPB system,-- A few days later a Treasury circular along simiJ.ar, but
slightly anplified lines was distributed to all permanent heads.2l Ttre
following ilune, in his 1969 annual Budget speech, the Minister of Finance
(MuIdoon, later Prime lr{inister) publicly announced the establish-
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rent of the new system of "Financial planning and Control,':
In the 1967 Economic Reviehr I noted that a review of Covernrnent
accountinq 
"@ontror systems had begnrn. As aresult of this review, the C,overnrnent has decided to introduce
a comprehensive system of planning, progranming and budgeting
ttrroughout all departrrants. The first step (caLled phase I
in Treasury) in the implementation of t.l:e new system has
been to develop a fulty-integrated managerrEnt accounting
system which will be in generaL use within the next 2 years.
More important and far-reaching changes (known as phase II)
will follow which will lead to better information for decision
making on the use of resources in the public sector. These
changes will reguire new attitudes to Ciovernment financial
managernent and new techniques of planning and control. To
these ends a comprehensive education and traininE programrre
is being d.eveloped. Initially it is proposed to introduce
the fu1l planning, programming and budgeting system in tJ.e
Ministry of Defence and a feasibility study has been started
in the Ministry. 22
A few nronths later, one of the Treasury advocates for PpB, Laking
published an article on tlre genesis of the new systern in the New Zealand
Journal of Public Adrninistration in 1969. His approach was low key; he
emphasised the essential "common sense" aspects of the system, and avoi.ded
making claims which could
he wrote "no radically new
later be difficult to substantiate. "Ttrere arer"
ideas in... LPPBSJ except the'jargon'...
The term as used in New Zealand really covers the wbole nranagenent process
through determination of objectives, definition of activities and their
costs' relation of expenditure to funds available and designation of
specific tasks to be perfornnd, control of inplenrentation, and review to
revise prograrrunes or objectives. "23 The adoption of the new system, which
involved considerations of the tirre span nnst appropriate to public sector
planning, the form in which financial inforrnation was available and
presented to decision makers, and costs of policies themselves were, Laking
suggested., less important tttan "a more basic issue: to what extent can the
whole process of decision-naking on resource use in the public sector be
made more e>rplicit and analytical?"24
Despite the relative modesty wittr which Laking fleshed out the
finance Ministerrs earlier announcement, and the careful restraint wittt
which he rehearsed the pros and cons of this 'fnew approach to management"r
records of Treasury activities during the L967-7O period, and for sore years
Iater, as a PPBS was developed, are alive wittr optirnism and enthusiasm.
Among the nore striking aspects of this period of Nerd Zealandrs administrative
history is the international camaraderie which extended from Wellington to
Washington, London, Quebec, Canberra and elsewhere. we digress very
briefly to sketctr in ttris elerent in expenditure planning history' so strongly
a
evocative of deja vu when viewed from a vantage point ten years later.
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The salad days of PPB;
As we have already seen, tJle Study Group on Financial Managenent
ciLed sone international sources for the reform proposals in their 1957-58
report. Ttre New Zealand Treasury had always maintained contacts with sinilar
organisations in other comonrealth countries and the United States. Indeed
the numbers of persons directly engaged in "controlling the public purset'
at any one tirne in ttrese mainly English speaking countries would have been
so small (and, in general, so anonyfirous) that opportunities for consultation
and the sharing of adrninistrative and other e:<periences were lirnited, in
New Zealand's case, rlore by geographic distance than any other barrier.
General papers on PPBS were prepared in the Treas.q/r25 and used
variously as the basis for training courses, pr:blic speeches, published
articles (like that written by Laking in September 1969) and international
exchanges among bureaucrats. In April 1969, for example, a Treasury officer
(D-A. Shand) visited the Malaysian Treasury, where he inquired about progress
on introducing PPB in that country. He found that ttre Malaysian budget
managers were being assisted by an Anrerican (M. Medley) who was "working
in the Treasury on a Ford Foundation grant". Problems noted there were
carefully recorded by Shand and fed back into the embryonic New Zealand
.26sysEem.
By September 1969 officials in ttre New Zealand Treasury, acting wittr
ttre approval of bottr political parties and authorised by the e:<plicit 1969
Budget announcement of the Minister of Finance, vrere abLe to write to the
Financial Secretary of the Cook Islands Treasury. They info:med him that
"the New Zealand government is norp committed to the introduction of programnE
budgeting for governnent departrents", and that "work in this field so far"
had concentrated on changing the forrer accounting system to SrGnaAiTstarting
in the Ministry of Transport with the intention to include aII departrnents
over the next. two years. They also reported that the recomrended Treasury
Manual on Financial Managenent vras now in draft form, and the first
circulars had been issed to departnents, with a letter from the Prire Minister
to ltinisters inforuuing thern about the new system. In addition, the Cook
Islanders were told, an extensive training programnn to prepare departnental
officials for adoption of new techniques for analysis and evaluation lilas
being devised. It should be noted, the Treasury letter added, that "it is
not planned to irnplernnt prograrnne budgeting in all departnents. For some
of the smaller departrents there is littLe to be gained fron a full- -.
system." The letter concluded with a bibliography of American, Canadian
and British pr$lications which officials in New Zealand had found r:seful
and informati.re. 28
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Nunerous discussions were held between New Zealand Treasury officials
and their Australian counterparts. Initially, correspondence between nen
like Battersby (New Zealand) andS.G. Herring (Australia) was formal
in style; wittrin a short tirne exchanges vrere on an open, casuaL basis, as
conmon problems were identified and solutions worked out. In March, L97O,
for example, Herring errote to Shailes (New Zealand, Assistant
Secretary, ttre Treasury) :
Dear Fred... One of our Defenc-e chaps asked me a few weeks
ago whether vre heard anything when we were in Ottawa [as Part
of an extensive UK-USA-Canada trip for information and advicel
about the EDP manaltenent information system supporting tbe
PPB application in ttre Canadian Departnent of Defence. We
didnrt visit Defence there, but I r,,ras wondering if Dick Battersby
had any details (I understand he was to cone honre via Canada
after he visited ttre UK last year). If he has, perhaps you
or Dick could let re lggovr and Phit Hudson (Defence) could drop
him a note direct..." zY
A nonth later, Battersby wrote to Herring that
Whilst writing ttris, the officer responsible for installing
our Defence PPB system (Lt. CoI. Jones) cane to see me
inquiring about inforrnation on measures of performance and
effectiveness. We have a good deal of e:q>erience in ttre work
nnasurement fietd but generally at the lower level. llhere is
no experience whatever in the nreasurefiEnt of programnre
effectiveness available to us in Government here and I was
wondering whether P.A. or the S.R.I. had any background in
this area. The problem can be illustrated by a sirnple
exanple 
- 
for an air transport squadron (or single aircraft)
we can take out physical measures of performance quite
easily - something on a tonlmile basis would probably do.
But rneasuring ttre effectiveness of that Squadron's contri-
bution to Defence objectives is a nore difficult matter and
a problem that we are now struggling with. Our Defence people
are wondering whether a consultant could he1p, hence my
inquiry re P.A. or S.R.I. Hav^e^ you any knowledge of their
e:rperience with this matter? 30 -
Ttre international circuit traciked by government officials interested in
developing some form of PPB in ttreir own countries becarne so well worn that
the correspondents even began to build up a smalL collection of private
jokes. one conunented, fot example, on getting "a bundLe [of papers on PPBSJ
from Novick's 5" shelf". Ttris rdas a reference to David Novick (USA), who
was invited by the New Zealand Treasury to conunent on Defence Departl€nt
experiments in PPB, and later returned the complirent by inviting
Battersby to contribute to an Anrerican publication, Current Practioe,
describing the New Zealand er<perience in ttte PPB field.3l
Other New Zealand Treasury officials, such as de Jardine, maintained
regular contact with rnenbers of the British Treasury wittr comparable
seniority such as the Third Secretary (D.D. Henley) and the Under-Secretary
?,)(p.n. Baldwin). " Lakinq contacted British managenent consultants, and,
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with his colleagues, studied such reports as Public Er<penditure: A New
Presentation (Apri1, 1969, Cmnd. 4OI7) which examined British problens
of pricing and nrethodologL to cater for price effects tnder programllE
budgeting systems^33 
"r,d the record of proceedings at a 1969 Conference of
Cornnpnwealth Auditors General , held in New Dethi.34 Members of ttre acadenulc
professions in New Zealand universities becarne increasingly interested in
the new developments, and from early 1969 on there ttas an enthusiastic
exchange of current literature and informatiorr.35
Early in 1970, Laking began an overseas journey of inquiry on
behalf of the New Zealand Treasury. His correspondence, where extant in
Treasury records, highlights the atrnosphere of intimacry and critical
enthusiasrn in which he and his colleagues were working:
(12 June, 1970, Ietter to Shailes, New Zealand Treasury) :
I arrived in ttre middle of the Bureaurs (US Bureau of ttre Budget,
Washington) change of status, with Mayo leaving and being
replaced by Schultz from Labour, and the Bureau being given a
'lower profile' within the Executive office of the President-
I have had conflicting assessllents of this. The progranune
evaluation people in the Bureau consider that their analytical
functions will remain unchanged, and that they will simply
inherit natural allies in the form of the staff of the new
Donestic Affairs Cor:ncil. Ttre budgret review people say that
budgeting goes on for ever, whatever nonsense Presidents get
up to, and that they donrt see their e:<pertise in ttrat field
being devalued.
On the other hand, A1len Schick of the Brookings fnstitute,
who is a most engaging character, but probably a little idio-
syncratic in his views, says tl1at the Bureau is becoming a tornb
and ttrat Mayo is being given a Christian burial. He says that
the signs were posted when half of the Bureau (including
programme evaluation, incidentally) was thrown out of the
Executive Office Building sorre time ago. He suspects, I tttink,
that Nixon wants tlte Bureau to revert to its caretaker role
in the Eisenhower days.
schick's views of PPB were also rebellious - and a little
self-contradictory. On the one hand, he says ttrat analysis
through tl1e programnre evaluation shop of the Bureau was never
really brought into the 'decisional structur€rp and on tlre other
that the budget process has tyrannised the development of analysis
by encouraging the development of 'systemsr - comprehensive
docunentation, ful] treatrrent of alternatives, etc. - which was
emphasised at the e{pense of letting the agencies follovr their
instincts on analysis. Partly because of the isolated position
of the progranme evaluation staff and partly because of the lack
of interchange between the office and t}1e budget analysis staffs,
many agencies have never felt that the Bureau IIEant what it said
about PPB. As a result they still attach prine inportance to Ure
A-1I circular (equivalent to our Estimates circular) rather than
to the PPB directives.
while I arn inclined to take what he says with a grain of salt,
he has highlighted sonre dangers, IIrcst of which I hope we can a\toid.
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The main thing is something I know you have recogrnised for a
long tirne, that the irq>ortant thing is getting sorre analysis
of new and existing progranures done, and getting it done at
a tine iIF it a place where rre can use it as a means of
influencing decisions on pr:blic er<trrenditure. Let us at all
costs avoid becorning hypnotised by docurnentation and tirnetables,
as the Bureau did. For example, ttrey used to send out about
300 of their rissue letters' each year, each of which was
supposed to produce a major piece of penetrating analysis on
a particular po1iry question 
- all- alternatirrcs displayed.
The result lvas a lemon: the job was more than the agencies
coul-d conceivably handle, good analysis does not subrrit to
absolute deadlines, and so on. So most of the analysis was
trivial. Now the Bureau is happy with three or four issues
per agency.
One thing $re can do is cleave firmly to the philosophy
of our Treasury reorganisation of encouraging the investigating
sections in Treasury to develop their own analytical capabilities,
which rleans keeping thern supplied wittr good people. llhus I regard
PEsCrs (uK) main instrunent as its ties with analytical work done
by Treasury and departnents. Here is where the issues alight to
be identified. And let's not be too anibitious about ttre arpunt of
useful work the departrnents can do for a while. If we can ginger
them up to start one or two major pieces of ajglysis each and to
cost them out, this wouLd be a good start. -.
In September 1959, acting on tJ.e recomrnendation of the 1966/67 Study Group
that Parliament be more directly involved in financial managernent, Treasury
had sent to the Pr:blic Expenditure Committee, at its reguest, a report on a
British green paper on pr:blic expenditure. In May J-97O, Battersby
r,trote to Laking, still o\rerseas in Canada, that "Our discussions witlt the
Public Expenditure Committee finished last week. AII nrembers are keenly
interested in financial management. Unfortunately, they tltink that we can
pubtish forecasts as the LJK do. It has taken a lot of our tinre in trying
that we have great difficulty in forecasting one year ahead
37 A few weeks earlier Battersby had written in
to get across
at present." a similar rrcin
at the morentto a Treasury colleag'ue then
the EsLimates exercise is in
stationed in Washington: "Just
full swing wittr everyone trying to get last
rninute proposals included. However, \^re qo to the printer in a few days, so
this should put paid to the argurents".38 Altowing that this inforrnal
comnent on the existing allocative system was never intended for publication,
and its writer inevitably suffering the annual jaundice of an unattractive
grab-bag process, it nonetheless appears that Laking and other messengers
wouldn't get hone with the fruits of their inquiries a monent too soonl
while some Treasury npn trere concentrating on overseas e:<periencest
and others on rninding the shop until the new system r'tas nore securely in
place, both ttrey and others were also taking stock of ihe training implications
of PPB in New Zealand. Files of the period indicate that there htas growing
interest among politicians and continuing debate and discussion between
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Treasury and educational centres such as Victoria University of Wellington,
and the Technical Correspondence fnstitute (Wellinqton), where many future
departnrental staff members could be trained in the new rpthods and
techniques associated with PPB.39 From at least May 1969 the Study Gror4l
training recomrnendations were being acted upon.
Those principally involved in promoting staff training and education
included N- Lough (later secretary to the Treasury) , shailes (later
controrrer and Auditor @nerar), L. Durbin, R. Laking, c.J. McKenzie
(appointed Assistant secretary to the Treasury in 19go), D.A. shand,
J-R. Battersby, R.J. Hogg, N.c. Anqus, and J. Robertson (later secretary
for Defence, then Justice). From 1968 to 1970, this coterie of ppB advocates
and their senior "patrons" such npn as H.G. Lang (most of whom remained
closely associated witlr the budgetary system over the next decade and, in
some cases, participated in reform developuents in r97g/go) held, or
sponsored, lectures, staff courses, and slide-tape presentations on ppB -
"The SrGMA show", for example, was a great success. lhey introduced other
departmental officials to carefully selected "bibLes" of the new inter-
national cult: Cbarles Schultz, and his Politics and Economics of public
sPending (1968) , for instance, was warmly recomrnended; Treasuryrs ohrn
Guide to Financial Managenrent in Governrrent Departrnents (1969) was
distributed, and a sequel, Planning and Control of Covernment Expenditure:
Planning Programming and Budgeting System was prepared for prilclication in
L973.
The experiences of professional colleagues and associates abroad was
frequently consulted. rn June 1969 shailes wrote to Herring
(Canberra, Australia) cormnenting on the first two-week course on ppB for
public servants:
we have just compreted our first two week course. r think it
went off pretty weIl. At least the ones who were converted before
the course stayed, and we found a few new disciples, one problem
was that the Railways and Post Office course members seerned tofeer that they were attending a course on cost accounting and
consequentry werenrt goi.ng to learn very much. However, nlost ofthe 'corer lectures were rated very high, and I think only one
course rnember went av/ay unconvinced.
Some more particular reflections which may be of interest
to you:
(I) Visual aids and slick presentation have an enormous irnpact -the slide presentation and the srGMA shor^, were both very success-ful and well received.(2) Particularly with reasonably senior staff, you must give
them plenty of opportunity to participate themsel"es: if we made
one big mistake it was to earbash these chaps too long, and not
given them adequate time for discussionsr cds€ studies etc.
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(3) We found generally that Government people perfonned
better than non-Government people as speakers and that Treasury
people were better than other e,overnment officers. I think ttris
is mainly a reflection on the specific nature of the course and
the need to place it firmly in the context of Governnrent financial
management practices. Ttre P.A. (Public Administration, acadernlc
staff from Victoria University of WelLington) people who
lectured were not as good as vre e:rpected because they insisted
on retailinq theory in a business context rather than concen-
trating on their actual experience in C,overnment departlents
such as Ministry of Works, Electricity etc.(4) The course nembers - a related point - demanded a high
degree of relevance in the material presented; standard SSC(State Services Commission) topics such as Politician and ttre
Public Servant, Organisation Theory and Communication wele all
graded guite low in the course evaluation questionnaire*0
Included in the notes to this chapter is another delightfully sardonic
41.letter (unsigmed), written one year after the introduction of PPB to
illustrate the complex problems. such as those facing trainers, which ttte
innovations were presentinE. As history has a habit of doing, many of these
problems recurred, indeed, many remained unattended to ten years latert
sorne were unconsciously built into what we will later discuss as "the
Quigley system" of 1980- For instance, as E- Winchester, an Arnerican
consultant employed in ttre New Zealand Treasury during the early I970s,
observed the question of "whether the PPBS philosophy would be extended by
the Treasury... for possible use by line managers" had not been tackled
several years after the system had been introduced. "In searching PPBS
literature", Winchester wrote in 1973, "one can hardly fail to notice the
references to PPBS as ra tool for top managen€ntr - This implies that either
PPBS was not designed to be a tool for rniddle and lower level managers, or
that the application of PPBS theory had not yet been extended beyond 'top
managementt ]evels..- Conceptually, there is no reason why the essential
elements of PPBS could not be applied at any organisational level. fn New
Zealand, PPBS designers have not yet seriously addressed this important
. ..42tssue 
- 
"
Further, Winchester notes, although PPBS had becorre an accepted frame-
work for expenditure planning and resource allocation, within five years of
its introduction ttre special group established inside the Treasury - the
Budget Systems Section - apparently no longer existed. By October I972r
Winchester reports "there was absolutely no organisational unit anywhere in
ttre entire Ner,{ Zealand governnEnt... actively working to develop government-
wide finanee and accounting systems, 1et alone a totally integrated resource
managernent philosophy like PPBS. A11 work ainred at achieving this goal was
at a complete standstiLl. There was no-one in the Treasury Departrnent
workinq to develop the PPBS and there were no official plans for further
developnrent of ttre syste.." 43
78.
One must regard this series of assertions with some caution, since
apart from anything else they are somewhat self-serving on Winchester's
part, as an expert in the (apparently neglected) field of PPB. However'
it does appear that in part at least the PPB honelrmoon had not begun
a fruitful relationship between those officials who had an annual set
of Estimates to prepare, and enthusiasts who, despite their best endeavours
to consult the entrails of overseas experiments, were inevitably caught
up in the continuing demands of their organisations their ovtn careers,
and the political pressures of life at the centre.
oevelpments in luagetary
The following chapters are largely an account of developments in
fiscal managernent and planning from the time when the PPBS was introduced
to the New Zealand budgetary system. fn Chapter Four we begin a
chronological three-stage account of innovations at the Cabinet Corunittee
Ievel frorn 1971 to 1978. First, the Cabinet Committee on Government
Expenditure (CCGX), convened by Muldoon, the then-Ivlinister of Finance.
When Labour was elected to office in 1972, the Government established the
Cabinet Committee on Policy and Priorities (CCPP, L972-75) This system
for budgetary control and expenditure policy management was later dis-
continued and replaced, under the inconing National Party Government, bY
the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure (CCEX), which remains an irnportant
element in the current expenditure planning system today,
Chapter Five, entitled The Life and Death of Cope retraces some of the
more detailed material included in Parts I-fIf of the preceding chapter,
and summarises the main aspects of the COPE system itself, taking the
account to a point where historical developments occuring at the end of
the 1970's are described.
2.
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New Zealand Society of Accountants, (Wellington, N-2., 15 Augustt
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In an interview h'lth the author (Treasury, f.2 June' l-980).
J.R. Battersby, then-Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, outlined
rhe history of coPE as he recalled it. He identified the 1967
Treasury Report of the Study Group on Treasury Proceduresi. Finan-
cial planning and Corrtrol as a critical point in COPE's history.
inted the PPB way" and was strongly
influenced by developments in this direction occurring elsewhere,
such as the USA and Britain. Battersby was at that time in the
Finance Division (Treasury), with A.C. Shailes (then responsible for
the writing of the 1967 Report, later Assistant Secretary to the
Treasury, Ig73-75. then appointed Controller and Auditor-General'
Audit office). Battersby's posltion in Finance r was occupied
during 1978-80 by Ron Hamilton (See ChaPter Six) - Battersby
and Shailes "decided that (they) musE do something to improve the
financial review and Estimates systems - there were really only two
reviews, the l"lain and Supplementary Estimates, Some action was
needed at Government level.t' T1^7o things were done: "First, we
re-designed, well, tidied up, the Estimates and initiated SIGI4A(government accounting system) ". The Cornmittee which did this was
then in the Finance Division {of the Treasury):
J. Lang (Assistant Secretary to the Treasury 1965-73),
J.R. Battersby,
L. Peko ("an EDP man, now working for the t'lellington City(Council"),
A. Wilson (now a Divisional Director in Treasury).
"By this time," Battersby recalled, "various people had had a look at
PESC and thought that something might be worth trying here. So secondly
we examined and began to reform the decision-making machinery". The
Comrnittee for this included Shailes and Battersby, and other Finance
Division officers. H.G. Lang (Secretary to the Treasury) was "sYmpathetic"
and added his inprimatur to the proposals they were making. Following
the PESC procedures, Battersby continued, "the Treasury group set up
an officials committee - they felt this could be the way to go - they
could thereby get the participation and, expertise of other public
servants". Battersby himself wrote the initial COPE terms of reference(srtbsequently expanded in a published discussion in the Accountants
Journal, I97L, p.27O) .
Battersby himself then moved, he recalled, to another Treasury
division and Max Bradford (in 1980 a senior adviser to the New Zealand
Employers Federation) influenced the early development of COPE. The
first COPE exercise was carried out and serviced by Laking (in 1980 a
Divisional Director in the Treasury - see notes on early development
of PPBS, Chapter Three, Pt. I) who was the first secretary to coPE.
It was atternpted to put all the information for the first coPE
on the computer, but this was, Battersby recalled, a slow and very
cumbersome system. Laking "husbanded the first COPE through".
Thus COPE began. The terms of reference written by Battersby
had had three din,ensions - "but in fact only the first, as (he) said
the Accountants Journal in 1979, \itas taken seriously, and acted upon
COPE and the-ffi-tments " .
ln
by
8r.
Further to this discussionr Battersby also recalled, re the
beginninq of New Policies reviews, that when J.R. Marshall was Prime
I'linister (197 2-L97 5) Battersby was "back on the (Finance)division in time to do the first new ;nlicy exercise. There was a need
to gather all new trrclicies together at the one time. The CCPP then
developed this sort of exercise through to 1975, when the CCEX was
set up. tt
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cHlFrER FOUR
DEVEIPPMEMTS DURING TT{E I97OIS
Part I: New llorses, Ne!l' Courses: The Ca-binet Cotttrnittee on Government
Expenditure L971l72
one expectation the Government had in adopting PPB was that
the new system would improve public sector resource management.
on its own PPB could generate or categorise information
needed for improved budget decision-making, but it was hoped
that in conjunction wittr COPE (19?O), the reformed accounting
systern (SIG!4A) and changes in the format of the annual published
Estimates of Expenditure a general improvement would come about.
In particular, ttre c;overnment was looking for clearer identification
of expenditure objectives and better recording of policy achievernents'
Ideally, the developing systems would provide a more effective
means of estimating the future costs of C'overnment policies as well
as a more precise account of the inputs and outputs of expenditure
plans. However it was soon obvious that even with PPB' neither
the annual COPE examination nor the annual Estimates and Supplementary
Estimates reviews could ensure the comprehensive, detailed investigation
of major existing policies and proposed ne\t policies needed for a
more satisfactory balance between revenue and spending'
During the 197Os a number of procedures were developed by the
Treasury in conjunction with members of the Cabinet and other departmental
officials to deal with this problem. By the end of the decadet reviehts
of existing policy and new policy Reviews had become fairly regular
features of the annual budgetary cycle. Both were closely associated
with the development of special cabinet-Ievel machinery for the
examination of new policy proposals and review of exlsting or continuing
government policies - initially the cabinet comnittee on Government
Expenditure iG}TL-7I, CCGX), then the Cabinet Conunittee on Policy and
Priorities, under the Labour administration (CCPP' L972-751 and in
1975 the (National) cabinet conunittee on Expenditure (ccEx).
The need for these developments in New Zealand was sinilar to
that descriula by an itrmerican officiar whose government had adopted
PPBS as a means to deal with allocative problems:
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Ttre Planning, Prograruning Budgeting System (PPBS) is an
approach to decision-making desigrned to help make as e:qrlicit
as possible tJ:e costs and consequences of major choices and
encourage the use of this information systernatically in the
making of public poliry. . .. ltre portion of t}e budget over
which ttre President, the Cabinet, or ttre Congress has effective
control in a ginen year is srnall because the legal and npral
cornmitrents made by past decisions are great. Effective
Governnent requires that sorne technigue exist to ensure that
the smalL portion of the budget sr.rbject to discretion is fore-
closed only ttrrougtr deliberate pollcy choic-e, not by inad-
vertence. This requires recogrnition of the extent to which
present decisions, possibly minor at first glance, conunit ttre
Governrnent to future e:<penditures. I
In order to obtain ttre rpst effective use of available resour@s, and
to increase the scope for deliberate poliry choice, special efforts were
nade in New Zealand during the | 70s to control spending on existing
policies. These efforts were inevitably fuelled by the fact ttrat ttre
overall rate of economic gro,rttr was sladcening markedly, wittr severe
inplications not only for ttre @vernnpntrs ability to continue to fund
existing policies, but also its ability to re,sist (or respond adequately
to) increasing pressure to provide resources for additional (or approved)
demand.s from ttre electorate. Gaining effective control- over current
spending, as well ixproved estimation of future spending reguirermnts,\
were matters of alnost obsessive interest to nany in central governuent
during the decade under review.
The section which foll-oqrs sets tJ:e scene for later e:<perirnents under
the Labour go\rernnent in reviewing existing and new e:<penditure policies.
We describe in sorre detail an attenpt by sorne ministers and officials to
corne to tenns with the difficulties of allocation and forecasting (or,
alternatirely, budgetary control and e:qlenditure planning) in a system
where ttre rnachinery did not yet exist to sr4rplenent COPE and tlre established
Estimates reviews. Ttre inqrlications of the PPB approach had not yet been
systenaticall.y neshed with formal procedures for conprehensive, regrular
and adequately inforrcd coumunication of data and priorities between
nuinisters and officials. Feedback to ifre'executive wls often ad hoc,
arbitrary and on ttre whole nerve-racking. ltre inpact on rninisters of
officials' advice (such as that fo:rrarded frorn the Treasury) on ttre
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conponents and causes of e:c5nnditure growth, and recomnended @vernlcnt
responses to these, was particularly severe where there was no established
"noise-filter" whereby ninisters and officials, in conjrnction with eactr
other, could work. Exlsting policies, from tine to tire, cLearly needed
re-exarnination, r4>dating, rpdification or termination. Yet any
laundering process rmrst ensure ttrat essentiaL information nas not over-
looked by officials, or denied to ministers interested in reviewing
existing policy in order to gain better fiscaL control. Sinilarly, any
vetting of proposed new policies shouLd take into account both specific
and often unanticipated pressures on the Governrnent to respond quickly to
particular circumstances, and at ttre sarm tirE to continue over ttre long
term to enrich existing programrrEs and activities fi.uded by ttre State with
new policies as ttrese hrere proposed by goverrunent departrents, or inctuded
in the electoral counriilrcnt of party manifestos or other political
statelEnts.
An important aspect of these allocative-forecasting tasks, and the
procedural and other problems ttrey generated, was the gradual evolution
of governrental r:nderstandings about what constituted an appropriate and
acceptable division of labour between ministers and offl-cials, particularly
tltose in tJle Treasury. Irlany of the e:q>erinents conducted, for exanpJ.e,
under ttre umbrella of the CCGgr ttre CCpp and the cCEx, may be viewed as
having symbolic signrificance in terms of this question. On ttre one hand,
there was the underlying debate about who ought to exercise effective
control otter continuuing spending: individual ministers, through their
particular portfolios, in sore on-going process of existing policy
evaluation and.new policy consideration; or t}re Cabinet collectively; or
I
officials, individually and as clustered in their depafUnents; or the
Treasury, 'with its particular constitutional, tegal and political respon-
sibilities rris f vis ttre ptrblig purse._ O.n the otherl*U, there was the
real difficulty of who could in fact exercise effective control.. Some
97.
aspects of expenditure po1icll were clearly the Jealously-g'uarded pre-
rogative of elected minieters: for exampLe, new poJ.icies which had been
part of their pre-election platform. On the other hand, since nrinisters
could not know, even in a quite general way, what impact e:<penditure on
their specific new policy preferences would have on levels of funding for
existing prograrnrNes and activities, and since they literally could not
undertake the detaiLed work of investigating how extensi've the "snall
portion of ttre budget subject to discretl-on" night be, what activities
could and should ttrey delegate to officials, and which set of officials -
tltose in spending departrmnts, or those in Treasury, or sore c.ouibination
of these two?
During ttre decade numerous schertes and systems were proposed and
experinents r:ndertaken to deal with ttris question of the appropriate, and
npst effectirrc, division of labour in central go\relnnent so far as its
allocati've and forecasting tasks erere concerned. It is of considerable
sylbolic, as weII as sore real significance tlrat ttre th4ee previousty-
nentioned Cabinet sub-systems developed, that the office of the Minister of
Finance was augrlEnted by the appointment of additional finance minLstersr
and that inside Treasury small units were developed with responsibilitlz for
budgetary rnanagement, and tlre impro\renent of existing systens for providing
managenent inforrnation. ft is an indication of the growth of enecutive
povter, and attelpts to insulate centraL Government from the corylex entropic
condition of the welfare state,t a],"a these developnents took place at the
very centre, wittt only erratic conplenentary strengthenlng of the adm{nl-
strative environnent.
Cabinet E:<trbrinpnts in Cost Control 1970-1972:
On 21 December 1970 Cabinet asked that "feasibility reportstr should be
presented to it by all departrnents, J-n conJunction with Treasury, on I'the
practicability of lirniting er<periditure in the l97L/72 financial year.'
lrtris reguest, circulated to departroents as a cabinet Minute,3 r"as made
after the t4inister of Finance and his Cabinet colleagrues had received the
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inaugural report of the Conmittee of Officials on Public Dcpenditure set
up earlier that year.
Prior indications of the cost of governnent activities had been for-
warded to the Minister of Finance .(uulaoon), h a "secret"Apaper
from Treasrrry dated l-6 october l9?0. Retrnrting on behalf of the Secreiary
of Treasury, Lang (Oeputy Secretary) wrote as follows :
1. Ciovernnent expenditure as shown in the SupPlenentary Estimates
adjusted for transfer to Loans Redemption Account is $11865.0
million fot L97O/7L. To this rmrst be adiled allowances for
increases in salaries, wages and other outstanding matters
that could come to change before 31 ltarch 1971.
The outturn for L97O/7L therefore at this stage of the year
is estirnated at S1,894.o million arrived at as follows :
($ million)
Expenditure as shown in the
Supplementary Estimates 1,915.0
Less transfer to Loans Redenption
Account 50.0
I,865.0
*Plus 
- 
October half yearLy review 15.0
October ruJ-ing rates survey 3.0
Increases in Social Security benefits 8.0
Aid to Private Schools 3.0
Expected outturn L97O/7L 11894.0 rrrl
*Asmentionedonp.2ofTreasurymemoraryilumofI3october
1970 on Supplementary Estimates L97O/7L.
2. Forescasts of expenditure for the three years ta L973/74 have
now been received from departrnents in connection with the survey
of forward expenditure being undertaken by COPE. These
forecasts have not yet been assessed for realisr by Treasury
as they have only just been received. An analysis for L97L/72 shows
that departments are forecasting expenditure requi:ements of
sr977.0 million for 1Lbe L97L/72 year. As these forecasts are
in terms of August 1970 prices they sust be adjusted to allow for
increases in wages and salaries since that time, and also for
the October surveys and other matters still oustanding for thisy.aij. fnclusive of these adjustments the e:<perxlJ-ture reguirements
of departments for L97I-72 are forecast as :
($ million)
D<penditure forecasts received
. from departments Ir977.O
Plus 
- affect for full year of salary
increase granted aftqr Augrust 1970
i.e. october half yearly review, an&
sunrey, and teachers and sPecial
clerical increases 51.0
gg.
Increase in social security
benefits for full year
Aid for private schools
Defenoe
Land Use
Fuel and Potver
Education
Science
Transport
7. 0
3. q_
3.
s2,048.0
Tlre table attached analyses the estimated outturn for L97O/7L
and tlre forecast e:penditure for L97I-72 into the major fi.urctionE
of Ciovernment. As indicated above, the departrnentaL returns
have not yet been assessed for realism but relevant npvements
to note at this stage include :
+12.0r
+11.9C
+17.0r
+ 7.7*
+I8.7t
+L2.74
4. Ttre overall rate of increase is forecast at 8t in real terrns(i.e. without adjustlent for possible prLce, wagte and salary
increases in 1971-72). Girrcn that GNP in 197I-72 will
increase at substantially loivrer rate, it wouLd appear that
the grovrth in Governnent e:<penditure in 1971-72 will need to be
kept to a much lovrer figure than 8*. As indicated earlier the
departnental returns have yet to be assessed for real-ism and
it is er<pected ttrat this assesstrEnt could reduce the forecast
requirenents e.g. Ln the FueI and Power category a detailed
serutiny wilL no dor:bt revd:al possible reductions in"Vote:
Electric Supply capital r:equirements. Hotrever, ttre
comnitments irqllicit in the departmental returns may not allow
for the full reduction required, and policry changes could
therefore be necessary if e:<penditure is to be constrained.
Treasury will be reporting to you separately on this aspect
of e:<penditure Linitation at the same tire that the COPE report
is placed before Cabinet (1.e. Decenber next).
Ttre appendices detailed this information, and the overall picture
must have been slightly unnerving. For exarq)le, erq>enditure trends under
the heading Education and Science srere as follows :
E:<pend- Budgret t Budget t Est. t Fore- t
iture L97O/7L In- Supps. rn- o/turn In- cast In-
L969/7O crease L97O/7L crease L970/7L creasel97L/72 crease
( $n) ( $m) ( $m) (9n) (9m)
Education
Science
(b)
226.3
25.1
(a)
208.5
23,9
(s)
(a) (c)
(g)
(a) (d) (e)
(g)
(d)
(d)
(a)
8.5 25A.7
5.9 26 .9
24.L 267.4
13.5 27.3
28.3 288.I 7.7
L5 .2 32.4 18.7
TotaL: 232.2 251.4 8.3 285.6 23.O 294.7 26.9 320.5 8.7
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At the same tirne (16 October 1970), another paper from Treasury by
L.G. Durbin, for the Secretary, to the Minister of Finance relnrted that
iJl terms of grovernment revenue and expenditure, and given certain assumptions
(e.g. taxation rates anrd receipts, allorrance of $29 nillion for various
contingencies including nrling wage rates adjustrnents and social security
benefit increased) tfre estimates of expenditure f,or L97Q/7I could "show
a likely srnall overall cash surplus at 31 March next (i.e. 197f) brrt this
could be affected by a number of factors already mentioned including policy
changes. Consequently the figrures should be regarded as indicative at thLs
A
stage." -
Two days later (L8 october) another confidential paper was forwarded,
on behalf of the Secretary to the Treasury by Lough to the l,linister of
Finance. It was entitled i
Crodh farqets for Gove , and read as followsc
Sunmary
I. The analysis below in economic terms of the forecast expenditure
outturn for L97O/71 indicates how much of an extra demand Government
expenditure has placed upon national resources this year cotpared
with previous years. The CoPE will be meeting soon to prePare
forecasts of Governnent expenditure to L973/74. Particularly
with reference to the upcoming estjmates year 1971/72, Lt would be
appropriate to give the Corunittee sone quidance from Cabinet
on acceptable rates of growth in Government experditure over the
forecast period
2. It is therefore suggested that you recomnend to Cabinet that COPE
be requested to consider the implications for expenditure forecasts
of an overall constraint of 4t average annual growth in real
Government expenditure. Some of the irnplications of thls
target vote are aLso discussed below.
Economic fmtrnct of Government ExPendLture I97O,/71
3. In national incone terms, total Government expenditure (constr.nptlon,
investment and transfers to other sectors) is forecast to rise
by 15.3 per cent in the year ended March 1971- This increase
includes the total Supplementary Estimates allocation recomtended
in Treasury report T 3/5/70 of 13 October 1970 plus the further
likely increases forecast in that paPer.
4.
gl.
The total increase (some components of enpen<liture or Estlmates
being excluded in economic accounting) is analysed as follows :
Amount
($n)
ActuaL expenditure L969/70 1.37L
Main Estimates 1970,/71 1.488
Main plus Supp. Estimates L97O/7L 1.568
Further increases added to above 1.592
Pr:r Cent Increase
over L969/7O
+ 8.5
+14.3
+16.1
5. In both real and money terms this increase represents a
substantiaL pressure of demand from Government activity on resourcea.
Government consumption plus investment e:<pen'liture will rise
as a proportion of total national expenditure on GNP from about
16 percent in 1969/70 to about 17 percenX Ln L97O/7L. (this is
on the basis of NZIER forecasts of GNP made in July I-97O).
This is a marked shift of resources into the public sector.
Government extrlerditure in real terms, assuming a rise in the
general price leve1 of about I per:cent this year' will increase
by about I per cent. This is by far the highest rate of real
increase for many yeErxs. The average annual rate of real increase
since 1955 has been about 3L per cent.
Both Government consumption and investment expenditure €rre rising
rapidly. Capital spending is forecast to rise by 18 per cent,
after remaining virtually static for the last few years. Since the
demand here hinges upon sectors such as hri.lding and constmction i
with traditional-ly rapid inflationary resPonses' the
expanionary effect in terms of total national spending has
probably been even greater than the percentetge increase would
suggest. Consumption expenditure will rise even faster, by 22
per cent. llere a good part of the movement is explained by Govern-
mentrs response to wage and salary movements in the private sector.
Increases in Government sector salaries and trages will amount to
about $IOOn. this year, About $16 million of this represents
palzments which are "non-recurring" in the sense that they arepart of backdated increases which relate to periods before I
April 1970. However, assuming that all increases antarded this
year \dere paid out starting I April L970, the increase in the
"full year" cost of C'overnment salarieS and vtages was alsO about
$100 rnillion. The actual first year cost rr:presents 40
per cent of the total forecast increase in Government expenditure
in Estimates terms.
Implications for Future Expenditure Growth
8. It is apparent that any plans the GovernmenE may make for future
activity must involve returning the annual rate of increase to
something closer to a reasonable demand on national resources.
In earlier subrnissions to you on this subject (e.9. in Budget
paper 1. this year) it tras been implicitly or explicitly assumed
that an appropriate long-run rate of increase in Government
expenditure is one approximating the increase in gross
national product. While the mix of this expenditure is
certainly important, an aggregate target like this is a usefuL
benchmark. It has been used in recent years in the U'K"
6.
7.
9.
92.
10.
The long-run objective in the forecasts of thr: National Development
Co.mcil is to increase GNP at an annual rate r>f 4L per cent per annum.
Therefore a Government expenditure target in |he 4-5 per cent range
would be appropriate. The lower figure is srrggested for its
Estimates year l97I/72 because of the excessi',re demands of the
Government sector in I97O/7I.
The actual cash expenditure on Estirnates in the L97L/72 will, of
course, also reflect price changes during the year, and the Percent-
age increase in expenditure in cash terms will therefore probably
be somewhat larger than the rate of increase in real terms.
Nevertheless, this 4 per cent increase must allow for policy changes
and. for extension of existing services not covered in present
forecasts, as well as for future increases in Government salaries
and wages above those necessary sinply to compensate for increases
in the price 1evel. Thus the increase which can be definitely
prograrnmed as this stage must be held to an cverall figure which
is a good deal less than 4 per cent.
Recommendation
11. As in paragraph 2, it is suggested that you recommend to Cabinet
that the Committee of officials on hrblic ExF'enditure be requested
to consider the implications for its expendit.ure forecasts of an
overall constraint of 4 per cent average annural growth in
real Government expenditure in L973/4. [appernded was table
showing government expenditure in national irrcome terns $ml.
lsignl N. Lough
for Secretary to the Treasurlr
informed the Minister that in terms of allThe appendix to this paper
the items shown, the cumulative percentage change $ras upward, and significantly
so, over the period under discussion i.e. L969/7O-L9'7O,/7L :
Cumulirtive ? change
Current expenditure on goods and
services
Transfer to local authorities
bH".-] transfers
Public debt interest paid in N.Z.
TOTAL TRANSFERS + 8.0
+22.1
+l-4.7
+ 6.0
+ 4-I
+50.2Subsidies
TCITAL CURRENT EXPEIIDITURE
Gross Capital formation
+15.6
+L8.2
TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE +16. I
The impact of this information was apparently severe. The government
(which had been returned to office with a reduced rnajc,rity in the general
election the year before) I could not help but be distu.rbed bry the advice
it was now receiving.
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The Minister of Finance, who had consistently demonstrated a
lively interest in the efficiency and economy with which public funds
were dispensed, ttas a receptive audience for his advisers' on December
3 1970, some two weeks before the first report of COI'E was received, he
authorised the distribution of a Treasury circular oll exPenditure
procedures to permanent heads.
The Minister of Finance has directed that expenrliture for the
current year, particularly normal adrninistratio:r and operating
expenditure, should be carefully scrutinised to ensure that
all-ocations for L97O/7I are not exceeded.
Departments were urged to pay careful attention to Treasury Instruc-
ions, particularly those referring to monthly departmental returns:
Although some departments (unnamed) are making fuIl returns,
the majority are only partially meeting the requirements.
Employing the guaintly formal langruage of the executive system, the
Minister (for Treasury) added that
For the returns of expenditure for the 8 monthsr to 30 November
1970 (and for subsequent monthly returns ... ) l' would be
gratified if departments r,rould provide full inJ:ormation q
including details of appropriated and actual expenditure.-
Other similarly phrased "requests" were made f()r detailed information
on price variations, and internal travel 
"o"t='Io
On 18 December .L;TOI Treasury fonr.rarded a "contidential'r report to
the Minister of Finance on the first COPE report, j:st subnitted to the
Cabinet. AdditionaL copies of the Treasury papeliuere attached "for
distribution to your Cabinet colleag"ues, if you .9t..".II The paper was
signed by Lough, deputy Secretary to Treasury. fts two main messages were
(a) although, "as could be expected in a conpletely new apProach to
expenditure planning (i.e. a review of the costs of existing policies
by COpE) we encountered some reluctance from t.he main spending depart-
ments to put forward realistic options for Go"u'ernment considerationr "
permanent heads now probabty had "a better aplrreciation of the problems
involved in dealing with expenditure planning not only in their own
departments but from an overall point of view, "
(b)
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while Ithe Treasury writer inferrea] tnis improved appreciative frame-
work was valuable, other firmer steps should be taken promptly by the
Government on the basis of specific information generated by the
COPE exercise.
It was recormnended for exarnple, that no new policies should be approved
for l97L/72 except under "very exceptional circumstances; that current staff
numbers be firmly held; that approved staff increases for the Police and
for Science should be deferred; that operating expendit.ure should be held
at the same 1evel as at the current year (i.e. I97O/7L Estimates); that all
overseas travel and staff training progratnmes be held :tt 75 per cent
ofi the L97O/7L appropriationlthat savings already identified (amounting to
about $40 million)b rapproved; and that departments, in conjunction
with Treasury, should prepare "feasibility studies" oo any proposals
considered by Cabinet to warrant further examination- "
To assist in the latter, Treasury subnitted a lisb of proposals
which, it believed, warranted treatment in this way. Ireasury suggested
to the l*tinister that these "feasibility studies" should be completed and
in the hands of Cabinet no later than January 31, 1971 - i.e. about 6 weeks
alvay, in a period which not only included the traditional Christmas-New Year
statutory holidays, but the egually traditional New Zealand sumner months, when
school children, their families and many adults took ern annual vacation.
No detailed atternpt has been made in this study to ascertain departmental
and ministerial reaction to this "feasibility studies" recommendation.
which Cabinet subsequently adopted on 2I December 197t1.12
However, an internal memo dated 14 January 1971 :trom Shailes
(director, Finance II division) to Lough (deputy Secretary) pointed out
that Lhe Cabinet t4,inute authorising the feasibility sEudies had not been receiv-
ed in Treasury till 5 January Lg|l-, "the day Government officers returned to
duty; however, in many cases key personnel did not ret*rn to duty until 11
January 1971. fn some cases [Ty] investigation'. officers have found that
off icers concerned have still not seen the appro$iate Cabinet l{inute.,,I3
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rt is of interest to note, however, that this development in what
was gradually firmly established as a post-COPE Review of Existing Policies,
also threw up an ernbryonic Cabinet conunittee for expenditure review. The
forerunner to the 1L972-51 Cabinet conunittee on Policy and Priorities and
the [1976 - present tfune] Cabinet Csnmittee on Expenditure was probably
a Cabinet Committee on Government Expenditure, appointed by the
Government in January 1971. After discussion with his principal advisor, aretu-
ments for the establishment of this additional supervisory structure ltere
put forward by the Minister of Finance in a memorandum to
Cabinet dated 28 January 1971. The draft for this memo was
written by Lang, Secretary to the Treasuryrdated 28 January 1971-
Goverrunent Expenditure
Attached to this report [Treasury to the Minister of Pinance]
as annexes are the feasibility reports requested by Cabinet
(eM 70/54/45 of 21 December 197o refers). All reports have now
been received except for the Ministry of Defence which will be
available later.
rt is obvious from the amount of material sumitted by the
Cornmittee of Officials on Public Expenditure (previously
circulated to Cabinet) and by departments that the reports
will need cLose study before Cabinet can take a decision on
the matters dealt with. A Cabinet corunittee should therefore
be appointed to consider the reports in detail, with officials
from Treasury present, and officials from other departments
available to answer questions. The conrnittee should preferably
comprise those rninisters whose departments are represented on
the Committee of Officials on Public Expenditure-
Reconunendation
I reconunend that a Cabinet Conmittee on Government expenditure
be appointed; the conunittee be invited to make recommendations
to Cabinet designed to achieve a reduction in projected
expenditure for lgTl/2 of $4O million- fn considering its
recomrnendations, the committee should have regard to
(a) the report of the Cormnittee of OfficiaLs on Public
Expenditure previously circulated to Cabinet (Cp (70)
1392 refers);
(b) the feasibility studies subnitted by departments in
response to cabinet instructions of 2L Decernber 1970.
The members of the Conrrnittee to comprise :
1.
2.
3.
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t'linister of Finance (Chairman)
Prime Minister
Minister of Industries & Commerce
Minister of Education
Minister of Health
Minister of works and DeveloPment
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Transport
Minister of Forests
Minister of Defence
Postmaster General
It is envisaged that when departmental expenditure proposals
are under consideration the committee will, unless the minister
concerned is a member of the committee, invite the rninister in
charge of the department to be present. 14
The Cabinet had not adopted in ful-l all Treasury's recorunendations of
18 December L9?0, a;rart from approving irunediate action on the feasiJrility
studies. Decisions on all the other recormnendations had been deferred by
Cabinet until it met, over a month later, on 26 January 1971. Then Cabinet
"aqreed" not to adopt new policies involving increased expenditure in
L7TL/12 unless there were "very exceptional circumstances" (as recommended
by Treasury); "agreed" that staff numbers should be held' as Treasury re-
commended, "at leve1s prevailing as at 31 January 1971 throughout the
L}TL/12 financial year"; but they "added" (what was not a Treasury recomnend-
ation) that there would be exceptions to this ruling :
(i) The State services commission be permitted to authorise
departments to increase staff numbers up to lt of the
level at 31 January 197I provided the total is within
the staff ceiling for the L97O/7L yeart
(ii) any further increase in staff levels to be approved by
the Cabinet Committee on State Services' t5
Clearly, the necessity to reduce expenditure had not yet been accepted by
ministers; and in any case, ministers with interests in control departments
and Cabinet conmittees other than those in Treasury-dominated fields were
not prepared to capitulate to Treasury and the Minister of Finance without
a struggle.
Cabinet agreed to defer staffi-ng additions to the Police and Science
areas; and that all votes fot I97L/72 overseas travel should be held at
75 per cent of the I97O/71 levels. However, one additional area of
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resistance by Cabinet to the potential leakage of power to those who con-
trolled the purse-strings (which included both the dynamic Minister of
Finance and his evangelistic, PPB 
- indoctrinated Treasury advisors)
is hinted at in one further change to the Treasury recommendations. In
its 18 December papet', Treasury had urged ministers to "direct" that
"without specific approval of the Minister of Finance" provision for
"normal administration and operating expenditure under all votes" should
be held to the previous year's level (i.e. L97O/711. That is, any detrnrtures
from an undefined "normal" base would require the explicit approval of
l"luldoon as finance minister and, by implication, Treasury, as his
principal advisers. In the event, what the Cabinet minutes actually stdted
was that "without specific approval [undefined], provision for normal
[undefined] administration and operating expenditure under all votes be
held in the L|TO/71 financial year to the l-evel appropriated in tSzO1t1."L6
We have no means of knowing whether the discrepancy between the Treasury
reconunendation and the Cabinet llinute on the question of departures from
administrative and operating expenditure levels was the result of (a)
deliberate Cabinet inten! (b) delilcerate, but subtle manipulation by the
secretary of Cabinet (p.,f . Brooks) , who wrote the minute, or (c) was an
unintentional secretarial slip (other contemporary Cabinet office staff
report that both (b) and (c) f.orm part of their discretion and practice).
But in view of what developed later in the 1970s - a deliberate procedural
nechanisn by which departments must front up explicitly to the Mlnister
of Finance (still Muldoon) for any departure from the rules - we
may guess that this idea was sinply one whose time had not come. In a
sense it lay dormant until activated by the pressure of economic events
after 1973174. Whether or not National party ministers, Iulled by long
years of office and relatively benign Prime Ministerial leadership, merely
sensed thatrin the 1-970s, po$rer would belong to those who
controlled the gates to'the shrinking public purse remains somewhat sPecu-
gg.
lative. In any case, the group they approved as the Cabinet Corunittee on
Government Expenditure was born too large and too leaky to suggest an
inner cabinet , al-though it did hint at such a possibility - one which
developed in differing ways Later under both Labour (L972-75,) and then
National from 1975/q on
The feasibiLity reports on government expenditure L}TL/72L7,
while interesting both in themselves and to the student of financial alloca-
tionrare not described here. It is worth noting, however, that departments
did not apPear to be fallingr over themselves to offer up hostages to fortune.
RePorts' for example, from Education and other big spenders , made it
perfectly clear to their contemporary readers that the exercise was n.ither
of their voruntary doing, nor had it been conducted in any overtly
generous manner.
Studies producing some minor cash rewards were stiffly descrilced as
having been undertaken t'at cabinetrs request" or "at rreasuryts requestt'.
There was no section entitled "off our own bat,/on our own initiative",
although the Education Department, for example, did take the oplrcrtunity
to offer up some items for which, it appeared, it had no great administrative
affectionr 
€.!f. "financial assistance for hobby classes" (which, it was
suggested, could be made self-funding), reduced expenditure on "teachersr
aides" (except for Maori schools and schools with "special needs"), the
temlnrary/selective suspension of grants towards the capital costs of
kindergartens; slowing down in reduction of teacher,/pupil ratio in primary
schools. SignificantLy (though nowhere identified as such in the
Departmentrs report)most of the recorrnended savings lrere in areas with
greatest adverse impact on women (e.9. as teachers, aides, relievers, consumers
of hobby classes) and young children (e.g. potential and actual kindergarten
enrolments). Established interests, such as those of the universities
were not suggested as suitable areas for downward adjustment, although a
recormnended increase in tuition fees did succeed in cabinet.IS
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The Cabinet Conmittee on Governrnent Expendityrre. 197]-]972
At a meeting on 1 February I97I, Cabinet adopted the Minister of
Finance's recommendation to set up a nevr Cabinet Committee to oversee and
analyse the voluminous information which had been generated in the first
COPE review, and the feasibility reports (a11 but Defence had been
received on 3l January 1971).
A Cabinet Minute was circutated to the Ministers concerned
informing them of the membership and functions of thb Cabinet Committee
on Government Expenditure:
Mr R.D. l{uldoon (Convenor) (sic)
Prime Minister
Hon. N.L. Shelton
Hon. B.E. Talboys
Hon. D.N. I"lcKay
Hon. P-B. AIIen
Hon. D.J. Carter
Hon. J.B. Gordon
Hon. D. Macfntyre
Hon. D.S. Thomson
Hon. A. McCready
This committee of 11 men was
to make recommendations to Cabinet designed to achieve a reduction
in projected Government expenditure for I97I/72 of $40 million
having regard to
(a) the report of the committee of officials on Public
Expenditure;
(b) the feasibility studies submitted by Departments in resPonse
to Cabinet instruction of 2l December 1971;
(c) the decisions taken by cabinet on Government expenditure
at its meeting on I FebruarY 1971'
CP(71) 58, cP (71) 19 and CP (70) 1392 refer'19
ThenewCommittee,headedbyMuldoon,wastotakesomeofthehard
decisions which the cabinet itself, or its conventional agent for Estimates
review and new policy recommendation - the Cabinet Economic Conmittee - was
unwilling or unable to take. rts cash-locating, cost-cutting task was guite
explicit, and regardless of its success it was a tool which was bound to
r00.
appeal to many, in the growing climate of approval for PPB and other
cost-ef f iciency systems.
The Cabinet Committee on Government Expenditure began work furunediately.
Muldoon convened its first meeting on 2 February, L97L. Only seven of
the appointed members attended; the Prime Minister, Ialboys, Carter ,
Gordon were all absent. Gair attended (for reasons not stated in
the minutes), and the Hon. D.C. Seath was invited to be present for specific
agenda items. Three Treasury men (J.D. Lang, R.J. Warwick and, Battersby)
attended, with R. D. M. Smith from the Cabinet office as Secret^tY-2o
The Conunittee dealt with nine agenda items including expenditure
proposals and recommended reductions for the Estinates of the
departments of Maori and Island Affairs, Works' Internal Affairs'
Education, Housing, Health, Railways, the Post Office, and government palments
to Local Authorities. Both 
""oitJ95hi otrr.r matters were included in a
rather arbitrary collection of assorted bits and pieces. A suggestion was
to be made to Cabinet that Education Boardsrexpenditure should be lfunited
to a maximum growth of 4* over I97Ol71 expenditure; but the minutes noted
that "it was the understanding of the Committee that any such letter [to Aoards]
would not be despatched before the return of the Minister of Education
from his visit to Australia." AlI the Committee's decisions htere to be
referred to Cabinet for consideration and confirmation-
One of the parameters for the new Committee's guidance had been
expenditure decisions made by Cabinet on I February 1971-. The scope of
those effectively removed some of the more interesting - looking proposals
for cost-cutting from the new Committee's jurisdiction. Some other rnatters
such as the abolition of the current egg subsidy had been referred to the
National party Caucus for consideration. Others, such as the removal of
a subsidy on milk, were to be referred to the Caucus wi':h a Cabinet re-
commentation in favour of removal. Various items had been deferred by
Cabinet pending departmental or prime ninisterial review (e.S. Overseas
Aid prograrune, the Brucellosis Eradication Scheme) 
-21
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On FebruarY 1, Lang (Secretary to the Treasury) had sent
the t'tinister of Finance a brief paper entitled : Government Expenditure
L97L/72. The Minister had asked for "details of savings from the
apptication of the general measures to limit expenditure approved by Cabinet
at its meeting on 26 January 1971 rcM7L/I/L8 refers".
Lang wrote :
The portion regarding the departmental forecasts for L97L/72 and the
effect of the general measures was given in the Treasury report of 18
December l97O which accompanied the COPE report. The relevant
parts of this report are surtrnarized for your information.
Staff freeze : The total increase in direct salaries forecast by
d"p"rt*."t" ras g4".2 million. Allowing for the 1 per cent tolerance
for staff in the process of being appointed and for
additional staff for urgent new activities which may be approved by
Cabinet (e.g. brucellosis scheme), the savings due to the
staff freeze are estimated at about 93 million' works Proqrarnme:
Treasury and the Ministry of works have assessed
requirements at $35 million, less than forecast by departments.
' Further reductions of, say, up to $10 million rnay be possibl-e when better
information is available on corunitments for L97L/72-
Administration and Operating Expenditure :
Departrnents have forecast an increase of $33 million in items coming
within this category. After allowance for unavoidable exceptions for
high priority activities, it is estimated that at least $15 million
of this could be saved.
Overseas Travel and Staff Training Expenditure :
A red.uction of 25 per cent in these items would save about SO.55
nillion on the forecast amounts.
Sununary. The portion is sununarised as follows !
Reductions already assessed :
Works progralnme 35
Staff freeze, of
expenditure etc. (rounded up) 20 55
Forecast increase in expenditure
for L97I/72
Increase without further
reduction
$ mitlion
]-62
Percentage
8.4
5.5r07
To achieve the 4 per cent target and allow, say, $10 rnillion for new
policies such as assistance to agriculture, a further 940 million must
be saved. This reduction would come frorn the specific measures
now put before Cabinet for decision. 22(Note: all ernphasis in original)
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This paper was then modified somewhat (presumably by Treasury in
the light of the Minister's comments on reading it), and on 4 February
another paper was sent, clearly intended as the basis for action by the
new cccx.23 This paper enclosed 3 schedules showing
(a) savings in expenditure resulting from Cabinet decisions on I February,
(b)
1971;
savings if Cabinet endorsed reconunendations made by the new CCGX
on 2 February;
items still to be considered by Cabinet.(c)
The surunary showed an increase of 9100 million in government expenditure
in L97l/72 fiscal year without additional action, and stated that to achieve
the 4* target and a1low $10 rnillion for new policies, a further $33 million
shoul-d be found and reconunended to Cabinet for deduction from the
expenditure totals (mainly Schedule B of the Treasury paper).
Cabinet met on February 8, but simply rrrtotedt the Treasury report.
It took no decisions on the "schedule B" recormrended savings, which
would affect Works, Housing, Beal-th, Railways and Post office. Housing
was dealt with separately and an earlier Cabinet decision to allocate
$10 rnillion for housing construction was changed, approving only 98 million
for this prr=po=".'n
At the same meeting, Cabinet dealt with a submission by the Minister of
Education, who apparently felt rather threatened by the atmosphere of
restraint created by the new Conunitteers terms of reference.Cabinet
"noted [*re t'linister's] reguest that. if Cabinet decide to make reductions
in the LTTL/12 education expenditure beyond those appro!'ed at its meeting
on 1 February L971 (CM7L/2/39 refers) you should be given the opportunity
of recommending priorities in containing growth of expenditure in the Vote
to a certain sum."25 It did not appear that a Muldoon-cum-Treasury
investigation of educational priorities (and the costs of these) would be
welcomed.
r03.
A few days later, a Treasury circular entLtled.I'i-neqqlal AUocations
7AI97Ll72'" was dLstributed to aI-I permanent heads. Thls circular represents
the equivalent of a staEe-of-the-art definiEion of what the central
executl,ve system had l-earned as a consequence of recent lnnovatlve forays
into improved flnancial management and expenditure control.
It was, in effect, an Estinates cLrcul-ar, advislng the departments of
the current yearts rules, and the Cablnet-approved guldelines, which should
govern their Estimates for the coming year, and reminding then of the
need for care, caution and frugaltty. The lnpact of COPETs first report
on ministers was to be felt by the bureaucracy. While it was conceded
that changes ln the format of the Estirnates (sirnultaneously beLng
introduced, with COPE, into the system) and additional information (e.g.
on salariest calculation, "other capital" expenditure), could place an
additional burden on departments, Treasury requested that all Estlmates
returns be presented (r'in Erlpll-cate") by 5 ldarch (t.e. just over one month
away) .
The circulsalso included advance notice that a COPE clrcular would
shortly be sent out I'requestlng information on forecasts f.ot L97L172,
Lg72/73 and, L973/74 in COPE forrnat. These forecasts will need to take
into account alL of the general measures approved for l97ll72 and any
specific measures applying to each department. hpartments should there-
fore"begin to analyse the effects of all expenditure measures on their
actlvltles for future y""t"".27 This lnJunctlon - whlch amounted to
nothlng more than a pious throw-away exlt line - was sti1l being resisted
by departments nearly a decade later, This study lndlcates that such
dlrectives have had no lmpact on bureaucratlc behavlour in any way whatsoever
until accorrpanied by a number of other pressures (such as worsening
economic recession) and procedures (such as systematic review by
pennanenf cabinet couutittees with widely-accepted dlsc.etionary powers) '
An exarnple of a typical, departmental response to the Treasury circular is
(b)
104.
aa
appended.-" In this, Post Office officials, allowing their
bruised sensitivities to show, argued that
(a) service standards would suffer if staff nr.unbers were held as Cabinet
had directed;
Inanagement training programnes and basic training of other staff
would be "adversely" affected if operating expenditure was held
as Cabinet had directed. (No details of the meaning of the "adverse
effect" were included) i
(c) some information, necessary to realistic acceptance of sa1ary
restraint, hras not yet to hand;
(d) "growing demands for service" r*ould be I'hampered" (not specified)
if restraints were in fact imposed as given in the circular.
A Treasury wit in a scribbled annotation on Treasuryts copy of this
paper, noted, re. (d) above, "That is the idea!,t As usual the gap between
Treasury and the departmental view of what was desirable was quite wide.
On 15 February the Assistant Secretary to the Treasury wrote to
the Minister of Finance on the need for stricter controls of departmental
spending. He pointed out that flexible provisions allowed for departmental
overspending had become too lax.
Permanent heads have usually acted in a reasonable nanner in controlling
a&ninistration and operating expenditure, and over the yeats the controls
exereised have been sufficient to ensure that appropriations have not
been exceeded. However, in a period of rapidly rising prices as
experienced over the past year coupled with the assumption of new
and enlarged activities by departments, it ls quite evident that
controls will need to be tightened if expenditure is to be kept wlthin
appropriated lirnits. This is especially so when appropriations are
to be limited to previous levels with no allowances made for growth
or price increases.
r,.tg t.to*nended that firm rules must be applied Ln LITI/72,
with an accompanying amendment to this effect in the Treasury Regulations.
The Minister of Finance signed his narne on the letter, signifying his
approvat, and sent the letter back again in that torm €o the Treasury, where
it was received on 17 F"br.r"ry.2g
r05.
,^
A Treasury circular, lnforrning per.manent tleads of the nl tof"= fot
financial control (L971/721' was distributed on 29 lrlarch, L972. It
ernphasized the following rules agreed to by the Minister of Finance :
(a) total vote appropriations for the year must not be exceeded;
(b) no offset of over-expenditure within a vote will be allowed
except as provided in (c) below;
(c) as regards Administration and operating expenditure, i.e. ftedi:
falling within the four Standard Expenditure Groups (S.E.G.s)
Travel, Transport etc.; Maintenance Operation etc.t
MateriaLs, Supplies etc. and Other Operating Expenditure' detrnrtmentl
must keep within the individual terms appropriated for InternaL
Travel,Overseas Travel,and (where there is a separate iteim) Staff
. 
Training. The remainirig items whithiri the Administration and Operatit
Category can be grouped together and up to 2Lt
over-expenditure of any individual itern will be allowed without
Treasury approvaL provided that the total amount appropriated
for Administration and Operating expenditure is not
exceeded. Treasury approval must be obtained if any item
in this category is likely to be over-sPent by nrore than 2lt
of the arnount approprlated.
(d) the Monthly reporting system will operate from 31 May 
"".h y."t.3o
As departmental returns were received and the Treasury Investigating
division reviewed the estimated costs for the coming year the extent of
likely over-expenditure became apparent to the Minister of Finance
anil his advisers. On I March 1971 a further succinct circular was sent from
Treasury to aII permanent heads. Entitled baldly Over-Expendlture of
Votes , it stated that
1. An examination of the returns of expenditure shows that many
departments may exceed their IgTo/71 appropriations. This is
particularly so now that arrangements are being made for salary
increases, including the balance of the october I97O
half-yearly review and the general wage order' to be paid int rany
cases before 31 l4arch.
If over-expenditure of the vote ie unavoidable, departments- 3loultl
ensure that the procedure set out in (Treasury Instructions)--
is carried out, ind in particular that the pennanent head Lrmediate-
Iy advise the minister in charge of the position and refer a coPy
of the memorandum to TreasurY-
3. Attelition is also drawn to fielevant Treasury instruction]l"relating
to any iten which is likely to be materially over-spent. rz
2.
-106.
The next day the CCQ{ met and discr:ssed various departnrental pleas for
special consideration or exerption. lttre ltinister of Finance, Muldoon'
draired the neeting which was attended by Shelton, l,lcKay, Carter
Gordon, Maclntyre, McCready and Thomson, with two Treasury officers and the
Cabinet office secretary present. Most concessions requested were allor.red.
The Police, for exanple, had argrued for the maintenance of a policeman:populatlon
ratio of l:890. This was alloned, wittr a mild decision to review ttre questlon
again in Marctr the follorrj-ng year.
Most Post Office argufiEnts succeeded, and the opportunity to make savings
by abolishing Saturday postal (urban and rural) deliveries and rercvah of
"tutecononllc pr:blic call stations[ was not taken up. However, a note in t]re
formal CCGX minutes stated ttrat "although no direction was given by ttre Comtrittee,
the view was strongly e:<pressed by several neribers ttrat private box rentals
(bottt Post office and Rural Delivery) should be reviewed and the possibility
of an increase should be examined". (he watchful [Co] secretary had taken care
to ensure that alttrough the Post office officials might feel they had safely
negotiated one shoal, they would nonetheless continue to be ttre subject of
ministerial attention 
- 
sonetine.
Despite sone nodest recortrEndations to Cabinet on Post Office spending
(e.9. "restriction of ttre issue of inland noney orders to values above $7")
nottring of great rnonent was decid"d ,rporr.33
A couple of days later the CCGX Ctrairman, MuLdoon fonuarded a
?4
renprandun to Cabinet entitled C'overnnBnt Expe4diture.'- Ttre paper stated that
the new Cabinet Cornnittee had ret three tires, and nour sougtrt Cabinet approval
and recordedfor a nunber of reconuendations. Cabinet approvals already given (Ln Appendix
"8" of the l'linisterrs'paper) totalled S9r205r000. CCGX-recorurended savings
could produce a further $12,875,000.
In addition, the CCe( reconunended
itens totalling about $81400,000, and
many savings "in principle" on costed
i
two j-@ms (closure of all Hutt Valley bus
IO7.
services and deferment of Mangaweka-Utiku rail divgrsion) for which
information on costs,/savings was not yet available. The Minister
reported that a number of other items had been referred elsewhere
(e.9. Treasury, or the Cabinet Conrnittee on State Services) for further
investigation,/reconurendation.35 Education was to be the subject of a
separate Cabinet paper. The total of "savings" recomnended rdas some
$21 million plus a further $8 nillion+ in principte. At.this stage the
required $33 nillion must have seemed rather elusive.
During ltarch Cabinet dealt with various ad hoc decisions, approvlng
several costed items for inclusion in the forthcoming Estirnates. Education,
for example, put up a nunJcer of prolnsals for special consideration ty
Cabinet. These were referred to the Caucus - they involved capital works
totalling 91.0 niLlion, and a request to "approve the suspension of the
previously 
€rnnounced 3t increase in salary grants to independent schooLs
from I February 1971."35
On 17 March Treasury again reported to the Mlnister of Finance
on anticipated over-expenditure for the l97O/7L financial year.
Information has been obtained from departments on their expected
expenditure under votes for L97O/7L.
At the tirne the final supplenentary Estimates were prepared
Iast year, the extent of the october 1970 half yearly salary
and wage review was not kno$m, but provision was rnade for 3 percent
in advance. The actual increase was 8.7 per cent.
As a result, quite a nurnber of votes ... will be overspent.
At this stage the figrures are not finaL as some savings may
ba made in other items. The figrures for Education and Hospitals
include backpay which will be transferred to trust Account. The
over-expenditure, including Post office. appears ltkeLy to be
' about $40 nillion for L97O/7L. The limit for
unauthorised expenditure is $42.79 million.
6in cornpletion of the accounts at 31 March, the final details
will be lubmitted for your formal approval in terms of s.5l
of the Public Revenue Act. [rmphasis ailded.]
An attached schedule showed that although $1r336'240'000 had been
appropriated for L9'TO/IL, SI,375,430,000 had been 
"p.tt.37
By the end of the month, the picture on over-expenditure for the
108.
L97O/7L year had become even clearer - the $33 million which the new
CCGX had set out to find was rapidly vanishing down a plughole of Cabinet
approvals and decisions, and departmental practices-
The Works Progranune, which had been compiled over the previous months,
needed adjustments upwards, in a number of cases , fot the cash figute.38
In their paper on Works to the Minister of Finance Treasury official-s noted:
you will recall that Mr. Allen (l'linister of Works) and yourself
[sic] considered that all progranmes, however small, should be subject
to some reduction so that it could be said that all Ministers
received the same treatment.
However, it was also suggested that although this general rule should
apply, there should be a tacit agreement that
a snall measure of over-expenditure would be acceptable if this
should eventually prove necessary.
Other small oversights and omissions were included. Railways 
' 
fot
exannple, had a progr:ilnme level of $6.500 million reconunended by officials,
for 197:-/72 of which the joint Ministers [i.e. Financnand Railways] haa
actually approved only $5.60O million. Officials had recommended a cash level
of $6 million for l97L/72; joint ministers had approved only $5 million-
However, the Treasury paper pointed out: "As mentioned in our Report No. 6400
of 10 March", the fact that "a Railways Works Programme of $6 million cash for
Lg7L/T}fwas]|incfuded in the schedules on which the recent loan from the World
Bank was negotiated was unfortunately not drawn to the attention of Mr. Allen
and yourself at the tfune the allocation was being considered." Ahis
meant a new set of sums had now to be considered.
Ministers confronted with this "unfortunate" information must have
felt some irrita'tion - probably scarcel! rnollified by what followed
in the way of a rather graceless defensive gesture by officials: "The
$6 nillion (the progranme l-irnit) proposed is by no means generous and the
55 nillion (i.e. cash limit) would be very tight. Bearing in rnind that
the World Bank loan agreement was only signed on I March L971 and that
we are currently working towards a D.F.C. Ioan frorn the Bank, it is suggested
that it would be more desirable to make a cash allocation at or near
109.
in the
Muldoontt,
56 nillion" : (coincidently, the figure recommended by officials
first placel)
A handwritten note in the margin, dated 8/4/7L signed "R.D.
underlined very firmly "$5 million" - presurnably the Minister of
Finance was not persuaded that even minor incompetence should be
in cash.
reqarded
A further Treasury memo. dated 31 ltarch 1971 (i.e. the end of the
L97O/7L financial year)summed up as follows :
Estimates 1971r/72
"The increase of $116 million (6 percent) in recolunended
allocations over estimated out-turn fot L97O/71 is made
up as follows :
$ rnillion
46-00
18. OO
52 .00
Personnel (incLudes $14 nillion for
hospitals' salaries and $5 nillion
for teachersr salaries)
Administration and operating (includes
computer charge $2.2 rnillion, palment
to Post office $5 million, etc. (sic)
Capital, grants, subsidies, etc,*
*Comprises
Balance of hospitals' main grant of $15O.5 m.
Capital works (part of $5 n. )
RailwaysI pLant
Health benefits
Permanent appropriations
Supplementary Estimates
Social Security benefits
Capital 
- 
Defence (grants and transfers)
Grant to U.G.C.
Railways - other capital
rt*
2.46
3 ,00
7.00
2 .00
10.78
10.00
5.00
3.24
4.00
3.00
50.44
Although part of this 6 percent over-expenditure was generated by
past agreements on formulae for allocating grants and subsidies/benefits,
much of the surplus was the consequence of a leaky, poorly-disciplineit
departmental system in which ministers were persuaded to allow "exceptional
circumstancesrt on grounds which usually had nothing to do with a proven
or demonstrable case for extra money-
39
lr0.
Ttre CCGX had handed questions on staff ceilings over to the Cabinet
Comnittee on the State Services. ALthough the CCSS had accepted its
Cabinet brief (as defined in clt 7L/L/I8, 26 January 1971) to irpose staff
ceilings, and had made and promulgated a series of decisions on ttrese on
AO2 March I97Lr -- it had, at that tinre, also been warned by the SSC
Chairman to e)qlect departrnental appeals for special acconurpdation.
Fifteen such appeals had aLready been received, and in each case the SSC
recomnended an increase rnore or less as requested by department".4l I.
Lythgoe infornred the CCSS that "further subrnissions for Staff Ceiling
increases will be coming forsard for consideration. "42
On 2 April a total of 629 additional staff rnembers tras recoruended
by the SSC, taking ttre current approved ceiling from 56,808 to 57,437
over the whole state sector. Ttre total additional cost, as at 5 April
1971, Treasury officiaLs reckoned, would be about $600,000 in the L97L/72
Estimates and about $1,6131000 in a full year, As eventually approved
by the CCSS the total increase represented about an increase of 1.26t -
from 551808 to 57 t44L (the new approved SS ceiling) .
Although the decisions of the CCSS hail, on the whole, the sarne
force as those taken by Cabinet, an untitled merrp from Lang (Treasury)
to two of his senior Finance f colleagues (8 April 1971) made the following
point :
Ttre Minister [i.e. of Finance] e:4>ressed concern about the liberal
nature of the joint reconutrendations on increases in staff
ceilings. He has passed on his view to Mr. Talboys. In particular,
he commented on the increase for social security (+ 35 people),
and I must say ttrat I regard it as excessive. In fact, I think
that we had agreed that no increase would be granted r:ntil a further
investigatjon had been made.
The purpose of ttris note is to indicate the Minister's view -
and I am inclined to agree with him 
- 
about the attitude to a?be taken in respect of any further reguests for increased staff.
But despite the irritation, it was obviously another case of belatedly
shutting the stable door. Ttre system needed both npre eyes and ears
tban any existing procedure yet offered to those responsible for control
and restraint.
111.
When the CCSS met on 8 April, the Minister of Finan€ was listed in
the mi-nutes as "also present'r. The Conrmittee of six ministers, with
Talboys in the chair, mrst have been acutely aware that they were being
closely - and disapprovingly - watched for "Iiberal attitudes". Although,
as in most Cabinet-Ievel minutes, comments are normally not attributed to
individual persons present, it is not difficult to deduce that the
opening batting was by the "guest" Minister of Finance, Muldoon -
who was careful, nonetheless, to attribute "blame" to officials, not his
own colleaEJues :
lne. staff ceilinss 197L/721
The corrnent lras made that the recorunendations made by the State
Services Commission and Treasury were not consistent with the
attitude of Cabinet towards staffing restraint in the
State Services. A number of the increases in staff ceilings
proposed related to activities which were not of high priority.
The Committee should consider the recomnendations in the
context of the continued need for a tight hold on Governmentrs
spending and also in the context of the severe cuts which had been
made in works activities. Generally, it was suggested that the
recorunendations of the paper were less stringent than they should
be.
The Conunittee was advised that it had been estimated that
the cost in the 529 additional positions reconutended in the
paper would be $1.63I million. 44
The no-doubt somewhat chastened CCSS then made a series of decisions
to defer, decline or nore modestly approve the earlier staff ceilings.
The Minister of Defence put up a stiff but unsuccessful fight,but
officials' advice won the day:
The Conunittee was advised that if the Defence staff ceiling was
anended to provide a float between actual staff and staff ceilingr E pl€-
cedent would be set on the basis of which it would
not be possible to resist reguests from other Departments placed
in a similar position. The outcome of such a review could well be
an overall increase of It or 24 in expenditure on salaries. The comment
was made that if the Defence staff ceiJ-ing were to remain at its
present level the effect on Defence would not be so serious as the
effects on other Departments if other of the recommendations
submitted for increases in ceiling were not approved.
The Committee agreed that the staff ceiling for the Ministry
of Defence shouia not be increased and should remain at
ll97o/7r levell. 45
112.
An Education bid rdas successful, as was one from Justice, reportedl'y
supported by Treasury officials.
Although several Social Security increases were allowed, rninisters
were clearly unhappy about this:
The Comnittee \'tas advised of the general increase in caseload
of the Social Security Department throughout the country. In
Auckland the increase in caseload since 1965 was 381. Ministers
inqgired about the factors other than the increase in popuJ'ation
which had contributed to this increase. A cormnent was made that
the increases could reflect changing social circurnstances and
attitudes. It was the view of the Conunittee that additional
information should be provided on this nratter for the information
of the Ministers:
... a report [to le] prepared for the information of mernbers of the
Committee on the growth rate in the caseload of Social Security
including the breakdown of increages in the number of
beneficiaries in each category. 46
Instructions on expenditure control procedures had been circulated
to permanent heads in late March, and most departments had made some kind
of an effort to be more careful. In a rather prissy internal staff
memo, Treasury itself set a good example. ToIl calls, second class postal
rates were aIIEng the Petty cash areas where care was reguiredi at another
level, Treasury officials servicrng statutory and other bodies such as
the NDC and Monetary and Economic Council were to ensure that in spending
public money their charges did not exceed a newly-set budget tl1ot"rr.".47
The Treasury files include no further reference to the embryonic CCGX
after early March- Although it had, at that stage, been somewhat unsuccess-
ful in identifying major cost savinqs for the coming year, it could also
be argued that it had been overtaken by events. Information generated
by the COPE report had permitted early-197l iilentification of probably
significant over-expenditure - on a scale which $tould negate the value of
any small economies the new committee could locate.
lL3.
The Minister of Finance had a scheduled overseas trip in April, and
on April 7 Treasury forwarded to him what is fo:enalJ.y known as Budget
Report No. 1 
- the pre-Estimates definition of what the Government wiII
need to find in the way of money for the coming year. Treasury requested
authority to send each delnrtment notice of its approved financial
allocation for L97L/72, with a note on the Cabinet directive which guided
Treasuryrs actions 
- i.e. the Cabinet decisions of 26 January 1-971. Treasury
also sought permission (later granted and acted upon) at the same time
to point out to departments that "it is recognised that the allocations
are very tight, but these reflect the need to substantially reduce
the rate of increase in Government expenditure in L9ZL1Z2-"4A
This may indeed have been Treasury's and the Government's intention, but
it was nonetheless a counsel of necessity, if not despair. The Treasury
paper showed that "total requests from departments amounted to
$2r058.7 nillion, representing an increase of $I41.8 million (or 7.4t) over
the estimated outturn for L97O/7L. The recormnended allocations total
S2,025.5 mi1lion."49
Ministers should not, however, beJ-ieve that they had been completely
/\ profligate. A combination of normal investigating-decisions making
I
" practices, plus the additional fiJ"Lip given by the CCGX had had some effect.
The reconunended $2,O25.5 million represented "a reduction of $43.2 mitlion
on departmental requests"'-roughly $3 rnillion more than the CCGX had set
out to find-"and an increase of 598.6 million (5.ft) over the estimated
out-turn for L97O/11.50 Since the overwhelming bulk of this Latter
irrcrease ($45 millions) vras generated by personnel, with $18 million front
increased administration costs, the CCGX (which had had no speciaL brief
on these items), could be seen as a useful device in a simple, surgical
fashion.
)- iI ilr.,,,Ufg
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There was, however, still a relatively long rwr up to the public
Budget-Estimates announcerrEnt, and history had derpnstrated considerable
success by ruinisters and departments in winning back resources.
On 16 April, departrents were inforned of their financial allocations
for L97I/72. lltre leLter providing ttris information noted that it was
'likely the Go'vernrent would want to table an early Budget - Treasury would
"t}terefore be grateful if you would accord priority to the preparation of
your Estimates". It also noted that allocations lrere "ve4t tig&tt", in
reflection of the "need to slor^r down substantially the rate of increase
in Governn€nt e)q)enditure" during the corning year.
Permanent heads lrere, at the sane tine inforred by tlre Secretary to
the Treasury:
Following the tabling of the Estinates I would hope to convene
neetings of Perrnanent Heads in say.Iuly, sindlar to those held
Iast year. As well as discussing the current economic situation
I would also like to discuss with you further possible develop-
ments in financial managernent including reorganisation of the
Pr:blic Accor:nts, greater emphasis on net expenditure in depart-
rental Votes as a basis for future allocations, and the future
work e:<pected of the Comnittee of Officials on Pr:blic E:<penditure(COPE) in advising @vernment of e:<penditure needs over the
longer term. I also intend to girie Pernanent Heads the opportunity
to comrent on any financial arrangements or rules which, in their
view, limit ttre efficiency of ttreir adninistration. 5l
Within a few days, additional sums had been requested
departrents, and approved for various advisory bodies such
Development Cor:ncil . 52
by
as
a nunber of
ttre National
Treasuryrs Budgret Report No. 3, dated 29 April 197I, inforned the
ttinister of Finance of changes in the Financial Allocations for L97I/72.
fn view of a probable rash of requests from his colleagues for special
treatrnent, the l{inister \^ras acqluainted wittr "t}re salient points concerning
individual allocations" as a guide to ttreir treatnent. At tttls stage a
percentage increase of L0.4 percent was expected in L97I/72 e:<penditure
over the (provisional) out-turn for ttre previous year. the Minister was
reminded of all Cabinet, Cabinet connittee and rdnisterial adjustnents
ll5.
upward made during April, and Treasury stated that no further
adjustments would be perrnitted without "your or Cabinet's approval"
Corunents in this rePort
points:
on individual Votes included the following
re Vote: Education * Increase
Expenditure L97O/71 - 92511917,000
Request I97O/72 - $288,776,OOO
Allocation - $280'50o,000 11. 3
(b) The increase in this Vote reflects the very high
personnel content and the additional cost of teachers I
salaries in L97L/72. The allocation includes $7'5
million for teachersr salaries due in I97O/7L but
which could not be paid in that year ... ' Even
without tne $7.5 million for teachers' salariesa this
Vote was overspent by $7.1 million in 1970/7L'>t
A further Treasury circular to departments, dated 5 May L97L, sought
to impress upon permanent heads the necessity to observe all existing
rules on financial constraint. It concluded:
It is important that constant reviews are made of probable
annual expenditure on items in order that early action may
be taken to prevent over-expenditure. only in exceptional
circunstances will Treasury be likety to support proposals
for additional expenditure in LgTL/72.54
This warning againsL any later attemPt to win back in the Supplementary
Estimates what had been scraped away earlier in the year was no doubt
written in a spirit of optimism rather than expectation. Just a
few days before (3 May) Cabinet had already rescinded an earlier
decision (recommended to it by the CCG$ to reduce Post Office expenses.
Doubtless the Caucus had been unwilling to accept negative public
criticisms had the proposed cost reductions been effected.55
Although not al1 reguests succeeded - for example, Vote:
Agriculture did not immediately gain additional funds reguested - by
20 May an additional (net) $A,gzs,Ooo had been approrr"d.S5 within
two or three weeks, Cabinet approvals had increased this by an additional
$36,500,OO0 - nainly Social Security benefit increa;es ($21,000'000)
(a)
116.
c
while a further $9r55OrO0O was allocated to Vote: Agriculttrre.t'
On 4 June Treasury submitted a somewhat obsequious paper to the
Minister of Finance providing an interpretation of the meaning of
"real Goverrunent expenditure". The paper concluded that the basis
for estirnating "real" expenditure increases by COPE had been "essentially
pragmatic" and had taken insufficient account of a number of critical
factors such as ttopportunity costs". COPETs form of measurement had
indicated a growth rate in total Goverrunent expenditure of 7.3 percent.
The alternative calculation 
- 
which Treasury argued was "theoretically
more acceptable" 
- 
produced a growth rate in real expenditure of only
4.5 percent "which is close to the target".58
A few days later an internal memo was circulated to divisional
directors in Treasury, offering guidelines on how Treasury officers
should deal with departmental requests to offset expenditure or to
increase allocatiorr=.59 Its function was to stiffen their resolve -
already beefed-up in an earlier circular dated 2 June.60
Various last-minute requests from departments were handled by the
Secretary to the freasury, who sometimes suggested in reply that
approval to offset expenditure within the overall Vote or other accom-
modations would probably be forthcoming. Sometimes a departmental
advocate would be asked to reduce a bid to a more modest level so that
the matter could be "tidied up". The item was then formally determined
by Cabinet or the Minister of Finance.
The Budget lras eventually presented on I0 June, and on 15 June
197I Kirk, MP, opened the debate for the Opposition. AIl statements
made in public by the Opposition were regnrted to the Government.
For example, on 23 June a report on the likely costs of alternative
Budget proposaLs put fomard by Opposition MPs was submitted to the
6'lPrime Minister."- The total value of these appeared to be some
11,7.
$4O milllonr laten caleulations of, other lrabour trrtoposals were costed
at an additional $60 ni11ion.62 
"t.="ure frqm 
ttre Ol4losition on over-
expenditutre as sholdn in the Estimat-eE continuedr partieularly ac the
Prrhlie &cpenditrlre Com.ittee hea:rings began. Several papers on itens
raised during iluly and Augiust, beth in the House the FE€ and a$ relnrted
in the news media, Ytere sUbnritted by Treasu:ny tq, the 6overnnent'63
Ehe 197I,/72 Estinrates file concludes at this tr'oint'64 It' is
wortl1 notlng, ttrat from this T:reasufy soure€ at least rNo- fulth€r'ntrntion
was made ,of tlre tshsnt-l.ived Cabinet (brrmj.ttee Qn Government Expenditure
althouqh there were otlrer more sophisticated experi:nents before \976,
when Gair eonvened the fi'rst meeting of the CCEX'
1rg.
CHAPTER F'OUR
Part II: Expenditure Pla under the Labour 6vgrnmentt-ihe
Cabinet Conunittee 9n Poficy and Prforftfes ]ffi
Introduction
One reason why the National party appointed the 1971 Cabinet
conmittee on @vernment Expenditure was the obvious gap in the range
of procedures avaitable for ministerial surveillance of government
spending overall. The initial work of coPE ernphasised the significance
of such gaPsr and the CCGx's brief history pointed to the potential
value of a sub-cabinet system for monitoring expenditure proposals
priel to their tabling and adoption by Cabinet as a whole'
The CCPP is Established
WhenLabourcametoofficeinNovernberlgT2'oneofthefirst
actions of the euphoric cabinet was to set up another new sub-conmittee -
the cabinet comnittee on Poticy and Priorities (ccPP). This action
qras not the result of officialsr reconfiiendation, but was taken on the
initiative of the new reformist ministers. The aims of the Committee'
disseminated by Cabinet Minute on 18 December 1972 were (a) to establish
priorities for the inplementation of government policies; and (b)
tokeepunderreviewtheprogressbeingmadeinimplementingtheLabour
party's policY Progranxme-
To assist the Corsnittee in this task, all rninistbrs were immediately
instructed to ,,inform the Secretary of the Cabinet (then Brooks) of
their priorities in respect of the policy items which cane within their
ministerial responsibi.Iities, indicating whether the policy should in
their view, be implernented in the first, second or third year of the
next Parliament,'. Despite difficulties which cabinet conceded might
present themselves, this task was to be carried out before christnas -
i.e. within one t."k.65
However,CabinetdidnotsimultaneouslysetuPanofficialscorrmittee
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to service the CCPP - nor, indeed were any officials other than the
Cabinet Seeretary invited to attend the Comnittee on a regular basis
for almost a year. Nor were any special provisions made to assist
the neophyte ministers in their first heroic task. A consequence of
this was that many ministers found it impossible (or were unwilling) to
carry out a policy review in the manner laid down' despite several
extensions of time, so that the CCPP never had before it a clear systen-
wide account of policy preferences ordered along a three-year spectrum
of implementation. While the justification for the review was obvious -
letrs get a clear picture of what we want to do before we begin to
act - it was undo rhtedly politically, as well as administratively, naive
in its initial expectations.
At the same time, however, the Treasury, pursuing its own interest
in PPB and more careful policy review, subrnitted a report to Cabinet
recommending that the departments themselves carry out a special review
of all existing policy, along progranme lines, and forward this to
ministers by the end of January (just over one month away, at the height
of the annual srunmer vacation period). No particular procedures $tere
recommended, nor was it proposed to set up any new officials group to
co-ordinate the review, although Treasury did nominate the COPE secretariat'
in Treasury itself, as an appropriate channel for co-ordinating and
reporting on the information received.
The first meeting of the CCPP, on 9 January' was held in the Prime
Minister's office, with all five members present - the Prime Minister
(Kirk), his deputy (watt), the Minister of Finance (Rowling), the
Minister of Trade and Industries (Freer) and the Minister of Justice
(Finlay). The only official present was Peter Brooks, Secretary to
the Cabinet. The Committee did not discuss Treasury's proposal for a
departmental review of existing policies, but concentrated on a wide
range of topics which might be appropriate for inclusion in the 1973
Iegislative progranme. Considerabte emphasis was given to the necessity
to
in
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create, or channel, revenue and capital funds towards the Government
anticipation of its spendir,g ne"ds.66
The CCPP had not yet received their colleagares' list of policy
preferences, and it was obvious a week later, when Cabinet met on
15 January that this would be a protracted and difficult task. Cabinet
therefore decided to act ugron Treasuryrs advice, and instruct permanent
heads to conduct a special review of existing policies, with costs
projected forward to 1975/76. Officials were to be asked to identify
where existing policy diverged from Labour party ;rcIicy, as described in
the partyts L972 Manifesto or any post-election statements by new ministers.
Costings were to take into account the decisions nade by COPE in L972,
but were to make clear any expenditure decisions of the previous
National government after the COPE forecasts had been subnitted, and
before the General Election in November. rt was decided that pernanent
heads should begin this review immediately, and forward their reports
to ministers in two weeks, by 3I Jrrrr"ry.67
On January, three days after departmental heads received the Cabinet
Minute informing them of this decision, shailes, in the Treasury, sent
a memo to lough, Deputy Secretary of Treasury, noting that he had
received several inquiries from departments regarding the forthcoming
review. "In view of the time lag", Shailes wrote, "it is now suggested
that the review should be completed by Friday, 15 February 1973". He
recommended that a Treasury circular to this effect be distributed
inmediately, with an additional request that permanent heads folard a
copy of their ministerial reports to Treasury whj-ch could then co-ordinate
the replies and submit a report for further consideration by the Cabinet.
Further, Shailes recommended, the circular should provide guidelines on
how the review shoutd be conducted, with an offer of Treasury assistance.
The note summarised the purpose of the exercise, as Treasury saw it:
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It was originally intended that the review should be
carried out by progralnme. All estimates are now
subdivided into programnes and the intention was that
the expenditure of the prograrnmes should be critically
reviewed to ascertain whether or not it was in
accordance with the policy of the new Government and
if not what expenditure in the programne could be
eIiminated.6S
Shailes' advice was acted upon immediately, and the following day
a Treasury circular, citing the original Cabinet Minute, was issued
to aII permanent heads with the instruction that they should report
not only to ministers but also to the COPE secretariat in Treasury
along the lines described. A copy of the circular is appended to
4qthis study."' Its essential elem.ents were that permanent heads
should supply the Government with a clear, costed account of existing
policies, identification of where these differed from Labour party
policies, and an indication of where expenditure could be cut or
savings effected. In effect this was to be a revie$/ of the National
government's allocative policies, but as one senior Treasury officer
recalled wryly "The (Labour) Government wanted action, not analysis" in
expecting that this sort of task could be conducted within a few short
weeks.
Atthough Treasury reported to the ministers on the existing policy
review on 12 March, 19'13,70 i., fact not all departmental reports had
been received or cleared by individual ministers by the due date. In
one case (Social Welfare), the minister did not approve of his department's
findings until 16 March, four days after the Minister of Finance received
the "final consolidated report".7l This report must have been a
considerable disappointment to anyone hoping for a rich harvest of
either information or money. Apart from three specific cases, in the
appropriations for Defence, Labour and ElectriciEY,T2 permanent heads
had been unable to detect any incongruity between what National had
been doing and what the Labour party might want to c'e, as defined in its
manifesto and other more recent sources. Nor were permanent heads able
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to report any expenditure which was not in line with existing policy,
nor make any suggestions as to where savinqs could be affected.
Indeed, permanent heaCs $tere at pains to point out that in a nurnber
of cases implementation of government policYr 6rs outliled in the
manifesto, would involve considerabLe increases in expenditure'73
Shailes' initial draft report, based on the returns from departnents,
included two tables, the first entitled "New Expenditure approved
by the previous government to 30 November 1972 and not taken into
account in the COpE forecasts!', the second called "Detail of Expenditure
which Departments Confirmed as Not in accordance with Government Policy".74
It was Langrs vierd that this draft !,tas too long and complicated for the
?q
ministers,'t and a mueh briefer paper, omitting the first table, was
subnitted, r.rith the sole recommendation that Cabinet "note" the t.Iott.76
No other action r,{as suggested.
In a detailed analysis of this and subseguent reviews, Winchester'
an American systems advisor to the Treasury working in New Zealand aL
the time, pointed out several cleficiencies in the first existing policy
review experiment in 19?3.77 The first two were inherent in the design
of the review - the assumption that d.epartments unused to this type of
exercise ltould be abLe to "gear up"r review all their existinq activities'
evaluate them carefully alortgside the new Government's largely unknown
policy intentions, and report back within one rnonthi secondly' the
assumption that government departments knew what aI1 their existing
policies were, and the current costs of these. In reality (and the
value of such a docurnent is questionabl.e) no such inventory existed'
although continued ministerial belief in the fiction encouraged later
reviews of existing policty. Further inadequacies included the assumption
that policy horizons coul-d be lirnited to three years. This not only
ignored existing planning variations, (for example, capital works had a
5-l-0 even 20 years-horizon) but suggested a certain timorous attachment
to the Parl-iamentary term as relevant to expenditure policy planning'
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In its instrtrctions, as relayed via the Treasury circular, cabinet
had provided few explicit gruidelines as to how the exercise should be
conducted, and no indication of the role that control departments
(Treasury, the State Services Commission and the Ministry of Works)
would play. There was no special provision to take officials out of
their normal work-timetables and put them, fulltjme, onto the preparatlon
of the required information. No procedures were laid down to standardise
the style or content of the rePorts when they $tere received by the COPE
secretariat.
Winchester conments that there r{ras no clear indication of }tho should
take responsibility for the proper conduct of the revieht - while
departments were to report not only to their own ministers, but also to
the Treasury, no one unit in that departrnent was made specifically
responsible for providing expert advice on how to assemble and collate
data along the lines required, or ensuring that departments gave detailed
consideration Lo the implications of their generalised instructions.
The terms used in the Cabinet Minute and the Treasury circular
did not clearly define what was meant by "policy" or "activity prograrunes"-
The semantics of political discourse and the meanings ascribed by
departmental accountants or Treasury management information systems
experts to words such as "activitiest' and "progranmnes" were technically
at odds. Generalised interpretations could allow ministers' expectations
to slip through the gaps, particutarty in the light of departmental
resistance to the time constraints and personnel difficulties of
conducting a major policy review l.rhen many criticaL staff menbers were
already enjoying a sunmer vacation. As it turned out, officials were
either unwitling or unable (or both) to define existing policies in
terms of Labour's manifesto statement at this early stage in the new
administration's term of office.
It is arguable that new ministers, of whom only watt (deputy
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prime Minister) had had any previous cabinet experience, could not have
foreseen the effects of these deficiencies, and were inadequately
briefed on how to proceed. It is also apparent' however' that
Treasury,scontroloverthedevelopmentofPPBsandtheimpactofCoPE
on the budgetary process was stil} relatively tenuous. In any case,
officials, willingness to give the new government some rope was not
necessarily accompanied by the deliberate expectation that it may succeed
only in hanEing itself.
In the event, one or two ministers were quick to perceive the
potential value of such a review. The Postmaster-General, R.O. Douglas,
for example, had taken his departrnent's point that "any significant
reductions in operating expenditure could only be nade by curtailing
services or degrading standard,s", but also noted his Permanent head's
unwilling report of "steps that could be taken to reduce Post office
operating expenditure", although none htas recommended for action.
Treasury was prepared to support two of these proposals, while mindful
of the post officets caveats about the poritical effects.TS The
suggested reductions were subsequently <liscussed by ministers and although
no cost savings were approved, the exercise served to sharpen Douglas I
awareness of the need for greater efficiency in pr:blic expenditure and
policy development. Douglas vras a member of neither the cEC nor the
CCPP, but later he was put in charge of another small Cabinet sub-corunittee
on Efficiency in the State Services.
The second meeting for the CCPP was timed for I Februaryr just as
there was a changeover from one secretary of the cabinet to another
(P. Millen), and apparently ministers did not actually meet to consider
the agenda, which included a report on the Progress of the ministerial
review of policy Priorities.
When the corunittee met next (on 22 t'tarch) both the Prime I'linister
and his deputy were absent. There were three items on the agenda -
a proposal for restructuring the Development Finance corporation (DFC) '
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major papers on economic strategy, and the rninisterst policy priorities'
which presumably could now be examined in the light of the 12 March
existing policy revievt by departments. Discussion of economic strategry
dominated the meeting. The question of policy preferences cane up,
and although there is no record of reactions to the fruitless results
of the departmental review, the CCPP did recommend to Cabinet that "the
Minister of Finance and other ministers should prepare specific progrannes
to implement agreed lnlicies in time for their financial and economic
implications to be taken into account in the framing of the Budget"'
One other significant decision taken that day was to circularise
all members of the Conunittee informing them that "in the event that
Ministers who are members of this Cormnittee are unable to attend " "
Officials cannot represent them at meetings of this Corunittee"'79 It
was to remain a very tight circle.
A paper on economic devel-opment strategy, based on the ccPPrs
discussions, vras to be prepared by Rowling, Minister of Finance, and
submitted to Cabinet when it met a few days later. In fact, what
Cabinet discussed on 26 March r.ras a summary of Rowling's full Paper,
i-n which 16 points for Government action were identified and approt"d.8o
Only the three members of the new Corunittee present on 22 l4arch had
participated in the full debate on the background to these, although
all five had received fu1l minuted records, and copies of the complete
Fllpaper.ot Additionally significant, in terms of the CCPPTs growing
influence as an inner Cabinet , was Cabinet's decision that aII draft
Estimates for L973/74 should be submitted in the first instance to the
CCPP for consideration. Since Watt would be overseas when this was to
be done, Tizard (Minister of Hea]th) was authorised to act, on this
occasion only, in his p1u"".82
Thus after four months, the CCPP, which had met only twice' had
acquired responsibility for supervising, monitorinq and initiating
several lines of action:
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(a) the request to ministers, still extant' to prepare a
statement of their policy preferences in order to assist
the Comnittee in promoting the tabour party's policies
on bbhalf of the governnent;
(b) initial consideration or vetting of the draft Estimates,
but witholt any special provision of an officials'
committee to assist in this, and with a specific self-
denying ordinance about the presence of officials as
substitutes for absent ministers;
(c) develogment of a strategy for the economic development
of New Zealand, to be adopted in tirne to have an impaCt
on the Governnent's first Budget statement.
Budget Report No.I was forwarded from Treasury to the Minsiter of
Finance on 4 Aprll, with an accompanying note on the progress of the
Estimates preparation. The l{inister was informed that "new policy
proposals have been classified by Treasury as either approved (Classifi-
cation A), and including those policies approved by Government since
assuming office, unavoidable (Classification B), recorunended for
further consideration (ClassificationC)., and del.ete or defer (Classfi-
cation D)". With these classifications, the aggregated totals for new
policy proposals submitted from 28 Departments to Treasury were as
follows:
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($m net expenditure)
Le74/7s
Class A -
Comnritted
Class B -
Unavoidable
Class C -
Recommended for
further
consideration
Sub Total
Class D -
Delete,/Defer
TOTAL
1973/7 4
36
5
25
282419
t975/76
24
5
54
88
60
60
5'1
101
r20 L42
The paper to the l'linister of Finance then continued:
You will recall in Relnrt 528, 28/2/73 on Inflation Risk and
Economic Stra-teglr83 Treasury reconmended that tthe best action
M taken is to stop increasinq Government
expenditurer. It is therefore strongly recommended that no
further increases in Government expenditure (other than minor
matters) be agreed to until the whole position can be assessed
in the light of new poticies which various departments and
Ministers vrant to implement.,.. Estirnates reguests from aII
departments have now been received (and it is hoped to give
you a provisional report on likely overall Government Expenditure
and revenue for L973/74 in a few days) -
In Report 52184 we indicated that with the very limited provision
for new policies, net expenditure $ras esti-rnated to increase by
14 percent. Any additional expenditure on new policies will
of course increase this growth rate. At the same time it was
noted that receipts were likely to increase by a little over
12 percent.
(we dontt expect any change in this i-e- without further
expenditure commitments we face an increase in deficit before
borrowing.) with the economy already fully employed an
increase in Government spending not matched by a corresponding
growth in revenue will lead to a resurgency in demand inflation
which would undermine the Government's stabilisation policy
until you have had an opportunity to study the implications of
this further report (i.e. the review of existing policies) it
is recomrnended that no final action be taken on the attached
report on new policies.
(signed shailes, Assistant Secretary to the Treas,-,ty) 85
The ccPP met to consider this paper and Budget Report No 15 on
the lL and 16 May. These were the Committee's only meetings before
r58
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the publieation of tlre Estimates arrd the presentation f the Eudget
on L4 J1me, l9?3. AU five minJ.sters (Tizar€ replacinE Watt) were
pre.sent On both occasione, with the Prime Minieter in the chair.
Apart from llilIen,, lulo TreaEuL officials were invited to be greserit,
and on lJ. ![ay Shailes :ird de Jardine, and on 16 l'lay shalles and tang,
advised the Conunittee.
The agencla f,sr the f,irst rnetj:rgi, 11 Dtay noted ttrat:
the Minlster of t'inane€ has approved the provlsional!
gross oryenditure f,o-r eacl! departnrent. In Eene aI
these altl.ocatl-ons inelude the e<tst of lnlicies
class.ified ae A and E in the attached retrlolit''
!{inistets will bowever need to desj.de ryhich of t}re
proposals classii,f,led C and D ar€ Eo proceed this
financial year.
In addition, there may be other poficy Srrotrros-als
whiclr the tninLster,s aoncerned hav€ Rot included
in the attached rePart. fhe most no'tabl'e example
is ttre E'roEpsatr to fnetease social secur:i'ty
benefits.E6
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llhe Treasury had prepared another single-page paper (auagret Report
No. 15), entitled Go'vernlrent Finances: @neral O"tfoof fot fgZf/Za, dated
lO May 1973. Alttrougtr copies were
the other four neurbers of tlre CCpp,
distributed to the Prime ltinister and
the ninutes record e"l they were
of their reeting on ll l{ay. At t}tereclained from the latter at the end
very least, the report had sobering onertones:
1. I thought it rright be helpful to you if I sursnarised the
curr.ent position with regard to extrnnditure and revenue for
L973/74.
2. Expenditure allocations approved so far total sote 92,492
nillion. To t]lis mrst be added about $f5 ldlfion to allowfor partial restoration of ttre rather se\rere reductions in
the allocations for such items as regional derreloplEnt,
defence, forestry and Irlaori housing.
sone arlorranoe say $8 nitlion, must arso be ruade for expenditure
on ne$r policie's on sport and arts and in the education field.l{ith provision for an additional $30 rnillion for pulcric servie
salaries and $30 rniltion for the inevitable increases on
miscellaneous items that will be required to be provided
f,or in the SrryBlerentary Estimates, ttris would give an outlay
of $2.665 million [sic]. rf as much as $15 rdrlion is artanedf,or other miscellaneous policies yet to be selegted by ttre
CCPP, ttris will bring total C'overnnent Expenditure to $21680
million or €rn increase of alnpst 21 percent on the outturnfor L973/74.
Revenue is estimated at $2,333 nill_ion, leaving a deficit
before borrowing of $347 nillion. Ttre deficit for L972/73
was $206 rnillion. The view of tlle llonetary and Ecsrornic
council, which considered it was advocating only mild restraintin the field of fiscal poliry, was that the deficit for Lg73/74
should not greatly exceed the level of t}re L972/73 deficit.
If allowance is nade for t}te rerpval of soue of the farm
subsidies as outlined in Budget Report No. 12, this wouldinvolve a saving of $26 million Ln 1973/74. This wourd reducethe forecasted deficit before borrowing to $321 rnilrion. Ttris
does not allory for any changes in taxatlon and indieates the
seriousness of the fl.scal problem confronting Governr{Ent.
Copies attadrcd for dlstrlbution if you eo wish to the priteMinister and other -rneubers of the cabinet cormrittee on poliry
and Priorities.
3.
4.
5.
H.G. Lang [Secretary to ttre fr"asurtr]87
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The Minister of Finance opened the discussion by cornmenting that
he did not want to see the deficit before borrowing exceed $250 nillion
and he hoped that when provision was made for new pclicies the CCPP would
be able to prune these to a maximum of 915 million, as recommended by
Treasury. An "inconclusive discussion on a systematic means for pruning
o1d policies - in an overall way - in order to eliminate unnecessary
expenditure" then took place. During general discussion on Votel
Education, the Prime Minister indicated that he favoured the idea of
setting up a task force along the lines of that developed in Australia
to review expenditure in all votes, with a view to.eliminating unnecessarlt
expenditure. His comment was included in a post-meeting memo by an
alert Shailes to Lang, in TreasurT, but was not recorded by Millen in
the minutes for the neeting.
The Cornrnittee eventually approved funds (in addition to Category A
policies already committed a.s "unavoidabie" or "committed") for a nurnber
of iterns, the most expensive of which was a Health package totalling
$2,493,000, with an additional provision for pharmaceutical benefits. By
the time the meeting adjourned, ministers had approved a "running total"
of about $3r288 million, with total approvals to date reaching $3'968
millions.
The retrrcrt back to Treasury by Shailes on ttre procedures and
activities of the new Cabinet conunittee rdas apparently of some interest
to the Secretary, and Lang replaced de Jardine for the next meeting
on 16 May. Here various additions to Category A policies were authorised,
and the amount approved by both meetings tsoLalled $f-7r55or0o0 - already'
$215001000 over what Rowling wished to see as the upper fihit.88
It should be remernbered that when the CCPP was engaged in this exercise,
it did not have before it a consolidated report from ministers of their
poticy preferences, although the request for these, reiterated on 26 March, 
_
vras now several months old. Not only were expenditure decisions, wttich
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concentrated on new spending, made in the absence of such information
about priorities; there is no evidence in ttre records of either meeting
that ministers' attention focussecl on anything oLher than the irurediate
fiscal year. Nor is there any convincing evidence that rainisters were
fully avrare of the future cost irplications of policry itens where onry
brief three year projections r,rere provided. rn vote: Education, fotr
instance, approval was given for "classification A: rryrovenent in school
Guidance Service,',
Le73/74
$254,000
but little supporting
decision.
te74/75 L97s/76
$500,000 S75O,OOO
evidence was provided, or requined, in rnaking this
1ffie c@P did not neet again r:ntir August, several weeks after the
presentation of the audget. However, in Treasury.s pre-Budgret Report
(8 ilune) to the Minister of Finance the officials set out rhe Gorrcrnnent,s
final e:<pen&iture decisions ("as we understand them',) for eudgret announce_
rrsnt' rhe Seport deart with increases in social Security and Housing and
:reduced s'bsidies for farrning, arong lines previously recomnended by
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'r'reasu4t' rn addition at this tine nurerous papers were subnitted by
Treasury on Property speculation Tax, an interest which the Labour party
had declared in its pre-election manifesto. Notes in Cabinet office fiLes
dated 12 ilwre include a memo recording that in an oral presentation to
cabinet, the Minister of Fi.nance had reported as forrons:
r. Ttre Budget provides for net c;overnnent eq)end.iture ofS2605 miltion, an increase of lTrperc€nt o\rer tlat forL972/73- Ttre deficit before borrowing is estimated at
9232 niltion conpared with $2OG nillion in Lg72/73. Itreinpact of the Budget will theret'ore be e:<pansionary.
2. These figrures refLect the folLowing inajor ctranges on ttre
expenditure side:(a) + $73 rnillion for increase in sociar security benefits(b) rncreased advances to state Advances corporation (for
housing)(c) sl million to the cor:ncir for Recreation and sport(d) 
- $22 nrirrion (i.e. saving) through reduction in farm
subsidies. Sr:bsidy payrnents wiLl = 925 million,
132.
compated with onj.y $3 million five years ago.
$10 million will be set aside in a fund for
marketing assistance etc where necessary for
the farming sector.
(e) + $10 nillion aid to less deveLoped countries.
3. On revenue side, the main neasures are(a) removal of property tax from October I.
i.e. loss of $I9 million L973/74
$33 nillion 1974/75
(b) end of year adjustnents to shift and overtlme
tax (no effect on revenue)
(c) Housing savings scherne outlined in the Manifesto
had to be modified to take account of introduction
of National Superannuation Scheme' Revised
housing savings schemes gives tax rebates of
25 percent, on savings held for three years
torards purchase of first home. Post Office
savers will receive preference for State Advan-
ces Coryoration loans.
(d) 1O percent rebate on personal income tax continues
to the end of the financial years. From l- April
1974 new tax scale. Personal and related exenp-
tions to be replaced by rebates. This will mean
revenue loss of $130 million in L974/75.
(e) Standard allowance up to $50 all wage and sa1ary
earners irr lieu of other e)q)enses which rnay now be
cLaired.
(f) Share purchase loans for employees(S) company tax spread over 7 years will = revenue
increase of 936 million in the curent year.
(h) ilvestrnent incentives etc. (No revenue irnplica-
tions given for other measures).F
lltris report was received and approved by Cabinet on 11 JuIy and the
Budget was presented three days later. Ttrroughout the remainder of
L973, the CCPP !.ras preoccupied witJr acquiring control (and ascendancy)
in other fields - wage and price stabilisation policies, the development
of an econorui-c strategy and ttre introduction of "new machinery to implenent
ttre Governmentrs economic development and stabilisation policies" - i.e.
a replacernent for the National Developrnent Council systen. Very little
explicit discussion of financial. policies, e:<penditure reviews or
budgetary nanagement is included in the minutes of CCPP reetings from
May to Decenber 1973. However, ttre question of fiscal nanagement accor-
iling to party priorities lvas not forgotten.
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On Jrxre 22, inunediateJ.y after the first post-Budget Cabinet
meeting, Millen drafted a confidential meno to Rowling,
Minister of Finance, reminding him of the current status of various
economic strategy papers ttrat had been before tj:e cabinet and its
committees, Cabinetrs endorsement of the economic strategy paper
presented to it by the ccPP on 26 March (cu 73/t4/29r, and cabinetre
decision at ttrat ti:ne to reguest all ministers to indicate their
poJ-icy preferences in te:ens of their individuar portforios (i.e. an
extended ti-ne allowance for tlne initial request rnade on 19 December
Lg72). At the Cabinet nreeting, Millen wrote, Rowling had indicated hig
disappointrrent that only a few reports had been sr:bmitted by nrinisters
to the CCPP in response to Cabinetrs earlier invitation. Those received
had been prepared only at departrnental levei-. "You [nowling] e:<pressed dis-
appointment that lilinisters had not given greater attention to an exercise
which is clearly of continuing sigmificance if a successful strategy is
to be established so that specific policies can be frarned in ttreir right
order of priority."
"You [RowIinSJ recognrised," hovrever, that ttre 26 March urinute
nuight be an inadequate framework, and "you explained that you had in
hand the preparation of a paper which will identify - in the context
of the Governmentrs philosophy of economic strateglr - those subjects
on which reports by Ministers and ttreir departments are required."
Ttre memo went on to reca1l that this paper was to be presented in the
near future, and rninisterial cooperation would then be requiredl in
drawing up a priority list for policiu".9 t
Presumably at ttre suggestion of ttre Minister of Finance on
receiving this informal- memo, Lough, Deputy Secretary to tlre
Treasury, was asked to conunent on tl:e draft. As MiLlen had done,
Lough replied informally; in neittrer case was official letterhead,
or any file reference, used. Lough made some srnall arendments,
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incluiling the slightly tendentious observation that "As a general
comment, rfaster growttr' or 'better allocation of resourcesl
should not be looked on as an objective. lttre objective is probably
irnproving the welfare of the commrnity by better rreeting their desires
in social economic and, rquality of Lifer areas. Better use of our
resources to achieve higher 'per capitar output and economic grovrtlr is
a neans to bring forth tlre additional resources \,re must find to achieve
ttrose objectives. We do notwant to drift back to t growtlr in GNP
as the end objective.
Regards
[signed] NoeJ. rough .' 92
lliIlenrs draft nemo vras anended accordingly, dated 13 July, and submitted
as an amendnent to a paper presented by Rowling to Cabinet for endorse-
rent. The nemo included the following note to tflinisters:
The memo and its appendices set out, in relation to
the framework of the economic policy endorsed by t}e
C,overnment on 26 March 1973 (c]l 73/14/29) the progress
made on the presentation of reports on major policy
neasures. Some of the measures were incoqporated
in the 1973 Budget and others have been implemented
outside the Budget provision.
llhe memo also identifies sr.rbjects requiring
further work by ministers and their departments and
indicates where major policy decisions are reguired,
with the procedure set out for facilitating these
decisions.
Particular reference is made to tlre means of
achieving faster economic grolrth to enable the
implementation of Governnentrs social policy. Ttre
basic reguirements for tJle fulfilment of this
objective require -(a) the concentration of the country's productive
resources into areas tllat will rnaximise returns both
internally and externallyr €rnd
(b) ttre upgrading of the efficiency of supporting
and ancillary services for the main productive
sectors.
rn addition, reference is rnade to the need for Govern-
ment to have a firrn policy on demand management and in
matters affecting incomes and prices. Appendix 1.
contains a schedule of topics on which further reports are
required from departments, which deadlitres defined.
Appendix 2. is a summary of measures taken to date on
specific policy issues in accordance with C,overnmentrs
stated economic strategy, and points out where policy
decisions stiLl nee<1 to he ma<le."93
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At this point is should be noted that. Cabinet agreed witJl
RowlingIs arguments for j-uunediate ministerial attention to tlre
protracted task of priority setting, and published this agreement in
a Cabinet l"linute to ttrat effect, dated 16 July 1973.94
Throughout the first three weeks of August the CCPP lyas preoccupied
wittr difficult wage stabilisation negotiations, and the increasing
workload apparently necessitated augmenting the Committee's membership.
On 13 JuIy it was agreed that C. Moyle, l"linister of Agriculture, shoul-d
be asked to join tbe CCPP to assist in the co-ordination of ministersl
reports on progress made in irnplernenting rnajor policy r..".rt"".95 Early
in August it was proposed by Freer that,J. Wal-ding, Ivlinister of Overseas
Trade, be co-opted to the CCPP. In a note in his own hand, the Pri:le
Minister h/rote briefly, if somewhat, less than warmly, "I have no objection
to concurring with this proposal to co-opt l4CfI in this case. (signed
96N.. K. 17/8/73n'
The first minister to respond to the Cabinet directive (I5 July) and
make a submission to the CCPP as instructed, was lrlatt, Minister of Labour,
q?
on 20 August.-' Treasury had submitted a brief interim report on a ninor
area of policy interestr9S brra all other ministerial reports were still
ouistanding. Ministers were then given another extension of time 
- 
until
September, the Cabinet secretary recolded, "in recognition of the heavy
invol-vement of Departments in the current stabilisation measures, (although)
the Minister of Finance points out that work on longer terrn policy must
continue".99 Because it was then realised that three members of the CCPP
including the Prirne Minister were going to be overseas during Septenber,
it was decided to give a further extension till late October, which would
give the Minister of Finance adequate time to consider an econornic strategfy
before Christmas, in conjunction with the annual COPE report.
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During october and september, however, profor:nd differences of
approach to the business of economic rnrnagement becane 
"pp"r"rt.IOo
The ccPP received conflicting and highly assertive advice frour officials
in Treasury and ttre Department of Trade and Industly (each wittr tlreir
own cluster of ministerial and departnental al1ies). CCpp ministers
were in a state of extrene anxiety. One desperate soLution appeared
to lie in ttre fonnation of some sort of informed cabal of well-intentioned
private citizens. Ministers and officials exchanged papers as ttrough
they were gar:ntlets, barbed with the claims of ttreir competing
interest groups and hurled across the ccpp table with real passlon.
The seeming incompatibility of belief in what constituted the nrost
appropriate line to take in New Zealandrs economic developn€nt $ras
complicated by a mutual tendency for both sides to guote ttre Cabinet
endorsement of 26 March as the sourceoftheir own authority. the fact
that Cabinet had not been priry to the full background to that decision
caught the c€PP up in a toil of i.ts own making. rn addition, the
Corruaittee had been unable to extract from its ministerial colleagrues
compliance witir the request ttrat poLicy priorities be defined for each
department. This was a persistent running sore rdrich the intense,
bitter crashes over economic strategry d:id little to heaL. An inner
cabinet, operati-ng by its own wish largery in secret, vras proving a
ratl:er uncomfortrtle creation, arthough ministers ,,on the outer,'
cherished strong ambitions to be a&nitted to tiis powerful group.
Winchester, in his study of PPB and various review exerciseg
conducted as part of the deveropnent of this system, rep,orts tllat in
october 1973 ttre Government, recognrising ttre pressure on resources in
all sectors in tJle economy, directed that departments should undertake
a second existing poliry review. This exercise, r:n1ike the generalised
survey requested at the beginning of tfie year, was intended to infonn
137 .
Ministers on the timing of e:<penditure for the remainder of the
financial yeat L973/74. Supplelentary Estimates and the forthcomlng
COPE
down
exercise appeared unJ.ikely to produce evidence of any slowing
in ttre rate of publLc sector spending. Probl-ems over stabilisa-
tion policies, and protracted and difficult negotiations over wages in
particular combined to generate an air of crisis in central government.
Winchester comrents as follows:
In particular, departments were asked not to cormrit
expenditure in 1973-74 *rich could be delayed.
They were also warned that Supplerentarry Estimates
would not be entertained unless the department concer-
ned could show that financial requirements could not
be met at least in part from savings which could be
made elsewhere in tie Vote.
Inplenentation of tJle Cabinet directive was
Treasurlrs responsibitity. Therefore, by Cabinet
mercrandum the Secretary to t}le Treasury asked the
permanent heads to personally review the timing of
rernaining e:<penditure for L973/74 and make sure that
deferrable e:genditure would not be conunitted.
In accordance with ttre Cabinet directive, depart-
ments were to report the results of their revierys to
Treasuty by urid-November 1973, including details of
any under-e:genditure by progrEilune for the current
financial year. It should be noted that these reviews
were not ained at reducing expenditr:re, but at deferring
the timing to a subsequent year.
The review disclosed a projected o\rer-e:ipendlture
of $18.2 nil-lion Ln 22 votes and under-etqrenditure of
923.8 rnilLion in 8 Votes, a net r:nder-e:<Srenditure of
$5.6 million. However, in 16 Votes both an over-
e:rpendlture and an under-expenditure was projdcted.
This indicated that npney $ras being tranferred or
reprogramlEd by underspending i-n one area to finance
overspending in another. This information was submitted
to Cablnet and agreenent reached that for the last slx
nonths of each financial year a monthLy schedule indica-
ting ex5ncted outturn for each Vote would be submitted
to t}te llinister of Finance.
However, Treasury did not recornpnd to Cabinet that
departments be directed to defer any of this expenditure
to do ttris. There were no measurable savings frorn this
second 1973 review of existing policies, and there is no
evidence to show that any expenditure was deferred as a
consequence of it.lOl
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Winchester also reports that Treasury Instructions al:eady
reguired permanent heads to provide for ministers a monthly return
of Expenditure under each Vote, and report after September eactr year
on total expected expenditure by Vote and by programrne. Departments
lvere to show where any over-expenditure was f-ikely to occul, and re5nrt
on any corrective action they proposed to avoid thi".loa CIearIy, by
late 1973, this procedure was either not being employed property by
departments, or was not given sufficient attention by ministers.
On 2t November, during the protracted debate over the economLc
strategy, CCPP Minutes incLuded the following record:
the Conmittee agreed that greater coordination should
occur at Cabinet level. While Ministers must exercise
the authority delegated to them - in line with theirportfoJ"io responsibilities - there was neverthel-ess a
continuing requirement for prior consultation in matters
which affected the general thrust of Government policy
and for which the Cabinet had a collective responsibility.
There should be more provision of tinue in Cabinet for
discussion of overall poJ.icy and its direction, although
in some cases (e.9. poliry on containerisation) it would
be preferable for the decision to be taken by a snraller
group than Cabinet itself. 103
Thus we can see Ulat although tJ.e CCPP was becoming a familiar part of
the madrinery of central government, regularly consul-ted by officials
fnom various departments, and beginning to erploy the established
cabi-rret office procedures (e.g. regular meeting times, regular submission
of official papers a few days before meetinqs, in time for distribution
to an approved list of persons) the Ministers who comprised its rneuiber-
ship were relatively insecure. Not only did they appear to enteftain
severe doulcts about the ability of their colleagues to respond jn a
cooperative manner to specific requests for information (such as the
policy priorities), but they o'bviously guestioned other mjnistersl
wiJ.lingness to discipline themselves and their departrnents in terms of
their individual wishes and organisational e:<penditure anbitions.
The oJ.igarchic response to this, connpn enough in times of stress, was
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to turn inward, to reassert their own primary in decision-making.
What the CCPP, frequently attended by onJ.y tt4'o or three of its full
compl.ement, needed was tire... time to contempLate the spending
policies of the previous government, ti:ne to weigh up the merits of
conflicting arguments about econornic developnent and industrial- relations,
time to construct innovative and feasible structures for pr:bJ-ic partici-
pation, wittr governrnent control, in national planning endeavours; The
one grace history was not to allow ttrem was time.
In mid-December, ttre Cornmittee of Officials on Public E:genditure
(COPE) reported to ttre lvlinister of Finance, and ttre confidential report'
with its accompanying Treasury conment, was tabled in Cabinet on L7
December. It was intended to be a soberi:rg e:q>erience. The Governnent
was informed that existing poJ-icy costs would absorb all of the 3 per-
cent increase allowed for in the ercpenditure strate W, ! lL percent
set aside for new poLicies. The bleak consequence of this was that
"tlrere is no allowance for new policies in L974/75 ." Total forecast
costs represented a 14 percent increase on outturn fot L973/74, and
"no allowance has been made for further nen policies and costs arislng
from increased oil- prices." The report continued in a similar vein:
At ttris time last year the forecast increase in
Governnent expenditure vtas J.1.9 percent - a figrure
broadly comparable with this year's 14.I percent.
Actual outturn for L973/74 is likely to be about
2I percent. The possiJcility of similar escalatlon
in L974/75 cannot be ruled out in view of t}te
continued, flow of new and costly decisions fron
Cabinet. Ttris prospect should be avoided at alL
costs. Last year's result was cushioned somewhat
by employing formerly under-utilised resources, but
the cor:ntry is now hard up against ceilings on supply
of labour and goods. The prospect of a 14 percent
increase in Government expenditure is already too high
(a) in relation to real growth of the economy(b) because it is inflationary,departrnents are
likeJ-y to be unable to spend their alloca-
tions, and if they do succeed it will- be at
t}re cost of perpetual inflation and the
frustration of the @vernment's stabilisationpolicies.
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Current terms of trade are extraordinarily favourable...
But a cautious attitude to the future is warranted
since this level (115 current irldex) has been reached
onJ.y in two of the 30 odd post-ltar years. Ttre
concomitant of such good conditions is very high e:port
incornes and a windfaLl level of tax receipts. The
right policy is not to build permanent expenditure
policy on these probably temporary benefits, but to nake
a npre determined effort to divert er4>enditure like1y to
make calls on dorestic resources in ttre meanti:re to
overseas sources of supply. A specifie poficy which
should be implerented forthwith is the rerpval of the 25
percent price loading on import tenders by purchasLng
departments.
Experience in New Zealand and overseas shonrs ttnt
the main impact of new policy decisions occurs in tlte
years after the first. It is iqportant to bear i-n nind
that decisions already made by Government wil.l hare an
even larger impact on expenditure levels over the fore-
cast perioil. In these cirsumstances, the introductLcn
of new policies should be kept to an absolute $nimrrn.
It is Treasuryrs view that there is no scotrre for
approving substantial additional new policies during the
next two years. If new policies continue to be adopted
at tJ:e present rate next year then drastic crrts in
Governnent expend.iture may become necessary in 1975 invol-
ving a reversal of policies in mid-strean.
The options open
which it is suggested
Cabinet on 17 Decenber
to C'overrurent to restrain e-'<trnnditure
you discuss with your colleagues in
are
(a) defer any further neld poliry proposals neantire(b) invite all Ministers to immediately review tlre
existing activities of their departrnents aod
indicate areas where expenditure could be pnured.
t'linisters should direct their depar@nts to
incorporate in their reviews specific protrnsals
for substituting overseas expenditure' desigmed
to minimise the use of domestic resources (a
similar ad hoc review was undertaken early this
year but did not yield any substantial salrLngs).
However, Ministers have now had 12 rsrths erqlerience
with the operation of tlreir Departrents. :Ihis
option is recormnended bY Treasury;
(c) inqrlementing forthwith removal of 25 percent loading
on imported tendersi
(d) consider implementing an arbitrary percentage cut in
forecast net expenditure for all departmenls (this
suggestion has been tried i-n previous years and found
to be unsatisfactory. Ii is not recomnended) t
(e) to lay down (as in ttre COPE report) guidelines as to
areas in Government expenditure wher:e reductions should
be sought;
(f) restrict staff leve1s, admitlistrative and oper:ating
expenditure and capital works in L974/75 (these
tneasures have also been applied on an ad troc basis
in previous years but offer no long term solulion to
achieving savings in Goverrtment expenditure.)
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(S) consider appointing a special cornmittee along
ttre lines of the coombs corunitte (Australia)
1973, to assess whether existing priorities
and expenditure were in line with trnlicy.
The Committee would comprise people drawn from
outside the Public Service and topline depart-
mental officers seconded for the purpose.
This is a longer-term option recomrcnded by
Treasury.
Attempts by C'overnrnent to spend at the 14.1 percent
increase rate in L974/75, or at even higher rates will
deprive tlre private sector of even more of its trailitional
share of total goods and senrices. The mechanism by
which this would occur would be either
(a) by inflation. Expenditure at these levels in
tJre private sector would push prices beyond ttre
Ievel where private purchasers could competet or
(b) by increasing taxes and charges so ttrat t}te
transfer of purchasing power is made with as
little inflationary impact as possible.
Both (a) and (b) are contrary to @vernmentrs announced
policies. The remaining renedy is therefore (c) a deternrined
policy of reducing forecast leveIs of Government expenditure.
obviously ttris means deferring some existing trnliciesr a
freeze on new expenditures unless comparable savings are made,
and the shift, as far as can be made, to overseas supply
sources. Iu!
Lang had recomnended that his report go to both Cabinet and the
CCPP. Ttris and each of his other recommandations lvas agreeil to by
Cabinet. When tire CCPP met two days later, with ttre Prime tlinister over-
seas, ttre Treasury report was not specifically itemised anong ttre agenda
papers, but, wittr officials present fornrally for ttre first time, there
was a noticeable increase in the mlnistersr gri:nness of attitude towards
various fiel-ds. Ttre need for "mandatory" policies, "tough policies"
and "rea1 control-" in various areas was frequently mentioned. Despite
the hitherto alnpst r:nparalleled terms of trade, ministers c-ould not
help but be depressed by the evidence of profligacy and Poor e)q)enditure
pl-anning they and their colleagues had displayeil before ttre stern and
critical permanent advisers of the central bureaucracy.
lltre CCPP had met on 13 different occasions during 1973, witlr
l4illenr Secretary to the Cabinet, as its secretary from the end
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of l'larch on. The Prime l'linister, Kirk (Chairman) attended only four
of these meetings 
- 
the initial discussion (9 January), the two meetings
when the Estimates were considered (11 and 16 !4ay) and once more on 6
November. Most of the work of chairing the meetings rtas done by the
Prine Ministerts deputy, Watt, who presided over seven meetings in aII.
He was replaced in tte chair on one occasion (6 November, by the Minister
of Finance, Rowling, although Kirk $ras present), and once by Freer,
Minister of Trade and Industry. Both Rowling and Freer attended CCPP
meetings regularly 
- 
the Finance minister was absent on only one
occasion, through illness, while Freer missed only two meetings. The
Ministers of Agriculture and Overseas Trade, Moyle and Walding attended
occasionally but were not admitted as formal members of the CCPP untit
November 1973. The Secretary to the Cabinet, Millen, recalled that
membership of the CCPP was much sought after. It was considered a mark
of significance to be invited to attend, and a token of ministersr
/
acceptability in the inner circle of executive power to be formally
admitted as a regular member after late 1973.
An interesting syrnbolic sidelight on the character of this new
conunittee was the fact that its first twelve rneetings were held in the
Prjme !{inisterts office (whether Kirk was present or not), and after
November 1973 in the Cabinet room itself. Millen reported that it
was unprecedented, either before or since, for any group other than
the Cabinet proper to use this particular sanctum for meetings.
Numerous officials attended the CCPP from time to time during
L973 - Millen, of course, was always presenti Lang, Secretary to
the Treasury, attended on four occasions, Davey, Secretary of Labour,
attended four times (a reflection of the industrial preoccupations
of the Cornmittee), and Lythgoe (ssc) attended twice. Various
others from the departments of Treasury (ghailes, de Jardine, Malcolml
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Trade and Industry (Clark , Lewin, Datsan and Moriarty) and
Agriculture and Fisheries ()tacrant) attended once each.
on 7 November, ttre ccPP, heavily engaged in negotiating acceptable
wage and incomes policies, decided to meet on a regular (rather than
ad hoc) basis - every second Vledrresday at 8 a.m. With tlre colunence-
nent of this practice, paPers for consideration by ttre Couunittee were
to be submitteil to the Secretary by ttre Monday before ttre fortnightly
reeting. A note to this effect was distri}uted to all Permanent
heads and private secretaries, and this information coupled with the
forrnal admission of TreasurT and other officials as pertnarnent parti-
cipants in CCPP meetings from 19 Decernber, gave formal recogmition to
the presence, and status of the "inner Cabinet" group'
Review of existing PoIicY 1973/74
On 14 Deceniber, Lg73, Treasury hacl pointed out to the l"linister
of Finance and his colteagues that "tJ.e forecast level of expenditure
for 1974/75 is moving towards a 20 percent per annum increase for the
ttrircl year nrnning and this level is compl-etely out of step with the
trend of real growt5 and resour*t."105 Three days later cabinet
authorised the start of another review of existing poJ-icies in a
Cabinet Minute which pointed out that with increased government expen-
diture of about 20 percent in 1974/75, and' wittr ttre likely financial
impact of any approved new policies, drastic cuts in expenditure or
significant increases in taxation or borrowing could be necessary.
Departments, via t}eir ministers, wele instructed to review their
existing activities with a view to
(a) restraining government spen'ling in L974/75, and(b) identifying specific areas where, in t}re meantirrc'
overseas e>Qenditure could be sr:bstituted for
domestic funds in order to save domestic labour
and resources.106
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Ttrese instructions vtere based on Treasury advice very like
that which Lang had given to the Cabinet Economic Committee a year
before, when he advocated caution in public sector spending. He
had then suggested several approac;lres. First1y, to avoid rnaking new
commitments until ttre major policy changes to which the C;overnment was
already [i.e. rebmaqf 1973] pledged had been exarnined and their full
expenditure irrplications properly assessed. T'weLve rcnths later this
task had still not been carried out.
SecondLy, to carry out a reappraisal of existing policies.
"Scope here is limited and apart from minor economies, the nain
avenue of savings would appear to be in tJle area of assistance to
farmers." flle first review of existi:ng policies in 1973 had
confirmed Lang's pessirnism, atthough its failures may have been caused
at least as rmrch by deficiencies ofadministrative leadership on
Treasury's part and habituaL conservatism by other permanent heads ae
by ministerial laxity.
lltre third approach Lang had identified was the slot'ring dom of the
inuned,iate fulfilnent of policy cornmitments. Ihe second 1973 review'
which aimed to defer policy e:rpenditure, \tas an attempt to experiment,
aLbelt rather unsuccessfully, with this suggestion. Lang had also
reconunended that consideration be given to easing the mounting pressure
on domestic resources by naking greater use of the (then) arnple over-
seas resources available to "us." He pointed out that these took the
form of a surlplus on current accognt, a continuatly high level of
private capital inflow and very substantial foreigm exchange t"".*"".Io?
Ihis advice was included in ttre Cabinet minute, J-7 Decerrber 1973, which
asked departments to attempt to sdtstitute local for overseas costs. A
In ttris first 1974 e:qenditure review departrnents ltere to reSrort on
available savings to their rninisters during December-January, with ttre
resuLts in Treasuryrs hands by the end of January. Treasury would
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collate the resurts, and fo.nrard a consoridated report to the ccpp.
9linchester notes that "as a ronger tenn option, cabinet agreed to
consider appointing a special commj-ttee consisting of people drawn
from outside the PubLic Service and top line departmental officials
arong ttre rines of the coombs cornrnittee in Australia.,,1@ Ttre early,
official-Iy unrecorded cornrnent by rirk in May I9Z3 had been
squirreled away in Treasurl/r and brought out at what appeared to be
€rn appropriate tiue. It rrras an illustration of the feeling of
suspicion and even distrust of the Pr:blic Senrice ttrat had appeared
in the tabour rninistersr discussions over economic strategy the previous
109year.
Wtren Treasury reported to ttre Minister of Finance on 20 February
L974, the ind.ications were that as in 1973 the review had produced
little paydirt. On behalf of Lang, Shailes reported ',few areas
where Ministers firmly recommended that savings in e:<penditure couLd
be ach:ieved r:nder existing gnricies.', They had trninted to some areas
where, wittr stringent contrors, small gains could be made, but on the
whole, shaiLes poi-nted out, the only way to save wourd be to change
poLicies 
- a "reappraisar of Goverment's spending priorities.,,llo
In terms of its second. task, the first 1974 review indicated that
ministers were unabre to find nuch scope for substituting overseas
o<pend.iture, and "on balance and in view of the change in outlook for
t'tte balance of payments Treasury reconunends that this point not be
pursued." The Treasury report concluded bluntly that "unless there are
major changes in c;overnment poriry, particularJ-y those rel-ating to
stabiLisation, there is rittle or no seope for reducing e:<penditure on
existing activities". The recorunendation therefore, lras ttrat Cabinet
"note" the results of the revigw, and that the report be for:rrarded to the
CCPP for irunediate appraisal of the small offerings made by departments,
in ttre fight of TreasurT,s comments on tlr."..lil
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The only significant areas of reduction identified by departments
and verified by Treasuty were all politically sensitive. The prine
Minister, Kirk, had spent rmrch of 1973 pursuing foreigm affairs
and was a strong advocate for a generous attitude tonards developing
countries, particularly in the Pacific. Although a sigmificant reduc-
tions on overseas aid was nominated as an area for e:<pend.iture savings,
ttris proposition did not meet with Kirkrs approval. An inter-
departrnental conuruittee had proposed that some S34 nillion shoulcl be spent
on aid overall in 1974/75. coPE, with Treasuryrs support, had recorrended
that this be reduced to $24 rnillion. Kirk rejected any suctr. reductions,
and Trbasuryrs report to the Cabinet in Februaty 1974 noted t]lat,'the
Prime Minister considers that worthwhile savings could only be made in
areas of activity where cuts of the magnitude [significantly, not qr:oted
in the report] reguired would mean a major scaling-down of the foreigm
trnricy objectives the Government has been pursuing.r' The reality was
that both the Foreign Affairs department and Treasury could satisfy
their need to appear virtuous in recormnending cuts, since it was perfectly
obvious ttrat sornething as dear to the Prime Ministerrs heart as this would
alrpst certainly not succeed in Cabinet.
Reductions and,/or removal of sr:bsid.ies in Vote Agriculture and
Fisheries, and vote: stabilisation, and the lifting of the existi:rg freeze
on Post office, Railways and Electricity charges had also been nominated
as areas of worthwhile reductions. once again, these were particularly
hot political potatoes, included in Labour's election platfo:m, but under
considerable stress throughout Ig73, and in some cases ttre basis for
negotiated agreements reached wittr rnuch difficulty during the partyrs
first year in office. They were unlikery to go far. A specific change
in the mil-k subsidy, for exampre, could. yierd about $37 nirlion; but at that
stage the very ideo of making domestic milk nrore expensive was still anathema
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to ministers whose political and sentimental roots lay in the Depression
of the 1930's. SimiJ.ar1y, a suggested reduction yielding some 916 million
ttrrough the abolition of subsidies on bread and sugar was unlikely
to appeal to Labour party men and r^rornen whose political liyes depended on
protecting such basic commodities for ttreir erectoral supporters.
In all' four departrnents had suggested about $5 million in possible
savings; Treasury had suggested that some $85 miltion couLd be added from
16 other Votes. However, in its report Treasury d"icl not rnake any comoent
whatsoever on the quality, or the adequacry of departmental replies,
which had 3enerally been aLong the lines that "a reduction would irnpair
our efficiency" or in some other unspecified way reduce ttreir capacity
to irnprement covernment trnlicy. rn his three rine report, watt, for
instance, had found "it difficutt to see where any savings could be affected."
The departmental advice.on which he based this had given hin the necessary
resolve to resist Treasury (and his eolleagrues):
I I Secretary of LabourJ have re-examined ttre ne] expen-diture forecasts submitted by the Department [of f,abour]for the coPE review and r now confirm that the forecasts
were based on minimum requirements for the continuation
of existing policies and existing levels of servies.
The commitnent of e:<penditure under all headings is kept
under close control and indeed without such close controlit could be expected Crat spending would be significantly
higher than ttre forecast leveL,
Restraints on expenditure increases were applied
wherever seen as practicabLe in the course of the forecast
exercise. It should be noted that the Depart_mentrs net
expenditure forecast for 1974/75 ($t0,O2O,OOO) is Less than3t higher than the estirnated outturn for tJle current finan-
cial year (L973/74r.
Comparative fig.r:res for the three years L972/73 to
1974/75 arez
Total net expenditure Increase on previous vear
L972-73 $9,232,000 30.6 percentL973-74 $9,745,000 (est.) S.6 percentL9'14-75 $1O,O2O,OOO (est.l 2.8 percent 11?-
After a discussion of t*ro areas - migration recruitment and expenditure
enplolarent pronotion 
- the Secretary of Labour added that "it would be
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difficult ... to further restrain expenditure and virtually irnpossible
to make any significant savings without looking towards changes of
policy and curtailment of existing services. lfhe cutting back of,
services under any of the Departnentrs main activities (nmplo1nment,
Irunigration and Industrial Relations) could be exSrected to have an
adverse effect on ttre generaL industrial relations position and on
national productivitf .. ."
In the absence of comprehensive and authoritative aLternati.ves, the
deParEnent's arguments, wittr their intimidating caveats, were bor:nd to
succeed, despite Treasurlr's reconurnndations.
The report from Treasury on the first existing Snlicy review of L974
was fo::vrarded by Cabinet to the CCPP, as reconmended. It rernained on
the agenda of the Committee for another three months, and there it
languished. Winchester observed that "the fact that the ... review hras
conducted at a tirne in January when many departrental officials were on
holi.day (as had happened tJre previous year), that it was quite superficial
(in that procedural gruidelines, firm and detailed instructio,ns for its
conduct were not provided) and that none of the proposals Treasulry suggested
[was] supported by economic analysis to derrcnstrate t]re wisdom of the
actions being proposed, may have had some bearing on ttre outcotrre of this
review and the lack of action by ttre Government on the final retrnag."l13
Towards tlle 1974 Budget
Ttre strategic Budget report to the l"linister of Finance (Budget Report
No.I) included a number of policy recomrendations all pointing in the saroe
direction: slow down public and private spending rates, maintain present
levels of government revenue, and actively encourage export-oriented
industrial developrn"rrt".ll* This report was fo:*rarded to ttre CCPP, and
followed shortly aftenpards by another Treasury paper (14 !1arch 19741
entitled "Net Goveqlment Expenditure 1974-'75". It was pointed out that
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the coPE forecast for L974-75 represented a 14.1 percent increase
t}te 1973-74 forecast. However, revisions of actuar expenditure
Ln L973/74 had shown ttrat there was in fact a lorer outturrr 
- 
that Ls
a lower financial base, giving a revised increase of rz.L percent.
Treasury has received departmental- requests for Lg74/7s
based on Government, poricies approved to appro:rimately
22 Februanl L974. Returns have arso been received of
'ne!r' policy requests. Sore dor:bl-e counting between
the reports is evident. A rough check has been nade to
eliminate t}te larger items (detailed revias in two weeks)
and allowances have been nade for later sa1ary and wage
increases during the year, for higher sociar we!.farebenefits and for sorre c-ost escalation.
At this provisional stage, the departmental re.quests
. 
(including all new poricies) befor:e normal pruning look
more like costing 25 percent more tJran ttre estimated out-turns for 1973/'14.
Not included are new p,olicy requests by State Advan-
ces corporation (SAC) comprising approximately $90 urlllicnfor housing and farm loans and proposals for substitutingloans for higher capitalisation of famiJ-y benefits. Ttrese
could lift requested e>cpenditure to 28 percent above Lg-73/74.
ReaL Expenditure
Cabinet directed COPE to do its work in I9Z3 on tJlebasis of a 3 percent rise in the cost of existing trnlicies
' during 1974/75, leaving ltr percent for ,new' policies.
coPE reported that the cost of poricies already approved by
ciovernment as at Augrust l9z3 woul-d absorb nearLy art the
combined alLc,wance i.e. 4.3 percent.
Budget Report No.l outlined the general baclground, L.e.
sre can contemplate a 5 perc€nt rise in domestic output but
a loss of overseas purchasing power because of adverse terms
of trade, equivarent to a decline of 4 percent in the.oross
domestic output.
WitJl only 1 percent increase in real resources ttrus
available from current production for tJ e wbole of ttre pr:b1ic
and private sectors, it will obviously be necessary to
exercise firm restraint on real grovrth in Government sector
craims on available goods and services, even if, as appearsdesirable, substantial overseas borrowing will be arranged.
Treasury then went on to descri.be "Areas for pnining., arising from ttre
recent Review of Existing Policry by t4inisters. It suggested, anong ottrer
things, reductions in overseas aid and in subsidies, and increases in bulk
charges (for ex^mple by t}re post office) as re;rns to ,,release tmre
resources for aLternative 'new' policies." Treasury expected to gain about
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930 million out of its normal pnming of departrnental requests and
through elininating double counting. It fointed out that the New
Policy reSnrt, fomarded to t}re CCPP on 17 l4arch 1974 would shor"r a
total of $176 nillion, of which $45 nillion was alneady corunitted or
r:navoidable. "The discretionary area", the report stated, *""tatrr=
about 5133 mtLlion, plus the SAC!s hpproximatelli 990 million polJ-cy
pro;rosals.
llhe aim should be a provisional allowance of no ntore
than $I5 million on the grounds that this would lift
net Government expenditure Ln 1974/75 by 19 percent in
money terms. Xtris implies a high rate of inflation
and a very signnificant increase in that proportion of
the countt1lrs resources conunanded by cenbral @vernment -
bearing in mind tJle I percent estimated rise in the volurne
of goods and services available for dorestic use before
overgeas borrowing or use of reserves.
Treasury therefore recomnended that no rbre than $15 nillion should be
approved for new policy proposals unless savings could be made in such
areas as subsidies and C,overnment charges. A further paper (Budget
r15
Report No.2) was attached showinlt reconmended sr:bsidy savings. The new
policy report (Budget Report No.4) subrnitted on the sarne date (I4 March)
showed that some changes in format had been introduced by Treasur-y over
the 12 nonttr period. There were slight changes in ttre classificationsr
with the general effect of tightening up the systern. The two schedules
to the Report showed l. Policies approved by Government since
Septenrber 1973 and,
Poticies not yet approved which Ministers
may wish to introduce during 1974/75 and
r,rtrich will involve expenditure in 1975-76.
2.
Classifications
Classification
within these schedules were as follows:
A: ComnitrEnts: "Policies approved which will involve
e:<penditure in L974/75 or subsequent
yeafs; "
(as for L973\ iClassification B: Unavoidable
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Classification C_: (as for 1973);
crassification D: Delete or defer: policies which in the opinion of
rf Treasury should be deferred or deleted.
These include proposals which are highly
questionabLe, are not cost-effective, would
not contribute sigmificantly to the attain-
ment of prograrT[ne objectives and have not
been backed up with sufficient prior
analysis and written justification.
As an example, Education department bids (nracle on behalf of the Minister,
P. Arcs) looked like this:
Le74/7s LeTs/76 Le76/7?
Schedule 1: (comprisecl 24 policies) 61109 61070 5rggl
Schedule 2: (comprised 91 polieies
not yet approved by
t]:e Government) 23,667 47,663 5I.905
Total 29,775 53,733 571816
F"ttrther, Treasury noted ttrat the Educational Development Conference, conducted
by the Labour Government lvas likely to produce policy proposals estlmated to
cost roughly $ZSO nillion, although there was no indication of l*rere thLs
calculation had come from.
Treasury then recommended ttrat all policies in CLass.C (totalling
$1'374rooo on the first year, rising to $1,543,000 ia 1976/771 and
class.D ($21,778,ooo Ln L974/75, $45,593,000 in t97S/76, $49,817,000 in
L976/77) be reconsidered, or deletefldeferred. without cr.ass.D, the
total for Schedule I would be :
L975/75 L97s/76 Le76/77
($000)
7,997 8,l_40 7 ,ggg
In ttre liqht of Treasury's parallel recomnendation that all new policies
together total no rbre ttran $15 rnilliori, this account of what had already
1Ib
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been approved by the Government allowed for very little manoeuvre.
fn an unprecedented step, the CCPP decided to hold a special
meeting to consider new policies in Tizardrs private home in Auckland
117
on 17 March.--' As usual with Budget papers, classifications
were "secret" and distribution limited to the members of the Connmittee.
During the previous weeks the Comnittee, particularly the Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Labour, Watt, had been engaged in difficult
stabilisation debates with the Employers Federation and the Federation
of Labour. The records of all meetings held during this period
convey an impression of enorTnous tension and stress upon individual
ministers. The tight report from Treasury on the state of the ecorrortye
and'the lack of room for satisfaction of party and ministerial adbitions
must have contributed to their feelings of pressure and frustration.
Kirk took the chair, with all four members, pJ-us I'aulkner (Minister
for State Services) present. Three Treasury officials, Lang, Green
and de Jardine had travelled to Auckland, with ttre Cabinet Office
Secretary, l'lillen, for the examination.
Treasury began with a brief restatement of the state of affairs.
"Any slack that may have existed
economy had now been fully taken
lras nolr needed - the maximurn for
in resources availabl-e to the New Zealand
up." It was stated that a tough line
new policies should be $15 million unless
offsetting savings could be found. 1\ro Treasury papers (3994 and 3570) 
.
had indicated what specific action might be taken by the ministers.
'rAttention r^ras drawn to attempts by all Departments to reach for something
unattainable in their Votes. The CCPP should insist that no Vote went
through unless there was a reasonable assurance that necessary resources
would be available to implement proposed policies; otherwise there would
simply be a cost escalation."
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After this opening, aimed at stiffening resolve, the question of
sgbsidies was discussed. It was stated that increases in oil prices
must be passed on, with Ern accompanying pr:blic relations exercise,
,,for example through an inquirYr or aWhite Paper... 1972 electoral comnit-
ments affected by t}Ie energy crisis constituted a new ball gane, the
rules of which should be drawn uP now, rather than in ]-975.rr It was
agreed to seek an urgent rePort from the Monetar-]r and Econonuic Council
on the "econortic impact of higher oil prices - as the background to
formulation of corrective and compensating policies by the C'overnrnent"
Desperate situations called for drastic remedies. It was agreed that
ttre accumulated deficit in ttre Wheat Account should be met by a special
subsidy of about 96 nillion, and the remaining sr:lcsidies on bread removed;
that the sr:bsidies on sheeP meats should be removed by the end of the
npnth; and the wool price stabilisation scheme phased out, if apProved
by cabinet when it nEt the following day. The latter point was to be
raised on 18 March by the Minister of Trade and Industry (Freer)
but the minutes included the cryptic postcript that "this was not raised
in Cabinet on 18 l,tarch 1974." Cabinet was to be asked to consider
removing the sugar subsidy (which Cabinet jn fact deferred, as an
item for decision, gntil later in March). The CCPP deferred discussion
on increases elsewhere recommended, such as milk, electricity tariffst
Post office charges and RaiI charges.
Trhe Committee then moved on to discuss Budget Report No.4, on New
Policies fox 1974/?5. 23 Votes were discussed and nurnerous changes made
to ttre classification for trnlicies - generally noving then up the scale
e.g. from D to C or, occasionally C to A. Education's new policies were
put agailst the general background of the Educational Development
Conference, from which "a comprehensive plan [was] e:<pected to ererge."
lltre long afternoon ended at 5.30, when the Committee adjourned, intending
to reconvene in Wellington trvo davs after Cabinet net, on ZO parctr.llt
r54.
In fact, this neeting was cancelled, and when the CCPP met on
22 l'larch, the Prime I'linister was absent, so Watt took the chair.
The agenda was longl but made somewhat easier to deal with by the decision
taken at the beginning that all "D" classifications were to remain in
force for L974/75 unless there srere "exceptional circurnstances." Nine
more votes were considered, and the group once more adjourned until ttreir
regular scheduled meeting on Wednesday 27th.
The day before, on 26 llarch, Ivlillen sent a memo to the l'linister
of Trade and Industry, with copies to the Chairman of the CCPP' tJle Minister
of Agriculture (Moyle), the Secretary of Treasury and the Controller and
Auditor General confirming that "the CCPP at its meeting on L7/3/74
agreed that the sr:bsidies on sheep meats should be removed from 3L/3/74".
Another similar memo was sent to Freer noting that on the same day the
CCPP had agreed that "the WooL Price Stabilisation Scheme should be phased
out and that the timing of this should be decided by Cabinet on L8/3/74
as an oral item submitted by {yool. Ibwevs , this rnatter has not yet
been raised in Gbinet"'f19 one may interpret this noratal- action of
rurinding ministers of their undertakings as havingr, on this occasion, a
cat-among-the-pigeons effect, since Moyle in particular would obviously
be confronted with some political difficulties.
The next three neetings of the CCPP all dealt with highly sensitive
wage policy negotiations. Not until 5 April, at 2 p.m. on a Friday after-
noon, did the Committee take up the matter of specific budget items again.
Itre five ministers (Kirk in the chair) were present, along witi- the
Minister of Housing, W. Fraser, and three Treasury officialsr Lang, lil-
Green and T. Brewerton. The Secretary had prepared a very full agendat
which was carried over till ttre following Monday after the weekend
adjournment. Three Treasury reports on Housingl2o took up most early
attention, followed by a discussion of a Paper on a General Meilical
Services senefit.l2l New policy proposals were examined, concentrating
nowonTreasury'sCfass.Cgroup.Numerousi.EemswereaPprovedfor
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firnding, although departnents still had to get financial approvaf at ttre
appropriate level before rroney could actually be spent after Estirnates
announcenent. Significantly, al.l the sums approved !,rere on a one-year
basis only. O,ptions on horr to deal wittr tJ:e guestion of the nilk subsidy
were referred back to Cabinet (which srrbsequently lnvited ttre ltinister of
Finance to report to'it again on this topic in mid-April) . Other itens
on the agenda, including ttre ill-fated Review of Existing Policy, net
@verntcnt E:<penditure and Econornic Trends (both Treasury papers) were not
- 
L2Lctrscussect.
An extrer€ly brief rEeting of ttre CCPP on 9 April was attended by
only one ordinary nenlcer (Rowling) , wittr Faulkner, Amos and
Fraser. Three Treasury official-s were pr€sent, but the Secretary,
Millen, was absent. Ihe (presumably) unusual step was taken of
Brewerton [freasury] taking rninutes, which were later countersi-grred
by tie Chairman, Rowling, after they had been certified by t'lillen
The neeting confinred an agreed housing "package".
A series of tense and difficult reetings followed througrhout April
and into May, all concerned wittr the proposals for a Ceneral !{age Order,
a1l fraught with extraordinary tension. Ttre Corurrittee had taken to neeting
at 7.30 in the rprning, or just a little later, and it must have been a
slight relief, on I May, to revert to their norrml practice of reeting
at 8 a.m. On ttrat date several decisions affecting the Estirnates and the
forthcorning Budget were made, such as the agreerent to approve a nert
Police Task Force, and ttre addltion of $I million to the $3 millton
allocated to Sport and Recreation. Probleus of all sorts rdere non pouring
before the Comnittee. Ilrere were on-going discussions on a structure to
a
replace the NDC, debates on whether to take over (and rescue) the Cook
Islands Shipping Service, decisions on economic strategy, incenti'ves schemes
in ttre rrDtor industry, debates over the movement in wages, and appropriate
adjustnents to accomrodate these. Budget reports flowed in from Treasury
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on Housing, Works' a graduated sales tax on cars, and subsidies. The
CCPP worried about housing policies, and discussed the party Caucus view
that physical controls should be exercised which would divert resources
into low cost housing. In discussing the integration of the Governmentrs
'Growth Strategy' in its 'Overall Economic Strateg'y', the CCPP emphasised
that "conflicts should always be resolved in favour of full emplolnuent
and growth".
At an urgent Budget meeting on Sunday J-2 May, RowJ.ing (the only
CCPP member present), with his colleague the Minister of Social Welfarer
N. King, two officials from Social Welfare and two Treasury officers
(Galvin and Brewerton, who again took the minutes) discussed proposed
increases in social security benefits, and approved their inclusion
in the forthcoming Estimates. Since only one mernber of the Corunittee
proper was present, this was,
Minister of Finance, although
copies of the minutes.l23
effect, a solo decision bY the
course other members would receive
in
of
As May rolled towards June, the pressure to take decisions increased.
Through this entire period (until August) the Prime llinister, Kirk,
was extremely ill. By the beginning of April it had been obvious that
any "boom" enjoyed by the Labour Government was well and truly overi the
Prime Ministerrs health reflected the state of the economy. Kirk's
frequent absences from Parliament during ApriJ- and May threw an enormous
burden on his colleagues, particularly Watt and Rowling. These men and
their 'inner cabinett colleagi"ues grappled with the constant demands of
other rninisters 
- 
anxious to secure the best possible funding for policies
before the Budget announcement (30 Uay) - and pressure from unions and
employers.
On 7 May, in a trnst-Cabinet memorandum to the Minister of Finance
Millen wrote to Rowling as follows:
I57.
When new policies review L974-75 was raised yesterday
at Cabinet sotrE of your colleagues requested rrpre
infornation on the exercise being conducted by the CC?P.
They errguired how priorities were ranked and compared
portfolio by portfolio, and asked for an indication
of areas where new conunifinents could be established.
You undertook to consider what information night be
released under various general (but not Vote) headings
which would indicate total cost of proposals subrnitted,
approved, deferred etc.
In your comrnents you stressed, among other things, ttre
need for l{inisters to order ttreir priorities clearly
in ttreir Departments and to cut out dead wood so that
greater provision could be made for the introduction
of new policies. D+(sgrrd. P. Millen) ---
Given ttreir growing awareness of the enor:urity of ttre economic problems
presented by the oil crisis and its attendant effects and in the absence of
effective leadership and stimulation of the Prime l"tlnister, it is little
wonder ttrat not al.l ttreir decisions were balanced or wise.
In his Financial Statenent (Budget speech) to tJ:e House of Representatines
Rowling enphasised ttre inhibiting effects of "changes in world
conditions which are beyond our control and which vitally affect New.
Zealandrs interests'r. He reported an unexpected decline of 2-3t in tbe
"real incore" of ttre country, and ttre Governmentrs determ:ination to prorrcte
policies which would [stirm:late e:q)orts and production" in response to t]ris
situation. He added, however, that 'rthe difficuLties of the present
situation and the consequent need for economic adjustrent" did not diminish
the imperative purposes of ttre Covernrent in terrns of its social policies.
For this reason higftr priority would continr:e to be accorded to social
welfarel housi-ng, healttr and education.
The I'linister surnmaris.:d the Governmentrs recently adopted econonic
strategy, an irq>ortant component of which was tJle "identification and
exanrination of activities using nalionaL resources inefficiently to see
what inproverrenLs [were] possible and to review t]re level of assistance
and protection".
r58;
Reporting, in effect, on the outcome of the @vernrRntrs reviews of
existinq and new policy, the Minister described sr:bstantiaL increases in
proposed e:<penditure on housing ($I90 million to the S.A.C. and $55 rnillion
for increased rental State house construction, an increase of over $36
nilLion on L973/74); an increase of nearly J.5 percent ($65 million) on
Education spending, with a 21 percent increase ($15 rnillion) on education
capital works e:<penditure; and a massive 966 nillion increase on Health
spending - a provision which allowed "a second year of substantial real
growttr in hospital services" 
- 
wittr additional e:<penditure on healttr
benefits anonnting to rDre than $13 nillion ovet L973/i4. Social securlty
benefits (including superannuation) were to be increased to a level
28 percent higher than ttrat prevailing at tJ:e end of L972.. fn all., the
l"linister reported ttrat total net @vernrent expenditure for ttre year ended
I"tarch l-974 had been L8.5 percent higher than the previous yeErr, and required
the borrowing of $242 nillion - $10 nillion rrore than had been anticipateil
in the 1973 budget. The Estimates tabled with the Budget totaLlecl (net)
$3,I29 million 
- 
18.8 percent over the L973/4 Estirnates anil $595.8 million
nore tlran the actual outturn for L973/4- ftris would necessitate an
anticipated borrowing of $159 million (sigrnificantly lower, as an estinate
than ttre actual borrowing of L973/4, guoted as $241.7 miltion).ttt
There were clear echoes of Lough I s earlier neno (ilture 1973) in
t}te ltinisterrs concluding remarks. "TLre Ciovernrent does not regard econornic
grovrth as an objective in itself but rather as a neans of bringing about
ttre better social conditions we all desire." Ttre significant fact was ttrat
the adoption of policies ainred at inproving New Zealandfs overall econorric
position vras not, and on ttre Minister's statenent, was not intended to be,
at the e:q)ense of growth elsewhere, such as ttre social services field. It
was the case, however, that ttre success of both depended not only on
deteriorating external conditionsr but on ttre C;overnnentrs ability to win
agreenent from the rnajor pressure groups for its wage and incores policiesl
and the relative rcdesty and care with which tbe spending ministers built
. 159.
on the. generous base ttrey had been provided with during f,he past
fiscal ycars.
AuFust 19?4. 
- 
a tl-me of crd,_sis
By the beginning of August, the ministers in ttre CC?p were obviously
fee).ing considerable strain. on 2 Augrust, wittr . Kirk in ttre chaLr,
and Tizard and Walding added to the original five rnenbers, ttre CCpp and
it's attendant officiaLs began a harried debate on how to control ttre
worsening econornic situation. Of iruediate interest was ttre question of
irport controls, and the problens of tining and quantifying such moves.
The rni.nutes for this neeting state:
... excess demand existed for scarce resotrrces. Ttre
Prime Minister asked Treasury to review proposed
Government expenditure and the financial requirerents
of tie National Roads Board witJ: a view to achieving
savings which would enable both a transfer of
resources to other sectors such as housing and
industry, arrd a reduction in import reguirernents.
In addition, Lang (Treasury) was asked to prepare a paper on ttre
selecti\re reduction of intere"t t"t"".12b The C@P ttren adjourned r:ntil
ttre foLlovring Sr:nday, when it would consider these pressing natters again.
On 4 August, during an afternoon 
-nreeting, the CCPP decided to redistribute
sales tax on new cars, with appropriate legislation, and to tigtrten the
adnr:inistration of import licensing "where stocks are too high". Il:rther,
Treasurlt was "instructed to sr:bmit for ttre CCPPTs consideration at its
reguLar reeting on 7 Augrust at 8 a.m. proposals for a sr:bstantial pruning
of public er4>enditure (including capital items but excluding sr:bsidies)."
Recormended cuts adopted by the C@P would imred.iately be announced by
the Minister of Finance wittrout furttrer reference to Cabinet when he
addressed the sector Councils of the old NDC later that aay.Uf
When the Comrnittee ret on 7 August, the inquiry ordered three days earlier
produced the following Treasury recorunendations:
(i) no increases in staff ceilings from 7 Augrust L974i
(ii) no further adjustrrents to pulelic Service salaries and wages, .
although there could be exceptions for the results of the
Tradesrnen's Ruling Rates survey and "established cases";
L60.
(iii) items in (SEGS) Transport, Communication, Travel,
Itlaintenance, Q>eration, Upkeep and Rentaj. property
and equipment,, Materials, Supplies and Services and
other operating expenditure aLl to be held at 95 percent
of the 1974/75 allocation;
(iv) a reduction or deferral of all EDP requirements for aLl
ilepartments while Treasury and ttre SSC conducted a special
review on this to be reported to ttre CtrPP by 23 Septe$er
L974i
(v) National Roads Boards e>rpenditure to be reduceil by 5 percent
Ln L974/75t
(vi) no new commitments for aid e:<penditure for L974/75. excePt
disasters and the special. training programme for Is1and workers
in New Zealand; a deferral of large aid projects where
trnssible; and a recommendation t}at there be no further
transfers to trust fi:nds for the bilateral aid progratmF -
"Treasury will no dor:bt report to the Ministers concemedni
(vii) no ne\^r policy-type pro5nsals for Education rxrtil the EDC lePorts
were recej.ved - although state aid rnay need to be considered
before then;
(viii) ttrere shouLd be an inSuiry into ('r3 look at") hotr to reduce
Hospital Board grants, by Treasury and Healttr officialsl
(ix) review ttre design and planning of airport terrninals;
(x) accept il principle a lirnit on the National Development Loan
to the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (96 nillion) and
slow down al-l broadcasting developments - Treasurlr to negotiate
with the NZBC on ttris;
(xi) DMvc to find $3 nilLion savings, and review ttre bulk ordler
for vehicles to the value of 914.5 mil.lion;
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(xii) instruct rreasury to circurarise all departments that all
Supplenentary Estimates vrere to be kept at an absolute
nrinimum, plus the instruetion that all suppl.enentary claims
must be absorbed where possible, except in ttre case of most
exceptional circumstances ;
(xiit) reissue the Cabinet decision made on L5 october 1973 that no funds
would be provided for approved new policies unless half the anpunts
required were found in departmental savings on existing policies;
(xiv) instruct departments that new policry proposals not previously
approved by tJle CCPP could go on to the Cabinet agenda only witlr
the e:<press prior pernuission of the prime Minister;
(xv) instruct the departments ttrat savings in one SEG uray not be used
to cover for over-expenditure in another, even if the department
stayed within its overall allocation;
(:ryi) the ccPP should reach a cieiision on import policy by 12 Rugrost.U8
.The Committee ldas informed that arbitrary (i.e. across t1-e board)
reductions apPeared to be the only way to achieve substantial savings in
e:<penditure, unless the Government wished to increase charges or remove
existing sr-rbsidies.
The CCPP acted inunediately on six of the
Treasury, and their decisions were to be passed
via a Treasury circulart
16
on
areas reconunendetl by
to all permanent heads
(3)
(1)
(21
staff ceilings were frozen;
departments were to stay within the Estirnates and supprenentary
Estimates, and ttre latter were to be kept to an absorute minirnum;
transfers of funds from one progrannp to another to avoid
over-expenditure in any particular area, even while this did not
entail any change in the overalr arlocation, were not to be made;
departments were to report within a few days to Treasury on
ttreir prant and eguipment expenditure, and Treasury would review
these reguirements, with a subsequent report to the Minister of Finance
(4)
L62.
(s) deparLments were to consider reducing or deferring ttreir
current and proposed EDP requirernents, and a report on
computer needs would be submitted by the Treasury and tlre
SSC to the Goverrunent;
(6) Specific expenditure groups (urainly operating expenditure)
were to be held at 95 percent of the Ig74/75 a11ocation.129
Appendix 3A to this study contaj.:ns a detaiLed analysis of aspects of this
existing policy review by ttinchester, the systems expert then
employed by ttre New Zealand Treasury. It is not proposed to rehearse
the numerous criticisms Winchester had of the second J-:974 reviettt
except to quote his conunents concerning ttre only area where imnecliate
cost reductions were possiJrle (Winchester estimated some $30 nillions
could have been "saved" as a result of a 5 percent cut in specific
SEGS),
There \^rere a nurnber of reasons why the projected
cost reductions evaporated. First, many dispensa-
tions were sought by government departnents an,il
generally supported by Treasury reconmendations to
the Government. Viewed in isolation, each case may
have seemed a justifiable reguest, but in total they had
the effect of negating ttre original Cabinet dinective to
reduce e:<penditure. Second, departments incurred
e>cpenditure without seeking Cabinet or Treasury dispensa-
tions. Itrirdr Do rnandgerent control procedures were
adopted to prevent over-spending or to ensure that the
Cabinet d,irective would be effectively implenented.
Fourttr, because the government accounting system [did]
not provide for recording outstanding financial obliga-
tions and conunitrnents, financial reports [aia] not give
a complete picture of cost incurred as of the date of
these reports. Hence, departmental officiaLs naturally
[had] difficulty anticipating how much expenditure [was] being
incurred by district and fielcl officers and [could] react only
after cash payments [were] made. By that tine it [was] too lateto initiate corrective actions.
There r^ras no evidence of any sanctions or penaltJ-es
being imposed on departments which failed to comply with the
Cabinet dj-rective for controlling L974/75 expenditure'
Neither could any evidence be found of action by Treasury
to do anything about the cost of overruns which occurred
or corrective actions taken to strengthen manaqement controls
to prevent recurrence of this situation in the future. [he
fact that no corrective actioDs were taken to improve
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managellent corrtrol procedures and financial systems
tends to reinforce the misconception some people
apparently have that growth in gove).nment expenditure
is largely uncontrollable and inevitable, rather than
being out of control and something which can be managed
more effectively.lP
Inurediately prLor to the announcerrent of ttre August Review lleasures,
Winchester hirnself hacl participated in in-house Treasury discussions on how
to improve the general review capacity of the government system. He hadl
advised the Treasury that given the indifferent results of past reviews,
a different strategy should be adopteit this tirne. He proposeil thah an
e:qperiment be conducted in which special evaluation teams reviewed tJ:e
o<penditure progr.umes of the eight biggest spending departnent"il3l hc.
drafted a public statenent for the announcement of this exercise by the
l'Linister of Finance on 7 eog.rst.I3e winchester also suggested to
Treasury officials that in order to ensure that departnents did not later
seek to reinstate cuts made to particuLar SEGs, they should be instructed
to apply reductions to prograyn$es and activities. lltris woulcl have
reguired a re-ordering of priorities, rather than simply an arbitrarlz
one-off reduction for purposes Winchester obviously considered largely
cosrretic. To ttre Arerican consultantts obvious chagrin, neither advice
was taken up. His Treasury colleagrues did not fornrard his proposed
8-department review idea, or his drafted statement, to ttre Government.
The idea of programme,/activity rather than SEG cuts was not generally
received with acclaim, although later tough, deputy Secretary to
the Treasury, did agree to foryard ttre proposal to . Douglas,
Chairman of the Cabinet Sr:bcomrulttee on Efficiency in the State Setrrices,
and three pilot stud.ies were eventually 
"ondrr"ted.133
The CCPP met twice rnore during Augrust - a neeting plannecl for 2lst
ltas cancelleil and the records note that "the only urgent paPer - Review
of C'overnment Expenditure: Motor Vehicles - hras refered instead to
Cabinet for decision on Monday 26/8/74." Tr^ro days later the CtPP
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reconvened, witlt Watt in the chair, and llinisters Freer, Rowlingr
Finlay and Tizard. present. Three officials from Treasury - (Lang) r
the Reserve Bank (Low) and Trade and Industry (Datsr:n) - and tso
Cabinet office staff mernbers, t{iIIen and Curran atterided.
A paper on hire purchase was the only agenda itemrl* ooa the Collutittee
was informed ora1J-y of the worsening economic situation - it was descriSed
as "a drastic deterioration." TLle Monetary and Economic Councllrs
positive estimate of an overseas exchange transaction deficit of $700
miLlion to llarch L975 was passed on to the ministers. It was reported
that borrowing was being r:ndertaken but consumer demand was still exces-
sive.' "ftre key factor in a policy to deal with the present Balance of
Payrents situation was whether or not the level of wages could be held.
[ff not] the Governrent would be forced to introduce repressive measures
on consuner demand around .Ir:ne 1975.n
Officials reported that ttre Conbined State Services Organisation
(CSSO) was not prepared to accept the Governmentrs proposaL of 11.25
' percent wage increases, and sought 4 percent on top of the mandatory 9
percent 
- that is, a 13 percent increase - backdated to October 1974.
Ministers were urged to meet urgently with the chailuran of all ltage-
fixing tribr:nals.
It was pointed out to ministers that changes in hire purchase
arrangements would be insufficient to correct ttre deteriorating Balance
of Payments situation, although substantial borrowing had been arranged
to date:
(us)$fSO rnillion from the Bank of International Settlenents (incl.uding(9100 million for one year);
(uS) $fZS niLlion on a roll-over basis from LLoyds and the Consortium
of Banks;
(us)Sfooo million from fran (arranged with the shah of rran during his
recent visit to New Zealand);
(US]SZZ rnillion as private placenent in Swiss francsi
(us) Sfoo million in export credirs.
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That was a total of 9702 million. It wes not intended, officiaLs
reported, to borrow from the Euro-dol1ar market, although a further
$200-250 million could perhaSrs be borrowed from the fMF. After a
sonewhat desultory discussion of means to keep domestic interest rates
down, and a proposal for increasing the minimum interest rate on.hire
purchase for second-hand cars and new vehicles, which would be put
before Cabinet on 2 Septemberrthe Cormnittee 
"dio,rrned.I35
Three days later, on 31 August, the Prime Minister and chaiman of
the CCPP diect. His last work in the latter role had been to chair the
Sector Councils neeting on 7 August.
Orly one comprehensive analysis of expenditure reviews conducted
during the first,20 months of Labourrs administration appears to exist
- 
that already cited, by Winchester. There can be little guestion
that many of his criticisms of the methods adopted, particularly by
Treasury, to conduct reviews and provide financial analyses on behalf of
the Ministers of the CcP{ were well founded. Managenent inforrnation
systems, bottr those avaiiable to individual departmental permanent heads
and to Treasury officials, lvere less tban satisfactory. Instructions
for the conduct of the numerous reviews of e:<penditure on computers,
plant and equipment, staff ceiling reductions, expenditure on Suppletren-
tary Estimates and so forth were inadequate. The tirning of reviewg,
and the time allowed for reviews, was highly questionable. There were
too few occasions on which officers inside Treasuqr and ersewhere were
taken off normal duties in order to give ttre kind of attention to special
exercises that rnight have produced sorne lasting results' not only by way.
of cost reductions but also in terms of improved systems roanagenent in
tlre longer term. Treasury did not always report back to rninisters on
the results of particuLar reviews - for example, the plant and equipment
review was not reported to the c'overnment, nor were any subsequent'
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instructions circulated to departments whiclr would indicate to them
that tnportant information had been gained as a result of that
particular exercise. Where reports were made by departments to
Treasury and by Treasury to ministers, these often irnplied that there
was a direct and necessary relationship between "wants" and "needsr',
between general statements of purpose and specific prograrffne objectives.
However, nowhere in his analysis of the 1973-?4 reviews of policy
does Winchester refer to the political climate which surrounded then.
Throughout the months preceding Kirk's death, during his protracted
illness, with the problems created by the loss of active, trnsitive,
consistent party and Cabinet leadership, Labour's ministers and their
principal advisers \i{ere engaged in sensitive and difficutt debates over
the proper nature of a wage and incomes policy; the proper line to
take in developing an economic strategy; appropriate measures to adopt
j-n controlling union demands while retaining union support; the kind
of planning structure most likely to facilitate Labourrs economic
strategy (once the profound differences between ministers and officials
on this were overcome); and above all, measures which would rnodify the
impact on the economy of the abrupt and virtually unforeseen problems
caused by the oil crisis and the change in New Zealand's overseas trading
situation. El-sewhere rre discuss these problems from another perspective,
but here it may be suggested that, in hindsight, Labour ministers had not
reached a sufficient level of agreement among themselves, before assuming
office, on some inportant questions of the ideological framework (or the
fo:ms of political preferment appropriate to pr:blic policy making) . Such
an agreement would have assisted them, once in office, in coming to terns
with officialsf differing points of view. The intense pressures of day-
to-day business in central Calrinet government do not allow the sort.of
time that major policy developments require: time to debate, time to
let issues lie fallow, time to reconvene discussions away from the daily
stress of ministerial decision-making.
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The same argrument may hold true for key officials, particularly
those in the relatively small department of the Treasury. Finance
officers and investigating officers had been required to initiate and
report on numerous expend.iture reviews by Augnrst L974. They werel in
effect, conpeting for tJ:e attention of the inner Cabinet against
ministers outside the CCPP detennined to gain the fi:nds necessary to
prorote their particular departrnental objectives il education, housLng,
health' social services or fa::uring. Labourts inunediate decision ln
Decernber L972 to shift important financial and economic policy decision-
making away from the traditional Cabinet Economic Conunittee area, where
officials and milisters had an established division of labour, wittr
habitual behaviour of advice and response, into ttre tiny, highly protected
and relatively closed circle of the CCPP had considerable psychological
impact on officials. For almost a year, the CCPP ministers operated
virtually without an official-rs consnittee. During L973/74 they were obliged
to accept the advisory services of tJ:e Officials Economic Corsnitteer and
placed increasingly heaqy reliance on officials in Treasury and the Trade
and Industry detrnrtnrent. On the one hand distressing reports on the
state of the economy led ministers to seek urgent measures for cost
cutting in government exSnnditure. On the other hand, other rdnistere
not privy to aLl that took place in the CCPP were clearly resistant to
attempts to depress ttreir spending arnloitions. In the absence of clear
Ieadership, Cabinet itself does not appear to have provided a forurn where
collective self-denying ordinances about spending could be formulated,
consistently applied and regularly evaluated. ft wouLd be unr.rise to
aecept the Winchester analysis, for all its merits, as providling a
comprehensive record of events. Ttre historical distortions createcl by
ignoring, or underestimating, the political motivations and pressures on
officials and ministers of the tine must be identified if we are to
recognise that failures, for exampLe in controlling public sector
expenditure, are political in nature. They illustrate the impact
of potitical conflict in central government at least as strikingly
as they do technical systems failures or deficiencies in management
sty1e.
The CCPP gets along without Kirk
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In a memo to the Minister of Finance (Rowling) some three weeks
after the publication of the 1974 Budget and annual Estinates, Millen,
secretary to the Cabinet had written as follows:
When the weekly item on nelr expenditure was discussed
in Cabinet on Monday 24 June, you drew attention to
the complete turn-around that had occurred in the ec.ono-
mic situation during recent weeks. You reguested your
colleagues to adopt a criticaL and selective approach to
expenditure by Departments, particularly items involving
the hearryr use of overseas funds. Restraint in the
Government sector would also need to be exercised generally
if some of the inflationary effect of the 9 percent wage
increase was to be absorbed.
Current indicators pointed to a deficit next year in
BoP (balance of payrnents) of the order of $400-500 million.In the import licensing field, consumer goods should be
cut to conserve overseas funds so as to ensure the availa-bility of sufficient materials and plant replacement forindustry. It was essential therefore to give emphasis to
domestic policies capable of maintaining production;
othenrise, unemplolment would become inevitable in certain
areas
The Secretary went on to recall discussions in Cabinet about the movement of
goods between New Zealand and Australia, current serious threats ("perhaps...
greater than at any time since the 1920's") to the international finan-
cial structure, and the problem of "rigidities caused by the indr..strial
. ..136unlons. "
Three months later, and only a few days after Kirkrs death, a
Treasury report to the CCPP showed that there hras no likelihood that these
earlier predictions would prove unjustified:
1. Excess demand and adverse terms of trade have turned
a current account surplus of more than $3O0 million in
the year ended June 1973 into a deficit of $145 millionin the year ended JuIy 1964 
- 
a net turnaround of $175
million. The annual rate of deficit could well approach
$700 million in t}i.e 1974/75 March year.
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llhere could be some improvement after that if the
rate of importing slackens and providing export prices
do not deteriorate.
2. New Zealand was fortunate in having high resenres
when our terms of trade started to deteriorate. So
far we have used more than half of our resources in
addition to some borrowing from tlre B.I.S. Our reselryes
are dovyn to $500 raillion, equivalent to less than three
rrcnths irnports. We cannot afford to allow them to :rtrn
down much nore.
3. We have been very fortunate in having been able to
make arrangements to borrow a massive NZ$375 million
which will see us through to early next year. Witfi
other credits being arranged this will double overseaspublic debt in one year. More loans will be needed
next year but clearly our internationaL credit rating
will drop sharply and we shal1 find it harder to borrow.
Potential lenders including the IMF will want to satisfy
themselves that lre are taking adequate remedial neasureg.
4. Our present policies involve hearry risks. If our
BoP looks as bad in 12 months as it does now, overseas
borrowing will dry up and we might not be able to'finance
the inports needed to sustain a reasonable level of activity.
In these circunstances effective control over our doresticpolicies becomes increasingly difficul-t. !{e would be
virtually powerless to prevent a general collapse of
confidenewhich could result in widespread unempIo1rnent....
5. The key issue at present is that we can no longer afford
the inrports needed to sustain the high rate of growth
achieved in the last tvro years. Restraints must be applied
to reduce the level of total spending. The problern is how
to manage this successfully, while rnaintaining fuII employnent
and reasonable growth rates. Most other countries are
dealing with similar problems by conventional measures which
have resulteil in national unemployment and a world recession.
There is a chance that the risks we are taking will pay off
provided:
- ineomes policies are firmLy held:
this means that there can be no sigrnificant
break j-n the 111 percent wage increase. The
public service dernands must therefore be
resisted even at the cost of strilesl
monetary policy is kept tight:
this does not preclude selective easing ln
high priority areas;
Government expenditure is held:
ner.v policies must be deferred untiL excess
pressure has gone out of the economy. It
may well be possiJrle to consider some new
policies in selected areas aimed at maintain-
ing enployment in the second half of 1975.
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6. To sum up: If we exclude the policies which aie
. politically unacceptabl-e, the choice is simple. l{e
eittrer hold incomes, keep rpney tight and restrain
Government e:q>enditure or we face the near certajJt
prospect of recession and unemployment next year
because we would not be able to pay for necessary irntrprts.
I
[signea] H. l,*rg.137
This paper was discussed by the Cormittee on II Septeniber and ttre folloring
day an updated version was tabled at Cabin.t.BB Cabinet was simultaneously
presented with a Treasury menp recormnending increases in bulk charges for
Railways, Post office and NZ Electricity departnent services - increases
which, it was stated, would be necesgary to cover current deficits in each.
of these departments. This issue was deferred, but the nuinutes of 12
September record that:
In suruning up the discuseion in Cabinet today .. . the
Prirne Minister stated that ttrere was agreerent that
lines must be held on Government's i.:ncomes and monetary
policies and that @vernnent must be on gruard against
an excessive rise in ttre pr:blic sector...Greatet emphasis
must be placed on maximlsing production and greater
NZ-added val-ue (npre processing) , particularfy for er<port. ..
I{hatever policies had to be devised' it was essential
to get ttre right ressage across to the cornnunity so that
the situation was understood and necessary reasures of
restraint accepted wittrout denting publicconfidence in the
future of the New Zealand economy. In this connection it would
be useful for Ministers to have by tltem a 'backgrounder' so
that they could coordinate [sic]. The Prirre Minlster added
that he c"ontemplated making a 'state of the nationr nessage.
The lrlinister in Charge of Publicity [or M. Fin].ayl
requested all colLeagues concerned to supply hfun with brief
notes on how they saw the situation, t.lle matters of nntrent,
and how these night be lrandled and presented. He would then
produce a'backgio*l6r. 1?9
A few days later the idea of a "backgrounderl coltated by Findlay had
expanded to include ttre possibility of a White Paper agai.nst which the Prime
Minister (R6w1ing) could deliver a state of the nation rEssage. In order
to allow Finlay to "inject the necessary insights" into Treasuryrs economic
report, Ministers lrere requested to inform him about (a) urgent current
natters; (b) new or projected policies which could be deferred (rernembering
that "it could be nece.ssary at some later time to re-stirnulate actlvity
in t1le pr:blic sector"); (c) a priority rating for all new policies ("which
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by definition, include significant extension of all new lnlicies") r
and (d) existing policl-es which could be slowed dorn phased out, deleted
deferred.
A11 colteagues are reguested to supply Dr FinJ-ay
wittr brief notes on how they see the emerging
situation, the matters of monent (i.e. the,need
for rising expectations to be restrained and social
objectives re-ordered within the constraints on the
economy) and how these matters might be handled and
presented (i.e. to generate a public acceptance of
necessary measures which, because they are in the
nationrs interests, require some sacrifice-g of
narrower interests).
[signea] uiuen.l4o
The idea of a public presentation, explaining the Government's present
situation and the nationrs economic predicament, grew and was enibnoidered.
Problems were discusged: how comprehensive should the prepared public
statement be? If it tras too lightweight, there would be adverse criticism;
if too signrificant, it rnay need to npve out of ttre status of a ministerial
speech, and become a White Paper, debated in the House. Eventually, at
the beginning of October, it was decided to repeat the exercise conducted
in August when Kirk was alive. A pulclic rneeting or conununity
conference would be heLd between the CCPP and a carefully selected audience
of "sigmificant publics." Emphasis was to be placed not on tlre facts
("the participants are likely to know the facts anlmay") but on hor the
Government would give a lead in the present situation. Trvo points would
be underlined: flrstly, ttrat despite soue breaks in ttre agreed regine for
wages (1 JuIy, L9741, the Governrnent would hold the line on prices and
incones; secondly, if overseas borrowing dried up, or ttre terms of trade
worsened, "further measures" now under consideration by ttre Covernrnent would
be introduced, their se\rerity depending on the denonstrable restraint
exercised by atl relevant sectors, including the Governrnent itself.14l
A date (later put forvrard) was set for 15 October, and in Cabinet and
Cabinet comnittees ministers debated with officials the form the public
presentation should take. There were strong reservations on the part of
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some ministers as to how pessimistic the report should be; others, like
Freer and walding, emphasised the need to present various (albeit
unpleasant) arternatives to the cormnunity 
- 
,,this was, they fert, very
much an exercise in politicaL leadership.,'
Mjnisters ltere no\t pushed right up against the hard-edge of electoral
office. They felt a real grip of restraint on their room to rnErnoeuvre,
caused particularly by the Partyrs erection cornrnitrnents in Lg7z. A few
days before the pnbtic meeting (23 october), the prjrne Minister (Rowtiag)
raised this question in cabinet, and ltilren rater recorded tlrat
you lthe prime Minister] raised for discussion theinhibitions imposed, by undertakings in the 1972Election Manifesto, and the possiJcility tJ:at in
order to be free of these it night be necessary tbgo to the cor:ntry. It was felt by many of your
colleagues that an election norir would be irr-timed,the Government had a mandate to govern and it was
surely possible to introduce energency measuresprovided the reasons and changed circumstances hrereput sqr:arely to tJ:e people. fhe holding of a snap
erection courd be corurter-prod,uctive insofar as it
night indicate that the @vernment was losing its
1gs nsrvg.I4Z
while these ner.vous i,iinisters were preoccupied with ttre significance of
Srnports and wages gronrth, they were also concerned about the contribution
the forthcoming coPE exercise could make to their deliberations. Treasu:.Jt
had recommended, and in october (Ig74) the Minister of Finance (Tizard) had
agreed, that "no specific growth target should be given to copE for its
1974 review"- coPE was to undertake its "normal" review, culling out new
policies, ensuring r:niforrnity in departnental estirnations and elirrinating
"padding" from the forecasts. rn addition, it was given a nrndrer of special
tasks such as identifying areas of sigrnificant overseas exchange expenditure,
areas for possible early sigrnificant increases in foreigrn exchange earnings,
and areas of possible "low import" employment in the government se"tor.143
simultaneously, in Treasury itself, there was clearly growing criticism as
to the efficacy of the coPE exercise. one Treasury officer commented, in
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an internaL riemo \"rritten in August, when Government anxiety was peakingt
ttrat during COPE "no attempt is made to calculate ttre effects [of fore-
casts] on resource allocation, or the sigrnificance of Govern:nent competing
with the private sector for scarce resourc€s. Instead, Treasury Euggests
t]:at Ministers r.ndertake a review of existj.ng policies to actrieve savings
in e>cpenditure. Suctr a review invariably cones up with very little
savings with Ministers beilg reluctant to support rneasures designed to
reduce the spending of their own departnents." The auttror of tbLs
criticaL paper continued to berate his or.rn colleagues:
Fundamental to the whole COPE exercise is the power of
. COPE as a separate entity to cut departmental forecasts
and not have some or aII of ttre cut reinstated at the
request of tJle permanent head. COPE is instmcted to
undertake a critical exami.nation of departnental requests
on existing policy. However, this is inpossiJrle when any
derogatory conunents or constructive suggestions for iryrove-
rents in forecasting techniques are deleted from the flnal
COPE report. It seems there exists a tacit understarrding
amongstpennanent heads to ensure that no department will be
discriminated against, either financially or by report even
if such action is warranted. The corol1ary for depart-
mental forecasters is that provided Permanent Heads can
quash any criticism of forecasts levied by COPE subcormnittees
and perhaps reinstate cuts,ihen forecasting techniques will
not be taken as seriously as they shou1d.144
As though in provocative echo of this criticism, on 9 October, in what would
be tJle tentle special existing policy review conducted since Labour assurned
office two years before,tnu *" CCpp had instnrcted ministers and their
departments to review and report on rneasures which would significantly
reduce or defer foreigrn exchange expenditure. This review w.rs conducted
and a report forrrarded, to tJle l{inister of Finance in early Decetrer L974.
Ttre reports from departnents (which included very few rec-owtendations of
where savings couLd be effected) showed direct overseas expenditrrre anount-
ing to $264 rnillion in L974-75 "with a forecast real growttr to $301 nillion
and $324 rnillion in 1975-76 and 1976-77 respectively. This was in
addition to $80 rnilLion involved in indirect e:<penditure on im;nrts'
e:<;rected to increase to $97 million by Lg76-77."146 The Treasury pointed
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out to fiinisters tJ:at "in 1974-75 New Zealand had used up $880 nillion
more overseas funds than it had earned. This was estimated to ber in
rough terms, about five years noranal growth of e:q>orts." Again, it was
emphasised tlrat much more effective 5nlicies concerning inports nnrst be
implemented, with substantial reductions in government expenditure of
overseas funds. Six specific steps of an "across-the-board" nature were
recomrnended:
departrnents rilere to be instructeil ttrat overseas travel
allocations in the next year's Estimates should Lnsur
no more than 75 percent of the amor.nt provided Ln L974/75i
the sarte 75 percent restriction should be placed on over-
seas eq)enditure tmder blanket import authoritles;
nrcre criticaL review of applications for imports should
be conducted by the Government Import Control Committeer
which should be provided with a detailed account of ttre
overseas funds implications of all proposals for depart-
lental- expenditure;
hospital boards should be circularised wittr a request for
their cooperation in reducing or deferring overseas expen-
diture ;147
a Cabinet circular should be sent to all ministers and
departments informing them of the labove] reguirernents; and
departments should be asked to specify areas where, although
irmediate savings could not be made, an in-depth review may
be worthw6i1s.l&O
By February L975, the C,overnment had adopted TreasurTrs recolnrcndations
on overseas e:<penditure, although the limit on blanket irport authorities had
been raised to 85 percent of ttre 1974-75 appropriation. Although sone
$21 nillions had been estimated as possible savings arising from the review,
it was apparent Later in 1975 tfiat once again this "special review'r approach
had been ahnost conpletely ineffectual. Expenditure continued to increase,
potential savings from this area were not realised,
that
One Treasury source noted
serious data lirnitation t/ete inhibiting
meaningful analysis of overseas exohange
transactions; that it was impossible to use tigutes on
irnport approvals emanating from the Import Control
Consnittee because only a relatively small proportion of
Governrnent imports were sr:bject to the Committeers approval .
llence, there vras reason to believe departments were generally
ignoring import reguirements to restrict overseas expenditure
Iargely because internal procedures were not geared to
effective control of overseas expenditure. Ikt
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Alttrough the October commr:nity conference had been considered a
success' when ttre Committee of OfficiaLs on Public E><penditure (COPE)
reported to tlre Minister of Finance in late Decernber 1974, the Government
was stiLl- engaged in intense activities over its wage and incornes policLes.
It was now clearly apparent ttrat past attempts to restrain spending and
resist denand, either through extrortation, revielr, or direct instruction
had been unsuccessful. The costs of existing policy maintenance were
becoming prohibilive, and given the severity of the external fr:nds situation,
COPE recommended that urgent action be taken to exanine the trrclicies which
reguired financial support,. fn an atrnosphere of considerable gloom, on
9 Decernber, the Cabinet authorised the CCPP to take steps recomnended by
Treasury to lower spending leve1s through the conduct of an.o<penditure
review to be conducted early in the new year. This review was to be
undertaken not by departmental officiaLs on behalf of ministers, as in
the pastl but by the Treasury itself. The paucity of previous de5nrt-
mental/ministerial- offerings indicated the need for a npre hard-linE
Treasury approach. Reconmended action was to be reported to tl:e CCPP.
At the begj-nning of February, a report from Treasury on ttre current
economic situation restated the rrrpleasant infonration of the previous year:
The e:<pected downturn in econorric activity is now uncletryay.
At the sanre tifie the BoF position is serious, inflation
rates are still high and unempl-oyment has increased. ltre
excess demand conditions of the past two years have been
repJ-aced by a situation where, in a number of industries,
production is being reduced as a reaction to falling orclers,
a build-up of stocks and a general decline in business
confidence. In due course the easing of investment and
constutption demand should be reflected in a fall in imports,
but this has not yet taken place...
lhe CPI for the year to Decerber showed the largest
annuaL increase ever recorded - 12.6 percent. A large
contribution has come from the housing group. At the srne
time wages have shown a rapid increase...
There was another large current account deficit in the
ronth of December. This was almost matched by Government
borrowing and a sr:bstantial private capital inflow. The
current account deficit for the calendar year was $815 nilliorr.I59
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Against this background, the CCPP consid:red Treasury's recolurendations
from the existing policy review. At its meeting on 5 March, with only
Lang and Mil-Len present, four ministers (Tizard, in the chair,
Fin1ay, Faulkner and Moylel were providec. with additional information.
Lang conmented oral-Iy that in 1975/75 exjsting policies alone would increase
Government expenditure by 26 percent. l.f aII new policy requests receiyed
in the Treasury during the previous few rronths were implemented, ttrere
would be an increase of 36 pereent over':he current yearrs appropriations.
As reaL growth in the economy rilas ,stati:", and assum'ing that witlr
critical appraisal of policies there could be only a 3O percent increase
in c'overnrnent etg>endl-ture, there would stiJ-L be, tJle secretary warned,
a "massive diversion of funds to ttre Governrnent sector.r'I5 I
The CCPP therefore directed all departments ttrat for 1975/76 there
would be a 5O percent reduction in overtime, and any exceptions to this
would require approval by joint ministels (i.e. the Minister of I'inance
and the ninister of the department concerrned). Further, all esLirnates
for furniture and fittings were to be hr:ld at ?5 percent of ttre 1974/75
allocation, unless there r^ras a special rlispensation on this by ttre
Minister of Finance. This provision w,rs e:rpected to yierd a savLng of
$1.8 nillion on a voted $7.4 million. In aildition, there was to be an
fuunediate review by ttre Treasury of policy areas where Treasury officials
believeil savings could be effected in nine Votes:
(i) Defence: bringing back New zealand forces from singapore. A
saving of up to St6.6 ruillion could be rnade per annum if ttre staff
affected were reduced j-n nunber, rather. than redeptoyed.
(ii) Foreigrn Affairs: a reduction :Jl overseas aid as a proportion of
percent, couldQilPr then set at 0.7 percent, recommenrled to become 0.54
save about 9ZO nillion in 19Z5-26.
(iii) Healttt: an increase of 10 per:ent on all charges for laboratory
services could produce increased revenue in the area of gl million
Per annum.
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(iv) Internal Affairs: a change in poliry on 'he Nelson notional
railway, wittr the elimination of ttre fixed charging systqn (a change
recomnended by COPE in Decenber 19741 cor.ld produce savings of about
$1.2 nilLion per annun.
(v) Justice: increased fees and ehalges, and a change in the
existing legal aid policy, could yielil irrcreased revenue of $f million
in the coming fiscal year, and each year thereafter.
(vi) Labour: it was recommended that assisted inunigration should
become more selective, and Treasury had .Lndicated that there couldl be a
variety of favourable spin-off effects f.rom reducing irunigration fignres.
(vii) P.ailways: various rail vehicles intended for purchase could be
re-considered in order to achieve an S11 miLLion saving over three Jtars.
Treasury also considered, and the CCPP approved, a review of passenger
raiJ- policies.
(viii) Stabilisation: An furmeiliate change in sr:bsiclies for breadr €9gsr
nilk and sugar could total savings of over 981 million.
(ix) Transport: the proposed design of the Wellington airp,ort terminal
could include modifications to save $9 nrillion over the next six y"""".tuz
It ttas hoped by the CCPP that recorrunended savings could be reported
later in March, ttreir effects analysed j.n time for adoption in the forth-
corning Estinates. As wittr earlier exil;ting poJ.icy reviews, however, later
study indicated that tlre actual inpact of the exercise had been extremely
modest. Winchester noted that
Analysis of ttre Estimates fo: 1974/75 and 1975/76 [showed]
the extent to which departnren:s had complied with the
prescribed across-the-board r,:ductions. of the 35 depart-
ments which could have been e*pected to reduce overtirne
charges, only 13 made the reg:isite 5O percent savings.
A11 others sought and obtainel exemptions for higher
allocations from their minist:rs and the Minister of Finance
so ttrat the anticipated cost reduction dwindled to 27.3 per-
cent 
- 
from roughly $22 millicn expected to $12.O million
Whether the fuII arnount of this reduction [was]attributable
to efforts to reduce overtime could not be established. The
reduction could have been influenced by other factors' e..9.'
stating original estimates at levels higher than what was
actually required, deferral cf planned overtime to suiosequent
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accounting periods, otr changes -:c assessments of, overtirne
requirements.
The exemptions vrere suppos,:d to have been a1l-oweil ln
only exceptional circumstances. Vltrether this was the
case in every instance is questionable. In one instance
Treasury reported that:
The Ministry of [nransport] couLd have reorga-
nised its opening hours...so that overtirne
fl :;:':;:1.::: . ?:: i:il::"il :"itu,l"frli:i:;'u
before the sunsner hoJ.iday. It now transpires
that the l4:inistry has made no attempt to reduce
the level of overtime worked...and this indicates
that the Ministry's internal check procedures are
," .hl: .::::T:::=,,,, 
"'nnorted rhe request ror an adrdirr.onaral.Iocation an]^rray. 155
Ihe same result was apparent in the requirement for a reduction in
furniture and fittinlts 
- 15 departrnents r,iere successful in obtaining exemptions
as the Finance ninisters considered each application on its individual merits.
Sone $1.8 million expected as a saving or this item across all departments
was therefore reduced to less than half a. million dollars - Ern Eunount whictr
htas not only trifling in terms of the governmentrs overatl needs, but
unJ-ike1y to be a reaL saving in terms of the forthcoming Estimates allocations,
Winchester comented that in this review,, as in ottrers previously conducted,
tlte guidelines for Treasury investigatin<J officers, rnaking their inquiries
on behalf of the Finance division of Treirsurlr, lrere extremely loose and
individual officers may interpret the inr;tructions wittr widely cliffering
degrees of precisiorr,l54
In mid-March the CCPP considered the question of subsidies, but apart
from sugar and petrol costs for r.rtrich pr.Lces had already been increased in
the light of continued Treasury recorunen,lations in that direction, a prop,osed
bread subsidy was deferred until the new policy review later that rnonth.
Treasury had recommended that continued feterioration in the current economic
situation suggested the need for another community leaderst conference,
possibly on 7 Aprir, to outline the Governmentrs budget strategy. The
L79,
timing of both conference and ttre Budget ,pould be affected by t;|e probable
absence overseas of eittrer the Prirne Minister or tlre tt{inister of Finance
from nicl-April to earl-y May, the dates set for the Federation of Labour and
Labour party conferences (6-9 May and 12-16 May respectively), Treasury
reconunended an earLy Budget,l possibly on 22 May.
on 20 March' the day before CCPP Ministers began their revien of new
policy proposals (already previously classified by Treasury in Budget
leport No.4) r Lang suburitted to the CCPp a najor fiscal policy paperr
He eormpnted sternLy arrdl critically on tte general situation which required
"some r:npalatable fiscal decisions." H€ defined ttre rnain problem as ,'the
impact of ttre Government sector which is far more expansionarl, than the
economy reguires or ttre bal-ance of paymerrts can stand. Govern .1t expen-
diture has been allowed to grow wit*r litt:Ie restraints and much faster than
infLation."
TLre Secretary ttren provided a table which demonstrated the extent to
which failure to rftrdt the spending ambir:ions of Ministers and trepartsents
was affecting the Governmentrs room to rmrne:
lg0.
EXPENDITURE
te74/75 1e7s/76
$ tincrease on $ tincrease on
Departmental [million] L973/?4 1milrion1 t974/75
requests for
existing policies: 3113O 4r?3g
Add. requests for
new policies (votes
and investrent
transactions 151 416
Total reguests: 3r28I 24.6 4,655 4O.O
Less no:rotal pnrning 
-58
Less new policLes
not accepted 
-87
Less misc
adjustnents 
- 7
E:<penditure
provision in
Budget 31129 lg.3
New Policies
approved after
Budget 196
ESTIMATED
TOTAI,
EXPENDIfiIFE: 3,325 26.3
The Secretary sununarised the revenue situation, e{pected to total $3r093rOOO
(29.3 percent increase on L973/741 in L9,74/75 andl $3,2OO,OOO nillion in
L975/76 (3.5 percent increase on L975/7('1. He suggested a nudber of tan
nEasures' lnrticularly those which woulcl redistribute incone furttrer tcr.rards
families' and sore concessions in courparry tax. lrtrese measures (net) in ttre
coming financial year would cost some g.r3o-f7O million, which would be added
to the deficLt before borror.ring. In srlmrnar?, the expenditure,/revenue
situation would be as followsc
lgl.
DEFICIT BEFCRE BORROWING
t974/7s
*increase
over 1973/74
r97s/76
$ *i:ncrease
1million1 t974/75
Expendlture
Less revenue
$
Imi1lion1
31325
-3,093
26.3
29.3
4 1655
-3200
40.0
3.5
232 1,455
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Add. tax and
benefit
concessions
the
232 I.623
GSfZO" million was the upper estimate nade by Treasuty of the net cost of
tax concessions and other tax trEasures proposed in ttre paperif
The Secretary then began to bring in ttre big guns:
Above all, we must maintain elternal creditnorthiness.
Both the OECD and the IMF missions have accepted that
present policies are reasonable even though they entail
considerable risks. Given or,r cunent BoP situation,
neither of these institutions nor the grcn*ing number of
our creditors would regard an expenditure increase in
the Budget of 40 percent and ir deficit before borroling
of over $1500 million as cted:.ble.
Ln Treasuryrs view a def:-cit before borrovring of
$800 miLlion must be regarded as an absolute rnaximum.
Whether we like it or not we rnust therefore adopt policies
Ieading to a reduction of at .least $80O niltion.
Failure to make changes ,:f this order would under-
rnine our ability to keep borr:wing. significant losses
of borrowing opportunities at this stage would greatly
restrict our capacity to import and would lead inevitably
to massive increases in unemployrment and severe econonic
and social dislocation.
As in almost all his reports to ttre Labour Government, Iang o<plLcitly
identified the syrnbiosis between the Gcvernment's problems and those of
Treasuty. Hoerever, even the kind of joint responsibility he indicated in
the language he employed (there was no distance between the Governrnent and
Treasury, or both and the country irs a whole in his use of words Like
"we" and ttourt') could not obscure the ;rcute embarrassment for Treasury in
the threat of nationaL bankruptcy. A::ter briefly pointing out that cuts
in expend,iture could not, on ttreir osn, be expected to yield the nece'ssary
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$800 million, and direct taxation j-ncreas,:s were assumed to be "not
feasible", Lang suggested that additicnal indirect taxes (inclucling
a major increase on petrol tax) could proSuce about $150 nillion. His
report then continued witlr an explicit account of past failures, a report
which was presented in strongly imperaLive, moral tones:
[In add,ition to the taxes suggested above] the rise in
Government expenditure rnust be curbed. Al.though sone
presentational changes can be nade, some decisions witlr
real impact are also required. There are three rnajor
things which should be done:
(a) GeneraL change in attitrrde towards Expenditure 3
The conditions of 1973 anit early 1974 haVe allowed
Ministers and departnents the l.uxury of regarding roney
and r-esources as unlinited and barely relevant to the
consideration of desired policl' change. Regrettably ttris
attitude still persists and narry proposals which are not
urgent are accepted because thr:y are desirable. .A funda-
mental change in attitude is a pre-requisite to curbing
Government expenditure. As a first step the procedures
for approval of policies invol'ring Governrnent expenditure
should be strictly adirered to.
The Cabinet should take sEeps to stop the practice
of publ"ic cornmitments being nale by individual Ministers
without prior approval of the increased expenditure involved.
In addition, departnents in adninistering e:rpenditure should
be instructed to conform stricE.ly to the prescribed control
procedures and have much great3r regard, before naking
expenditure proposals, to tlre need for economy in the use ofpublic funds.
The Treasury has considered the possibility of recollnen-
ding an across-the-board sut of say 5 percent, but has
concluded that this would not be practicable because the bulk
of expenditure consists of salaries, grants and benefits.
Salaries could only be reducec by reducing the number ofpublic servants but this pres€nts problems where there is
already r:nemployment. Cuts jn grantsr e.9. to Hospital
Boards or social security ben€,ficiaries would also not bepolitically feasible. The gr:eat difficul-ty in nraking
sigmificant cuts in on-going l,rograrunes at this late stage
clearly indicates the need foi: greater caution in entering
into corunitments without rega::d for their implications for
future expenditure growth.
(b) Modification of existingr policies :
To have any impact, mini:rum savings of $1OO miLlLon
should be aimed at. The nee,l to concentrate reductions on
activities which do not direcbly affect employment, and
decisions such as those not tr raise charges severeJ-y Lfuiit
tJ:e scope for significant cuts.
Apart from proposals already subnitted by Treasury and
reductrons in stabiLisation subsidies, tJ:e only possibility
lg3.
is to defer nerv policies already approved, with parti-
cular emphasis on ma3or iterns of capital eguipmerrt.
llhese savings wouLd, of course, be in addition to normal
pruning of departmental requests.
(c) New Policies:
It is reconunendecl that of the $416 million unconqnitted
new policies, only up to $40 million be approved by the
CCPP, provided the $100 million is saved orr existingpolicies.
Conclusion and Reconunendation:
Even with a sizeable cut in new policies, the deficLt
before borrowing after allowing for tax concessions is
likely to be well over 91,200 million. Although sorefiscal reflation is necessary in the early part of
1975/76, a deficit of this size is conpletely incourpatible
with control of inflation and external solvency. The
following steps should be taken to reduce the deficit to
. nanageable proportions:
(a) increases in petrol tax and saLes tax and
introduction of travel tax to increase revenue
by an estimated $150 nillion;
(b) a major curb on t}re excessive rate of increase
in Government expenditure by (i) fundanrental
change in tJle attitude of both l'linisters and
departrnents to approval and control of expendi-
turet
(ii) review of existing policies wittr the airo
of saving $l-00 million principally by reduction
. of stabilisation subsidies;
(c) holding approval.s on new policy not already comnitted
to a maximum of $40 million, provided $L00 milfion is
saved on existing policies.
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On the foLlowing day, with this sobering paper before them (and its author and
his Treasury colleagrues present) , the CCPP held a special meeting, beginni.ng
at 8.30a.m. in the Cabinet room. It was to be among the last new poliry
reviews ttre Labour administration would conduct. trhe Prime Minister,
RowJ-ingrtook the chair, with Tizard, Freer, Finlay, Faulkner and Moyle, and
Lang, Shail-es, Galvin and de.fardine from Treasury. llhey
set out to exanine all the new policy requests. It vras apparent that despite
past exhortations, requests and instmctions, the arguments for frugality
and restraint had J-argely gone r:nheeded. During its consideration of bids
from the Minister of Education, for example, the Committee expressed concern
lg4.
at ttle
"frag[,ented approach adopted by [Anos] in submitti-ng
his new policy proposals. In the circumstances tlre
Commit6l authorised [sic] the provision of finance ofgr mitrion@ $2 million (1976-77) anil $2 million(Lg77/78) respectively for the 9O new Snlicies marked...tn
Schedule 2 (i.e- policies not yet approved) anil invited the
Minister of Education to subrnit (with a copy to Treasu:ryt) a
revised list of policies for introduction Ln L975/76'-
totau_ing ,,o *or. than this financial restraint..,l5g
Atthough ttre adoption of ttris sort of envelope aPproach to new pollcy
bidding may have had some irnrnediate benefits in terms of tlre presentational
probJ.ens of tJ:e forttrcorning Estirnates, it is apparent from the records of
tj.e CCpprs activities that little thought was given to the lnssible irnpact
of such an instmction, For example, the distortions of current and
future policy funding caused by ttre departmental/ministerial selectiorr of
policies which would fit arithinetically into ttre prescriJred totals were
not explicitly discussed. Ttre flow-on effects of policies which were
seLected and approved as part of this arbitrarT packaging r"ere not descrjbed
or e:glicitly predicted, The extent to which there would be a build-up
of pressure for poLicies not fr:nded during the current new 5nt-icy exercisel
but irresistible later for other reasons (such as their political nature) x
and therefore borrnd to recur outside the more stringent parameters of the
special new policy review, was not taken fully into account.
Eventually the Corunittee stated its intention to insist that all
financial approvals must be obtained by spending departments at the appropriate
level, when seeking to impLement new policies, approved by the ccPP. It
was added (as another partial solution to the presentational problen)
that new policies would not be anrnor:nced until after the Budget r:nless
there eras a special reason for doing so. Treasu4t was then asked to
provide details of ttre estimated out-turn for each Vote in 1974-75, plus
tlre requested allocation for 1975-76, and the proportion of new policry
(approved for inclusion by the CCPP) in the Vote provision for each depart-
ment.
-.-
195.
A few days later, on 26 March, tJle CCPP reconvened to consider a
riuxge of special topics, the review of existinq policies and the new
policies proposals. One paper for this neeting was given an r:nusual
"Top Secret" classification, which requires a sigmed receipt showing
tlurt tlre person named has received documents as sctreduled (in this case
they - dealt with ttre possible withdrawal of New Zealand forces from
. rI57Singapore)-- - Other papers were given ttre usual pre-Budget
"Secret" classification. Rorling took the chair, witlt regrular CCPP
rnembers Tizard, Freer, Fin1ay, Faulkner and litoyle, plus ltlillen from the
Cabinet Office. Other officiats joined the Conunittee at relevant points.
Ttre Committee agreed on ttre phased withdrawal of troops froro Singapore,
and decideil that this shoulil be discussed wittr the Singaporean Pri.ue
Minister Lee Kuan Yew during his visit to New Zealand in early April.
It was decided to allocate $1m. for land purchase for Rolleston' a new totrrtt
neiar Christchurch, and pay $10 million sr.rbsidy to the Wtreat Board to off-
set trading losses, charging ttris to Unauthorised E:<penditure 1974-75.
Stock and station agents had sought financial assistance, and it was decided
to provide them with confidential notice that $20 nillion would be nade
available through the Rural Bank for re-financing farm debts in L975/76.
The Comnuittee agreed on only one new policy iteur - an increase in milk
by 2 cents per bottle, to be carried out imnediately after the matter had
been referred to and endorsed by the party Caucus. Decisions on bread'
flour and butter subsidies were deferred, while decisions about petrol and
fuel were postponed until later Budget considerations.
Eight existing policy items were discussed, and in five cases changes
rvere agreed: a reduction on overseas development assistance for butter
sales; an increase in Justice department fees (to yield about $4 million);
the abolition of Labourrs assisted passage immigration policlt, with a
general review of imnigrati.on poLiciesr' the cancellation of Railways purchases
of new r.ragons (about $1I mil.l-ion worth) and a review of all other van and
rg6.
Passenger raiL services; and a decision not to fund any ncdifications
to the WeJ.J.ington airport terminal. Healttr charges nere to remain
tgttouched' Defence policies were to eontinue wittr the sanre lene1 of
funding, and there would be no further action on the Nelson notional
railway. rt was anticipated that cabinet wourd endorse arr these
decisions.
The Conunittee also recorded in its minutes that items wittr a "Do
classification from Treasury (delete,/ilefer) were not to be re-submitted
at any time during L975-75 r-rnless their authors received prior approval
frorn the Prime Minister via the Secretary of Cabinet and even then they
would proceed only with the e:q>licit approval of the cCpp.15'8
Throughout April various itens classified as "existing policy review"
and "new policy" were debated: minor matters related to energy savings
were tabled along witlt some of wider significance, such as a decision on
2 April to approve the provision of funcls for the conversion to coal ln
inaustry.S? on 9 April, $rith no other officiats than MiLlen present
during the deliberations, the cCPP decided to defer its earlier decision
on assisted inunigration pending further information', and to invite the
Minister of Inmigration to attend the next meeting for consultation. At
t}te same time, in what was optimistically described as the "fjaal new
policies revieqr", the addition of various items, such as the approval of
costs for community use of school recreational buildings (Vote: Internal
affairs) and some instructions that departments shouLd absorb some costs
(e.9. SociaL Welfare to absorb 56OO for the Social Wetfare Council
Tourist and Publicity to absorb 93O,OOO for research and prornotion in
tourism) were aLlo".d.l@ The Minister of Education, Arosr had responded
to tlte earlier instruction on fitting his preferred new policies into tJle
prescribed sums for ttre three fo:lyard years, anrl the Committee noted that
"l'tinister of Education's protrnsals worth $9981000 are within the filancial
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constraints laid down in PP(75)MfO (p.3)." Accordingly ttrese items were
The Committee added, however'to be included in the L975-76 Estimates.
that:
with reference to ttre Minister's comrnents r:nder Priority
l: fntegrati* of Pritat in para.6 of his paper'
tit] advised that ttre anPunt
of $115O0,000 approved for ttris item was by way of further
interin assistance in increasing the percentage of State
salary costs paid to independent prinary and secondary
schools which would relieve the situation in ttreir accounts
and be a further step towards integration, and that the
Corunittee regarded as prernature the Minister's recorutendation
to provide fr:nds in the Main Estimates 1975/76 for their
specific purpose of meeting the costs of the Integration of
Private Schools because it is believed ttris proposal would
take scme time to be worked through. (tn short, what could
be put on the Main Estimates under this heading would only be
notional at this stage; it night therefore be better to
change the heading r:nder which provision for $lr5O0r00O had
alreadY been aPPrott 6.;161
Treasury had already reported to ttre CCPP on difficulties it had hacl in
isolating various costs in the funds for Education and Hospital Boards,
particularly furniture and fittings which, under the earlier existjng poliqf
review, r.ras supposed to be set at 75 perceht of ttre L974/75 allocation..
It was therefore agreed by the CCPP (9 April) that the llinister of Finance
should wrlte to the various Hospital and Education Boards reguesting them
to restrain er<penditure for 1975-76 as far as practicable below the 1974-75
levels on overti-me, furniture, fittings and inports. At this stage
(rrnlike the rnore direct approach aclopted some six years later by tlte
then-Minister of Health' Gair [Nationa]-l) the letter was both
optimistic and conciLiatory :
[fo tfre Chairmen of Healttr and Education Boards]:
You may be aware that Government, as part of its
policy to resfcoin growth in Government e:<penditure,
and ease pressure on overseas funds, has taken steps
to curb deparbmental enpenditure in 1975-76. In
general terms all departments have been directed to
plan to restrict expenditure below 1974-75 leve1s in
certain key areas, including overtime, furniture and
fittings, and expenditure on irnports. You will
appreciate the difficulties involved in deternuining
the portion of your grant expended in the above ttrree
areas and the undesirability from both Govermentrs
and your own point of view, in naking arbitrary cuts
at ttre time the Lg75-76 grant levels were decided'
No such action eventuated, or was indeed contemplated'
when allocations were set.
I8g.
It is not proposed that specific Auidelines be
issued to you in planning the disposition of your
Board,sr expenditure in J-975-76. Nevertheless, it will
be readily apparent to you that financial planning ancl
priorities should be in the general tenor of Governnent
spending elsewhere if the Governmentrs objectives are to
be attained.
In planning your Boards' expenditure in L975-76
therefore would you please emphasise the need for restraint
in the three aleas. I wouLd request you to restrain expen-
diture in these areas so far as is practicable below the
1974-75 levels. It is not, of course, intended that the
restraints be applied to the extent that ttre level of
service offered is seriously affected or that efficiency is
siginificantly reduced. I am confident of your cooperation
and assistance in taking steps available to lrep without
deleterious effects on your Board's activiti"s.162.
The foLlorring day (10 April) a Cabinet me$o was sent to alL Ministers and
alJ. pe:nranent heads on the 1975-76 New PoLicy Review. They were informed
ttrat (1) reviews had been completed and l4inisters would be informed individually
of the provisions that would be rnade in ttre Estjrates for new and existing
policiest
(2) ttre provision which Treasury added to ttre L975-76 Estimates after
consultation wittr Departnents may vary due to costing revisions or the
departrentsr ability to absorb e:<penditure. Financial approval at the
appropriate Level would still have to be obtained before actual expenditure
was committed.
(3) "D" itens hrere not to be re-subnitted throughout 1975-75 unless [I'linis-
sters]gaindprior approval of the Prirre I'linister through the Secretary to
Cabinet and the approval of ttre CCPP with its specific reconsnendation to
Cabinet. If the Prime Minister did not approve, then the CCPP could not
L6teLtner.
During April, and in the weeks leading up to the finalisation of the
Estimates and pr:blication of ttre Budget on 22 May, tJ:e CCPP gave its greatest
attention to matters of revenue and rrrages and incomes policies. Wages
claims were threatened, and the Treasury and other officials, along wittr
grinisters, were extremely anxious to secure union agreement to a freeze ;
on wages, or at least a deferral- of wage pushl until after the Budget
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announcenent. A Treasury paper on personal income ta* (Eodget R"por.!
No.12), submitted on 4 April to ttre CCPP and amended, with other suppLeren-
tary papers as Budget Report No.l-2, in early May, included ttre following
conment on revenue-expenditure difficulties :
The Conunittee (5 Uay 1975) noted ttre change in the
estimated deficit before borrowing fron 9395 rnillionin L974/75 to $1 082 million in L97S-76, against a
backg:round that whereas e:<penditure in L9ZS-76 would
increase by 21.69 percent, revenue could only rise byI.7 percent (in contrast with 29.7 percent and 26.3percent respectively in L974/75).
Ttris change vras said to be too big to be crediblein international circles. unress the deficit couLd be
reduced to a l-evel of g80O million it would be extremelydifficult to borrow overseas on acceptable terms or to
satisfy our creditors that New Zealand was serious in
taking remedial action. At least another $r50 milLionin revenue ought to be found.
The general guestion of unfreezing Governrnent
charges was also discussed. Some rnembers of the
Committee felt that consideration could be given to
announcing a phased timetable for unfreezing the eharges
over a period starting, say, with tJ:e Buclget and lasting
well into L976i these measures should be presented as a
necessarY corrective of the distortions in the econonqrthat had occurred because of the Government's undertakingsin the L972 Manig"=1e.16?
Oidtribution of this part of the CCPPTs discussions was lirnited to tfre
Prine Minister, the Minister of Finance, the Secretary to the Treasury and
l4illen (secretary). Sensitive topics such as the creation of state
services jobs for rxremployed, persons, an<i the revenue inplications of not
increasing railways, electricity and Post Office charges caused protracted
and exhausting debate, wi€r various exchanges between ttre Caucus (whictr
rejected the suggestions for an increase in ttre price of town urilk, and ttre
proposal for an increase in the Family Benefit) and the Committee.
Correspondence was exchanged between Treasury and.ttre ministers on t[e
guestion of capital gains and net wealth tax. Treasurry strongly rejected
the idea of capital gains tax on the growrds that
(a) profits of gains arising from sale of land prirnarily used for faruring
or agricultural business or a residence for the tarrpayer lwouldJ be exempt
(r:nder current 1aw);
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(b) cuffent assessments (under Property Speculation Tax Land and Income
Tax Act l'954 and Land Arnendment (No 3) 1974) already raked in 9350,000 and
covered nain capital gains;
(c) the case for taxation of capital gains was based on the principle of
equity. rf it were accepted tllat any system of taxation should embody the
principle of treating equall-y those who are in a like position, it would be
difficul-t to justify the exclusion of capital gains from the tax base
(d) administrative problems 
- it would be necessary to clearly defjne
categories of assets subject to tax and specify nethod of computing capital
gains;
(e) for practical and other purposes most countries which taxed capital
gains exemPted certain assets e.g. main private resid.ence, personal assets
up to a certain limit, nrotor vehiclesrfarrrs.
A general exenlption lras normaLly granted to eliminate a large nuliber
of small assessments and as a means of allor.ring for inflation. ExerrptLons
such as these eroded the tax base.
(f) on overseas experience' capital gains tax was unlikely to produ'ce
sigmificant source of revenuer e.9. OECD study showed that of 13 mernlcers
with capital gains tax, only 2 percent of their incorne cane from that ta:s.
Wealttt tax was suggested where income tax did not in itself
aPpear to be a sufficient rteasure of taxable capacidr. problens were that
(a) it was administratively dreadful i.e. would need an annual return of the
value of assets and liabilities of individuals and companiesr rt ,,would place
considerable workload on limited nurnber of independent professional valuers.,,
(b) no courtr? had wealtlr tax which produced significant revenue i
(c) neither the Ross nor the Asprey (Australia) inquiries had reconunended
wealth t"*.165
I9I.
Nunerous revenue producing measures' of a relatively minor kind, were
approved and passed on to Cabinet for endorsement, and a few days before
the pr:blication of the Estimates ttre CCPP agreed that there should be
increases in benefits for women, with legislation to bring those into effect
introduced within L2 months. Some new benefits were approved as a result
of a recentLy conducted Su:rzey of tJle Agecl.'
Immediately before the Budget, day, a simnering problem - housing - began
to peak. Itre Minister of Housing (Douglast joined the Comnittee on
2L l"lay, with some strong claims. Firstly, he pointed out, there had been
a fall in the nuniber of building permits issued in five urban centres, and
this was causing problems; secondly, the Government's target of 301000
new houses completed in 1975 would not be reached on ttre basis of present
policies; thirdly, 94 million was needed to provide ailditional loans for
young people:
A number of points mad.e by Treasurlr lf,ang and BrewertonJ
were disputed by tJle Minister lpouglas]. He claimed
that the diversion of $4 million would not reduce the
nr:mber of developed sections coming onto ttre market since
it would be taken from the S24 nitlion allocated for the
purchase of raw land. Effect of this reduced purchase
would. not be felt for 3 or 4 years. In the interirn,
the number of sections sold would increase....
The Secretary of Treasury pointed out that the
Minister of Housing sought $30 nillion for land purchase
and development for the L975/76 financial year. He had
received. approval for $24 million and was no\^t ProPosiag to
reduce this to $20 nuillion. In Treasuryrs view it was
likely that the need would subsequently arise for an increase
in ttre land purchase and development allocation if funds were
diverted from it. Treasury was said to agree with the neecl
to provide housing and majntain employment in ttre buildingjndustrlr, but the present proposal was, in essence, seeking
an increase in the loarr l-imit for a small number of peopLe'
Such a proposal appeared to be socially r:njust. Al-1
Government Departments involved in the housing progr:uune
were said to have agreed that a target of 30'000 houses was
required.. A consideration quite separate from the housing
. progranrme vras the maintenance of employment. It appeared
ttrat tlle transfer of $4 million for loans on sections vtas
not the most cost-effective way of maintaining employment'-
If information norv available inciicated that the original
forecast of 30,000 r:nits would not be achieved then a
complete reappraisal of the housing progranme was reguired
and action should not be taken on a piecerneal basis.
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ltre l4inister of Finance asked his Housing coJ-league why there had been
a drop in house buil-ding andl
ttre Minister of Housing indicated tltat in the near
future he would be asking tJ:e Committee to agree to...
the contj-ngency progranme for 201000 houses in specific
areas las in] t]re housing programme. The view was
e:<pressed that before this contingency programne ltas
introduced the whole housing field including the proSnsal
to increase section loans should be reviewed.
ftre Douglas ptan was therefore deferred, and a review of housing requested.l69
Ttris discussion provides an illustration of ttre sort of atternpt by Ministers
to retain for their own varied puranses the fwrds available, fron ti.me to
time, as a resuLt of defective plarrning, over-estimations, or changes in
ttre behaviour of a particular popuJ-ation. On this occasion, Treasury was
cJ-early disinclined to recommend that Housins should benefit frorn a switch
of funds to an area where the consequences could not be clearly defined.
Not only the Housing Minister, but ltoyLe, Minister of Agriculture,
spent tine knocking at the CCPP door before the Budget was finalised.
MoyJ-e had reguested more money and various incentives for farrers' and had
asked the Treasury to provide suggestions which woul-d t'meet the llinisterrs
proposals but not involve ezpenditure." In a sr:bseguent Budget rePort,
Treasury had proposed tax exernption for cooperatives in agriculture and
fishing, in order to encourage a "ploughback" of invesLment.lg? !{oyle had.
gone back to the CCPP on receipt of this paper, and reguested assistance to
sharemilkers wishing to purchase farms. Again, Treasux"y did not recornmend
any irrnediate provision of funds, although a week before the Budget announc-e-
ment the CCPP ilid agree that in his speech to the llouse the Minister of
Finance rnight "hint" that a scheme along these lines was now being worked
out by the Governrnent. (On 22 May, in the Budget, Tizard stated that'
It has also been decided to provide additional aid to
certain sharemilkers buying their first dairy fa:rm.
llhis will take the form of an interest-free suspensory
loan to sharernilkers who are required to seII a substan-
tial part of their sharernilking herd when buying a fam
with smaller carrying capacity. Ttre loan will be
repayable if the farmer concerned ceases to farm within
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l0 years of borrowing the noney. Itre Minister
of Agriculture and Fisheries will announce details
in due course of all the new measures of assistance
for the agricultural sector. lb? I
A Cabinet meeting was held on Sunday 11 May to finalise the Eudget
strategy. A whole raft of papers and Treasury reports, mainly concerned
with different sources of revenue and subsidies and other forms of assistance,
lvere considered. Some papers (e.g. Budget reports concerned wittr sales tax
on bitumen, fuel savings on private planes, fertiLiser subsLdies, noxious
weeds, the fishing industry, taxation exemption for cooperatives, soclal
security benefits and the study grant for students) were distributed to aLl
ministers, and retained by all. others, dealing with rrore sensitive natters
(such as sales tax, overseas travel restrictions, bulk charges, indJ-rect
taxes, structural assistance to industry and to dairy farmersr and monetary
policy) were retained only by nembers of the ccPP. llillen noted that aII
Papers [were] to be stored and retained in accordance with ttre rules that
normall.y apply to Cabinet papers
169Das:.s.
i.e. released, only on a Ineed to knowl
Three days later the CCPP rejected a proposal from officials for a
lower rate of company tax for firms with a demonstrable export perfo:mance,
but agreed that ttrey wouLd allow for a deduction from assessable income from
increased exports to be raised with a new market export tax incentive
introd.uced once officials had produced an acceptable definition of what
constituted new markets. Several changes to earLier decisions, such as
bank rates, petrol price increases and sal-es tax were implemented by Order in
Council regrulations two days before the Budget announcemerrt.lTO
The tone of the opening statement in the Budget was fairly aggressive
given the problems it announced: "The Government's policies calL for a
ccntinued high rate of increase in its spending and some concessions in the
17.,field of taxation."-" The Public Accounts, atready pr:blishedl had hacl tlre
following main features:
Ig4.Toial net Government expenditure (tor L974/75) amounted to $3'214 million'
an increase of 26.2 percent over the previous yeari revenue and other
receipts totalled $3rO2O million. This represented an increase of
26.3 percent, and left $19.1 mitl-ion of net expenditure to be financed
by borrowing. Estimates for the L975-76 year showed an increase of o]/er
19 percent in net expenditure, with only a 10.3 percent increase in
taxation and other receipts. This meant that an estimated $487 nillion
would have to be borrow"d.I72 Thus, between the time when Treasury
reported in early I'lay on an estimated 21 .69 percent increase in expendi-
ture, with a probable deficit of over $l-000 mill-ion to be covered by
borrowing and the Budget presentation, the CCPP and the Cabinet Cendor-
sing the inner group's decisions), had managed to produce a paPer reduc-
tion in the deficit of nearly $400 miltion. It wasr'as the next yearrs
outturn figures demonstrated, illusory. Table 2 of the 1976 $5lgq
showed that for the 1975-76 year some $I,000 million had been required
to finance the governmentrs borrowing requirements
The last six months of the CCFP
Triyo weeks after the 1975 Budget, the Minister of Finance submitted
a memo drafted in Treasury. It was endorsed and later distributed to
ministers. It was entitled Control of ExPPnditure J-975-75.
1. Ministers wilt be aware of the magnitude of
over-expenditure by departments in the 1974-75
financial year amounting in total to some $17f.2
million. This is in excess of the statutory linit
by about $I20 millicn. while some of this expendi-
ture was unavoidable, in particular that due to salary
and wage increases not provided for in the Esti:nates.
and to a lesser extent the circumstances prevailing
in the building and construction industry, it is
evident that there remains room for considerable
improvement in control of expenditure-
2. In the present economic circumstances and having
regard to the size of the Budget deficit before borrorr-
ing, a similar situation during this year is clearly
not tolerable. ft is therefore appropriate for me,
at this time, to draw your attention to the obligation
placed on }itinisters and Permanent Heads to avoid a
recurrence in I975-76. First, the relevant section
of Treasury instructions states that Permanent Heads are
themselves responsible for keeping expenditure on each
itern within and if possible appreciably below the
appropriation l-imif. The outcome for 1974-75 has
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demonstrated the need in some cases for a review
of procedures and for stricter control to ensure
these responsiJcilities are fulfilled. Permanent
Heads should keep ministers fully informed of the
Iikely Vote outturn and cliscuss correction action
as appropriate.
Secondly, l.rhen an approval is obtained to over-
spend the amount provided for an item, this does not
in itself authorise over-spending on tlte anrcunt aPPro-
priated to the Vote, the general principle being that
savings are to be made elsewhere. It is intended
that this principle be strictly enforced during L975-?6.
3. It is inperative tiat greater effort be made to
restrain e><penditure within the Estirnates provision.
Al*rough a number of specific directives to restrain
e>rpenditure, including overtime, furniture and fittings
and foreigrn exchanqe spending have been promulgated,
substantial dispensations have been made in soIIE cases
to framing the L975-76 Estfunates, thus reinforcing the
need to constrain e:<penditure within the appropriated
' Ievels.
4. You are requested to note that the $50 rnillion
provision for Supplementary Estirnates is al-read''1t
committed for likely benefit increases r:nder the
Budget. Provision jrt the Supplementaries for
departnrental expenditure outside these areas must, of
necessity, be kept to the absolute rninimum. OrIy
exceptional circumstances will be considered by t}re
Minister of Finance for inclusion in additional
appropriations.
5. In this context the scope for introduction of
further new policy proPosals in 1975-76 is virtually
negligible and Ministers are urged to defer proposed
neht expenditure. You will be require,:l to show
evidence of a genuine search of the Vote and indicate
areas where specific savings are to be made before any
new policy is approved. Cabinet has recogrnised the
absolute need to refrain from approving additional new
. policies between the Budget and the election and the
continued cooperation of all Ministers is of the uuno€t
imPortance.LT9
Within three weeks it was apparent that this sort of moral reminder, whether
endorsed by Cabinet as a self-denying ordinance or not, had little if any
effect across ttre whole range of portfolio responsibilities. On 24 ilune
Millen distributed a memo
Minister of Finance noted
May was runni-ng at a rate
to alt ninisters recalling that "the
in Cabinet on 23 Junb that enpenditure in April-
well in excess of previous yeats.uLTl+ Matters
which had with difficulty been held off by the CCPP before the Budget -
housing, farming, private school
were now brought back to tJ:en bY
---.
integration, National Roads Board funds -
their Ministers. Douglas (Housing)
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continued to Press for further dispensations for switching funds, based
on the review conducted at the CCPP's earlier request. The Committee
agreed (18 June) to recommend to Cabinet that $4 nilLion should be
transferred from the $36 million Land Purchase and Land. DeveLoprnent
progralnme to finance loans on houses to be built on section "and thus
reduce Pressure on Housing Corporation finance during the current finan-
cial year." Ministers l^tere concerned about how much preference should
be given to house loans and the impact of this on their regional- develop-
ment trn1icy, especially in the Auckland area, where it was suggested rmst
of the transferred fi:nds should go (and where several Government members
had tenuous electoral majorities). On 2 July it was decided to suspend
all loans on existingr houses, except in special cases or where public
servants were on transfer, and to continue to make Loans available to
Iow income borrowers. At first ministers felt ttraL, subject to discussion
witir the banks and the Public Trust office, these changes in housing policy
could be pr:blicly announced, but later "at a resuned meeting at which the
level of capital involvernent in Housing was discussed, the Couunittee
directed that no announcement [sic] be made, or action taken to refer to
Caucus the above decisions...pending a full report by officials to the
Comrnittee" in a weekts tine on the possi-ble financial requirements of
Housing and other votes. l?5
this report, dated 8 July, and forwarded from Treasury to the ccpp,
was entitled baldl-y Government Expenditure.
1. The Budget provided for an increase in Goverrunent
expenditure of 19 percent in 1975-76. For the first
three months ended June Government expenditure has
increased by 48 percent compared. with the same periodin last year.
If ad.vances to Housing Corporation, Rural Bank and
DFC are included this increase becomes 57 percent. Con-
ti-nuation of this trend could resul-t in a loss of cred.ibi-lity of Government's policies both in New Zealand and over-
seas, and seriously prejudice the success of those policiesfor maintaining employment while reducing price inflation
and conserving foreign exchange.
2. Following the Conunittee's direction last week, Treasury,in consultation with departments, has made rough estimates
of likely over-expenditrire for the year to 3l March L976.
The results are appalling. In the absence of Government
Lg7.
action, present estimates indicate over-expenditure
among big spenders as follows (slinor over-expenditure
which in total would add up to many n-illions have not
been included):
Housing Corporation
Electricity (coulcl be as high as $45 rnillion)
Health
Stabil-isati.on
Railways
RrraL Bank
Post Office
Social Welfare
Of fshore Mining-Petroleun development
Works
Broadcasting
Agriculture
Misc. new policies not yet approved(including ChrisUnas honus)
State serrrices saLaries (allowing for
only 2t percent + $1.40 frorn
7 JuIy and ninor increase from
January L976'l
SociaL security benefits (from JuIy and ,lanuary)
$n
39
30
25
24
16
9
L2
I4
L0
5
7
5 L95
$249 nillion
20
37
46
299
50
OVERE)PENDITURE:
3. As revenue is not likely to exceed the estimates,
the deficit before borrorving for 1925-76 and growttrin financing transactions could therefore be g25O mhigher than estimated at Budget tirne.
Conclusion
4. Policies for increasing Government spending on
employnent, creating low im5rcrt content prograrrnes
to counter any rise in r:nemplolrorent, seems to have
been interpreted as a sigmal to relax control of
expenditure across the board. ft no\d appears to
be ttre view of several spending agencies that money
and the use of resources involved are irrelevant.This attitude to e:<penditure controL cannot be
allowed to continue.
lgg.'
5. If measures are not taken to r'educe drastically
the e:<pected excess of $250 rnillion in Government
expenditure for L97S-76, the inevitable consequences
will be eittrer a resurgence of major inflationary
pressures in New Zealand, or external bankruptcy, or
bottr.l" b
Treasury recorunended that (a) Ministers wittr significant over-expenditure
be asked to report to the Minister of Finance in one week shoring -
reasonsi preventive measures; and (b) where further action was needed
Treasury and the department should report to the CCPP. lttre Conrlittee
accepted this paper, and on 9 Jul-y directed that Treasuryrs reconmenda-
tions be put into effe"t.lt The following day, to reinforce the
rEssage, Tizard submitted a paper to cabinet, reporting on Treasuryrs
C'overnrnent Expenditure Paper and listing those departments wLtlr an
excessive spending level:
Department Spent to June
lgg,
t Voted Average
Spent proportion past
three Years
Agriculture and Fisheries
Defence
Education
Electricity supply
Forest Senrice
Government Printer
Healtlr
Labour
Lands and Surnrey
Maori Affairs
Post Office
Railways
Social Welfare
Stabilisation
ssc
TransSnrt
Works and Development
Investment Transactions
BCNZ (Broadcasthg)
Offshore ltining
Financinq Transactions
Rural Bank Finance Coraroration
Housing Corporation
76.2
41.3
15I.1
56.5
17,2
3.4
136.3
3.4.
11.9
10. o
Not applicable
50.5
24I.L
34.5
5.0
14.8
26.9
2.O
L2.5
19.3
s1.5
42.2
23.0
25.4
25.8
2L.8
22.3
24.2
26.3
2L.7
23.6
20.5
30.0
22.O
J,6.5
25.7
28.6
20,o
19.5
2L.2
18.0
24.L
2r.0
22.4
r8.4
19.9
L6.4
lg.2
18.5
18.6
19.0
L7.3
21.3
16.6
9.2
20.4
20.4
NA
tn
NA
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Winchester suggested that "one logical explanation for the raBid
growth in expenditure, apart from any impact of inflation [was] ttrat
pressures to introduce new policies and to expand existing ones Blus the
backlog of deferred errpenditure had buiLt up to dangerously high l-evels."
He also noted the deficiencies of ttre existing system for governnent
accounting, which was incapable of providing the detailed financial anaLyses
Treasury needed to identify the causes of cost growth as they d".r"1otred.I79
Most sigrnificantly, the problems previously noted - failure to ensure ttrat
recommended savings were actually achieved, that approval to finance a nelr
policy area was actually accompanied by a real compensatory saving ln an
existing area, and "the effects of approving deferrals" from the preceding
COPE exercise in the next draft Estimates - combined to exaggerate the
general political difficulties of behaviour control.
The pilloryiJrg approach to expenditure,/cost rnanagement and control
adopted at this point in Labour's administration produced some nelrye-
racking results. In the very brief tirne permitted, departments reported
directly to Treasuryr. which formarded their findings to the l"linister of Finance:
1. Treasury report 30 (10 July) indicated that
total net Government e:<penditure to 30 June 1975(three months) was 47.9 percent higher than the
same period in L974-75.
2. ActuaL outturn at 31 July (excluding RBFC' NZHC
and DFC) is 43 percent higher than the sarne tiure
L974-75.
3. tatest information frorn Ministers confi:nrs that
ttre deficit pre-borrowing and in financing transac-
tions will be approximately $256 million higher than
expected. at Budget time i.e' at least 9200 nillion
wilt be required in Supplementary Estimates if you
are to avoid classification as 'overexpenditurer.
lltris al-Lows for only 2t percent in State Service
wages and salaries.
4. Annex A lists departments' reasons and their
cormnitments to hold to the t'tain Estimates to ltarch
L976.
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5. Key reasons given by departments for estimated
over-expenditure in 1975-76 are as foll-ops:
(a) increased personnel costs largely because
employment in the pr:blic sector is ruruning
at a higher level than provided for
(b) rnore rapid progress on works prograrunes
(c) decreasing delivery times for orders
(d) rate of price inflation 
- 
especially for
overseas items - greater than expectedl by
d.epartments, or by Treasury when Main
Estimates finalised
(e) decline in trading revenue in some departments.
6. There is limited scope for reductions over solne
of the largest areas of Government e)q)enditure such
as personnel costs and many works activities beeause
of the possible adverse effects red.uctions nuight have
upon employment in either the pr:blic or private sectors.
If additional increase from 9 July in State Serviqes
wages and salaries cannot be held to 2t percent the
Government may face the need to inE,roduce some restrlc-
tions even here.
7. As the position is so serious and because there
are rel-atively few areas where significant savings can
be expected it is all the more important to act guickly
to maximise savings where possible for as great a part
of tlris financial year as possible.
8. Major cuts can only be achieved by sigrnificant and
widespread, changes in present policies. See Annex B
for general across-the-board measures.
9. One major problem is the attitude prevalent at al.l
Ievels of Government that the pr:blic sector can couqanrd
a lfunit1ess supply of resources. Consideration must
be given to ways of changing this attitude and of
replacing it by an equally widespread appreciation of
the seriousness of the position and of the need to
secure economies and savings where possiSle
t0. Recommended:
- Review of specified areas by 2O August
- Consider across-the-boar6ngssrrr€F
At its meeting on 5 Augnrst the CCPP adopted.alL Treasu:ryrs reconunenda-
tions, including across-the-board neasures dealing witJl personnel, works
and plant and equipmer,t.lSl A number of special reviews were ilitiated,
tro
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with reports to be subnitted by 20 Nugust. The results of these were
as followsl
- By 7 August, the Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand reported
that it would be able to reduce spending levels by only 92m. Treasury
supported this "because of the level of BCrs conunitments. Programne
to be financed by National Development Loan account, within very strict
control lirnits. rl
- By 19 August there hras a report on why the amounts for moxious weed
control were so high. It had been found that apparently more farmers
than estirnated or expected had reslnnded to the Governmentrs provision
on noxious weeds, and that the amount of 3.5 rnillion reported as needed
on 1 August 1975 could in fact increase to $6 million (although-only
$0.5 million had been provided in the Estimates for this. purpose.)
It was agreed that the provision of any more funds here should be
deferred until the next fiscal year.
- At the same time, the Ministry of Works and Development reported
that because of the inadequate arnount provided for the Housing Corporation
(there had been nothing in the Estj:nates) they would now have'to defer
all new buildings, including land purchase, to the amount of $I9.6
nillion, plus $2.9m. for plant purchase.
- 
Treasury recomnended that in Vote: Agriculture and Flsheries
there should be restrictions on staff recruitment, and on works. They
also recommended that the Agriculture Ministry should absorb al-l plant
and equipment costs. The Ministry requested more time to study this.
However, although the time was allowed, there is no evidence in the
minutes of the CCPP that this topic was conclusively dealt with before
the November General Election.
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- Later in August Treasury recomrnended, and the Corrnittee agreed,
that Hospital Boards should be helcl to a spending level of $9.7 million,
with a review of all health benefits - although, as was pointed out,
there could be no promise of reductions here.
- 
The Committee ut-"o .nr"ed that savings in the Railways Vote could
be made by a deferral of $5.9 million in the works programne' and by
considering the closing-dot'rn of certain railway lines, which could
produce some $3 rnillion.
- It was decided to cut Education salaries by a limited anount, and
make some adjustment in Post Office costs. On 8 Septenber, the
CCPP decided to refer back to Cabinet its earlier request for
consideration of an increase in bulk charges with the tining of this
announcement to be made at ttre discretion of the Committee. The
timing question revolved around whether charges should be increased
irunediately, or before the coining elections, or deferred until later.
In the event, the CCPP decided to wait until after the elections
before announcing its intentions on bulk .hutg.".182
Numerous expenditure items were submitted to the Cornnittee throughout
Augrust-September. Salary questions concerning pay rates for state
servants were a matter of conflict between the State Services Co-
ordinating Cormnittee and the Combined State Service Organisations
(the 
'unionr voice.). The Government was under pressure to rnove from
its decision that nothing higher than a 2.25 percent increase !{.ls
permissible and was threatened with the embarrassment of a hotly
disputed public debate on this before the State Services tribunal.
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Absent ministers complicated the Conunitteers ability to deal with
specific expenditure review items. Special al hoc pleas, such as that
from T. llcGuigan, Minister of Healtle , fot additional funds for ttre
Auckland Hospital Board, were favourably received. Meetings were
packed - ttre agenda for 27 August alone, for example, included the follovring
items, all with o<penditure implications: a review of Works and Devel-opment
expenditure; ctealing with the black beetle and noxious weeds; revietr of
Agriculture and Fisheries expenditure; over-expenditure in the Etectriiity
departnent; State Services pay rates; a claim for salary increase by
primary teachers; review of specific Vote: Education expenditure itens;
Health funding mattersr government errpenditure on the Railways, and the
alLocation of funds for overseas aid. In most cases, propositions were
deferred or the department instructed to absorb additional costs. None-
theless, there was clearly a pre-election build-up in pressure from interest
groups in fields such as health and education, from the farmirrg conrnunity,
from state servants, from quasi-governnent agents such as t}re National
Roads Boards, and from those involved in developing sigmificant or nassive
plans such as the Clutha Valley Development. Spending agents attempted
to get as much as possible up to the CCPP to ensure that items were already
in the e:<penditure/planning pipeline, with as firm a comitment by Government
as possible, before ttre General- Election campaigm.
Lengthy and difficult debates took place between officials, spending
ministers, Tteasury officers and members of the CCPP. On Septeriber 3, for
example, after a long discussion of the State Services pay guestion, and
another on a proposed Severance Billrthe Corunittee considered a major claim
by primary teachers for improved salary rates. Education department
officials reported that the teachers' union, the New Zealand Educational
Institute (llZnf), rdas unhappy about the 1on9 delay experienced in having
this matter resolved. Ttre Ministers of Education and the State Services
were asked to convene a meeting with the NZEI to discuss their gzievances.
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Primary education grouPs now believed that they could get parity with
secondary teachers, and that broadbanding (a change in the schoolsr
grading system which eliminated a nr:mber of steps reguired for pay
increases) could be introduced. Lang (Treasury) objected to
the whole matter under discussion. He pointed out that ttre Education
Department hail already proposed l2O New Policies in 1975 (despite injunc-
tions for restraint) r and this particular item had not been anong them.
Further, the Education department was like1y to over-spend Lts L975/76
allocation by about $40 million, without the requested additionaL provision
for salaries. He pointed out that there rrras a surplus of prirnary teachersi
that a successful primary claim would undoutedly escalate into a new
secondary claim, and, finally, ttrat the primary teachers' clain far
exceeded existing Government policy. If it went, to the State Senrices
Tribr:nalr he believed, the Goverrunent would r,rndoubtedly be able to justify
its case for refusal. Williarns, Chairman of the State Services Commission
disagreed with his Treasury colleague on the last point, while the Education
department officials, Boag and MiIler, insisted that the bench-
marks (parity) question musr be addressed. The matter was deferred for
one week, with an indication that even then it would probably be cleclined.
At the same time the CCPP directed that in view of Education departmentts
likely net over-expenditure, 94 nillion should be cut from their allocation.lSS
Similar reductions were ordered in Electricity ($4rn), Railways (to
find $5.9n by deferral or deletion of approved capital works, with a reguest
to look for further savings in that Vote), and Overseas Aid (to maintain
its planned expenditure level). On the other hand, questions of Hea-lth
expenditure seemed to reduce the CCPP to despair. Given the forecasted
over-expenditure of 530.4 million, and an additional grant (aPProved) of
S9.7 mil-lion to the Auckland Hospital Board, there was obviously a finan-
cial crisis in this Vote. Tfre Corunittee instructed that there should be
a review of health benefits, though with no real expectation that over-
expenditure could be reduced by significant amounts. Although the Post
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office was instructed to defer capital works spending worth $5oorooo,
the Comnittee approved the allocation of an aclilitional $2.6 million
to enabre that department to employ more school reavers (based on
an earrier coumitment to ensure that ar1 unemployed persons in thls
category shouLd be in paid work by.rune L976.) at the same time,
a further $25O,OOO was approved for other projects.l8+
During the second week of September 1975 the teachers salariesl
problen became more acute. The ccpP was informed by the Education
department (10 September) that the Post Primary Teachers Association
was reacting very badly to proposals for benchmarks,/parity, and that
there vras a reaL threat of a primary teachersr strike. rn what was
apparentry his first appearance before the colrunittee, w. RenwLck,
Director General of Education, indicated that education interest groups
had found new grounds to support the NzEf claim, although he assured the
Committee that he did have rcontingency plansr in hand should tlre threatened
strike eventuate. Galvin, of tJ.e Treasury, urged the Conunittee to
take al-L necessary steps to keep the question away from the State Services
TriSunal-, and again Willians hotly disputed ttre wisdom.of this strategy.
Eventually the Corunittee ilecided to approve the suspension of depart:lental
negotiations with the NZEI while the PPTA counter clairn was being negotiated,
but noted that the prirnary teachers did have a legar right to lodge an
inunediate claim with the tribr:na1.185
The Conunittee then went on to approve an additional $5.2 million for
the second stage of a second television channel, on the grounds presented
by officials, and politically persuasive at that stage of an election year,
that "furttrer delay would cause public unrest." The Comrnittee had been
inundated with reports on the Clutha Val1ey Development, and reguested a
sruflnary report on this within a few days. At the same tirne, however, it
approved $40 mil-lion for expenditure on construction in the Cromwell area, to
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be spread over the next six years but, by inplication, available for
pubJ-ic announcement prior to the 1975 electiorr".186
Over the next month the Cornmittee made a considerable number of
ad hoc decisions (including the decision to approve an allotpance for
state servants pay, to be conveyed in a "carefully worded" conmertt tO
the State Services tribr:nal) . Unempl-oyment vras worsening, and additional
sums (for example, $12.5 million to Hospital and Education Boards) were.
approved for ttre employment of "special workersr'. One comtercial enter-
prise initiated by the C,overurent on the West Coast, the Mataii comP€rny'
the subject of numerous disturbing reports during the preceding monttrs'
was finalLy placed in receivership, on the decision of the CCPP, on
I october.lSf
On 13 October the CCPP decided to discontinue its regrular meetings
(in view of the inuninent election camapign) unless directed by Cabinet
to reconvene. Three such special meetings hrere held, the last on
Thursday, November 6 1975. The matter of Electricity department over-
expenditure($52 rnillion, on top of the Main Estimates provision and the
Supplementary Estimates allocation, which together totalled $185 nillion)
was sadly noted, but there seemed little l-ikelihood of effective reductions
at this stage,
Right up to the final CCPP neeting, the Ministers of Education (Arcs)
and Housing (Doug1as) continued to press their departnental anbitions on
the Comnittee. Amos, for example, produced a request to establishr
firstra community college in Northland, and then a general autbority for
a policy on the establishrent of other conununity colleges. On 28 October
Anos and two Education department officials, Renwick and Garrett
appeared before the Comnittee to argnre ttreir case. Tizard was in the
chair, with his colleagues Freer, Faulkner, l4oyle and Walding, and three
Treasury of ficials (headed by Lang'. ) fn" Co**ittee imnediatelY
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asked the Minister why the proposal for community colleges had not been
included in his new policies. Amos replied that buildings for a
technical institute were already under construction at whangarei and that
this was within existing policy. It was now proposed to use these build-
ings for a community college. Ttre additional cost in L975-76 (about
$151000)cou1d be net from p:rcvision in Vote: Education for grovrth in
Senior Technical Education.
The view !.ras expressed [presumably by Treasury] that
ttre proposal was clearly new policy since it wouldl
comrnit sr:bstantial new expenditure in future years.
A community colleqe was expected to cost $2431000 rnore
than a technical institute for buildings and equipnent
and $60,000 more per annum for staffing and e)q)enses
of operating...
As well as seeking authority to establish Northland
Connr:nity College the llinister also sought approval of
a new policy covering ttre establishment of subseguent
community colleges. He [anps] stated that if the
Government' s policy[Manifesto] for consnunity colleges
was to appear credilcle, a general policy was required.
A counter view expressed was t}at the establ-ishment of
the Hawkes Bay Comnr.rrity College showed that policy was
being fulfilleil and that while it might be necessary to
approve the Northland Coll-ege novr, the general policy
should not be considered outside the annual new policies
review.
The CCPP agreed to allow the Education department an additional $15r0OO
for the estabLishrent of the Norttrlancl College and noted that the l.Linister
of Education would sr:brnit further pro;nsals for community colleges in
L976-77 New PoLicy review and that "this submission wouLd take into account
the experience gained in the establishrnent and operation of the Hawkes Bay
community colLege. "rBY
One other education matter was discussed at this special meeting - the
guestion of the primary teachers salary scale. Although the question had
been put to Cabinet, it had been referred back to the CCPP, with full
authority delegated by Cabinet (which had its mind more on election matters)
for the Committee to rnake a final decision. The PPTA had already lodged
a relativities claim. The Minister of the State Services (Faulkner) had
obtained the agreement of the joint NzErr/PPTA and Education se:rrices
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Committee (Esc) for discussions on relativities. During these, the
PPTA had elected to accepL a general wage increase for the State Services
(arisi-rag out of the application of the hal-f yearly surrrey) in place of a
special claim. However, no agreerrnnt had been reached between the two
teachersr unions on benchmarks. The ESC had heard claims, and nade Lts
ovrn reconnendation; the PPTA had irmneiliately withdrawn from the negotia-
tions, thereby eliminating the primary teachers' option to go to the State
Services Tribr:nal .
'Williarns (SSC) reconunended, and the CCPP favoured, the establistment
by the Government of proper relativities between the two professions, with
advice on these to be received from the NZEI and the PPTA, who could then
appeal to the Tribunal. A tentative recommendation was floated for a one
step margin, favouring secondary school teachers, and with a nunber of
specific features. Although Renwick reported that a primary teadtersl
strjle was stil-l- possi5le, he advised that this could be averted if the
Governlent clained that it was going to the State Services Tribunal to
avoid breaking its own stabilisation poJ-icies. The CCPP agreed to adopt
. rggthis strategy.--
Before going further it is worthwhile at this point to retrace our
steps slightly, and very briefly note the paraIlel activities of tJle CCPP
in its 1975 relationship to COPE. On 4 JuIy a Treasury circular to all
permanent heads had initiated the next COPE review. Officials were
reminded of COPE's responsibility "to survey Governmentrs expenditure
requirements over a three year period; to establish ttrat departnental
forecasts represented a realistic assessment of the costs of existing
policies; and to analyse anil inform the Government of ttre effects on these
policies of keeping wittrin the expenditure targets imposed by the Goveln-
nentr s economic and financial objective=."19O
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Departments $tere instructed to re5rort to Treasury by late Augtust:
an additional note informed them that a circular regarding new lrclicies
would be issued in December. A nuniber of general instructions, such as
the continuation of an emphasis on prograrrune and activity analysis, and
the need to have strict regard for rules concerning justificatio,ns, were
included. The practice of identifying'grey areasr between new and existing
policy initiated in 1974, tdas to continue and woul-d be orpanrled; depart-
ments were to provide a written reconcil-iation of any differences betrrveen
their forecasted costs of existing policy for 1976-77 and tJle 1975-76
Estimates provision; and speciat COpE reviews of matters such as DI|VC
reguirements, works programxes, and science budgets were to be orpected.
Particular attention was to be given to the details of wage and saLaries
calculations for the three fonpard years, on a prograrune basis. An appen-
dix to t.he Circular provided a definition of what constituted "existing
policy" and what constituted "new" policy: 'Existing polici.:sf are
those policies approved before 29 August and whictr will incur orSnnditure
before 3l- March L976.' A rnew policy, was
an e>rpenditure proposal which introduces a nevr activLty
or significantly alters the size, scale or quality of
an existing activity. New policy proposals include
those which 
-
(a) introduce new activities e.g. nerv grants
(b) alter the size or basis of a subsidy or grant
unless such change is in accordance with a
Government-approved automatic formula (Note :
where an increase in the a:nount of grants is
based on approved formula to cover personnel
costs, this is not considered to be new poliqf)
(c) extend existing services where such an extension
has not been approved by Ciovernment, e.g. a
substantial increase in overseas or internal
expenditure on tourist promotion
(d) cause a radical alteration in the.performance or
nature of an existi-ng service e.g. computerisation
of a service currently performed by cJ-erical per-
sonnel; create an EDP master file.
(e) change replacenent policies or capital or equipment
(f) re-programme frrnds i.e. sh!-fting funds between
programmes or activities.l9r
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An additional instruction to Treasurry
new policies approved for L975-76 only
no ocplanation for this was specified
investigatirg officers noted that
were to be excludua.r9L Although
in this nerro, the obvj-ous implica-
an election year should not be takention was tfiat ad hoc approvals during
too seriously when they were given only a one-year costing, particularly
when they had been generateil by tlre (1975) March-April new policy exercise
before the Builget. Under no circumstances were they to be accepted or
regarded as having the status of an existing policy. Prices were to be
as at I July L975, with no allowance for price changes since that date,
except in tlre case of personnel costs.
COPE itself decided to recourcnd that for the L975 exercrse aaditional
"special tasks" should be undertaken on behalf of the Governnent (subject
to Cabinet approval, which was in fact obtained):
(i) to identify and guantify areas included in
forecasts which [required] ttre expenditure
of overseas funds, establish the grouth from
the current year's provision, and exarnine and
report on the clegree of comnr:ltment in each fore-
cast year;
(ii) identify and gualify the provision in 1975-75
and forecast years for activities undertaken in
line with the Governnent's policy of pronoting
temporary employment and ensure that specific
approval [existed] in each casei
(iii) draw to the attention of Government those areas
which [were] considered to be increasing at a
significant rate
(iv) identify and quantify areas in departmental fore-
casts which Irepresentecl] open-minded comritments
of public funds.193
l'reasular investigating officers rrere instructed to have special- regard for
"any areas of significance or disagreement which lemerged] during the
COPE review" and could be included in any later review of existing policies,
such as had been conducted in recent years. lltre Director of Finance I,
de Jardine, pointed out that "the next lsuch] review is likeJ-y to be
of rrcre sigmificance than in previous years", and TIO's shoul"d search
carefully for potential areas to pin lnint as capable of expenditure.reduc-
tiot.19ts Although one Treasury officer, R. Hurnard, had suggested that
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no increase should be permitted for staff ceilings on existing policiesl
Lang and his senior advisers decided that a figure of I percent over-
all (i.e. not arithnretically to each departnent) would be feasibL",lQd .nd
with ttre concurrence of the State Service Conunission and the Cabinet
corurittee on the state services this figrure was 
".t.'196
A Treasury paper to the CCPP elaborated on certain features of COPE
and the general financial situation.r9T on 28 Augrust the ccPP agreed
to give COPE specific instmctions as to e:rpenditure targets and special
tasks: If certain assumptions \rere accepted on growth (t!Ze-t2.0.0 growthl
Lg77-78:2.0 growth; 1978-79:2.0 growth) - the implication was that folecasts
should be reduced as follons:
For 1976-77 by 9328 rnillion (from the base year, i.e. the
L975-76 Estirnates'base) i
L977-78 by $344 million;
L978-79 by $419 nillion
Cabinet endorsed this recorsnendation by the CCPP/98.rrd the decision was to
be distributed as a Cabinet Ivlinute (29 september)which read as follo'rs:
COPE: TARGETS FOR GO\IERNMFNT E)GENDITURE L977-7?
At the meeting on 29 Septenrber l-975 cabiJret directed
COPE to
(a) sur:vey Government e:<penditure requirements over
a three year period
(b) estimate what departmental forecasts represent
a realistic assessment of cost of existing
Governnent policy
(c) analyse and inform Government of the effect of
reducing forecasts by 9328m. L976/77$344n. L977/78
$4l9ur. 1978/79
so as to stay within target rates of grcnrth.
llhe Minute then reiterated its approval for the "special tasks" (descriJced
above) that the COPE corunittee, via Treasury, had suggested COPE should under-
t9ql]Al<E.
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It was going to be essential that these instructions were followed
carefully and rigourously if there was to be any change to what
Lang (Chairman of COPE) had stated a few weeks earlier to his Purblic
Senrice peers at ttre initial meeting of COPE:
...when departments had previously been reguested to
make every endeavour to make savings no areas had ln
fact emerged. All departnents [are] presently well
ahead of the Estimates provision, particularly the
The Secretary
on aspects of
b:i-'g spenders; as a first step departments should try^
to live within their Estimates. lenphasis added,.lzttt
aLready reported to the Minister of Finance and the
Government's past performance, and ttre fuplications
had
the
CCPP
of
this for future e:rpenditure:
. lthe 1975 Budget provided for a 19.1 percent rate of
growth in government expenditure in the L975-76 finan-
cial year. Historically ttris was a very high rate of
growth but was justifiable on the grounds that it woull
help to naintain demand in the economy (and consequently
incomes and employment) through a period when private
sector demand was expected to weaken significantly.
There are indications that demancl in ttle private
sector is now reviving and that it may wish to claim
a much larger share of resources in L9'16-7'l tlran at
present. Unless the pr:blic sector is prepared to
accommodate this claim, by restraining its or"rn rate
' of growth (which in fact is nuch qreater than l9-I
percent), there will be increased Pressure on real
resources and a resurgence of demand inflation wtrich
would again increase the denand for imports. In the
light of our balance of palruents difficulties, this
situation cannot be allowed to develop. Eor this
reason it is essential that the rate of grorrrth il
government expenditure (existing and nevr policies)
be restrained as nearly as possible to zero growth in
real terms in the next financial. year. ..
E:rperience has shown that it is much easier to
increase expenditure frorn a low basel if and when this
appears desirable, than it is to achieve reductions oa
a high base of already approved po1icies...'u'
One penultimate hiccup occurred in the progress of ttre 1975 COPE exercise.
It iLlustrates, anpng other things, the problems caused by pressure of the
forthcoruing elections, and some deficiencies in the Labour Cabinetrs ability
to naintain a collective and disciplined approach to executive government.
A query had been raised by Lang as to whether or not Cabinet had
actually intended to agree wittr the COPE recomnendations on forecast targets
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(Cabinet !{inute
gave its assent,
Chair, and Lang noted in a menp to
been in the
"MrlF [Minister
effects of specific
Battersby, that
reconunendation lon
29 Septenber) Rowling had been absent when Cabinet
but Tizard, Minister of Finance had
of Finance] has previously declined
reductions in order to stay within target rates of growth]." on 8 October,
a week after the Cabinet meeting, a Treasury officer sent a menp to
Lang and Battersby, Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, in which he
nade the following points:
I asked Cabinet Office to issue an amended Cabinet minute
deleting the reference to targets. They mad,e the follon-
ing points:
(a) llr Tizard was chairing Cabinet when ttre COpE paper
was discussed;
(b) He introduced it and seemed happy with all the
recorunendations listed ;
(c) He sigrned the Minute as it now appears.
In the circumstances Mr McLeoC does not think it would
be appropriate for Cabinet office to issue an amended nrinute
unless they were asked to do so by }tr Tizard. He suggests
we take the rnatter up with I"1r Tizard. The l,linute is addressed
to the Minister of Finance and Cabinet Office has confirmed
that other Departments did not and will not receive a copy.
I suggest we leave the Minute as it is but not circulate it.Alternatively, we could write a note to the Minister to check
that he has not changed his mind but as COPE is now halftiay
through its examination of Votes it is a little too late to
change tack now. (ssnd.) tl.o. ltori"tty.20A
Lang approved the latter option - a note to the Minister of Finance,
although he indicated to Moriarty that there was no hurry for this to be
dorr..2OB A note (ilated L7 october) to Tizard included the comnent that
"it was ny [tang's] r:nderstanding that you had not intended this particular
section of the Paper considered by Cabinet to be passed on to COPE as part
of its terms of reference this year. The Cabinet Minute will not be cj.rcu-
lated to other Ministers. Rather than seek an arnended Cabinet directive,
I proPose, if you agree, sirnply not to inforn COPE of the targets initially
proposed. "2D*
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Such sophisticated balancing of advisory arrd political se:nrices,
as is hinted at here on Langrfs part, is characteristic of the subtle
=ssyanf-nnster relationships at the centre. As Professor '.1 . Roberts has
remarked in another setting, a pavanne of advance and retreat is performed,
aiured not to entertain but to surrrive without embarrassnent to eittrer set
of dancer=.F5 However, regard,less of the riinistersr minor difficulties,
and before COPE net to consider its final report to the Government, the
Labour party was heavily defeated at the polls by National, headed by
Muldoon.
Surunary of tlre Labour administration.
!{hen the Labour party cane to office in November L972, several develop-
ments had already been initiated, and were advanced further between J972-75,
in the br.t,,ro6 of fiscal control and e:<penditure planning. The introduction
of PPB, as an appropriate system for planning and evaluating the allocation
of resources through governnrent agencies, had had considerable irpact on the
thinking and ttre behaviour of some public servants, particularly in the
Treasury. lttre adoption of an output,/outcomes orientation in the investiga-
tive and decision-making procedures was, as Laking had noted, not only
a connon sense approach to the business of resource management. It was qrgo
becoming' an administrative and political necessity, as the heavil.y loaded
welfare state grappled wittr problems of rising costs for goods and se:nrices,
increasi-ng demands for support and encouragement from a more diversified
industrial sector, and a volatile world market for New Zealand e:qnrts, with
the threat of serious imbalances between imf,ort costs and e:cport profits.
A changing intellectual and conceptual approach to resource management
reguired the urodification of existing systems, and ttre adoption of new
procedures for budgetary managernent and e><penditure planning. In i970,
ttre National gcverrunent had approved the Treasury-based COPE system for
policy costing and forecasting, and within a year or tffo it was apparent
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to financial managers and senior officials ttrat this pre-Esti:nates
exercise could become an indispensible element in the budgetary process.
rt clearly distinguished the respective roles of ministers (who were not
directly involved in the COPE system, but received an annual report from
their most senior advisers on existing policy costs and predictions),
Treasury (which vtas central to the coPE system, but not required to take
fuIl responsi-bility for either the costing or rlorecasting tasks), and the
spending departrnents themselves. The deliberate irnplication of spendtng
agents in ttre annual budgetarry process- setting the poachers to catch ttre
gamekeepers 
- was possibly one of the npst significant post-war changes
in ttre Niw zealand governmentts financiar history. rt may armost be
regarded as a democratisation process, insofar as responsibilities were
distributed more equitably amongst those with the political- authority to
make financial decisions, and the responsibility to accountrttrrough
rulnisters, for their use of public resources.
By the same token, however, coPE may be regarded as a function of the
continual redistribution of financial power anong specific constant elites 
-
Treasury officers, permanent heads, senior finance officers in deparunents,
arrd ninisters- certainly for ttre first six or seven years of its operations,
the coPE system was not only characteristical-ly confidential
but a rather mysterious piece of government machinery2 poorry-understood by
officials at uriddle levels and below, and relatively r:nknown to outside
interest grouPs engaged in negotiations with ttre government over resource
allocations.
By early L972, Treasury officers had recognised that one of COpErs
important ddficiencies was its inability to distingruish between existing and
new policy costs. Departnents were therefore required to separate these out
and identify their differences as clearly as possible. Thereby, t1.e CopE
review would genuinely demonstrate the financial base of government lnlicy,
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and highlight areas where discretionary choices by ninisters and Treasury
COuLd be cOnsciously made. However, as Winchester comrented, "in 1972'
de3pite intentions of Treasury and the Cabinet Economic Conunittee to use
the lfirst] new policLeg report for priority setting and decision ma]cing
on what to include in the Budget, Cabinet nereLy noted the report. Hence
it appears that it served only as an information docum"nt'."2D6
This informational aspect of the new policies report, which has been
provided by the review since L972, is of course an itportant part of any
"early warning" approach to planning. But as Winchester suggests, on its
own this contribution to the problems of resource allocation rtas of linitecl
value unless supplenrentecl by other advantages. During t-he.L972-75 period
of Labour administration, there was considerable pressure on officials and
ntinisters, partlcularly those involved in the CCPP network, to sharpen up
ttre Lnstrunental role of ttre "new poJ-icy" review phase, atld increase its
value firstly as a planning tool and, nuch more energetically, as a means
of cost control.
lfhile fron 1973 onward there nas an emphasis on improving the avail'able
definitions of difference between existing and new policiesrthe cybernetic
value of this was somewhat obscured by ttre political- style of the inner
Cabinet (the CCpp), and the adninistrative style of its principal advisere
in Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry and other senior
of,ficials.
Further, Winchester has dercnstrated ttre extent to which the COPE
exercise and the Main and Supplerentary Estimates reviews were capable of
distortion (in terms of their formal intentions). Spending agents were
anxious to ensure that new policy proposals entered the e:<penditure pipeline,
or lrere not entirely eliminated from it, during these rnrlnerable phases of
the budgetary cycle.zo7 The CCPP had started with a firm intention to
define a sharp line of difference between ministers (as policy coordinators,
and expenditure planners who would determine spending priorities j-n an
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atmosphere not dominated by public officials) and the conventional advisers
to Governrnent, notably those in the Treasury. But such a clear division
of labour sinply could not be sustaj.neil. Ottrer aspects of the corunwrica-
tion networks remained geared to the needs of ttre permanent bureaucracy,
elaborated over a long periocl of more stable working relations with the
National party adninistration.
The slightly herculean task which the five members of Labourrs inner
cabinet took upon themselves lvas complicated by a number of critical
difficulties:
(i) whatever their general objectives before gaining office, the leaders
of the parliamentary Labour party were either not adequately info:med about
the workings of existing systems for cost control and expenditure plaruring,
or they d.id not anticipate the i:nplications of these for the achievement
of political objectives;
(ii1 t}re immediate distance created between the eLite CCPP group and other
spending ministers, totally 5le>rperienced in Cabinet government, provoked,
rather than claryred dovrn, ttre ambitions of tJ:e latter. The initial excite-
ment of electoral success, the apparently optimistic staternent of New
Zealandrs economic circumstances, the lacl< of rese:nze in undertaking new
financial conunitrnents before these had been comprehensively revietred in
the 1i9ht of existing financial obligations and policy costs aII contributed
to ttre d,ifficulties of the government i.n its first l-8 monttrs of office.
llhey rnassively complicated the CCPP's later need to restrain their colleaguesl
anbitions;
(iii) the insertion of an additional node into the establishecl networks of
advice-consideration-decision-reconmendation, which had previously . centred
on the Cabinet Economic Committee and Cabinet itself, was mus\ nore than
a minor innovation in executive sty1e. Inevitably, given tfie seniority
of the ministers who comprisect the CCPP (but complicated by the freguent
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absences of the then-Prime Minister, Kirk, and his death in 1974),
the CCPP began to exert almost centrifugal force on the flow of information
into the central system of cornqnunication and control, Because no specific
sub-system was established at the outset to differentiate between the
sorts of information which reached the CCPP, t}re Conunittee itself quickly
began to suffer fron information overload. The opportunity to evaluate
materiaL previously worked over by officials specifically and exclusiveiy
connitted to realising the CCPP's formal responsibilities (to iaentity
priorities, and ensure that, policy proposals conformed to these) was lost as
a vast arnount of relatively raw data passed before the ruinisters. Ihe
Targets Advisory Group could not fulfil this role in tire. llhile it would
be an exaggeration to claim that the CCPP was simpJ-y the Cabinet Economic
Committee in a different giuise, it is, however, the case that tJre CEC
met infreguently, was the object of much less interest to officials and other
ministers, and played oniy a minor role during Labourrs te:m of office.
(iv) An unmanageable confusion of demands, requests, advisory reports,
informationaL docr:nents, "housekeeping" accounts, "nachinerry of government"
plans and so forttr fLowed in to ttre CCPP during its three years life.
The CCPP not only took upon itself (and inevitably failed to extricate itsel,f
from, Later) the central role of resource allocation and approval, prior to
Cabinet endorsement. It engaged in direct face-to-face negotiations with
powerful and determined pressure groups over vrages and safaries. It
conducted these negotiations while simultaneousJ-y trying to cone to terms
t*ittr the concepts and implications of a wage and incomes policy' couched
in terms of general- principle as well as specific emphasis. It approved
ttre conduct of various existing and new policy reviews while actually
engaged in working out the theoretical basis of macro-policies on economic
development. It considered and approved the introduction of departmental
policies on industrial ancl social d,evelopment while simultaneousLy grappling
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with the considerat'Ie intellectual and political problems of what
constituted a desirable long-term economic and industriai strategy
for New Zealand as a whole. 
i(v) The CCPP planned to restructure existing systems for advice and
information exchange established as part of the NDC, while itself suPer-
vising and reacting to the details of direct encounters with pressure
groups during the community conferences it sponsored. Unable to assure
itself, or its own caucus, that reliance could be placed on a quasi-
governmental system for econornic and social planning and pr:blic partici-
pation, it redefined, its own initial role to include that. of the former
National Developrnent Council. The CCPP, whatever its private intentions,
was forced by changing economic circunstances to attempt to impJ-icate the
major generators of policy-cost demand in its own political burdens.
Ttre community conferences , wha';ever the public rhetoric, were intended
as vehicl-es to persuade interests cutside central government itself that
through some form of social and economic contract, which would include
restraint on the pressure on the government itself for policy develop-
ment and expenditure, better government could result. But the agents
of demand were unlikeli and in the event unwilling to accept a share of
this political burden, particularly after L973/74.
(vi) The loss of symbolic instruments for cohesion and pr:lclic support
(notably with the death of Kirk, and his replacement by Rowling)
forced the CCPP to turn inwards, towards officials.who themselves suffered
from serious differences of view as to how the Goverrm,entrs political and
economic objectives could best be achieved in a deteriorating econornic
climate
During the period of Labour administration, important advances in
the e><penditure planning - cost control system did occur, The establish-
nent of the CCPP itself was part of this, along with the sophistication
of t-J:e COPE system, the proliferation of experiments in poi-icy revielt'
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the adoption of a computer-based financial forecasting systeml and
improvements in the defini-tional framework for nelv policy bids. fn
several ways the stage was set for the later atternpt made under the
National government, which assumed office in November 1975, to
re-define- not only the conceptual framework and definitions of expendi-
ture policy and decision-making, but to sharpen up role differences
between ministers and officials.
Rather than create an inner Cabinet, as Labour had done, with an
inevitable propensity to concentrate upon itseLf a substantial range of
tasks and responsibilities, the National government wiclened the supportive
services directly available to Cabinet, while restoring the traditionaL
role of some networks such as the CEC. On the one hand (wittr the
bene€it tiat previous attention to this had already been given by
officials in Cabinet office and the State Services Commission), the
office of Prime }linister was suppJ"emented by the creation of a new net-
work of information and advice in the Advisory gto,.rp.2og With a narrow
focus in terms of its reporting functions, but wide powers to traclc
significant data for its political master, the Prime Ministerrs department
could quickLy and more accurately alert the senior minister to developments
te couLd not othervrise follow. Since, in this case, the Prjme ltinister
was also the Minister of Finance, the value of this supplementary system
has been considerabl-e. It has become both a protective device and a
legitimate neErns of survey for the individual hol-cling the key role i:t
the executive system.
on the other hand, as part of an inevitable process of systems
development and information refinement initiated with COPE and the endorse-
nent of PPB as an appropriate style of expenditure considerationr the
National goveinment real-located its own executive roles. The enormous
business of expenditure and resource allocation was chanrrclled towards a
222.
pew filtei agency - the Cabinet Committee on Errpen<liture. This additional
node, Iess grandiose in conception than the CCPP but absorbing some of Ehat,
Comruittee's essential features, vras provided with the necessary delegated
authority to al1ow the cybernetic experiment to proceed, Un1ike Labourrs
decision over the CCPP, the Prime Minister/Minister of Finance \ilas not a
direct participant. His primary interest, suppl.emented by the work of
his own advisory group, could return to the CEC. The CCEX was an
elaboration of the earlier National e:rperiment with the cabinet comittee
on Government Enpenditure where financial messages couLd be de-coded,
initialLy by officials (which Labour was only eventually obliged to see
as necessary for the CCPP), re-scrambled for Cabinet consideration, and
processed for dissemination to the spending departments.
During the L975-80 period the most serious work on the fiscal system
was d,irecteci towards ensuring that the definitions which vrere applied to
e><penditurepo1icies(existingorproposed)were@anexpIicit
indication to spending agents of their political acceptability. Once
a definition had been negotiated, through COPE and the existing and new
policy review phases of ttre annual budgetary cycle, it should serve not
as an invitation to further dispute but as an agreed principl-e of future
behaviour. rn addition, Treasury (encouraged and actively led by an
energdtic Associate Minister of Finance) attempted to rationalise the
division of .trabour between rninisters and officials that had become so
confused during the Labour term.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Part III: Old llorses, Nelt Colours: The Cabinet Committee on
Expenditure, 1975-78. (Bhe panels interposed in the text
indicate other important political decisions and activities
of the government during this period).
Introduction
On 15 December, 1975, a fortnight after the success of the National
Party at the polls, Cabinet, Iet by Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
Muldoon, agreed t'o call a special neeting of permanent heads to "outline
to them the economic situation and the rnajor lnticy issues and emphasise
the need for further control over expenditur"".209 Muldoon had had
considerable experience in the business of budgetary management, both
as an active and forthright member of the Public Expenditure Committee
during the 1960s, and as t'linister of Finance when COPE was introduced
and the experirnent conducted with a Cabinet Committee on Government
Expenditure.
15 Decernber: Loan of $US200 million ($ItZ191 million)
from an international group of financial
institutions to finance Governmentrs half
interest in development of Maui offshore
natural gas field.
The meeting with permanent heads was set down for 22 December,
three days before Christmas and just after the Committee of Officials on
Public Expenditure (COPE) submitted their annual report to the Minister
of Finance.
The COPE report stated that the Committee's review structure allowed
both lrtinisters and officials to see the longer tetmr
expenditure requirements for existing policies of their
own departments in the context of the reguirements of
all other departments. Forecasts are prePared in constant
prices to eliminate inflation of vtages and other costs,
and accordingly the resulting indication of growth in
Government expenditure is in 'real' terms.
Expenditure under permanent legislative authority was not included in
the COPE survey, but nonetheless the findings of the Committee provided
the new Government with a pretty good indication of the fiscal situation
that history had created for it:
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($milIions.)
Voted
L975/76 L976/77
iluly 1975
I977 /78
Prices
L978/79
Main and Supp.
EstiJoates* 3 r3O2
Amended DepartmentaL
requests for
existing policies
Rate of increase t
Forecast l-evels
r€cotilrr€Dded by COPE
Rate of increase t
Net adjustments by
COPE
3,565
8.0
3r4L3
3.4
153
3,638
2"O
31454
L.2
184
31766
3.5
31522
2.0
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However, L975/76 includes about $135 million for certain
ffies and other types of expend.iture not provided for
in the forecast years, Examples are the additional public
service pay day in L975/76 (estimated at $25 nillion) and
certain agricultural subsidies (noted eLsewhere in ttre
Report). Adjusted for these items, the base year (L975/761
becomes $31167 million, and the percentages are ttren
arnended as followsr
Departmental requestsr 12.6t 2.Ot 3.51
COFE recommendationsr 7,8t l.2t 2.0t
*Supplementary Estimates included to the extent of ttrelr
non-devaluation effects only.
The Report ttren went on to state as strongly as possible the caveat that
"because of the forecasting base used and some of ttre assumptions which
have had to be adopted by the Comnittee, these figures significantly under-
state both the real and monev costs of existing policy in the forecast
years." (1lhe lassumptionsl mentioned are descri-bed Ln the 1975 COPE
211trePort. - In addition, the Committee reported to the Goverrunent on ttre
'radditional tasksil it had undertaken with the agreement of the previous
Labour administration. Its findings on (a) itens forecast to include
overseas expenditure indicated that overall approximately L2 percent of
recommended COPE Levels would be absorbed in this way. The Corunittee
considered that (b) insufficient allowance had been made for the Governmentrg
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existing poricy on funding temporary employment 
- apart from some
rrnegligibre amounts' in the operating Votes of departments like the
Forest Service' only 92 million had been approved for Labour for this
(despite a voted provision of $8.65 million in the L|TS/76 Estinates).
(the question of overtime allowances had been problematic for the Comnittee,
which recommended a special survey of ttrese requirenents before the Lg76/77
Estimatesl indeed, serious reservations were expressed or irnplied in
relation to the whole field of staffing requirements.
COPETs strongest corments $rere reserrred for (c) their inquiries into
"spsn"ended commitmentsrr. rn an appendix, the Report Listed ttre major
examples of such policies, altlrough this excluded conrpletety all trading
department activities "which on a very broad view could aLso be regarded
as open-ended". Ihe Committee stated that
The items listed totaL some glrl50 nillion per annra
which comprises approximately 33 percent of the COpE
recommended levels of Government ex?enditure. The
committee is concerned that such a very high protrnrtion
of Government expenditure should be open-ended and
therefore not subject to strict budgetary contror. The
committee considered that there h'as scope for greater
contror (for example by programming expenditure on itens
such as serderage subsidies) although it recognised ttratin many cases this could only be achieved by a positive
covernment decision to modify the existing policy.
Government nay wish to consider this matter further.
FinaLly, the Report noted that
(COPE|s) recommended level of $31413 million on existingporicies for L976/77 represents an increase of 3.4 percent
on the previous year, or of the order of 7.9 percent if
adjustments are made for certain non-recurrint or specialitems. Given the assumptions used by the Conmittee it is
clear ttrat substantial additional expenditure'wil1 be
unavoidable. (This) should be viewed in the light of recent
Treasury reports to Government which predict an increase in
Government spending for L976/77 of about 18 percent. The
Treasury figures use COPE recommended levels as a startingpoint, and make adjustments for cost changes since ituly and
approvals since 29 August L97St as well as inc-luding expen-diture outside the COPE review structure such as expenditure
under Permanent Legislative Authority. 212
one point vrhlch had been made by the copE vforking party to the
committee on 9 December hras not passed on by copE in its Final Report to
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the Minister of Finance a week later. This concerned various disparities
noted by the Working Party and regarded as constituting a serious general
arrocat,ive and predictive problemr that is, "lack of total cost dis-
closure. It would seem that the full costs associated with a scherne are
not always disclosed when the proposal is being considered for approval."2l3
The nearest COPE came to elaborating on this stringent criticism of
departmental behaviour was to point out to the Government tlrat tlre levels
it recommended may be affected by price changes, devaluation and other
modifications arising since the cut-off dates set down in its original
instructions to the Departments.
A further omission frorn the final COPE report had also been rnade by
tlre Working Party in its advice to permanent heads. It concerned, anottrer
rhdditional task'r required by ttre Labour government: to identify ,'those
areas of existing policy which were considered to be increasing at a
significant rate.'r coPE had decided early on that it wourd regard as
significant a l0 percent rate of growth (i.e. over and above the base year
L975/76') in any of the forecast activities. The working party had reported
that almost all activities, prograrnmes and Votes fell into this categoryr
and that a detaiLed acccunt would amount to a rehearsaL of the great bulk
of Government expenditure.2l4 copE accepted that this would be super-
fluous, so this point was not remarked upon specifically to the Minister
on I8 December.
COPE members had had many anxieties in the preparation of their 19?5
Reportr stimulated in part no doubt by the change of Government, their
own knowledge of the probable informational needs of the incoming National
administration, and their expectations about the formidable finance lrlinister.
At the last COPE meeting some per:nanent heads "expressed doubts in the
confidence that COPE could have in placing its 
.report before the Government.n
Soune felt that to base forecasts on the anounts voteC in the Estimates was
unrealistic 
- a better base, they argued, was provided in the estirnatbd
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outturn of annual expenditure. However, Lang was adamant on this
point - he asserted that voted appropriations constituted ttre only
Iegitimate basis for forecasting departmental expenditure and alone could
ensure the necessary discipline in preparing copE returns. A number of
objections and worries were raised about the techniques and procedures
of COPE as a forecasting exercise, although the senior men present agreed
that the whole business of costing, approving and predicting expendl.ture
policies needed urgent attentionr
The Cormittee considered ways of improving the current
reviews of existing and new policy" In the field of
existing policy it was considered that our aims should
be to obtain greater Government involvernent in settingpriorities for existing policy expenditure. With nen
trrcIicies, the Committee felt that the time of Cabinet
Committees was being wasted on the many new poLicies
with minor costs. To meet these objectives {1@g
srlggested that a small- Cabinet group gf one 6ffi6-Ministers could be set up to review (possiUtv wittr ttre
assistance of cfficials) existing poiicy spending andFJ ives.
The group could be given delegated authority witnin faiily
generous lfunits, wich cases of disagreement , or in excess
of the lirnits being resoLved by the appropriate Cabinet
Committee. This suggestion was received favourably by
the Conmittee.
Mr Lang outlined several Treasury proposals for tighter
control of Government spending. It hras proposed toinstitute a monthly cash flow budgeting system for depart-
mental spending, and in the longer term after appropriate
legislation was passed, to make expenditure under
permanent legislative authority subject to review by ttre
Public Expenditure Conunittee.
Mr Lang also spoke on the economy, Ttre meeting adjourned
at 4.00 p.m. (Emphasis added).215
Thus the secretary of the Treasury strategically introduced the most
senior government officials to the idea of a new piece of governrnent machinery
the Cabinet Cornmittee on Expenditure. The tactful implication of this kite-
flying was that the new comrnittee was nothing to do with the old CCPP;
indeed, any ner grouprs Blace on the hierarchy of Cabinet structures, Lang
partner. Anythingsoothingly suggested, would be very much ttrat of a junior
outside its terms of reference or explicit delegation would have to be
channelled for approval,/discussion through old-estabLished networks of
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influence such as the CEC, the CCSS or the Cabinet Works Conmittee.
Without direct access to the relevant Cabinet minutes, it is not
possible for us to do more than spe:u1ate on how far the idea for tlris
nevt exPenditure survey system at Cabinet level was the creature of the
new Ministers themselves. However, the record (above) of the 1975 COPE
meeting strongly suggests that Treasury realised quite clearly that no
matter how disappointing in ter:ns of its actual impact on sBending
behaviour, the kind of work done by Labourrs CCPP must be carried on wittr
the change of Government. Like COPE itself, certain structural modlfi-
cations to existing systems, once tested, became indispensiJrle, if tlre
agents of central Government were to cope with the complex and extensive
financial data that required analysis and decision.
rhE .cabinet 9oTnni}.tge on slpg)di.t,ufg. .(gcFx) : The first six months
on the day the Frime Minister net wittr the permanent heads of the
pttblic service (22 December'1975) he presented precisely the messages
recommended to him by Treasuryl all departrnen+-s were to begin a ne\f,
system of preparing a montlrly cash budgetl they were to subrnit statements
to Treasury each month comparing tlre budget with actual expenditure to
date (auttrority to reguire this, the Minister asserted, would be obtained
later by him from the Cabinet). Expenditure under Permanent Iegislative
Authority was to be tightened up, and Muldoon infor:nred permanent heads
that Treasury had been asked to introduce appropriate administrative
controls ln tJlis area, Finally, tlre officials were inforned that Cabinet
had authorised a review of charges for services performed by Government
departments (excluding trading departrnents), with a view to increasing such
charges in line with cost increases in recent ,."t".t'o
The Goverrunent now formalised the plan outlined by Lang to his
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public service colleagues in COPE. Cabinet set up the new Cabinet
Committee on Expenditure, to be chaired by Gair (Minister for National
and regional development, but with no servicing department in either
of these portfolio roles), and including D. Thomson (then Minister
of Defence and Justice) and Holyoake (forrner Prjme Minister, then
Minister of State). Again, as with most neophyte cabinet coruruittees,
Millen, Secretary to the Cabinet, acted as secretary. Four Treasury
men (who also formed the main Working Party for the COPE secretariat)
with the usual senior-junior mix, acted as advisers.
The new system was thus very carefully guarded in its menbership.
Apart from the energetic and ambitious Gair, the ministers were
experienced members of both the National party and the Cabinet system.
While neither Thomson nor Holyoake might necessarily bring to the r.rork
of the Committee any radical financial insights, they would ensure that
nothing was done that their highly developed political instincts rejected
as premature or rash. Holyoake's seniority alone gave the Committee some
initial standing. However, the fact that the llinister of Finance,/Pri-ure
Minister was not directly involved suggests that the CCEX provided both
a useful place to divert the paternalistic attention of the "elder
statesman" while Holyoake remained in the Government caucus, and was at
the same tine a sensible use of Holyoake's considerable experience (and
nemory) of government. The officials, working directly out of the Finance
division of Treasury and with many years accumulated experience in COPE,
and in dealing with CCPP, would ensure that procedures adopted conformed
to the general thrust of Treasury's adaptation to change since the early
1970s.
At its meeting on 22 December, Cabinet accepted Treasury's recotunenda-
tion that "there should be a comprehensive review in the first few months of
1976 and the need to continue all existing Government policies (Clt 75/52/12
refers) ... The review process will involve departments, ltinisters and
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ultimately the Cabinet Comrnittee on Expenditure in a critical and
fundamentai reappraisal of all existing policies.uzl1 Winchester suggests
that Treasury simply dusted off the old scheme it had presented to the
Labour govetnment after it took up office in Novembec Lg72.213 Indeed,
there is a very close (but, it, rnight be suggested, necessary) similarity
between the terms of reference for the first review of existing policies
conducted by the Government in 1973 and that initiated fot L975/76. Wtren
Treasury circurarised departrnents informing thern of the review
(8 ;anuary 1975) it pointed out thatr
(a) Departments are to review the need to continue all
expenditure activities and to report to their Minister(with two copies of the report to Treasury) by 13 Febnrary
1976 on areas of expenditure in their votes:(i) which are incompatible wittr the Governmentrs
election manifesto or may be inconsistent with ttre
philosophy or approach implicit in the Manifestol(ii) which are of less relevance to the needs and
concerns of New Zealand society today than when they
were first introduced;(iii) where Government's objectives couLd be achieved
more efficientl-y by other meansi(iv) which are of relatively low priority and which
could be curtailed, deferred or dropped either to
acconunodate new policies or to achieve savings in
Government expenditure I
(b) In carrying out the review Departments should give
particular enphasis to examining expenditure activities
involving substantial overseas fundsl
(c) In all cases an estirnate of the value of gross savings
resulting from the proposals recommended should be shown
for the three years L976/77, to L978/79. In addition,
the effect, if any, on revenue and the anount of any
overseas funds involved should be stated.
Ministers have been invited by Cabinet to report to the Minister of
Finance (with two copi.es of the report to Treasury) by I March 1976
on the measures they propose to take in (a) above to reduce
expenditure on existing policies. These reports will be collated
by lreasury for submission to the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure.
It was pointed out to the departments that Treasury had also "been
requested" (on its own advice) to report "independently" to the CCEjX on
cost-saving measures. xWith the obvious exception of any across-the-
board measures, tlre Treasury reports proposing possible savings in any
individual Vote will, where possiJcLe, be considered by the CCEX at the
same time as the Ministerrs recommendations",2lf
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Thus it was established that from the outset Treasury would have a
direct and explicit interest in the work of the new Cornmittee, and wouldt
in effect, vet ministerial offerings and accompany these by a financial
reportr as was supposed to be done with all policy proposals to Cabinet.
the initial rejection of officials by Labourrs CCPP was not to be
repeated in this National government innovation.
The only striking difference bet$reen the first 1976 existing policy
. 220review--- instructions, and those distributed after the change of govern-
ment in Novernber L972, was the explicit manner in which Treasuryrs role
was described. There were, however, still no detailed instructions on hoil
to conduct the reviewl no special time allowance was made for officers to be
freed for the first 1976 reviewl and no explicit schedule indicated the
precise manner in which information was to be presented. As before, the
historical timing of the change of government, immediately before Christmas
and the ilanuary-February sunmer vacations, vras certain to have its effect.
As the Prime Minister had announced in December, Treasury also
inforned permanent heads, in the I January circular, that a review of
charges for services provided by non-trading departments was to be conducted,
with the intention of finding justifications for increases. This revier.l
was to be for*rarded directly to the Minister of Finance (and Treasury) by
13 February r'with recommended new rates" which, wherever possible, would
cover the fulL costs of the service prorided.2zl
At the same time, Treasury circularised alI departments advising thenr
that a review of new policies would be carried out during February-March
L976. It lras
avoid ad hoc
stated that the expJ-icit intention of this review was to
submissions on new policy, with departments,/ninisters putting
proposals up throughout the year. Although Treasury had attenpted to avoLd
this piecemeal process under the Labour government, a new dimension now
was added - the CCEX. The circular of 8 January inforsred officials ttrat
the (CCEX) would carry out a
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preliminary examination of all new policies and will
have authority to approve policies invclving expenditure
of up to 950,000 per annum. The Cornmittee will make
recommendations to Cabinet on proposals involving
annual expenditure greater than this amount.
There was an additional injunction to the effect that any new policy
proposal that did not succeed in the forthcoming review, or was deferred
by the CCEX, was not to be submitted through spending rninisters to
Cabinet until it had first been for:vrarded, through Millen, Secretary
of the Cabinet, to the Prime Minister, and had obtained his approval
as a Cabinet agend" it"*.222 AlEhough a definition of what constituted
a nehr policy was included, and departments were reguired to order their
bids according to their ministers' priorities (and, so far as possible,
with some expticit indication that they were in accord with the Govern-
mentrs election manifesto), there was no categorical requirement that
new costs must represent a substitution for existing costs. Nor was
any specific upper aggregated limits on new policy expenditure approvals
suggested as a constraint.
L2
26
January:
January:
Goverrunent bread subsidy reduced.
Announcement of general wage increase
of 9 cents per hour or S3.60 per week,
estimated to increase national wage
bill by 3.21. Social security benefits
increased by 7.9 percent in line wittt
increase in CPI in second half of 1975'
Rail charges increased and C'overilnent
milk subsidy reduced' doubling the
price of nilk to consumers.
Imtrnrt deposits scheme introduced,
effective for one year' applying to
about 7t percent of total inports.
llost postal charges increased
sr:bstantially.
1 February:
February: $NZ 37 llillion Government loan in
Deutschmarks through international
banking sYndicate announced.
Government banned raising of new
Iocal authority loans for other than
specially exempted work until end of
September 1976
I3
18 I'ebruary:
3 March:
19 March:
30 ltlarch:
I April:
2 April:
22 April:
Series of monetary' measures announced,
including:
- increases in interest rates on
government and local authority
securities
- revocation of Interest on
Deposits regulations which con-
trolled deposlt rates in most
f inancial institutlons
- i:rcreases in maxirnum savings bank
interest rates
- abolition of control over trading
bank overdraft lending rates
- tightening of hire purchase
regulations for eolour T1/ and
motor vehl.cles
- increases in Goverrunent lending
rates through Housing Corporation
and Rural Banking and Finance
Company
- 
increases in rentals for state
houses
- 
reduction of goverrunent security
ratios applying to savings banks
by 2 percentage points to assist
the housing industry
Further drawing of $NZ 53 nilLion
from IMF 1975 oil facility
NZ agrees under "voluntary restraint
scheme", to limit beef sales to USA
in 1976
Bread and flour subsidies abolished.
ElecLricity charges increased by
about 40 percent at retail level.
Remainj.ng telephone charges increased.
Import licensing schedule for the 1967/77
year agrain fixed at the same value as the
previous year.
Task force (chairman: Frank Holmes)
established to review social and economic
planning
Further drawing of $NZ 56 million from
IMF compensatory financing facility.
Subsidies on eggs and butter abolished.
Reductions in Government expenditure
and freeze on State Service staff
levels announced,
28 April:
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14 May: fncome stabilisation scheme for
woolgrowers announced. Economic
package announced, including:
- wage order of 7 .percent, subject
to maximum of $7 per week(applicable 25 June 1976)
- one year freeze on wage and
salary agreements
- 
professional fees and charges;
as well as company dividends
frozen for one year
- increases in local authority
loan interest rates and exten-
sion of restriction on new loans
to March 1977
2I May: Government borrowing of US $50
millior on the Eurodollar market
announced
Cabinet office records include CCEX files from the begiruring of May,
when in a series of three meetings the Committee examined the results of
the l-9?5 New Policy r"rriuro.223 Decisions were recorded as part of Budget
Report No. 2 to the llinister of Finance. On 3 June the three Ministers,
with only l*lillen (Secretary) present, considered a highly confidential
review item on Foreign Policy and Administration. They were later joined
by officials for the rest of a very long pre-Budget agenda including, for
example, an item on Education proposals, discussed with the lrlinister of
Education (Gandar) and five of his senior departmental officials led by
the Director-General, (Renwick, and his deputyr p. b.g). Four Treasury
men advised the Committee on the Education te.rierr22q ,irtin its accornpany-
ing Treasury reporE.225 The recorded discussions illustrate how the ccEx
began its task:
CCEX agreed: re Category 2 policies (i.e. policies not
approved before 29 August \975/pu|- up for consideration
by Ministers as part of the New Policy Review for the L976/77
Estimates) for inclusion in the t'tain Estimates, to a further
provision of $416,000 for Education grants for L976/77 (on
top of the $2,448 million already recommended to Cabinet) to
be spread over the foltowing years by the Minister of
Educatj-on, in general to increase these grants(a) by 12lB but with a maximum of 15c on any one grant:
Priority 1.4 Play centre running costs
I.6 Primary school maintenance costs
1.8 Primary - general expenses
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1.12 Primary - free text books
1.14 Secondary schoolsr general
1.I7 Secondary schools: free text books
1.20 and 21: Assistance to lrrivate schools
1.23 Technical Institutes - generall
(b) and to further provision of
(i) $16610O0 for remuneration of examiners,
moderators and supervisors (Priority 2) I i.e.
a total of $3261000 eubject to the increases
eomplying with the Professional Charges (Price
Freeze) ReguJ-ations 1976;
(ii) 2 additional staff for Additional Teaching
positions in Special Education Service (Priority 3)
i.e. a total of L2 staff, costing $L8r000.
The CCEX also decided, on the basis of a referral of this matter to it
from Cabinet, to reconunend to Ce!!_Eg! that it approvet
(i) changes in the procedures for the advertisement of positions and the
appointnent of teachers in their first three years of service so that
- basic scale positions could be reserved solely for Year 2 and 3
teachers (approximately 31600 positions in 1977) and
- teachers in Years 1-3 of senrice could apply for permanent
positionss
(ii) a change in the proeedure for the staffing of primary schools to the
continuous staffing principle for all schools with a grading ro11 over 155
on an overall teacherr pupil ratio of 1.31. Special provisions were to
remain for schools with "special education needs'r and currently staffed on
better than L:35 schedules.
The CCEX "noted" that the above changes would provide "adeguate control"
over the primary school. staffing and that there would be. "no need in future
to provide supernumerary employment for bonded teachers". They accepted
advice tlrat any school building alterations or additions to cater for the
improved staff ratio werer"in the view of the Education Department", expected
to be minor and could be "phased in over a period of years and the costs met
from within existing allocations'l The Committee accepted that the changes
in primary staffing could be implernented "at no extra cost", but that'there
would be a reduction in positions authorised under Reg, 36 of ttre Education
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Regiulations (Staffing and Salaries) and a reduction in the positions
approved by Cabinet for the introduction of l:20 ratios in infant classes.
Ihe Department vtas
- authorised to draft the necessary Regulation amendments.
The CCEX also noted a decision of the IndustriaL Conrnission to approve
a new rate of pay for part time clerical assistants in schools. llhe cost
of this item would be $3I8r900 (including arrears) in 1976/77, and,
$t82rOOO in future "as a full year cost. '2%
A memo, dated 15 ilune (i.e. just over a week after ttris CCEX discussion)
was later sent by MiIIen to Gandar, Minister of Education, with
a copy to the Minister of Finance. It suggests that despite the Govern-
t
ment- s widely publicised intentions to regard its first year in office as
one of Retrench and Save, it still saw nerrr expenditure decisions as a
series of benefits bestowed by benificent ninisters on a grateful and
expectant publlc:
Vote Education: l-976177 New Policy Reviewl Increase in Grants
At the meeting of Cabinet yesterday you sought authority to
announce to the Secondary Principals Association on 17 June
the increase in the general grant which has been approved
at an estimated cost of $7801000 for the year ending 31 !{arch
L977.
I'he Minister of Finance and your colleagu.es in Cabinet
agreeo. Also invited you to announce as soon as possible all
the other increases in grants recently approved in the New
Policy review i.e. included in PrioriEy 4 of your original
submission. It was felt that it would be better to announce
aII of these at one time than reserve them for announcenent
on Budget night.
It is my understanding that the increase in the general
expenses grant for secondary schools is computed as followsr
Light, Heating and Water (inflation proof) $2801000
Increase approved by CCEX as advised on 19 May $3501000(which excludes L, H & ll)
Approved by CCEX 3 June SI5O'OOO
'(an extra amount drawn fron
further provision of $4I5rO0O
for education grants[227
l0 June: Goverrment borrowing of Nzg102 rnilllon
through a Swiss banking syndiuate
announced,
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The CCEX inform.rlJ-y adopted.a quasi- judicial procedure, from February
19762 individual spending ministers, whose new policy bids had been
investigated by Treasury and tabled before the Cornm.ittee, were invited to
attend the relevant meeting, accompanied by any of their officials, during
the "taking of evidencert. When their own vote was being discussed they
could ask for a I'private conferencel with the three CCEX ministers and
their Treasury advisers after the departmental officers had withdrastn.
They could debate the Committeers opinion of their own Vote, but must
t)A
withdraw when final decisions were taken by the CCEX.--- Those involved
in the first few months of the operation of the new committee agree that
despite some rather over-excited newsmedia speculation and optimistic
estimations of the "damage" the CCEX did to departmental and ministerial
expectations in the first existing-new policy reviews, its initial impact
was more symbolic than real. An attempt to apply the discipline of a tit-
for-tat requirement $ras relatively easily thwarted by skilled and determined
ministers who had yet to accept the constraints of a pre-Cabinet filtering
system.
t
:
I
:
i
I7
16 June:
22 June:
26 June:
9 JuJ-y:
15 July:
Rail freight charges increased by an
average of 25 .percent
Wage freeze regulations relaxed to
perrnit renegotiation of conditions
of employment and reimbursing payments,
and, in some cases, wage ratesr subject
to the approval of the approPriate
wage-fixing body.
EEC sets import guota for New Zealand
butter in the years 1979-80 of 125,0O0,
12O,0OO and l15,0OO tonn6s respectively.
covernment borrowing of NZ $33 million
from a Sr+iss banking sydicate announced.
Government borrowing ef NZ $74 million
from a Middle East source announced.
Govetnment announced an overseas Swiss
franc loan raising of NZ $31 million
by the National Provident Fund, for on-
lending to harbour board,s for container
port development.
29 July: 1976-77 Budget announced. Main
features included:
- incentives, either by suspensory
ioans or tax deductions, for per-
manent increases in farm livestock
nurnbers, estimated to cost $90
million over an 8-year period
- reduction in the fertiliser price
subsidy fron $36 per tonne to $25per tonne, and changes in fertiliser
spreading bounty rates
- 
introduction of a tax on foreigm
fishing vessels calling at New
Zealand ports (ranging from
$1000 to 55000)
- reduction of the first-year dep-
reciation allowance on plant and
machinery to 25 percent, and
introduction of new allourances
for investment in plant and
machinery contributing substan-
tialJ-y to increased export production(20 percent); in priority regions(up to 20 percent); consistent with
the Governmentrs industrial develop-
ment policies (up to 40 percent);
and in the farming and fishing
sectors (40 percent). The first two
allowances could be added; all four
to terminate on 3l March 1980.
- 
existing export incentives extended
to 3l March 1980' with some
modifications
- increases in sales tax rates on some
luxury items
- introduction of l0 percent sal-es tax
on machinery, with provision for
exemption to farrning, fishing and
forestry sectors, some public services
and where principally used for exSrort
production
- 
27 percent increase in duties on
tobacco products, 15 percent increase
in duties on spirits, and 33 percent
increase in duties on imported beer.
- introduction of 10 percent tax on fare
component of foreigm travel tickets
- replacement of progressive conpany
tax structure by flat company tarc
rates of 45 percent for resident
239.
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companies and 50 percent for non-
resident companies; increase in
maximum tax rate for life irrsurance
companies from 18 to 30 percent;
changes in rates of land tax
- tax rebate of $0 per week for familtes
on low incornes
- 
announcement of rate for National
Superannuation benefit; rates to
be adjusted six-monthLy in 1ine
with wage movements
- increase in sociai security beneflts
of 9.L percent, in line with increase
in CPI in first half of 1975
- 
reductions in estate and gift duties
In his first Financial Staternent to the House of Representatives on
29 July, 1976 (an unusually late Budget date), Muldoon was understandabty
grirn about the regacy left him and his cabinet on assuming office:
The first [major problemJ rrras a record and growing rate ofinflation; the seccnd was a massive and increasing deficit
of Government revenue as against Governnent expenditure (the
fp]l-extent of which had not previousry been disclosed); th;tnrrcl was a rnassive external current account deficit which
was failing to respond to such Government measures as had been
taken and which was continuing to run at a rate far greater
than aI1 previous covernjnent predicitions; the fourth najorproblem hras a revel of unemployment which seasonally was
running at a near-record peak with every indication that it
would increase rather than diminish. (Ernphasis addedl
Treasuryts apparently ineffectual advice to the previous Government (which
was not,, in any case' supported by effective budgetary control systerns)
was trnintedly quoted:
[A reasonably high standard of living] can only be achieved...if we are prepared to exercise restraint in good times and,
as a capitar importing country, lirnit increases in consumption
which lead to the expenditure of external funds. A failure to
understand this simpl"e fact, particularly during 1973, had
compounded the inevitable problems arising from an international
downturn in farm product prices and a massive increase in theprice of oiL-based products during L974 and 1975. (Enphasis added)
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Further, tha Minister served notice that tighter financial control
was going to be applied, regardless, he bravely stated, of its impact on
sectional interest, pressure group reaction or "personal interestn.
He did not explicitly define how far this should be construed to include
ministers ttremselves. The Budget stated without prearnble tlrat the CCEX
had been established "to investigate whether economies could be rnade Ln
Government spending programmes.r The Minister claimed that the corunittee
had been abre to achieve 'significant economies! - in particular in
encouraging Cabinet to insist that staff ceiLings in the publ-ic service
were held at prescribed levels. Although Muldoon grent ot! to say that
ttre Government had "succeeded in cutting over $550 million off the deficit
before borrowing of $11400 million which was pnojected for L9'16/77,fwtren
they took office seven months before, this was, from the publlcrs point
of view, somettring of a straw man. The outgoing Labour gov-irnment had not
announced that it had accepted advice as to an anticipated deficit of ttrese
proportionsr and no official Government or Treasury forecasts to that
effect had been published at or around the ti-sre of ttre General Election
in 1975.
Net expenditure (as deseribed in the 1976 Budget) was stated as
$41597 million, which may be compared with COpE,s very consersvative
rccorylrrrc dqhorr koe existing poticy fot L976/77 of $3r413 mi[ion.29
Betvteen December L975, when COPETs rep,ort had been for*rarded to tie
Itinister of Finance and (,rufy f976) an amount in exeess of $1OOO million had
been added to the recommended financial base. Alttrough as trluldoon
pointed out the rate of growth for the current fiscal year had been reduced
from over 26 percent in 1975 /76 Eo nearly 5 percent, ttre Budget included
no detailed outline of how the Government intended to ensure that bottr the
overall total of policy expenditure (which was, in the Ministerrs olrrn
words, t'massive") and the growth rate wouLd be restrained in futrrre. One
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guiding principle was, however, established: the proportion of Gross
National Product absorbed by the pubLic sector. The minister corunented
that this had risen by J-2 percent between L972/73 and, 1975/76 - apparently
an intolerable rate of increase, so far as the National Government was
- 
230concerned.--- Ttris remained a political touchstone of Government e:<pendi-
ture policy during the next few years.
Thus the Prime trlinister/lrlinister of Finance's imprimatur was added
to the reputation of the CCEX in mid-1.975. Its general objectives were
ptrblicly restated - identify economies, achieve 5rc1icy cost savings,
reinforce Cabinetrs directives on matters such as staffing levels, promote
the general objectives of reduced deficit levels and restraint in the
growth of public sector appropriation of national resources. Its member-
ship remained unchanged throughout L976, and its place in the central
executive system became more assured. Unlike the earLier Cabinet Corunittee
on Governrnent Expenditureoilabourrs CCPP, its role was to be neither that
-n
of a one-off exercise in noney-grubbing nor an inner Cabinet towards whictr
a wide variety of data fl.owed. It would have none of the direct respon-
sibility for wage and prices policies appropriated by ttre CCPP, which was
now returned to the CEC, with the Prime tilinister as its direct controlling
agent. The CCEX (unlike the CCpp) would not have among its tasks the
problens of rnedium-to-long term planning 
- it was announced in the Budget
that the Government had established a special task force "to consider the
future of social and economic planning" and reconrnend "a pJ-anning framanork
to deal with these i""o"s."231
One i:nportant step was thus taken towards a clearer definition of
rol,es inside central executive networks. Immediate and critical e:cpenditure
questions would be kept strictty inside the new Cabinet sub system, wlttr
Treasury closely implicated as advisers and confidants. Related issues,
such as the sources of revenue avail-able to or needed by the Government,
and controL over factors such as wages, which contributed to inflationary
Pressuresr would be siphoned back to that part of the Cabinet system of
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most personal and professional interest to the Prlne Minister and his
economic advisers in Treasury 
- the cEC. The general, and potgJrtially
valuable planning and coordinating role of the CCPP, where all economic
and fiscal information had been channelled, was dispensed with. In part,
this was because the styre of politicar managernent preferred by the
National Party differed markedly from that of its political opponents.
fn part, it was because given the extreme vulnerability of the CCPP to
information overload, it was obvious to Treasury that more precise and
specific role allocation was necessary if effective decisions were to be
taken by central Government agencies. Further, with this new division of
labour Treasury was abre to regain its central role as economic and
financial coordinator, moving directly between the various Cabinet com-
mittees, its relationship to the l'linister of Finance greatly strengthened
by Muldoonrs parallel role as Prime Minister. Since the Prime Ministerrs
new advisory group was hedded by a senior Treasury officer, Galvin,
Treasuryrs interest over this deveropment was prote"t"d.232 The balance of
povrer shifted away from the uncomfortable, if interesting, experiment of
the CCPP back to a more conventional Cabinet system, dominated (in this
case) by a highly assertive strategist in the position of prime minister.
The CCEX from mid 1976-1977
A fortnight after the 1976 Budget arurouncement, the CCETX met to
consider a very long agenda which included not only itenrs such as the
Hospital Works prograrnme, expenditure on immigrants fares, staffing in the
llinistry of !'Iorks, and university financing, but the outstanding question
of the 1976 Review of Existing poricy. onry Gair and Holyoake were
present, with Battersby, Brewerton and Burns from Treasury, lrlillen
(Secretary) and spending ministers and their departmental advisers
as required. Although the points canvassed were specific to various agenda
items, they identified a number of general problems. For exarnple, during
the discussion of capital works in hospital development, concerns were
243.
raised as to the adequacy of information which provided the basis for
decisions. Ministers and Treasury officials queried the flow of works
projectsr and the duration of major building progriuunes. ft $ras recorded
that the Comnittee sought "greater precision in setting priorities both
within and between hospital boards and in the national context.rr This
gtas essential if "the necessary degree of phased expenditure was to be
attained,." It had been announced. in the Budget that the Government had
approved over $30 million worth of new hospital board buililings due for
completion in the current financial year. Yet by 13 August the Cornmittee
had been informed that probable over-expenditure woul-d necessitate an
additionaL financial provision for hospital works progrardnes in the
suppJ.enentary Estimates. The timing (as well as the aggregate size) of
the financial resources allocated to capital works was a continuing souroe
of worry to the CCEX.
Any similar reservations the Government may have had about expenditure
on universities were only alluded to in the crlptic rec.ord of this meetingt
that rrthe Conmittee rescinded its decision of 9 April to initiate a revia
of the L977/78 and subseguent provisions of the university block grants'
presurnably a decision taken in the light of the fact that the overall
quinquennial consideration of university funding would begin in 1979.
Various reports and reviews rirere reguested by the Comnrittee 
- 
for examp!,e
on computers, regal aid and south rsland mines. The minutes for this
meeting noteC that Treasury would continue to monitor routstanding issues'
and report periodically on these to the cornmittee.2$
17 Augiust: Price and rent freeze imposed, effective
for up to 9 months
The CCEX met once more during August to consider matters held over, olt
arising since the Budget, and on 3 September visited the national police
College to satisfy themselves about claims that facilities were ',rundownr.
As a result of this inspection, Treasury, the Ministry of lrlorks and the
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Folice were instructed to prepare a paper on future work on the Col1ege,
and an indication of any inefficiencies in the police training curricula
"that are likely to result from an extension in the phasing of the
(construction! ttork'. It must have been the source of considerable
satisfaction to police officials to be given such an open-ended invitation.
Indeed, the Police appeared to be at least as successful in winning the
ear of National government ministers as they had under the tabour adnini-
stration. Only the nildest reproach about financial procedures $ras
incorporated in CCEX records for transmission to the Minister of Police:
(The CCEX) invited the Minister of police to make greater
use of the new policies review technique in planning
expenditure and in bringing to the Goverrunentrs attention
changing police requirements e.g. SVIAT, so that the
Government is properly informed and better placed to 
^a..assess the right order of priorities in the longer term.to-
22 September: Government security interest rates
increased
By the end of Septemberr witlr the build up of items requiring review
and oonsideration by the ccEx, Gair was in a position to agree witlr
MiI.l-en that a standardised schedule for the Conunitteers activities
stas necessary. The CCEX had met ten times between May and late September
and its nodal position in the information networks was apparently assured.
Communication of data requested by ttre conunitteet ett on its behalf by
Treasuryl and ministerial examination of analyses, reviews and reports
required the smoother inc-orporation of ttre Committee into the Cabinet
system. Millenl in a memo to the Chairman, gave the.following advice:
In view of the demands being placed on this Committee,
and the many requests for advance notice of meetings,
I think we should endeavour to establish a standard weekly
neeting tirne like we do to the Economic, SS (State Services)'
Vlorks and Legislative committees of Cabinet.
My staff suggests (three options) r(a) alternative Tuesdays (alternating with the
Cabinet Cornnrittee on Communications(b) Wednesday, in between the standard times for
SS and Works Committees
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(c) fridays at 2.3O t which would probably mean that I
could no l.onger act as Secretary on a regular basis because
of my weekly Cabinet commitments which usually involve me
in wo::k right through until Tuesday nridday (including part
of the weekend). However it may be possible to rearrange
duties of Cabinet Office staff tc take account of such a
change.(Please advise)
Shou1d you wish to move
know so that a suitable
p.1'1.235
in this direction, please let me
oral item can be advised to tlre
Gair returned this memor'annotated to inform the Secretary that hls
preference hras for alternate Tuesdays for the remainder of 1976, with the
Friday f,'.ne-slot used whenever there was a particularly healry workload,
such as existing and new policy reviews 
- although, as he pointed out,
when the House was not in session other afternoons could be used for this
236as t{eII.
30 September: Governnent borrowing of NZ$42 nillion
in Deutschmarks through an inter-
national banking syndicate.
On I October 1976 a letter was sent from Millen to Gair with copies
to Thomson, Holyoake, Ternpleton and the Secretary of the
Treasury infonning then that the scheduLe for the CCEX would be raised in
Cabinet as an oral itemr and noting that
The level of activity in the CCEX is comparable with the
four cornmittees which presently have standard meeting tines
each weekl these have become well established. Having
regard to the pattern of Ministers commitments the most
practicable spot for the fifth standard time would be
Tuesdays at 9 a.m. This would provide one and a half hours
per week for the transaction of regular businqss, For
heavier periods of work when, for example, reviews of
existing and ne\^' policy are held involving most portfolios
it will of course be necessary to schedule additional
meetings... For obvious reasons we should avoid establishing
a standard meeting tirne for any committee on a Monday or
Friday.
In recent months the CC on Communications has been meeting
on most Tuesdays at 9 a.m. in order to get through the work
connected with the establishment of the new Broadcasting
structure. Fhis should be much f.ighter from October on,
and this CCI could then meet as needed like other CCs,
e.g. on Famity Affairs sg6.217
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Thus2 by a variety of sig4alsp the significant actors in the central
system were advised that the CCEX had been accepted as €ul integral part
of existi:rg systems for executive policy and decision-making; that its work
was more critical than other committees with a limited or onc-off purpose,
that its over-riding interest in financial matters reqrrired regular,
indeed weekly attentionr rather than occasional or gg$ tirning during the
budgetary cyclel that it would continue to be rnanned at a senior mini-
sterial levell that it would continue to absorb the continuing and
systematic attention of important divisions in the Treasury; that the
"special" reviews of new and existing policy with which it had been
concerned could noW be regarded as regular, standard phases of the budgetary
Brocess. This advice had repergussions throughout the central networks -
t'he registrar of the Cabinet Off,ice, Nell Danskie, for example, corcmented
in retrospect that "the file on the CCEX lrad initially been kept just as
a continuation of the old CAB LZL/9/L (which had been started with the
Cabinet Comnittee on Policy and Priorities, Financial- affairs). But it
was changed from now on to cAB LzL/g/L/L - r didnrt realise how big it
was going to become .,,2?8
lihile its Cabinet coLleagues were considering this proposal, the
CCEX continued to meet as before to consider the Suppleurentary Esti:nates
and various ad hoc items. After some ten months learning about the state
of government finances it rdas apparently beginning to gain confidence in its
own right to instruct. On g Octoberl for example, in a Review of Education
Grants (a major and critical component of the Education Vote), the minister
(Gandar) had reguested $10.51I niflion, on the basis of Treasuryrs advice
the CCEX was prepared to recommend only $5.509 million. The minutes of
this meeting indicate horr the Committee and its princilnl advisers leere
attempting to tighten up the criteria for expenditure bids and cost
estimates, particularly where these had in the past given considerable
discretionary power to the depattment, and reduced the scope for cost
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reductions. The Committee now asserted that spending agents should not
simply assume that movements in costs would be fully or partially
compensated, and cornnented on a number of aspects
recommended p:ocedures. Certain',principles'r vrere
adopted "in respect of education grants',r
of current and
henceforth to be
and authorities will
grant income within
supplementary grants
(i) Quantitative increases in grants will be established
and announced prior to the conmencement of the academicyear to which they relatel(ii) qyalitative irnprovements will continue to be dealt
with under New policy piocedures.
Grants announced will be final
be required to budget within theirthe following exceptions for which
may be soughtr(i) subsequent general wage increases which cannot be
absorbed and for which no provision has been made in thegrantt(ii) special circumstances which
cannot be absorbed and for which
made in the grant;
arise, the cost of which
no provision has been
(iii) where the basis used in determining the grant is
estimated i.e. projected rorls or student hours, adjustments
wilr be made to the finar grant in line with the actualfigrures where these are available.
The authorities will have a greater responsibility forcontrolling their expenditure in that they will be hel.d
aceountable for that part of their expenditure which iscontrorlable. shourd deficits occur which are not eligiblefor supplementation (as above) ttre excess costs are to be
met by the controlling authority from its own funds.Grants will be carculated on rolls or some other appropriatebasis and where staff salaries are included these will bebased on approved establishments.
Grant increases may have regard to the movement in costs
which have occurred. from the date of the previous grant and
wilL not necessarily be tied to movements in any price index.For the purposes of COpE forecasts (then in train) grants willbe caluclated at I July prices. Final grants will bedetermined in october and may or may not incrude a furtherprice adjustment.
The basis for determining grrants will be reviewed at least
every three years to ensure that the formula remains current.Once the reguired levels of grant increase has been
established the Minister of Education will seek cabinet approvalto the new grant rates to enable announcements to be made in
November of each year. sr:bmissions for increases will isolate
compensation for inflation and, where appropriate, 3@growth e.g. increases in school ;oIF-Provision for Grant rntegration (assistance to integratingprivate schoors) will be reviewed on the basis of the adjustedintegration progranme in October each !€€lrr(Emphasis aaaea)23?
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Despite the apparently severe tone of this decision, the Education
lldepartment gained a nunber of important scheduled i'rights : regular, pg-
Christmas announcement of approved education grant ratesl an assurance
that demographic factors, unforeseen changes in circumstances, shifts in
wages and salaries and changes in the existing formulae for grant approvals
€o9. staffrpupil ratios, where estimates proved out of line with actual
e:cperience, could all be presented as grounds for increased education
fundsl although forecasts of grants (for COPE) must be in 1 iluLy prices,
considerations raised during the Supplenentary Estimates review could
have a favourable impact on the grants announced in November. The only
mandatory reguirements of any significance were applled, not to the
department itself, but to the controlling authorities - the Educatlon
Boards, which would be 'lexpected" to act responsiJcly and with self-restraint
in any area of discretionary spending.
Th€ brave words incfuaeiithe CCEXTs formal decisions could not conceal
the fact that this substantial element in Governnent's annual e:<penditure
totals was extremely difficult to pin down, given the paucity of appropriate
information, and the difficulty of insisting on quantification of critieal
cost-related elenents. Taking the review of grrants out of the ordinary
budgetary cycle (despite the injunction that qualitative improvements,
not defined as volume growth, or any other more precise termrwere to be
Put uP only during the New Policy review phase) eliminated some problems
for Education officials, and provided grounds for numerous problens in
future years as cost-cutting became an important motivation for the CCEX.
The first regular meeting of the CCEX, under its new tirnetable2 lr€re
held, with Gair in the chair, on November 9 L976. Like the CCPP before it,
this Conmittee had taken almost a fuII twelve months to estabLish itself
reasonabl-y securely in the consciousness of officials and others. A
recorded discussion which took place on 9 November on funding for ttre
Industrial Rel-ations Centre indicates the sort of interests that this
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conmittee was deveroping, and its potential varue in sorting out areas
of potential political confrict without so frustratinE ministers that
they would later attenpt to avoid the proper financial procedures and go
straight to Cabinetr
rt vras pointed out in discussion that the funding shouldbe through Labour rather t,.an Education, othervrise therewould be a risk of overlapping arising from block grantfunding. The (university Grants committee) normaliyresisted tagging smarr portions of a brock grant. 6n trreother hand, special grants for particular activities whichthe state desired to be carried out in the university
environment had become weII established. The prolnsal
seemed to fall into this kind of category.(The 
_CCEX) agreeg that industrial relations training isbadry needed 
-in-New zearand and should be accoraea i rrigtrpriority in Government progreunmes,
agree{ that Government should assume responsSJcility forthe |fulL normal operating costs, of the IRC (but Lxclrrdingfinancial requirements for studies which are of 
"p""iri"interest to the social partners (undefined) u" p.lt of its' policy to increase industrial relations training in NewZealandl
approvg9 (various anounts) as a direct grantl
noled that in the long term expenditure for the IRc shouldbe met from the universitiesr quinguennial grantl
agregd that the contribution of the sociar lartners shourdremain a substantial porLion of the total funding of theCentre,
n"ggg. that the r R Advisory comrnittee will continue tohave a watching brief over the centrers activigies.24o
rt would be a simpre matter to point up the gaps in this discussion _ the
undoubted opportunities for powerfur robbies to sustain small empires,
to feed off the state, to avoid drawing themserves to the future attention
of the corunittee, to inhibit tl1e urgency with which the ccEX nright approach
the question of approved grants during any witch hunt for crun5s of noney
in a crisis, to bask in the high priority accorded by trustfur and
optirnistic ministers to an activity the worFh of which was. far from proven
(if indeed demonstrable) r Yet attractive in that industrial relations rrere
a painful thorn in the side of all recent governments. On the other hand,
lte can also observe that while this discussion'night not demonstrate any
zestful ministerial deternination to eLiminate open-ended expenditure
policies, it did illustrate the significance that the committee, as an
executive instrument for moderation, had acquired in the minds of spending
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agents. r,obbyists stroked the egos of the ministers by engaging them in
apparently grand considerations of the industrial future of New Zealand;
they were prepared to offer up to the memt,ers of this CommiLtee as a
precaution agairrst a future rainy day when they needed some flexibility,
some soft areas which could be sacrificed to moxe pressing needs; they
were sensitive to the political arguments most likely to move menbers of
the National- government 
- for example the proposal for a joint endeavour,
with the private sector (the social partners) in the business of
government. They were prepared to use this Conunittee. That alone
indicated the inrportance it was acquiring in the networks of authority,
however immature the networks of information exchange at this stage. lhe
CCEX was becoming seen as a credible vehicle for approaching the Government,
and despite its strong Treasury associations, it was, like all ministerial
groups, susceptible to political persuasion. ft was a sign of strength
not of weakness.
l-6 November: Legislation introduced to impose levies
on natural gas and coal produced in
New ZeaLand from I January L977.
30 November: Devaluation of New Zealand dollar by
7 percent against aII currencies except
AustraU.an dollar- i.e. a net
appreciation of 12.7 percent against
Australian dollar and overall effective
devaluation of 2.7 percent.
Announcement of further drawing of NZ
$64.6 million from the fMF Conpensatory
F'inancing Facility, bringing New Zealand
to its maximum drawing entitlement under
this facility.
Economic statement including announce-
ment of directives to trading banks and
finance cornpanies both to reduce the
rate of growth of lending and to shift
emphasis towards priority areas, part!-
cularly those with export potential,
and extension of the irnport deposit
scheme to 2 August l-977.
L December:
I
9
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L3 Decenber: Temporary additional tax incentives(expiring 31 March 1978) announced
to assist non-traditional exports
following the devaluation of the
Australian doIlar; extension
restriction on local authorities to
raise loans for capital works.
Report of the Task Force on Economic
and Social Planning (Holnes)released:
Substantial increases in passenger
fares on railways, bus services and
rail ferries announced.
15 December:
The Couunittee's workload escalated. A wide range of iterns were
submitted for its consideration, making substantial dernands on the
e:rperience, capacity and time of the three ministers involved: environ-
mental reporting, foreign aid, afforestation projects, fees payable by
overseas students, rates policy, hospital boards financial allocations,
Post Office development, over-expenditure in various areas such as Trans-
port. The Committee took upon itself the authority to consider any
financi."l grants whenever these came up for regular review during the
financial year 
- e.g. in Education, or Water and Soil conservation. New
policy items still not harnessed to the annual review phase were
srrbmittedi Treasury sought CCEX approval for the format of its in-
structions to departments for the next year's review of existing policy;
a major paper on Government Expenditure 1977/78-L979/8O was placed before
the Committee: the Secretary of Treasury reported, and the Committee
noted, the difference between the COPE level of expenditure for L977/78
.($3974 rnillion) and the estimated total expenditure figrure of $5290
million, sr-rburitted to Cabinet on 2 De.e*b"r.241 on 17 December the CCEX
agreed that the current freeze on Public Service staff ceilings shouLd
continue for the 1977/79 financial year. Treasury submitted a time-
table of financial reviews for the coming year, and with a raft of
matters still to be considered, the CCEX broke, on l-7 December for the
su!ilner holiday p"tiod. 242
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20 December: New Zealand agrees, under "voluntary
restraint scheme" to limit beef
shipments to the USA in 1977 
- 
but
with a slight increase on previous
yearrs limit.
Revaluation of New Zealand dollar by
2 percent, reducing the 2.7 percent
effective depreciation of November 30
to 0.8 percent.
22 December: fnitial rates for National Super-
annuation announced.
lJanuaryDTT: Coalr 9as and natural gas prices
increased by 25 percent, 40 percent
and 25-30 percent respectively.
3I January: Government announced increases in
Social Security benefits of 5 percenL
in line with rise in CIP in second
half of L976.
9 February: Government borrows N2931 nillion
through a Dutch consortium.
By the end of its first year of operation, the CCEX had acguired an
enviable reputation, a regular and highly visible meeting slot in the
crowded Parliarnentary week, and its own servlcing network {for example
K. Marshall began to take over from tlillen after sitting in for several
neetings although he shared this with another Cabinet Office secretary
for a brief period). The Connrittee did not reconvene until the beginning
of February, which released some of its nembers to spend time on the
Cabinet Works Committee in the interim. At this stage, in real terms,
the CCEX had not gone much further than rnaking its presence felt, but
when it began its meetings in 1977 it established the now-familiar
procedure of calling for occasional reports on reviews already instituted,
or identified by COPE report as desirable. Depending on the reputation
of the spending minister or department under investigation, CCEX requests
of this sort became more or less perenptory, although as its agenda
filled up, and new policies and existing policies generated by the annual
reviews were tabled for its consideration, the ad hoc reports often
slipped by unexamined (if, indeed, ever actually prepared by departments).
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Despite the reliance Cabinet as a whole novr began to place on the
Cottwtittee, and the regard with which departmental officials approached
it1 the chairman, Gair, ccntinued to have difficulty in gaining
his colleaguest cooperation in his rather thankless task. His complaints
were very like those that had earlier been voiced in the forum of the
CCPP - ministers were often slow to resp,ond to requests for infonntion,
niggardly in what they did provide, or even deliberately obstmctive.
They were often less than enthusiastic about personal attendance, preferring
for many months to take the older policy-appropriation route of ninister-
Cabinet direct, despite instructions ttrat rnatters could be raised only
if approved in advance by the Secretary of the Cabinet and the prime
Minister.
Throughoux L977-78, the Chairnan found that his colleagrues rrere
very inclined to resist the summons to attend the Committee hearings.
On 18 March 19'17, for example, Gair and !.{i11en drafted a nemo
for Cabinetc
Difficulty is being experienced in processing the
. 
work of the CCEX by Ministers indicating that they
are unable to attend many of the meetings of ttre
cornmittee. This is resurting in an accumulation of
iterns for consideration...
xt went on to point out that the value of the weekly time and other
occasions set aside for policy review was diminished ,'where Ministers have
absented thernselves." The memo finished abnrptJ.yr
Please keep your diary clear. (Signed) George c^Lr.26
Nevertheless, the CCEX steadily built up ttre groundwork for its later
successes in poLicy review and expenditure.restraint. It was able to give
attention to matters previousry difficult for cabinet, arways under
Pressure, to consider - the standardisation of procedures for policy and
e:cpenditure review in different departmentsl the criteria that should be
applied in determining levels of subsidies to functions such as water and
soil conservationl factors influencing the Levels of incentives approved
by the Government to deVelop various activitiesl the respective contributions
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of central and local authorities, as a matte:: of poliLical, i.f not
economic.principle, in various fielCs. It became the appropriate agency
for review and approval of matters falling outsid.e the delegated porvers
of joint ministers. It had some fle:<ibitity to examine tJ:e impact of
certain tagged items, or agreed formulae or the use of earlier-approved
indices used for cost/price estimation and expenditure predictions. For
instance, the poJ.icy bases for goverrunent grants were, on direct instruction,
sometimes required for CCEX analysis. Many rrperks,' available in such
activities as overseas traver or the use of departmentar vehicles,
indulgently allowed when times were good, \{ere continually recalled for
conunittee investigation and Treasury review; subsidies, charges for
servicesr staff ratJ-os, and the automatic ratcheting of items such.as
heat, light and water were queriedl a nr:mber of reviews, nominated by
Treasury of coPE or both were approved by the ccEX. rn February L977,
for example, the Cabinet Office drafted an additional instruction to be
included in the forthcoming reviews of new and existing policy. rts
inclusion was clearly generated not only by pressing financial circumstances,
but by the improve9 capac,l$r tba.lt the CCEX was proli_jling for the execgtive
system to deal with financial informationr
Review of Existlng Policies:
fn addition to the information provided by each department
in terms of Cabinet Office Circular CO (76) 36, a further
report should be prepared indicating those existing policies
in order of priority which would need Eo be curtailed,
deleted or substantially revised if the total VoLe of the
department, as agreed by COPE, was reduced by
2 percent
4 percent and
6 percent respectively.(Note: this information is required from all departments,
including those who filed nil returns for the Existing
Policy review.)
Review of New Policyr
Ministers and Permanent Heads are requested to make themselves
availabLe at the meetings to discuss ne$r policy proposals in
March and Aprilr aDd to subnit further possible existing
expenditure savings as well, proposals or items that can be
offered in ful1 or partiaL sub.stitution for aII ne-w policies
which are sought for introduction j.n L977/7e. These
substitutions should be in addition to proposed reductions
made or offered during Lhe review of Existing poli"i-"r.2&
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The CCEX itself directed Treasury to provide it with a rePort
detailing the figrures to be used in undertaking the expenditure reviews
for L977/78. It had, in addition, by this time become the appropriate
channel for Treasury to transmit information about over-exp€nditure of
overall Vote-s - data which could greatly contribute to the comprehensive
nature of the Committeers scanning capacity.
On 8 February, as part of a crowded agenda, the Committee considered
information provided by its own mernbers about ttreir work commitments,
and the amount of time they would be able to give in future to the
Cornrnittee. Thomson (absent from this meeting) had reported that
he would be virtually unavailable because of his involvement on the
Human Rights Corsnission. However, Gair and Holyoake were both able to
carry onl and as a result Cabinet directed that in future all ministers
should give priority to their attendance at tlris Cormitteers meetings,
whether as members or as supplicant".24s
Treasury recommended to the Committee at this time that the sum of
9200 srillion shoul-d be set as a target for the reduction of expenditure
in the review of existing policies (irg77/78r.zt*b with this goal in mind,
the Conrnittee agreed that most outstanding matters remaining since the
1976 Review should be cleared out of the way by the end of March L977.
The recorded discussion of two CCEX meetings in February illustrate hol'r it
went about its review (bearing in mind its main objective - to find an
extra $200 million):
Review of Existing Policies: Public Trust Office
llhere was a discussion of the degree to which the seLf-
financing operations of a State agency like the Public
Trust Office could, or should, in contrast to a Government
department, be given administrative independence in its
statutory and commercial responsibilities, and thus be
exempt fron detailed aspects of expenditure controL such
as maintenance of buildings in terms of the best returns
for clients.
It was said that the maincenance item in the Vo|-e was now
unrealistically 1ow. It was accepted that State agencies
must, in their operations, reflect the tenor of the
Ciovernmentrs economic policy e.g. in their building
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programmes and staff nunbers. However, it would bedifficult to establish precise parameters for autonomous
control by the pro of those of its activities which would
' be in competition with private enterprise. The Govern-
ment must be left free to intervene if the right barance 
^,.qbetween state and private enterprise was to be maintained.'*'
A later discussion on the Review of Education policies was considerably
less philosophical. Gair and Holyoake were present, wittr their four
Treasury advisers and (on this occasion) Millen as sq_cretary.
Gandar (Education) Presented himself, accompanied by a four-man team
of officials headed by ttre Assistant Director-General of Education,
Boag. The ccEX began by noting various .adjustments, to votec
Education since the COPE surveyr additions approved by Joint ministers,
or, in one case, Cabinet itself, totalled some g3.5 million (including
an additional 92.2 for Education grants)l and subtractions totalling
9612001000 which included a reduction of 55 million on capital_ works, and
tlre rest taken off funds for teachers colleges. The net reduction overall
amowrted to $2r033r000 on COpErs reconmended level.
Tventy five items had been included in the general Education existing
poric.ies review, affecting every programlle in the vote. rn many cases an
additional, or more detailed reviel{ was called for, and towards t}re end
of the meeting the Ministers decided that any new policies approved by
the Goverrunent must be matched by specific savings elsewhere in the Vote,
additional to those already achieved in the existing policy review. A
suggestion from Gandar that "it rnight be possible to save up to a further
$115001000 in 1977/7A by taking $t million off the basic Arant to secondary
schools and g5gor00o off land purchases and buirdings for Technical
rnstitutes" was noted 
- and subsequently amended, on 25 February, to
read (l-ess threateningly) 
"savings up to $1 million,, with only g5o0r0oo
offered for the secondary schoor grant, and no specific reference to
technica.L institute= at .ff?9
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2 ltarch: Wage Hearing Tribunal approves general
wage order of 6 Percent, effective
from 14 uarch L977.
During this 1977 review period, the CCEX deveJ-oped a number of
standard responses in ilealing with existing policy itens sr:bmitted for
its consideration. There may be categorised as followsr
(1) e:Lt!1qr approve the COPE provision for a progranmet
(2, or approve the Departmentrs revised esti:nate,
(3) or accept the Treasury reconmendation for a reduction in
the COPE provision on a particuLar item or activity or
Prografilne,
(4) or ask for a reconciliation of differences between ofiicials,
or a presentation of further argument by the Department
under consideration and Treasury (this happened
Snrticularly when Treasury was recommending a reduction
in the COPE reconrnended Level).
Approvals for departmental bids over COPETs recorrunended levels were
given on ground ttrat
(a) ne\iv, or more precise information on the cost component of existing
policies than had been available to CoPE had persuaded the CCEX: or
(b) costs e:rpected to lcome to charge" in 1975/77 woul.d notd not appear
till later (therefore the CCEX could approve a higher figure for Year 2) I
or
(c). sone nehr or compelling argunent by the spending minister and his
officiats persuaded the CCEX to change ttre COPE recommendation; or
(d) price and cost movements could be shown to have moved upwards since
COPE conducted its survey, and the CCEX accepted this as grounds for
revision upwards.
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Other, more specifi-c grounds for agreeing to COPE levels included the
following considerationsr
(a) approval by CCEX of a departmentrs argrument for a particular
formula or index would remove ttre possibirity of regrurar review, so
that a favourabLe decision made now would ensure future ratchetting by
creating an approved precedent (a Treasury argurnent) I
(b) the item should more properly come under the New poricy review
procedures (a Treasury argument). On the other hend, the CCEX would
sometirnes give approval for an increase ,'subject to an estimationu
i.e. the discretion of the spending department (which did not then have
to be vetted again by the CCEX) on the grounds that better service or
hlgher standards of performance wourd result. Again, approval might
be granted for an increase on the grounds that the activity or programme
would attract private capital e.g. into forestry. on another review item
the Cormnittee might accept Treasuryrs reconunendation that no additional
money should be provided for an activity at this stage, but instead (or
very often in the interim) it agreed to a review or investigation of the
matter by one or more departments separately or jointly, with or without
Treasury, with a vi.ew to improving the argrunents/case for the policy.
For exampler the CCEX would instruct officials to subsrit a report on the
natter before or after the next Budget, or instruct the deSnrtrnent concerned
to report on tlre matter to the ccEX on an annual basis, or at longer
I'ntervals 
- which was, of course, seen by spend,ers as an attractive
invitation to try again.
On 9 l{arch a proPosal before the CCEX for a special. review of financial
management'and control in Government departments was favourably received.
The Cormnittee approved the engagement of two accountants (under terns
specified in Section 2l of the Pr:blic Revenues Act 1953) for six months,
at a fee of gr5r000 each, starting in August Lg77.2"1 This little-
recogmised (albeit formal) involvement by the CCEX in the ControLler and
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Auditor General-rs 1978 report $ras.a further illustration of its
increasing participation in the executive s!'sten. The review itself
subsequently generated some severe criticisrns of the procedures and
Inanagefient information systems of state de.oartments, which were then
'-\Ptaken/hot only by the Audit Office ancl Treasury, but the parliamentary
Public Expenditure Committee.
It is apparent from the Cabinet records that there were many
situations in which the comrnittee, advised by the Treasury, could not
find any way to recornmend savings, even where it was sensed that these
were potentialJ-y available. ft rnight be reduced to fairly weak gestures
(which could have a negative impact politically) such as an approved
increase in the revenue-generating activities of the Audit department
(fee charges for services). On occasions meJnos like those below would
effect,ively record a failure to discover surplus 'rfatrri
(re Customs, 9 March, L977) The CCEX noted that in
the circumstances out.lined in the rreaffmemo, there
is little opportunity for a reduction or deferral of
expenditure below levels recommended by COpE if t}re
Departrnent is to fulfil its functions as set out by
ststugg.25O
Or again:
The Conunittee noted the Treasury memo that there is
Little opportunity for reduction or deferrErlo.. without
it resulting in the Department being unable effectively
to fulfil its functions.,. and providing (an existing)
service.26l
This sort of conunent accompanied the Cornmitteers review of policies in
departments such as Customs, Government Life, the LegisLative department,
the State Services (including the National Research Ad,,,isory Council and
the Computer Services Division) r the Via,luation department, the Housing
Cogporation, State Insurance and the Crown Law Office. With few exceptions,
the pickings in these areas, even where incompetence or over-optirnistic
estimates were suspected, would be relatively uni:nportant compared wittr
what it was believed could be taken from the large expenditure areas, and
the sectors in receipt of subsidy and other transfer payments.
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At other times, a Treasury recommendation, for all its apparent
good sense, would not succeed because it was felt that its adoption could
be excessively restrictive in an area where political gains were possible,
as wittr ttre Ministry of Works. In ltarch L977 fot example, Treasury
reconunended that cost constraint clauses should be incorporated in all
new contracts for construction work, with a view to ensuring that
prograndned cash levels in the vrorks programmes of other departnents were
not exceeded in any financial year, The Cornmittee rejected this, although
it did direct the ttlvlp "to incorporate cash constraint clauses... where
the Ministry considers this advisable."2SL old empires, historical (and
trnlitically advantageous) relationships between the Ministry and the
building and construction industry wouLd not be jeopardised in the inrinediate
interests of financial economy.
As the first 1977 Existing Policy review continued through March,
the Committee enployed other shrategies where actual cost recovery proved
elusive - for example, the CCEX instructed the Social Welfare Minister
and his officials not to change the lglg of a particular benefit, but
to slow down the pgriod over which payments were made - euphemistically
defining this as the "Additional Benefit waiting period," 253 very small
items of expenditure ltere sometjrnes eliminated (for little if any possible
gaLn, except the probably pointless alienation of distant officials and
their clients) 
- for example, the ccEX "saved," $lorooo by discontinuing
a research grant to the Maori Affairs department.2su More rarely, the
CCEX would simply endorse the flow-on effects on spending of decisions
nade elsewhere, such as a CCSS decision to cut DSfR staffing provisions,
thereby'reducing the coPE level for that department by g7o0rooo.255
In March lL977l, as the Committee continued its demanding scheduLe
of meetings for the existing poricy review, Holyoake (appointed by the
Government as the Governor-General) was replaced by Ternpleton, deputy
Minister of Finance. Thomson, whose ti-rre was heavily committed to
a nunber of other areas, rarely attended CCEX, and Templeton was
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frequentJ-y absent. The bulk of the work was ther-cfore
Gair alone, witr\ Battersby and T. Brernrerton [later
the Transport department) as the key Treasury advisers.
done by
to join
The capital works prograrune for the Government was submitted to
the Conmittee for examination and approval during March. This inevitably
reduced ttre time it could give to existing policy items, and placed it
under considerable pressure in view of its own earlier decision to get
that review out of the way before taking up the question of new policy
bids. l4atters which had caused much soul-searching when they appeared
before the o1d CCPPr such as changes in the funding levels for the Post
Officers services, vtere efficiently (if somewhat, modestly) dealt wit}:
(re Post Office review) r ,'Confirmed for planning
purposes $35r893 million for programme 1(eaninistration and General) Ln L977/787 this
. represented a saving on COpE of $l_ million".
Additional smal-l itens under this Vote were taken as ,'savings', 
- for
exampie, the abolition of counter services in selected Post Officesl
the approval of fees for Post Office directories and other previously
'rfreeftitems - although the CCEX stated that "this is a sensitive area
and progressive savings only are capable of achievementr'. Administrative
costs were tinkered with, for example, in a Committee decision that in
future only two reminder notices should be sent to persons renting pO
.property before telephones were cut off (a saving of about $l0OrO0O per
. 26byearr.
The committee arso considered various across-the-board cuts
recommended by the Treasury, but in most cases, for exampLe, rnternal
Affairs, "declined to agree to Treasury (paper 4879) reeommendations on
2, 4 and 6 pgrcent reductions on COPE levels,'. It did, however, make
some minor adjustments in this and other votesl and usually invited the
Minister to report back to it on his reaction to their proposals. Treasury
was often obliged to accept defeat (for exanple in Vote:nailways) since they
themselves had been unable to come up with any suggestions as to how
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the Committee could make across-the-board recommended cuts stJ-ck,
either at the Ievel of tJle individual !{inister, or before Cabinet.
Vaiious signals were picked up by the watchf,ul actors in the system
during ccEX meetings. For example, on 23 March, in a 'rsecret, memo to
tlre permanent head of the Treasury, Marshall (ccEx secretary)
Pointed out that "the CCEX, in reviewing Vote: Agriculture and Fisheries,
indicated ttrat the Budget may not be until after ituLy. Officials were
to have regard to further strategy to cope with this eventuality when
considering the various reports to be furnished by the Minister of
Agricurture and Fisheries as directed by the ccEX. would you prease
bring this to the attention of those officers in your department who
tq?
need to knorrr"."' As with alt Budget-related information, of course, the
final instruction confirmed the secrecy of the proceedings.
Another hoary chestnut that had caused nuch difficulty for the
Labour government 
- the Nelson notional railway 
- 
reappeared during the
1977 existing policy review, anc, rike their predecessors, the ccEX
ministers decided that this political hot potato should be recorunended
for phasing out "after the next election.,'258 Sometimes extra-Committee
infLuences were directly feltr for example, on 25 !{arch, in an investigation
of Votet Ministry of lVorks and Development, the minutes recorded that,
re the setting of consultantsr fees:
it was agreed that consideration cf expenditure on
consurtants fees be deferred until the situation hasbeen reviewed in the right of the prime lrrinister's
reconunendation that a further 62 rnilrion be added tothe works programme to assist private sector architects
and engineers.259
Again we. witness the influence of oId-established connections between this
Ministry, its Minister (Young) , and the powerful members of the various
prof,essions and business interests associated with capital (works)
investment. one item(mentioned elsewhere in chapter 6 ) 
-
Developmentar Roading, went through without recorded comnent on its
apparently standard level of $2 million for each of the next three financial
years.
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The Health Vote, ardently defended by the Minister, GiIl
received what coirld only be regarded as favourable treatment. on
30 March, when this major expenditure area was before the Committee for
existing policy. review, the ninutes included the following decisions:
(re) Ceneral Medical Services benefit: declined
rreas ave about
:''' i:.ll';:,'il::ll::; ::,:l:"::T::i,fi:'ll.u"o,"
reconun v"
:*"ililiiill li;1.:iii::li? ;,:;:: I:il: or medica,
- 
__'-*rbenefits: (Minister reguested to fook at ways to save
b-y r.*o,.ing eligibility of special rate General Medical
Services Benefit for wives under age of 60 and the
consequences of doing the same thing for all super-
annuitants) r
Plunkett invited the Minister, the department and
rreas@to-i nve s t i ga te recl a s s i f y ing p runke t/Kari tane
hospitals as some form of social institution and
transferring their administration to the Department ofSocial Welfare3
Grantsl Noted that with the new control proceduresinstiEiF:.n L976/77 whereby Hospitar Board operatingrgrants are split between salaries and wages and other
operating expenditure some success has been achieved in
maintaining tighter controls on Hospital Board expenditureidirected Treasury and the Department of Health to ad.visedffiL could be done to improve control and inparticular the direction of any growth or irnprovementfactor that may be granted as a result of L977/79 NewPolicies Reviewl
Approved Capital Works levels.
' The Minister of Health was now granted his request for time to inform
the CCEX on what he wanted to be considered favourably in the new poJ.icy
review: that is1 "his personal viewpoint". Category I items had already
been approvedl the Committee now wanted to hear argrlnents j.n favour of
Category 2 (31 items)r particutarly those listed as the Ministerrs first
preferences 
- family rnedicine scheme, practice nurse sr.rbsidy scheme
extension, and heal.th centre construction. ft was pointed out that items
32-58 had not been placed in any particular order of priority, but were
sirnply grouped "in the order of the Departmentrs bureauxr'. Gill ttren
discussed various policies which he personally favoured. ,'It was stated
that he was particurarly anxious that the growth figure for health
expenditure be set at a minimum of 2 percent with I percent being retained
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for new project implementation".260 The CCEX "noted" the minister's
priorities 
- 
and its difficulty in resisting becane legendary throughout
the central system, a reputation which both inhibited and assisted his
successor, Gair, when in 1980 he began a highly ptlblicized attempt
to restrain spending on the puJolic health system in its Present
institutionalised, professionally-dominated form'
Despite its efforts, items from the existing policy review (including
matters outstanding from 1976) were still coming before the CCEX until the
end of April. In mid-April the three CCEX ministers, Gair, Thomson and
Templeton accepted Treasury's proposed tinetable for the review of New
31 March: Import licensing schedule for 1977/78
year again fixed at the sarne value as
Previous Year.
1 april: Petrol prices increased by 9'6 percent(which implied a rise of over 30 per-
cent in retail price of electricity) '
fifth and final step to equal pay for
female workers effective frorn this
date.
12 April: Government borrows NZ S87 million
through an international banking
sYndicate.
19 April: Housing package announced, incor-
Snrating reductions in the govei:runent
security ratios applied to trustee
and private savings banks on 30 April
and 3l- JulY, releasing $30 million
for home mortgage finance; an
increase in ilousinq Corporation loans
available for the purchase of exist-
ing houses; and removal of cost
limits on loans for new house con-
struction. A target of 55 Percent
Private sector finance and 45 Per-
cent Public sector finance for
housing announced; and a building
target in the 1977/'18 Year of
26 
.OOO-28,000 new houses.
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policies in May, with the recorded note that the Minister of Finance'
Mu1doon, would be invited to attend on May 3 and 4, and again on
t7 May (the day set aside for appeals from frustrated ministers) 'rto
avoid Ministers engaging in protracted appeals to the Committee for
reinstatement of their new policy proposal=."251 rn tJre event it appears
that Muldoon did not take up this invitation, but there could scarcely
be more telling confirmation of the effect the Prime Minister was capable
of having on his colleagues, or the extent to which his power was
husbanded and used by those responsible for restraint when they felt
their own authority might prove inadequate to the task set then.
An interesting illustration of interest group pressure and its
effect on the executive system appears in the records of a CCEX ureeting
held on 19 April. The Committee discussed the reinstatement of an earlier
"economy measure" that had proved politically irnpossible for the llinister
res5nnsible (Gandar) to sustain:
Reinstatement of conditions of ernploymen! gf fglief le3chers
It was stated that this was the Minister of Education's firstpriority for ... L977/78 and in view of the public controversy
' the cessation of this scheme had generated it was considered
most necessary that the scheme be reinstated from Term 2, 1977.
Any further deferral of the introduction of the new scheme
r'lould have grave political implications.... Difficult to
estimate the annual cost as many schools did not use their
. 
full entitlement of relief teachers; this was particularly
so in country schools where (relief) was not available.
Officials stated that the PPTA was agreeable to reduce use
of relief teachers towards the end of the year when teachers
tended to be under utilised. It was agreed that (the policy,
with an estimated cost of 52.4 million) should be approvedfor immed.iate announcement after Cabinet approval.262
This was one horse that neither the department nor the minister had been
able to run, and it is likely that the abortive attempt was responsible,
in part, for the "grave political" costs Gandar himself paid in
November 1978, when, to the surprise of many, he lost his Rangatikei
seat to newcomer Bruce Beetham, Social Credit leader - and o<-school
teacher.
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ilhe New Policy review began on 3 May. All agenda items coming
before the Comrnittee, since they carried with them the most sensitive
Budget classification, were "secret" and circulated strictly on a "need
to know" basis.. The three mini.sters assembled with Battersby
(Treasury) and Mike Wintringham (the junior Treasury officer responsiJcle
for processing t,}:.e L977/78 pre-Estimates procedures) and Millen fron
the Cabinet office. The records state that
Concern was expressed that th".. Votes, Education,
Rairways and Transport new-@ up
$20 nillion of approximately $30 miLlion uncorilnitted
at present for NP 1977178. Accordingty it was decided
that these three votes shouLd be dealt with first before
other departments.
ft was considered that there should be some sort of
flagging process for politj.eally sensitive longer lead-
tlne itemsl however, these must not be seen as
commitments for the 1978 Budget. 
,263(Hnphasis addedr
Thus expressing their shock and disapproval, the CCEX began. It appears
that attempts to find srrbstantial financial gains in their existing
poliry review had been relatively unsuccessful. They were now obliged
to act within very tight fiscal guidelines ($30 million was, in the words
of one official, r'peanutsrr compared with what was requested). However,
tlre records of their meetings do not indicate whether any more useful
strategy than moral and political outrage was devised to buttress ttreir
determination.
Education had produced its t1pically expansive shopping list - ttrat
year some 90 items were submitted by Gandar. Ttre Committee reclassified
some items, such as additional Funds for General Expenses grants to
schools (announced, as agreed, some months earlier, and apparently already
insufficient) and alL pre-school items were downgraded. However, a
reduced building programme was approved, as was one expensive proposal to
establish senior technical divisions in secondary schools, and another to
extend the scope and amount of bursary provisions for university and other
students. Certain policies, such as assistance to the parents of handicapped
children, with relatively minor cost irnplications (and even those only
'l
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vaguel-y spelt out) were sympathetically received, since every minister
could see political gains from this inexpensive and largely symbolic
gesture. The Government's growing interest in technical training was
reflected in the Corurnittee's general political concern over this area,
as expressed in its instruction to the departments of Labour and
Education that they jointly prepare "a short analysis of the balance of
advantage in a reduction of apprenticeship training and a shortage of
trained trade skills. This analysis should point out the qualitative
areas in education where major commitments will expand the Education Vote
in future years (e.g. bursaries).'264
The Committee vtas plainly diffident about its capacity to make
effective reductions, or restrain apparently inevitable growth in this
critical Vote. Interestingly enough, the records of this meeLing and that
held the following day do'not state that any Edr:cation officials were
present, so presumably the CCEX could avoid the persuasive strategies
of the skilled officiaLs who worked in this field. Nonetheless' they
obviously suspected that if Gandar went to Cabinet with complaints'
supported by the department's advice (or, from another standpoint, barely
veiled threats) on outraged response to frustration b7 lnwerful education
Iobbies then the CCEX itself would lose, in part at least, both money and
face. They cautiously agreed to defer Priorities 1-7 (all concerning
administrative policies) until the completion of their New Policy review,
and to place other Education bids "on a reserve list" for inplenentation
Ln 1977/79" only if sufficient funds became available at a later date ."265
9 May:
J.5 Mayr
Government announces extension of freeze
on wages, professional charges, director's
fees and dividents till 14 August 1977.
RaiI and rail ferry freight charges in-
creased by an average of 9 percent.
Although the Conunittee had tinetabled only one day for appeals, they
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in f,act met for this purpose on at least tr^ro occasions. The notes
attached to the agenda for the first appeal day 
- 17 May, outlined the
formal procedures:
l. Individual ministers will have only the,/those
appendix(ces) relevant to their own portfolio(s).
2. Summary of items submitted for reconsiderat,ion is
attached for information of members o1!1@fy. (siQ .3. rn view of the length or@re
requested to limj_t officials to an absolute minimum
ffhe usual gangs without which some departments never
moved were not, apparently to be present to in+_imidate
or unsettle the Comrnittefl.
4. Where actingr l4inisters will be present the attendance
of senior Departmental officials is requested Gon,t send
a boy to do a man,s worfl.
5. As final decisions on Np have to be taken at this
meeting so that the NP package can go to Cabinet on
23 May, Gppeals] will be deait with even if the Ministeris absent; and cannot be deferred till a later date.6. !'lhere the Minister can,t be present it is essential
that his Permanent Head represent him with the necessary
authority to act on his behalf, frresumably added forthose who could not read, or chose to mis-interpret the
significance of the earlier point 4J.
'Items submitted for re-consideration
' from the following departmentss
Foreign Affairs t2)
Overseas Trade (Z)
Labour (1)
Agriculture (1)
' Maori Affairs (I)
DTI (1)
ilustice (I)
Lands (2)
Tourism (f)
. Fisheries (1)
Regional development (l)
Transport (2')
Works and Development (1)potice (t)
Social Welfare (t)
Internal Affairs (2)
Forestry (1) 
^...Education (9).'oo
Again we can see at work the strategy Education spenders had so success-
fully employed in the past. In the assertive manner of entirely confident
evangelists, strongly convinced of the significance bf their function in
goverrutent, highly skilled in the sensitive operation of those potitical
taps that could be turned on {or, lnor. rarely in their case, off), politically
astute and in constant touch with the demand sources (teachersr parents and
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students) of their field through Education's compli.cated system of dual
nanagement by Departmental and 1ay controrlers and advisers, still
oriented towards the profession from which almost a1l of them were d,rawn,
they proved more than a match for the CCEX. They str.rbbornly bombarded
it with bids, and were uhbending in seeking their full re-instatement.
llhe following table indicates the outcome of this particular engagemenr,,
wlth Snlicies cLassified according to how the CCEX dealt with the appeal:
tion) I items roved in rt, with ific attached) :
l.
2.
Initial requestl $l4trOOO
Treasury classificationl Cl
Initlal CCEX reconunendationr D
Ministerrs appeal reguestr S14l.OOO
, 
fnitial requestr S390rOOO
Treasury classification: D
rnitial ccEX recommendation: fLag, to be a<ivised on political
implications
l{inisterrs appeal requestr $39OrOOO
Establishment of c.ornmunity colleges!
Initial request: $593rOOO
Treasury classification: D
CCEX initial recornrnendation: D
Itlinisterrs appeal requestr $593rOOO
Adjustments to Standard Tertiary Bursary:
Initial requestr SI2OTOOO
Treasury classification: D
CCEX initial recommendationr D
Ministerf s appeal request: $12Or0OO
5. Ioans to private schools for capital works:
Initial request: $IT5OOTOOO
3.
4.
Establishment of technical divisions
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Treasury recommendation: D
CCEX initial reconunendation: D
Ministerrs appeal request: 9250r000 for L977/78
$1r250r000 for L978/79
(Appeal_items approved in fulI):
6. Exllansion in-service teacher training:
Initial request: $I00r000
Treasury recommendation: D
CCEX initial recommendation: D
Ministerrs appeal requestr $100r000
7. 4inancial grant to professional teachers association (ATCC):
Initial request: $9r000
Treasury Reconmendationr Cl
CCEX initial recommendation: D
Minister's appeal request: $9rOOO
8. Vehicles for regional educational programmes (CAp and CES):
Initial reguestr $12r000
Treasury recomlendationl Cl
CCEX initial recommendationr put on reserve list (i.e. to be
approved if funds became available)
Ministerrs appeal reguest! gI2r0OO
_lAppeal items declined) :
9. Financial assistance for the pacific Island Foundation:
fnitial reguest! $1001000
Treasury reconunendationr C2
CCEX initial recommendationr reserve, 
"nd i€_.ry,!!,llg provide
half only
qlqMinisterts appeal request; $lOOrOOOz"/
It is not too d:fficult to ascertain where the Ministers perceived their
partyrs political interests to lie.
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Other Votes enjoyed slightly less favourable overal,l treatment,
although the foLlo$ring guide to those arguments which were well received
(or rejected) by ttre CCEX, suggests that officials and ministers were
neither narkedly inhibited, nor cowed, in approaching the appeal authority.
Successful argrunents may be clustered on the following lines, with a
possible interpretation of each in parentheses!
l. Part of the money could be provided now, as reguested, and the rest
could be built into the Supplementary Estinates later (succesto the
Departnent) I
2. The new policy bid was part of an election nanifesto coumitment
in 1975 (success to both spending departnent and its minister);
3. The itenr ttas an otherwise unpopular charityr/pr:b1ic need which the
Government couLd benefit from supporting, such as Prisoners Aid
Rehabllitation, at relativeLy ninor real cost (combined moral, political
and financial virtue) I
4. The equipment for which additional funds were sought was potentialJ.y
dangerous witlrout rnodification (avoidance of industrial strife);
5. The itemr if approved and announced strategically would nattract
favourable publicity in the latter half of I978r' (the ever-present fixation
with electoral timing) i
6. Funding for this item would assist the solution of politicalJ.y
sensitive prob).ems, such as drug abuse (again, working on ttre conscience 
-
and relative igmorance 
- of the CCEX) I
7, The item needed funding because it represented a "genuine social need",
such as the requested car allowance for foster hone parents (a Depart-
mental favourite) i
8. The item should be agreed to and approved in principle now, but the
department must undertake to find alternative sources of money for funding
before financial approvar would be given (a minor flexing of Treasury
muscle) I
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9. The item was part of an earlier-approved plan/programme (a
failure to apply/hold to the definitional niceties of New and Existing
poliey criteria - success to the department)
10. A change in policy direction necessitated new spending - for exarnple,
trade cornmissioners vrere to be located by the Government in the Middle
East, rather than Los Angeles, but this decision had since been reversed,
with unforeseen costs to the Department (which gained a bonus to be laid
at the feet of Ministersr earlier lack of prescience);
11. The iten proposed was the start of a long-term provision for what
trnay initially appear to be only a short term problem'r, such as
wrernSrlolment (this issue was still to be discussed in hushed whispers) i
L2. The inposition of a new control could begin lf the item was funded,
and although it nay be costly in the first instance it would produce
future cost savings e.g. noxious weed control procedures (go back to the
CCPPfs handouts to this insatiable poticy);2€
13. The iten represented some special and attractive minority need, such
as sulcsidies for I'taori maraes (a relatively costtess political gain) I
L4. A transfer from one prograrilne to another of some activity, with the
same price tagr nonetheless reguired CCEX approval under the current rules.
The Education Vote produced some variations on these themeso For
exanple,
1. The btd was allowed, recognising that it was in fact'Just"an increase
on COPE, "not necessarily a new poticy as such,';
2. The bid was allowed, to conrnence in 1978, but the costs were to be
shared with another department, such as Labour (apprenticeship training);
3. The bulk of a new policy was allowed (such as community colleges to
be started in Whangarei, Rotorua and Southland, all politically interesting
Ol-
as marginal electorates but not elsewhere, 
.such as wanganui { Timaru
:-- 
--- 
- wherer atnong other considerations, the Opposition could be said
to have a safe electoral hold, making a gift to these areas poLitically
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wasteful). The latter items were deferred until after the General
Elections in 1978.
4. The nesr policy bid was just an rradministrative" device to "remove
anomolies" in some existing policyr such as the STB schemel
5. The item (e.g. loans to private schooLs, maJ-n1y Roman Catholic) was
"part of a long-term Government plan", and could not be deferred "r*ithout
serious conseguences" for the intended (and puJrlicly expected) action
(this sacred covr was then and later generously fattened by Ministers);
6. An item was approved because the Department undertook (with protest)
to find the necessary sum in some existing activity or prograrnnei
A straightfo:*rard appea} for heJ-p or s)mpathy, totally unsupported
by any new evidence or compelling argument, usually failed, although
occasionally, as with the bid for money for the Pacific Island Education
Foundation, a matter which might have some political merit was referred
to Cabinet for final decision.269
Although, on its or,rn say-so, the Committee !'ras supposed to present
its findings to Cabinet on 23 May, it was still heavily involved in the
appeals on 24th. Various items had been returned, such as the Health Vote
policiesr and here, with time running short, CCEX decisions were more
symbolic than real:
Approved a rstabilisationr grant to Hospital Boards of
$6 million in the Main Estimates L977/78.
Directed that Boards be informed that this amount should
;@aed as an advance against the total grant for
L977/78, and that approval thereto by Government is
without commitment as to such further amount as may be
approved for this purpose following the review at
Supplementary Estimates. 270
With a defiant penultimate twit-chr the exhausted Committee boldly decided
that they would not approve the "basic growth" formula.constructed by
ingenious Health spenders as another way of maintaining ttreir hold over
pttblic funds - but even this was ineffectual, as Cabinet later Listened
sympathetically to the Ministerrs (Gill) argiuments in favour of this
technical nicety. At two rnore meetings (31 May and I June) the
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Committee attenpted
tlre Treasury report
to wrap up.the reviews of new and
on the L977/78 Estjmates reviews,
existing policyt
and other ad hoc
reports on items such as the Land Developnent and Settlement Programme"
In these meetings before ttre Budget, it approved an additional (late
entry) trrcIicy for Energy2:'l'- an area of future costs whictr even at this
stage scarcely appears to have impressdd Ministers as a contender in the
field. On 14 June, just over a month before Budget night, ttre Committeet
cJ.osely warned of the need for secrecy, considered the foJ-J-owing discon-
certing item:
(@'
The Associate Minister of Finance advised the CCEX that
figrures prepared for the Budget so far indicate that in
L977/78 there will be a 19 percent increase in Government
' expenditure, which represents 38 percent of GNP.
The CCEX was advised that the Prime Minister was aware of
this increase in C,overnment expenditure and he had asked
for further details particularly of the salary and wage
increases which are 75 percent of this increase.
It was stated that the deficit before borrowing should be
Iower in this year than that experienced Ln L976/77, It
was generally agreed that in the text of the Budget there
should be a statement that the Government had inherited a
situation where Government expenditure was 41 percent of
GNP, while a target of 38 percent of GNp had been aimed
for, 36 percent had been achieved. This year it has not
been possible to hold expenditure because cuts made last
year could not be maintained thereby resulting in
Government expenditure exceeding the L977/78 position
' and attaining a level of 38 percent e; 61,1p.2?L
Only ten copies of this ,extraordinary document were made, add
they were distributed, with a high security classification, to the CCEX,
the Minister of Finance and the Secretary of Treasury only. Perhaps the
only retrospective conment that is needed is to obsenre that when an
official nemo bearing such unpleasant news, requiring such a devious response,
describes a fiscal- deficit as something the C,overnment 'rexperiences", that
is precisely what it means. PoLitical animals like ministers and senior
officiars, in their physicar and emotionar behaviour, honed by many
electoral campaigns
literally "feel" the
and stimulated by intense and profound ambition, quite
irqpact of this sort of infornation in their quivering
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nerve-enqs.
Reserve Bank announced intention to
begin some limited dealing in conmer-
cial bills and trading bank transferable
certificates of deposit in the secondary
market,
Government borrows about Nz $103 million
from Swiss sources.
Existing and new items were considered in the run up to the Budget
(21 ilufy) as ministers and their departments raced against the clock to
ensure that precious poLicies were supported, and lodged firmly in the
expenditure pipetine before the public announcement of the Estimates.
Once they missed that bus, they had to face the difficult task - now
complicated by the CCEX and the vigilant if anxious Treasury - of getting
policies funded through the Supplementary Estimates, or padded into their
COPE forecasts. Old chestnuts continued to turn up - a recorded discussion
on the Nelson notional railway, which had produced many headaches for the
CCPP and which the CCEX hoped to silence until after the 1978 Elections,
provides an illustration:
(28 June) Oral item:
It was stated that since the 1975 election, the Government
subsidy on the Nelson Notional Railway had been taken twice
to Cabinet with a view to abolishing it. However, the
Governmentts hands were tied as there had been an undertaking
in the 1975 Manifesto that the subsidy would not be abolished
in the present term. Ministers wished investigations to be
'carried out on ways that the Government could terminate (this)
subs-i.dy. This must be announced prior to the 1978 General
El-ection so that the Government would have a mandate to
abolish the subsidy in 1g7g.273
The question was to be reviewed again by the CCEX in March 1978. Educa-
tion questions were particularly difficult to suPPress. On 5 July
(three weeks before the Budget announcenent) the question of "teachers
college surplus" was submitted for examination by the Committee. It
was a highly 5nlitical matter:
14
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The Corurittee advised ttrat a sub-conunittee which has been
set up on teacher training has presented a report to the
Minister of Education which he has agreed to release to
interested parties. Among other things it covers teachers
college staffing.
The Committee was concerned that release of the report
before it was studied carefully by Ministers could corunit
Government to further escalation of the staffing levels
for teachers colleges.
The report set out a new staffing organisation for teachers
colleges which would increase the number of teachers from
the approved level of 50I to 576 (which stas more than the
present supply). However, the increase was mainly in the
area of primary teachers'tutors. Since February this year
attrition had taken place in the staffing surplus of teachers
colleges and the surplus now stands at 34.6 over entitlement.
The surplus is not just in the nurnber of teachers but tends
to express itself in particular speciality subjects.
The Chairman was concerned that there may be a failure of
the administration of teachers colleges to see the size of
the problem overall as there would be a natural tendency to
relate only to the small surplus in a particular college.
The paper attached (by Education)... details a growth
trend that gets worse year by year until 1980 which is as
far as forecasts are now made.
The Chairrnan therefore asked wty staff could not be taken
fron teachers colleges and channelled to secondary schools
where there were now staffing shortages which it was
proposed to fill by overseas recruitment. Officials agreed
that this partial solution to the problem could be investigated
by the Department.
The CCEX was advised that Treasuryrs viewpoint was that the
Department is trying to formalize the present situation and
Justify the over-staffing levels by achieving a lower ratio
of teachers to students, whatever way it may be phrased in
the report.
Education officials informed the CCEX that instead of the
proposed reporting date of 3l July 1977 they would prefer to
report nearer the end of Augiust when the Sub-Corunittee's report
on Teacher College Training would have been studied by interestedparties for a sufficient time to allow feedback to the Department"
If a report was not to be presented until the end of Augrust
then the CCEX wished the Minister of Education to consuft then
at the next meeting, so they could be advised on the likely
outturn of the report.
This was particularly 5:nportant as the Conunittee wished a
decision to be taken on the clearing of the teachers surplus
so that the new school year would start in 1978 with staffing
at approved levels on1y.
Ttre matter was deferred, inviting the Minister of Education
to submit a report by JuIy 3l on ways of eliminating Present
and projected future surplus, including the costs, and other
implications of(i) closure of one or nore colleges (treatment of redundancies,
relocati-on of staff etc.) t
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(ii) realigrnment specialities between colleges (possibly
on staff sharing, effect on teaching curricul-um) i(iii) complete moratorium on staff hiring (inplications
of continuing with present ad hoc procedure, possibilities
for greater stringency on existing hiring procedures).
Finally, the Comrnittee emphasised that the Minister of Education must
withhold the report until after 12 JuIy 1977, and hLs meeting with the
ccflx.2?+. ?ilren Gair, and his colleagues Thomson and Templeton re-
convened with Gandar and two of his advisers (Ross and Munn)
they had before them a paper entitled: Trvo year Courses Prjmary Teacher
Training. The record of the meeting suggests that the CCEX were but babes
in this thorny administrative and professional wood. Ho$rever their
authority was acknowledged in the proper ritual:
llhere was a discussion on the kind of person the broadened
criteria would attract to prinary teaching and it was stated
that each case would be taken on its merits. Discussion
then centred on whether the two-year cours€s... should be
inplemented at aLl colleges or only at two teachers colleges
?S f€colurrended by Treasury.
Aqreed that a) broadened criteria on a triaL basis from 1978;
b) selection of applicants for this course to be
based on a crediL system along the lines set
out (in the Departmentrs submission);
c) there should be a rnaximum of 200 entrants to
the course, details and effects on course
quotas to be decided at the time the annual
intakes for 1978 are approved;
d) urgent discussions to be held with representatives
of teachers colleges likely to be involved and
service organisations with a view to establishing
course outlines, selection procedures and
additional staff requirements;
e) following (d) the preparation of a report (to be
strbmitted to the CCEX);
f) to attract applicants to the new course, an
accelerated recruitment campaigm will be needed
and an additional financial provision of S2000
may thus be needed in the Supplementary Estimatesig) a research project to be developed to evaluate
the effectiveness of the 2-year trained students
compared with the 3 year trainees.
Agreed that present Div. A2 course be subsumed under new trial
eourse and offered in all colleges.
Approved provision of $83r000 in 1977/78 Estimates to cover
additional demands made by new trial course.
Authorised Ministers of Finance and Education to approve special
provision of 7 t,eachers college staff to implement trial
course in teachers colleges.
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(Re) Teachers College staffing surplus:
It was stated that there may be some difficulty in
elininating the surplus by the beginning of 1978 and
one of the complicating factors was that there was
confusion over the employing authority for lecturers
as they were not employed under the State Services Act,
and also there was no standard redundancy agreement
for teachers in teachers colleges, unlike those in
teehnical institute s.2? 5
Finallyr the CCEX instructed that a joint paper, by Treasury and Education,
on the financial implications of the proposals and its decisions be
submitted to it by 2 August 
- 
i.e. q fortnight after the Budget. This
paper was to iaclude (a) an estimate of the net savings that night accrue
from removing the surplus, taking into account the options and suggestions
raised in the Departmentrs paper, and (b) reference to steps that would
need to be taken "to assist controlling authorities in identifying
individual lecturers to be deploy ed.n2'16 Whatever the Department did
with this final instruction, the Education officials had ensured that
their flanks were well covered. They were reasonably safe in encouraging
the CCEX to give them the authority they needed, in their teachersr college
planning, to anticipate the impact of projected demographic changes in
schoolsr population and, by implicationl the integration of private
schools into the public system.
At the same meeting, the CCEX gave a considerable amount of time
to the probJ.em of the relationship between National Superannuitants and
health benefits. This, and other matters still outstanding from the 1977
Existing Policy review, occupied its attention until two days before the
Budget announcement (21 JuIy). In the final rush to complete its formal
responsibilities, approval for an additional $60 million for Hospital
Board Works was given by the 'lRound Robin" procedure occasionally adopted
when there was some urgency.
When the Minister of Finance reported to Parliament on 21 July, his
address faithfully incorporated Treasuryrs suggested presentation, of
which the CCEX had been advised in June. The Pr.rblic Accounts for L976/77
279.
showed that net Government expenditure had totalled S4r504 nillion - an
increase of 2.7 percent over the previous year's outturn. An 18 percent
increase in revenue had reduced the amount actually borrowed to cover
the Government's deficit from S1002 million in L975/76 to $505 million
in the 1976/77 fiscal year. However, "necessary increases in social
services expenditure and pay increases to State servants" had affected
the Government's ability to hold the line. For the L977/78 financial
year, spending was expected to rise by I8.8 percent (net $51350 million
in total). Nonetheless, the Minister reported, this should not be
regarded as evidence of failure on the Governmentrs part:
When the Government took office 20 months ago, it
inherited a situation where Government expenditure
had grown to approximately 4l percent of GNP.
Last year we succeeded in bringing expenditure
down to approximately 38 percent of GNP lno
calculations of,. how this proportion had been
obtained were included] This year, the
indications are that Goverrunent expenditure will
anount to about 38 percent of GNP which is still
consistent with the long term objective of reducing
Government expenditure as a proportion of GNF.
The l{inister also estimated that "less than $400 million" would have
to be borrowed to cover the probable Government's deficit in financing
net expenditure. (es it turned out, the next Budget statement (1978)
showed that this 1977 estimate had been somewhat optimistic. Net
expenditure recorded in t]ne 1977/78 Public Accounts amounted to $5,669
million, 5 percent over the Estimate made in July 1977; actual borrowing
for 1977/78 had been $594 million, compared with the $382 million
estimated in July I97?.) tn his 19?8 Budget, the Minister avoided the
now-sensitive matter of total Government expenditure as a proportion
of GNP (and his 1977 Estimate that this would be about 38 percent), and
engaged instead in a minor exercise in public mystification by referring
to the deficit itself - "the estinated deficit for 1978/79 represents
6.4 percent of projected Gross National Product.r' fn a defensive note,
he pointed out that "the deficit Ln 1975/76 [i.e. the fiscal year for
which, presumably, the Labour government could still be regarded as
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responsible] was 9.2. pexcent of GNp, a substantially higher
proportion. ")
21 iluly: The 1977/78 Budget introduced to
Parliament. The central goverrunent
deficit was budgeted to decrease
from $506 million i,n L976/77 to
$382 mj-llion. Some important
features were:
- increase in tax rebate for low
income farnilies
- $94 million spread over 5 years
allocated to replacement of urban
transport rolling stock
- 
additional $35 nillion for
mortgage lending made available
through the reduction in govern-
ment securities ratio for savings
banks
- income-tested social welfare
benefits not subject to tax
increased from late July to give
full compensation for price
increases
- 
inflation-adjusted savings bonds
introduced.
3O July: Import deposit scheme
months to 2 February
extended by six
L978.
Toward the l-978l79 Estimates:
Inunediately after the Budget announc*rent, the CCEX returned to its
consideration of existing policy items still under reviernl, and various
"new policy" proposals which if approved would later comprise part of
Treasuryrs Category A schedule for the next financial year. One item
discussed on 2 August illustrates the tlpe of debate which could occur
between officials before the Conmittee. An "additional" sum of
$1 million had been appropria+-ed for the water and soil division of
the Ministry of Works, but its precise use had not been decided upon
before the Estimates. were tabled. J. Wight (MwD) and Battersby
(Treasury) disagreed over the basis for decision-choice. The minutes
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recorded that the money was
intended for those projects which would come into
production quick[ and give an almost immediate return.
In particular, in agreeing to the increased expenditure,
Cabinet had not wished to implement new projects which
would'Iead to long term commitments. It was understood
that these longer term projects should be provided for
under the basic annual water 4nd soil projects.
The l{inistry of Worksr Wight reported, did not agree with Treasuryrs
argnxnent that projects reconrnended for adoption (and funding) should be
evaluated on the basis of the economic rate of return whlch each project
Itould accrueo The Ministry claimed that this was not the best way to
assess the potential value of any given project. The "economic rate of
return", lfight stated, was 'rtheoretical prior to a scheme being implemented,
as it was based on a large number of physical assumptions, and. those
assumptions (were) seldom if ever tested as to their sensitivity before
a project (was) started.r' In addition, he pointed outl therreconomic rate
of return' was only one of r'a number of parameters' which should decide
whether specific projects were undertaken. He suggested to the idinisters
that 'other considerationsrt be taken into account (apart from the nicety
of some unsulcstantiated but prescribed financial return), including matters
such as "technical and engineering details; Iand holder interest and need;
environmental impact of the scheme; the water resource situation; the
readiness of the scheme for commencement.,l
l{ight stated assertively that the Miaistry 'tdid not agree" with the
"high priority" placed by Treasury on "those projects which were primarily
for sheep and beef producing areas. MWD contended that the other
agricultural areas such as cropping, horticulture and dairying reguired
adequate attention if farmsrrr vr€r€ not, to have their production severely
limited." In particular, Wight stated, "the MWD is trying to keep a balance
between short tenn works which have a high rate of immediate return and
longer term works... which have a rate of return which varies from only
average to very high.u2??
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The Committee accepted Treasury's rec.ommendation in this case, but
did provide a bonus for the Ministry by instructing that a start be made
on a long-term project which the Water and Soil division was promoting
in the Mataura val-ley. AJ.though one may regard MWDrs arguments as
simpl-istic or naive, it should be noted that this department, more
perhaps than any other, acted as an essential financial and economic
moderator for the Government. It was the MWD's traditional responsiJ:ility
to have available projects of varying complexity and cost to allow for
that I'fine tuning" which conventional political wisdom regarded as
t
necessary both politically and econonically. fn addition, it must keep
its huge empire of political alliances, with a wide range of professional
and technical interests, intact. The relationship between central and
local government, as well as political parties, individual mernbers of
Parliament and local pressure groups, was highly sensitive to the mani-
pulation of capital works funds.
The second matter discussed at.the same meeting (2 August) was
Education expenditure. This was still under existing policy review,
and the officials and the Minister of Education came before the CCEX
several times with arguments for other expensive and always complex old
and new proposals. As instructed some weeks earlier, the Education
officials had re-exanined the matter of staffing in teachers colleges,
and a plan to phase out at least one established college was begrinning
to shape up. on 2 August, Ross and Munn (nducation) reported to Gair
(who had been left by Templeton and Thomson to deal with this matter
on his own) that college staff could be reduced by 35 Persons. Gair
asked which teachers' college would be closed if staff were "declared
redundant". The officials replied that Dunedin and Waikato were being
considered for closure, but both proposals had generated considerable
controversy in the Department of Education, and as yet no firm decision
had been made. The minutes of this meeting record the following
arguments:
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There were two issues invorved fin the Departmentrs reportto the Corunitteel and these were not entirely related to the
staffing of teachers colreges. Not onry was the staffing
lever being investigated, but it was al-so proposed that the
accommodation at teachers colleges would be investigated by
an Education department t,eam in the near future. rt was
considered by the Department that there could well be some
classroom sPace available in teachers colleges which could
be utilised by other organisations. Accordingly, the
committee considered that it would be useful to have a
report on the economic use of teachers college facilitiesby 30 September L977 Lf possible (so that a d.ecision on
alternative use or closure could be made before the beginning
of the 1978 school year).2€
The subtle relationship between ministers and officials is suggested here
a ritual- scanning of each otherrs viewpoint, an intricate sounding out of
how farp at any one time, each is prepared to go, what the tolerance for
future action and decision is tikely to be, how far planning wilr be
approved even in Principle, where electoral and other political interests
are likery to be involved, how much time and effort it is worth giving
to any particular plan at any particular time. Arl parties present at
this discussion were aware that unless the necessary agreement could be
reached inside the department, on this matter (thus demonstrating that the
officials could manage their own client groups), neither the Education
ninister nor the ccEX could proceed safely. rn any case, a delay past the
beginning of 1978 would cause a deferral of the whole guestion, since its
electoral impJ-ications were tacit but quite real.
14 Augrust: Free coLlective wage bargaining re-introduced
subject to observance of 12-months nil
registration of agreenents in Arbitration
Court.
During its next five meetings, the Corrnittee r.ras preoccupied with
HeaLth and Education. Six policy matters approved in the pre-Budget New
Policy revier+ for the Hea1th vote now came before the Ministers for
financial approval-... and extension. For example, Gill now r.ranted an
increase of 10 percent in the benefits paid for speciaristsr work.
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(Eventually all this Ministerrs proFosals were approved, subject to
Cabinet endorsement in nid-october, when the thorny matter of the rate
of the General Medical Benefit (GMS) would be discussed.
On 4 October Lhe Supplementary Estimates were "reviewed", along
with an addj.tional Education department proposal for funding primary
school textbooks, and a report on the cost of the HeaLth departmentrs
GldS benefit, due to go to Cabinet four days J-ater. It was painfully
obvious by now, if it had not been before, that the 950 million "set
aside" for supplementary e:<penditure in the L977/78 Estimates would be
totally inadeguate. In connection with capital works for Universities,
for example, the MWD reported to the Committee that although 925 urillion
had been provided for this in the Main Estimates, "the Department's latest
computer run indicates that an outturn of e:<penditure on that it.., for
L977/78 (woutd) be $28.8 million',. An additional $4 rniltion woutd be needed
from the Supplementary Estimates "pool" for this activity alon".2'9
New policy items, sJ-ipping neatl-y through Treasury's formal
budgetary net of regularised reviews, were submitted and incorporated
in the CCEX agenda. Eor example (4 October again), the Connrittee decided
to reeouunend to Cabinet that it approve the Education departmentts bid
for money to print a nevr mathenatics textbook (at a cost of $4261000) r
to be included in the Estimates for L978/79. In this way various 'rCategory
1" items were buiLt up as the basis for the next yearrs New Policy review.
The Conmittee did attempt, somewhat feebly, to gain some kind of hold over
this weak area of fiscal control. For example, it suggested that the
Education department improve its own planning procedures by developing a
ibook programme" in the same way as it had a "building programme", so that,
by inplication, controlLing authorities could get an early warning on the
scope and cost of what the department regarded as its basic resources
along with capital works, and trained personnel. ,Just in case the depart-
ment should think this overly critical, however, a week later, the
corunittee approved a prograrme for reading materials for "infantsrr on
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the following basis:
S25r300 Ln L978/79 Vote
$495,000 in L979/80 Vote
F4g4rOOO in 1980/81 Vote.
The folly of such decisions was -pointed out (though not, it seems,
avoided) on the same day, when de Jardine (Treasury) advised the
Conunittee that "including those Supplementary Estimates items approved
on 4 October, those approved at this meeting (11 October) for reference
to Cabinet on 17 October, and revised health benefits package approved
by Cabinet on 10 October, the Supplementaries to date ftota1] approximately
$103 nillion. Tttis compares with provision in the Supplementary Estimates
fot L976/77 of $77 million. The provision in the Main Estimates for
Lg77/7e gos grrFplementary Estimates was $5O million.,,2QC No cormnent on
t'his oral item r+as recorded. rt is, however, worth noting that the
S77 million rePorted by de .Tardine as having been included in the estimates
for SuppJ-ementary e:qrenditure in Lg76/77 had actually been pgblished,
in the fiscal convention of the time, as only $50 mirlion in the 1976
Budget Table 2.
the value of the CCEX: a Treasu scouti
fiscal Tar-Babv?
-J-
By late 1977 the CCEX had been established for the best part of two
years. on cabinetrs authority and Treasury's advice it had conducted one
review of existing poricy in 1976, and another (stirr ongoing) during Lg77.
speciar inquiries had been made into the basis of staffing policies (and
their costs)-, and capital works prograrnmes. Tvo reviews of new policy had
been conducted, prior to the 1976 and L977 Budgets. Although the two
exlsting policy reviews had been rnodestly successfuf ('r5avings', were
estimated at $180 million in 1976 and 940 milrion in 1977), new policy
proposals approved subsequentty by the Government, additional salary
paltments to state servants, and the rising costs of most Government
programmes had easily consumed any possible gains. Ministers had been
286.
invited (and exhorted) to examine their departmental activities in the
light of their enperience of Government since Lg75, and identify any
areas where existing poricies could be modified, with a hoped-for
saving in expenditure. However, most of the people directly involved
in the business of budgetary preparation and e:<penditure management were
increasingly concerned about the effectiveness of the existing systems,
since, notwithstanding its early promise, the CCEX on its own obviously
could achieve neither the investigative capacity nor the restraining
infruence that growth in government spending appeared to dernand.
An embryonic Cabinet Omnittee on Planning had been set up, alongside
the establishment of the New zealand planning council.29' Although these-
new elements in central government were only tentativel.y welded onto the
executive system, the Cabinet eommittee did complement the work of the
CCEX, and served a useful purpose for those in Treasury and elsewhere
who sought reform. on 23 August, the Cabinet Cornmittee on planning
instructed Treasury and other cfficials to look into the possibility of
linking the CopE exercise (which concerned existing policies) with the
new policy t.rri.".28z
, 
Treasury officials, notably llamilton (Finance I), were at pains
to point out that such a proposal would not provide the answers ninisters
wanted. Firstly, it was suggested, copE must be seen as an exercise in
cost determination, not a review of the need for or desirability of
particular Policies. The subsequent existing policy review provided the
opportunity for an evaluation of policies themselves, and their expenditure
implications. Secondly, if Budget information was to remain as highly
classified as it had been in the past, a comparison of new policy proposals
alongside the COPE review would jeopardise the confidentiality of the
former 
- with obvious implications for ministers keen to appear beneficent
before the electorate on Budget night. Thirdly, Treasury considered that
the "logistical" difficulties of conducting 
"irria.n"o*r= CopE-Existing-Neht
policy reviews put such a proposal outside the scope of the existing staff
resources of the central system. 'rThe heaviest burd€D... would fall upon
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Treasury and on departmental accountants at a time when many of the
latter are also occupied with the parliamentary review of main and
supplementary estimates. u 283
Treasuryrs marked preference was to 'rstreamline', the administration
of the COPE system, and to cornbine the existing and new policy revians,
leaving coPE, as it was, primariry a .o=ting exercise. Hanilton, for
example, argrued that I'although the 1976 ICCEX existing policyJ review
obviously led to worthwhile savings in Government e:q)enditure, the results
of the 1977 review, while reinforcing the Governmentrs wishes to reduce growth
Ln e:rpenditure, demonstrated that in their present form annual, large-
gca1e, across-the-board reviews of all votes were unlikely to result in
further significant savings. Treasury and other departments, notably
those associated with cOPEr consider a change in approach is necessary.rr
Hamilton then went on to suggest the concept, so frequently surfacing
and equally often suppressed in the past, of ',compensatory savings,,
although this l-abel was to come later, with the rest of 'the euigley
schooL of thought." rn a paper drafted on 14 september 1977 Hamilton
outlined the system which was gradually accepted in principle at least
by his colleagues and the ministers, and partially adopted,three years
later:
Ministers and their departments fshouldl be directed that
as a general principle no new policy will be considered,for imprementation in r97g unless the tjtinister can firstdemonstrate to the cabinet dljffii-ttee on Expenditure that
equivalent savings can be made in the operitions of hisdepartment. Furthermore, when the proposar has a progranmedlife of more than one year, it must be demonstrated that savings
wiJ.l apply to ensuing years also.
Although the policy would be intended to have a general
application it wirl obviousry be necessary to make alrowancesfor those Ministers who are unable to provide savings, as
against ilrose who may be unwirring, if essential and highpriority new policies are to proceed. If the continued,
emphasis on savings is to have a sigmificant effect anydeviation from this general principle must be seen to apply
"l1I T exqeptiona_l. cases. The success of rhe new approachl^trrr therefore ciepend heaviry on the cabinet committee onExpenditurets evaluation of the Ministerrs justification
as to why a new policy should be determined as "exceptional.,'We would expect that the individual Ministers fwouf4) fe
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present during the discussion of their policies. Treasury
wil-l of course continue to report, on each new policyl it
nay be appropriate to augment our present classification
of new policy proposals by a further sub-category ofttexceptional 
.'l
It will also be in the Committeers discretion whether, in
deciding not to proceed with a proposed new policyr any
accomp;rnying proposed savings should sti1l be effected.
In effect, this directive will require a Minister to carry
out a searching review of his departmentrs operations with
a view to d,etermining which policies and functions are
either redundant or are of sufficiently low priority to
warrant phasing out or dovrn. In principle, only afterpotentiaL savings are identified can proposals for newpolicies be submitted. The initiative will lie with the
Minister and not, as was the case in the past, with Treasury
which to a greater or less degree, lras responsible for
suggesting areas of potential savings.2Bl+
Further, Hanilton recalled that an unsuccessful attempt had been made in
L977 to offset new lnliciesr costs against savings elsewhere, but on that
occasion the adoption of new policies by the c€X (and cabinet) was not
conditional on savings being found, and it was this aspect that Treasury
distributionnow wished to ernphasise. The proposal was recommended for
to both the CCEX and the Cabinet Committee on Planning, with the specific
recommendation that there be no separate review of existing policies in
early L978t but that new policies proposed for implementation Ln L978/79
'rbe sup;nrted by proposals for effecting equivalent savings e1sewhere."2Ss
Hamiltonrs arglrments reinforced the hand of those norrr conmencing
the COPE review, conducted as usual as the basis for the next yearrs
Estimates.
(Secretary to the Treasury)
message" fot L978/79 must, once again, be on restraint and even more
about expenditure priorities
appraisal of the economic
careful ercpenditure planning. All decisions
must be made in the light of the Governmentrs
situation, with ra large balance of palzments deficit, a continuing high
rate of inflation and a generally weak labour market picture.r' As
Langrs successer saw it, the problems of fiscal planning and control
In the draft of his address to the Conmittee, Lough,
for example, advised COPE that the "overall
centred on the question of
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large variations in.Government expenditure for economic
planning and objectives.... IniLially, there is the
information problem. We simply run up against data and
. analytical linitations when trying to forecast economic
trends as turning points. Even when we have identified
them there is inevitably a lag invclved in deciding
whether or not to take action. We then have to plan
and design expenditure measures - this is the exercise
which \re are about to undertake (i.e. the COPE review).
Almost six months will elapse before L978/79 priorities
will begin to be implemented, and response, in terms of
domestic activityrmay take up to one year to corurence!
the multiplier process may take additional time to work
itself out, In other words, we are talking of a total
' timespan of perhaps 18 months to tuo years.,.. Another
limitation of fan increase in] Governnent expenditure
relates to its entrenchment effects. Given the large
proportion which salary and wages bear to.total e:<penditure(it has been estimated at around 40 percent) any Iarge
increase in Government expenditure normaLly involves
increasing staff levels. Yet it is difficult for political
reasons to lay off staff and probably undesirable for
efficiency reasons. In other words the variation tends
to be oil€ wEl!. r r o AII this may sound to you lile a heavy
dose of fiscal conservatism 
- and maybe it is. The arguments
are nevertheless valid and it is rny view that they willplay an important part in future C,overnment planning.2B6
On 4 October, Hamilton drafted another paper, this time intended as
the basis for a circular to be distributed to permanent heads in preparation
for the 1978 New-and-Existing Policies Review. It assumed Government
agrreement with the tit-for-tat principle, and Cabinet approval for the
recormnendation that Ministers should also be instructed to carry out a
"searching review" of departmentar poricies with the intention of
eliminating unnecessary .o"t=.9E? rn the event the draft was to remain
a twinkle in Hamiltonts eye, at least for a year or so.
When the CCEX net on 18 October, it had before it (in addition to
several existing and new policy itemsl such as an Education proposaL for
er<penditure on primary school text books) a Treasury paper entitled
1978/79 Expenditure strategy and controI.49 This paper had originated
in the Cabinet Committee on Planning - which itself, of course, had acted
on the advice of officials and with the encouragement of members of the
new Planning Council. However, although Gair, Thomson and Templeton
were quite happy to consider proposals for improvement in that part of the
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e:q)enditure system over which they now had some control, they turned
out to be less interested in letting the Planning Council in on the act.
The E:<penditure Strategy paper included a reconnendation from the Cabinet
Committee on Planning that Cabinet approve amended terms of reference
for COPEI and changes in its nembership (presumably incorporating direct
Flanning cor:ncil co-option). This wourd involve the aplnintment of
additional staff in both Treasury and the Council, to service the modified
COPE groupr 
€rnd in addition special access would be needed to enable the
Planning Council to "conununicate with the Governnent and departments in
ttre context of its possible involvement in the copE exercise.,l
The CCEX was somewhat cool. The matter was set aside' 6nd attention
f,ocussed on what was of more interest to the conunittee 
- its own
activities in "setting Estimates levels for L97B/79.,' This was probably
a criticar point in the history of the planning council, marking its
eontinuing formal exclusion from an area to which at least some of its
mgnlcers were extremely ambitious to gain direct and authoritative entry.
This setback before the CCEX was anong the influences forcing the NZpCrs
reliance on informaL netrrrorks and other extra-cabinet strategies.
. 
The ccEX now discussed, at some length, Treasury's proposals
cottibining the existing and new poricy reviews r and the principles
decision which the corunittee might adopt. The ninutes record that
ninisters were not certain that the (tit_for_tat) proposal
was either workable or equitable. There wourd be three
categories of departmentsl two of which would give theComnittee sone concern. The department which would make
savings in Existing polici.es to balance New Policy proposals
would be easy to deal with.
However, departments which reguire more funding for NewPoricies than they could make savings in expenditure onExisting Poriciesp and departmencs which, because of their
activity had no New policies, and. which could have finance
cut from their existing policies wourd be of c.oncern to 
^aAboth l'tinisters in charge of the departments and the Committee"ar
Thus the ministers shrank from the nasty task that Treasury wanted to lay
on them. None of the three men was hirnself responsible for a significant
anount of expenditure. However, the combination of their very recent
for
for
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experiences at the hands of determined spenders like GilI (Health)
or convincing strategists Like the men frorn the Education department, and
ttre fact that 1978 was an election year, meant that fiscal restraint,
attractive as a political virtue in 1976, appeared somewhat less worttr-
while politically a year or so later. fhey optimistically suggested
to Battersby and Hamilton that at present the Committee saw
exJ.sting and new policies "in their totality, and consequently monies
(could) be re-distributed amongst departments with some degree of equality
and with an overview of complete Government e:<penditure." Battersby and
Hamilton, fully aware of the effectiveness with which principles like
eguity operated, and their i:npact on actual spending levels each year,
aade no reported corunent on this somewhat grandiose claim.
The Committee plugged bravely on, defending i-tself and its colleagiues
by pointing out that "under the new proposal, a department whose existing
Snlicies could not be cut back but whose new poli.cies were of such
J.mportance that they had to be implernented vrould be at a sig':.i ficant
advantage to other departments in the alLocation of finance." No specific
examples of such departments were cited, but no dorrbt any nnmber of
politicalJ.y "unavoidable" policies could have been suggested by each of
the men present. The Treasury officials responded by suggesting that
Berhaps ttre CCEX had taken the pitcher to the well too often already, under
the present system - an Existing Policy review had been conducted in each
of the past two years and Departmentsr existing policies had, perhaps,
been "mIlked dry". Treasury stated that it saw very little scope for
f,urther savings, if reviews were atternpted in this way again (and, as
Battersby and Hamilton were aware, as they had been conducted on several
other occasions by the old CCPP). They strongly recommended that the only
alternative was a "major re-thinking on the policlz in some departmentrs
existing prograrnmes .'t
It was something of an impasse. Desultory discussion followed, as
Ministers and officiaLs cast about for a more acceptable way to say and do
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the thing they both knew ought to be attempted. Zero-based budgeting
was toyed with. Then the Chairman, Gair, suggested that perhaps each
departmentrs overall Vote could be cut by 10 percent; and I'they would
have to fight to gain restitution of these monies.rr He added that "any
noney left over at the end of this exercise could then be used for
redistriJcution alnong departments for New Policies.rt The records include
no collnent on either of these counsels of despair, but rrre may inagine
that within rnoments each person rnust have had a quick image of their
probabl.e effect on official and ministerial behaviour, and the admini-
strative headaches involved.
The officials restated Treasur1lrs position, urging the Cormrittee to
come to an earJ-y decision since instructions for existing and new policy
reviews (in fact aLready drafted and !.raiting in ?reasury) must be distri-
buted as soon as possible. It was also suggested that this was the time
when ministers should be asked what National Party 1975 Election !,tanifesto
itens had not as yet been impleinented but which the ministers considered
nust be introduced.
'The first draft of the minutes for this rneeting concluded with the
words "the Committee agrreed to recorrnend to Cabinet that it consider the
reconunendation in E(77)227 [i.e. the Treasury paperf ttrat Cabinet agree..o."
llhis was subseguentLy arnended (though without written e:<planation retained
ln the Cabinet office file) and distributed as followsr
The Con'onittee agreed to recommend to Cabinet that it discuss
and note at its meeting on 25 October the following proposals
contained in E (77) 227 prior to the Cabinet Cormirittee on
E:cpenditure and the Cabinet Cornnrittee on Planning, at their
neetings on 27 october and I November respectively, ariving
at recorunendations on the proposal for final reference to
and decision by Cabinetr
(i) !'linisters are to continue to exercise restraint in
expenditure incurred through their departments in
L978/79 and later yearst(ii) Ministers are to carry out a wide review of depart-
mental operations with a view to determining which
policies and functions are either redundant or are of
sufficiently low priority to warrant phasing out or
down;
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(fii) New Policy proposals for implementation in L97B/79
must be supported by proposals for effecting
eguivalent savings elsewherel(iv) a change in the concept together with a reinforcement
of the continuous need to restrain expenditure
embodied in recorunendations (i) (iii) above may be
. pronulgated by issue of a draft (Cabinet Office)
circular attached to Treasury report 2104 annexed to
E(77r 227 .
The above to be considered by the CCEX between the 25-29October, depending on the legislative prograrme before the
11quss.29O
As the Treasury officials knew from J-onge:qlerience they courd steer
rdnisters and officials with salutary reports on the economic situationl
they could experiment with some new systemic refinement like the CCEX or
even tlre Planning CounciLl ttrey could take Ministers into their confidence,
and share ttreir private councils. But alttrough some nright come guite near
the water, in the end they would drink only if the most powerful actors
Ln the systems obliged them to do so. And in this case the main actors
were in Cabinet itself. The Prine Minister,/t'linister of Finance, now
supported by his own advisory group, with its economicrrather than fiscal,
Preoccupations, and his most forthright colleagrues, themselves cosunitted
to massive e:<penditure progranmes or keen to promote ne$r developments
through the cEC and other sr:b-systems, held snay. rn th€ endl a strong
cotmtitment to tit-for-tat was just too much to ask of the CCEX ministers,
and the timing 
- a bare year before the next el.ection - was still against
Treasury.
The Prime Minis+-er was out of the country for some time during
october, and at the end of the month, after his return, the Government
introduced a mini-budget. l,1r Muldoon justified this later, in his 1978
Budget speech, as followsr
Following my attendance at the annual meetings of theInternational Monetary Fund and the World Bank... I
took ttre view that there would be no upturn in the world
economy lrhich wouLd have an impact on the New Zealand
economy, and accordingly I introduced a major package of
economic measures...
Ttris "packagerr had included an additj.onal family benefit payment for
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ctt-ildren, an across-the-board income tax cut of 5 percent (to take
effect from February 1, 1978), additional spending on publie policies
[i.e. additional to the resources already allocated in the SuppJ-ementary
Estinates - for which, it wilL be recalled, only $50 million had been
aLlowed in July 1977) - and various other "monetary measures." In total,
the Minister stated, (although it was difficult to r+ork out from the
Budget speech what was actually included in the total), "all these
measures amount to some $770 million at an annuaL rate." They were
intended to provide "a substantial and timely stimulus [to hel-p] steady
the economy during a crucial period." The action may also perhaps have
been construed as an unavoidable inter-Budget device to formalise
expenditures and other lnlitically-motivated actions which it would be
both uncomfortable and difficult to justify without explanation in the
Estimates and Budget announcement six or eight months later.
From late October untit 20th December, when the CCEX assenbled before
disbanding for the Christmas break, ministers and officials engaged in a
fascinating game of avoidance-behaviour as they struggled to apportion
28 October: Package of measures introduced in Parlia-
ment included:
- 
lifting of hire purehase restrictions
on most consumer goods
- 
announcement special extra family bene-
fit payment of $25 per child (cost:
$25 million)
across-the-board income tax cut of
5 percent
increased public works expenditure of
516 million
reduction in trading banks reserve
asset ratio
compensatory deposit scheme to be
introduced to offset seasonal
liquidity squeeze on trading banks
during tax payment period
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responsibility for expenditure. control anong the elites of the central
system with as little embarrassment as possi-ble to tiemselves. on
27 oclober, after the proposals for reforming the basis of decisions on
e:cpenditure lnlicies had been debated in Cabinet itself , the Cornurittee
net to consider their colleaguesr reactions. Gair and his two ministerial
colleagues were joined as usual by Battersby, who was accornpanied by
8ob de Jardine from Finance r (Treasury). Both Marsharl (cabinet
of,fice secretary) and his superior officer, Millen $rere present
to record what took place 
- a possible reflection on the amendment that
had been deemed necessary in the minutes of the previous meeting of the
Comtittee. The meeting began quite calmly with a brief review of ongoing
discussions between Treasury and the Planning Council on how the latter
ndght be involved in the COPE exercj.se. Treasury apparently agreed with
npst of what the NZpC Chaitrnan, wanted. The .SSC, on the
other hand, was unhappy about the suggestion that additional staff woutd
be necessary to service an e:granded,/augrmented COpE, and had pointed out,
with stirl umbrage, that "some of the work which is proSnsed, to be under-
taken by Treasury staff wilt be duplicated by SSC managenent audits .,,2q1
Nobody really liked poachers, although all were prepared to use them
on occasions, and in this case the likely outcome wourd be to drop the
Planning Council, as the interloper threatened to exacerbate strife between
old rivals. We see here the beginning of what later became a more-or-Iess
habitual practice (albeit highly informal, since officially the planning
Council rrtas an entirely "independ.ent" commentator on Governnent behaviouf.
The new body wouLd be encouraged to noke an occasional- seni-public
announcement lrhen it was either unnecessary (or undesirable) that the
Government or its agents make it, themselves. On this occasion, for example,
it was suggested, and favourably received, that a paper on the medium-run
outlook for the economy and its implications for Government policy generally
would rrprobably be prepared by the officials Conunittee on planning or the
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Planning council, rather than Treasury as originarry propose d.uzqL At
least this was one task that could be handed over with impunity, since
Lt was both unpopular and difficult. It should not be iuragined that
there was, in the relevant records, any suggestion of cyni-cism or disdain
anong ministers or Treasury officials in their discussions about the
Planning CounciL. But the fact was it was a creature of the innermost
lnliticar system, an executive tool, and for at least a year or two it
would be necessary to try a few e:qleriments to test its ultimate use-
furness to those in office and their principal advisers.
The CCEX now moved towards the meat of their agenda. Gair began
(clearly reporting on Cabinetrs reaction) by stating that the for:nula
proposed for the existing and new poricy reviews in l97g 'rrearly only
neets orr-situation, and ttrat is where a department maintains the balance
between the savings it makes on existing policies and the additionaL
ercpenditure it reguires for new policy." Cabinet apparently distrusted
tlre suggestion that any surplus funds would ever find. their way back into
specific Votes, should ministers be virtuous enough to propose savings
without tying them up promptly with successful new policy bids. Gair
reported that rewards for good behaviour were seen as "only.fortuitous', -
particularly unattractive since "no cred,it" would be given to ministers,
and, by inplicationr even electoral brownie points could not be.won: who
wanted to show himself as an effective Scrooge?
In a rather smcotlt reversal of recorded responsi-bility for the next
proposal put to Cabinet 
- an arbitrafy cut of about 10-20 percent from
all Votesl the Chairman stated that this alternative, which he descrjlced
as having been "put forward by Treasury", had been seen as "unreasonable.rl
rhe ccEX pointed out that departments with large expenditure, such as
Social Welfare (Ministerr Ft,:I. Walker, a close friend and respected
colleague of ttre Prime Minister), wouJ"d have to bear a heavy Ioss, as would
departments whose major expenditure was in the palment of salaries -
297.
e.g. Customs. The rnain purpose for initiating the present exercise in
the first p1ace, it was pointed out, sras to I'strive to find a new formula
for re-adjusting Government e:<penditure in 1978" since the present
Existing Policy review'"had largely exhausted all savings that can be
nade Ln departmentsr present expenditure."203
Without 
€rny more evidence than this, we can see how the political
status of the CCEX participants was thus re-established. The Ministers
had been very hard pressed at the previous meeting. Recent economic reports
had been alarmingl over-runs in e:<penditure reguiring additional approvals
in the Supplementary Estimates had been extremely disconcerting. To all
intents and purposes the Conmittee had failed in its task of finding
$200 nillion before the L97?/78 Estimatesl COPE was under*ray, and already
there were signs of a marked increase in the forecasts of cost of existing
policiesl the coming election year meant that there would be pressure from
other ministers to get lrcIicies into the pipeline while they could still
do them some good. The three ccEX ministers, alL serious about the
potential contribution their Conunittee could make to good C;overnment (as
well as more venar electorar purposes), had then been vulnerable to
Treasuryrs arguments. Although, at the last minute, they had decrined
to make a strong recosunendation to Cabinet, even the watered-down version
had apparently caused collegial alarm and despondency. And they had been
revived by their colleagues' antipathy to the tit-for-tat idea as a general
and@gprincip1eofbehaviour.Treasurymustnowunderstandthat
its proposals were in doubt, that whatever enc€uragement officials had
been given up tilL now couLd not be expected with the same degree of
conpliance in the future. In particular, responsibility for the most
extreme suggestions should be correctly attributed 
- 
to officials. Such
is the nature of the central system, the srnall, intense village where
ultinate victory goes to whoever stands last in the field, that the officials
must accept the implied rebuke, confident that their day would come.
2gg.
Ttre minutes noted that there no\.r followed a "wide-ranging discussion,,
over possible ways of incurring savings in Governnent e:<Slenditure, most of
them firmly 'cotlched in the rhetoric of "rigorous examination't or the
organisation of resources I'for naxj.mum returnrr. Some suggestions - like
placing a global limit on individual errpenditure items,/activities such as
travel - were apparently well received, but the areas Treasury nonr:inated
for such treatment were unfortunate: "these named areas are those where
arbitrary and in some cases ruthless cuts have already been made, and the
Committee considers that in many cases, while short term savings ffly accrue
from such cuts, in the long term these savings may be only imaginary."
The Comnlttee did think it had been useful in previous years to have
some sort of target figure in mind, and the most popular indicator of such
a goal was the proportion of GNP absorbed by the prrblic sector. Templeton
felt that "a reasonable figtrre" would be around 36 percent of 6tiIP - but
this ratio obviously raised doubts. The minutes recorded the conrneni that
while the priorities rn the last Budget had been in the
e:rpenditure fields of Heal.th, Education and Social Welfare
$one of which had actually been cited in the iluly Budget
as having the highest priority, althougn simple arithmetic
suggested their pre-eminenc{ there !^ras a need to reassess
the Governmentrs priorities -of expenditure and, if necessarl,
to shift the balance of expenditure to other fields. Whiteit would be useful to set Government e:<penditure as a
percentage of GNP for the year, this must be set at adeliberately low level in view of two variables:(a) the cost of outstanding manifesto items and(b) the flexibility which must be maintained betereen
Departments where there is a need seen by the
Covernment to change the emphasis of departmental
spending.
Clearly Templetonrs horse would not run very far. Another which might
was j.n the area of staffing, and the enonnous costs of personnel. It was
agreed that the sinking-lid policy now in operation must be maintained,
and the inconvenient anomoly of having to employ additional workers (the
source for which was rising unemployment) could be coped with by identifying
such people as engaged on "special work"r artd thus not covered by the
sinking lid.
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A wistful glance was rnade towards the principle of shifting resources
to the private sector in a brief discussion on rr'hether work norv done by
the state could be farmed out to private contractors, But, regretfully,
the CCEX agreed that savings could not be guaranteed. fndeed, Treasury
pointeC out that increased spending might result, although one profitable
vein could be mined if private. finns were to carry out work now clone by
departments, and charge the prrbric directlyr so that ther?|?no neec ror
departments to be invo-lved." Little came of this, and (Iike the next
suggestion) it languished in the minds of ministers and others for some
time. lt was briefly proposed that perhaps departments could be clustered.
according to certain principlesp rvith funds apportioned according to
whether they represented Productive Priorities (e.g. Agriculture and
Fisheries), National Priorities (such as Defence and Foreign affairs) r
Large Spending Priorities (such as Social Welfare, HeaLth and Education),
or were Servicing or Trading areas. But at this stage such an idea was
rather too transparent, and it gained little attention until the Canadian
"envelope" system was discussed in I98O-81.
of
Policy
Finally, the Comrnittee, like three Musketeers, reaffirrned
their principal loyalties: "while un<lertaking the Existing and
one
New
Reviews next year, Lwe must] give the I'linister of Finance manoeuverability
to allow for tax restructuring in 1978". It was then agreed that a new paper
on the whole subject should be prepared for the I November meeting, and,
after that, for fomarding to the Cabinet Comrnittee on Planning. I'leantime,
Ministers were asked to cost any, remaining Manifesto items stilr
outstandi ng.2q+
By the time the CCEX met again, Cabinet had decided how far it was
prepared to let the Planning Council enter the formal networks of its
expenditure system. Not, it seerned, very far at all. However, a draft
Paper on expenditure control based on the discussions hel-d on 2'I October,
was adopted for submission through Templeton (Associate Minister of
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Finance) to Muldoon ancl thence to Cabinet a week later. The rninutes
noted Ehat both Gair and Templebon inclicated their willingrness
to discuss the matter in person with the Mj-nister of Finhnce before the
Cabinet, *."tirrg.zqt There was no further discussion of the e4penditure
system, as such, during November, and the CCEX now turned to some urgent
matters requiring its attention.
Ministers who had sensed danger in the Treasury proposals for expen-
diture reform lost no time in reasserting ttreir rights, and ensuring that
policies needing preferential treatment by the Government were firml-y
lodged in the pipeline, in case there \rrere any changes of sigmificance
in the pre-Estimates Reviews. Meetings held during November and December.
were dominated by Education and Health department items, including.the
annual task of examining and approving the grants to be made to the
statutory boards. The Education departmentrs earlier bid for money to
cover the publication of new infant readers vras approved at the levels
reopested (i.e. $251300 in L978/79 and nearly half a million each of the
next trso years, after the Elections). Ihe CCEX also agreed to support
the Minister of Educationrs proposal for the preparation of new mathematics
booksr a programme with massive forward costs totatling $88rOO0 in L978/79,
$4331000 Ln 1979/80, over half a million the next year and slightly less
in each of the next fiscal years till March 1983. Total estimated
. expenditure on this pr-rbllcation-printing progranne over the next five
fiscal years was over $Ir8O0'OOO. Approval for specific stages in the
progr.rmme was to be given by Joint Ministers, i.e. without subsequent
reference to the CCEX or Cabinet, thus illustrating how funds might be
locked in to particular prograrnmes for several years. the Governnent
Printer had' argued successfully to retain the printing contract for the
Education department, brit it was accepted that the printers would need
18 monttrs Lead time before publication couLd be expect 
"d.Lgb
Another major Education matter before the Conunittee during tJlis period
was its investigation of teachers collegesl and the Departmentrs pLans
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for the future use of this capital- resource. Officials had been asked
to prepare a report on the economic use of existing colleges, based on
their otrtn suggestion that an alternative to redundancies,/closure might
be to find other uses for the facilities. In November L977, the only
proposal reported by Ross and his colleagrues was that the psychology
department at Otago university might be interested i.n taking over the
Dunedin Teachers College, while 6 [demountabler' (semi-permanent) buildings
at Auckland and Dunedin could be relocated elsewhere if projected secondary
school rolls figures were realised. The question of teachers cotleges
Lq7did not come before the Conunittee again for several months.-"
However, discussions on how far the Government should go in funding
conununity-related school-based activities had considerable future
significance. During Ehe 1976/77 Existing Policy review, the Cononitteers
reductions l-n departmental expenditure on "continued education extension
classes" in secondary schools had contributed to the $IBO million it
"saved" in that first CCEX year. The Education officials now confronted
the CCEX with the question of whether resources for this activity should
be returned to their gre-L976/77 levels. "Treasury $ras of the opinion
that if the Corrnittee did rish to resume that (L975/76) level of activity
then the expenditure should be considered as a ner^r policy proposal in
19?8. Ttris would have the effect of any change that coul-d be made to the
programne not being irnpremented until the 1g7g academic year." Ttris
proposition $ras favourably received, and, in anottrer contriJrution to later
lcategory A" Budget items, ttre ccEX recorded the folrowing decisions:
(f) to approve as New Po1icy for L978/79 the provision of an additional
S50r000 in Voter Education for the introduction of a ,'trial
scheme" for administering and funding extension classes in
selected schoolsl
(ii) noted that the poricy approved in (i) would enabre onry a small
pilot scheme to be set up, but would proviCe ,,enough to meet the
Minister of Education's ]9?5 National Party Manifesto requirementsl
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(iii) directed the Department to report back rater to the ccEX on
the level of the programme that could be irnplemented in 197€
(i.e. before the next Election) on the sun aIlow.d.a98
on 24 November, the cormnittee conducted a "review,r of Education
grants.
but his
Tempreton lras present for only part of this vital meeting,
two ministerial colleagues were supported by Battersby
(Breasury) and two other Treasury men, including the investigating officer
resSronsiJcle for Votel Education, N. Stirting. Gandar Iras accompanied
by Ar'Hinton, a very senior Education official and the deputy d,irector
of Finance (Education), M. Burns.
discussion:
The secretary recorded the
There was discussion of the various proposals contained in
the paper (EX(77)250) and how they could be broken downinto quantitative and qualitative improvements. Treasury
considered that the gualitative matters in Education grants
should be deferred until tine L97B/79 New pot-icy Review.
The timing of any amendment to the grant was most irnportant.
Education Boards required final figures before christmasto enable them to plan for the l9?g academic year. Ftreprinciple already agreed to by the CCEX the year before.J
The various options available to the cormitted as set outin the Tr:easury report were discussed. There was particul-ar
euphasis on that option which provided for a furl adjustnentfor shortfall or over-provision with a projection of 12percent in 1978 giving a cost in that year of $4.169 rnillion.
Educatiorr officials stated that this option was the most
sensible for the Government to choose and provided thebest basis for presenting the Governnentrs case"
The Minister considered that this option placed him in adefensible position in view of ttre cosrnitments he had to
Education authorities.
rf this option was accepted it was the view of the chairman
and endorsed by the conmittee that this option wourd. makeprovision for full adjustment for short.fall but the principle
of full adjustment r.ras not accepted by the Government forfuture years.
rf inflation was less than 12 percent in l97g then Education
authorities would have received an over-adjustment and
conseguentry provision in the folrowing year would be marked
down accordingly.
lrhere was limited discussion of the so-carred *cosmetic,'
amendments to the Education Grants fDecided to leave ttrese
over to the next meeting]f . It was 
.ggg. to recommend tocabinet an increase in grants to rci&Fon controlring
authorities at an annuar additional cost of g4,169 million,giving fuJ.l adjustment for shortfarl or over-provision with
a projection of 12 
.oercent in 192g....t9?
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Five days J-aterl the CCEX continued this discussion. This time .
Boagl deputy Director General of Education accompanied Gandar, with
Hinton and Burns. The Departnent had put up an additional paper on
funiling what was known as the renewals reserve account - tJle tagged
component of Education grants which allowed spending bodies t,o replace
innumerable items of equipment and other goods, at their orrrn discretion.
The departmental representatives argrued that if qualitative increases j.n
Education grants were to be deferred until the L978/79 New Policy review,
then ttrey would form part of the Budget, and would, accordinglyr ,fnot be
available for implementation until the 1979 acadenic year." Treasury
disagreed completely with this line of argument 
- on the contrary, as
Battersby and Stirling saw it, any approved increase, classified
as a nevt policy fox L978/79r could be announced by the Minister inunediately
after the new policy review in March L978.
However, the Ministerrs case rested largely on the tirring
of the proposal. Education Boards required early
notification of the funding levels for the next agademicyear, and accordingty he would prefer to see as much of
the decision as possible taken now, with litt1e or nodeferral until tl;re L97a/79 New Policy Revieqr.
It was agreed that the decision on these grants would
have to be made on poLitical judgement as it woul"d be
better to add the qualitative i-ncreases beinq considered
by the Committee to the quantitative igrease that theMinister had sained at Cabinet this week (CM77/45/24):
fEmphasis addedJ
The Minister and his officials had lvon - at Least for the tinne being
(which was the only tine scale of any significance to those who recogmised
tlre force of marginal increments, however these were packaged). fhe
Committee went on to rrggtt that detailed rates giving effect to percentage
Lncreases in education grants were subject to delegated approval by ttre
Minister of Education at the appropriate time, and re,$. to reconunend
to Cabinet that:
it a.pprove an additional $1 million in 1978/79 to be
qpportioned bv the ttinister as he sees fit among(a) Pa!'ment of grant for notiona.l iolls on the highest
rate of the secondary schools general expenses grant
formula
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(b) calculation of an ancillary staffing allowance for
secondary school5 on the basis of notional rolls(c) adjustment to the administrative staffing formula
for the provision of an additiona!. 5 hours per week
for smaLl secondary schools(d) qualitative improvements in grants to secondary schools
and technical institutes.
lltre Minister and his officials assured the CCEX that this would be their
last request for special treatment before the next Estimates, an under-
taking which was recorded in the minutes as follows:
fttis $1 million will be the final figure for L978/79
and the Minister will not be seeking more money for
this purpose in the New Policy review L978/79 (i.e. this
$1 niflion will in effect be a Category A approved New
PolicY L978/79\3oO
The problems of funding the pr.lblic education system did not, however,
go away. Betr^reen late Novenber and Christmas, the CCEX received a paper
on Vocational Guidance Counsellorsl and the Department prop,osed a new
Policy which would involve appointing 52 more persons to do this work over
the next 5 years. The Committee approved a phasing in of these specialist
ataff members, but recorded that ttris should be regarded in future as
frcorwrritted policy" (i.e. Category A) in L978i79 New Policy and all sr:b-
sequbnt r"rri**"".3o1 on 13 December Gair and rhomson also approved
the addition of $251000 tc the annual grant of $1001000 for administering
another Education department activity - the New Zealand,/United States
Education Foundatiorr.tQ2 There was no recorded di-scussion of the educational
(or any other benefits) of this policy, although the CCEX did suggest ttrat
it should be reviewed in 5 years time. In the meantime, it was lodged
safely Etrncng the pre-new policy review items as a ICategory A[ priority.
Education funding caused some anxious political moments - but its
voracious wel-fare companion, Voter Health, was at least as bothersome. On
29 November (the same day as Gandar won his case for an Education
grants increase of 12 percent), Girl and walker (HeaLth and social
welfare respectivery) r accompanied by four officials, presented a case
for a "new policy" on "capital subsidies for accomrnodation for the aged."3og
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The "aged" had done fairly welI, under the 1975 National Government.
However, the National Superannuation scheme that had proved such an
electoral success had turned out to be a potential albatross of rather
alarming financial proportions. The CCEX had earlier called for a Treasury
report on its likely ongoing cost to the Government, and how this could be
offset by savings in other age-related areas such as health benefits for
superannuitants. On 2l Novernber, Treasury reported that National Super-
annuation would require the annual net addition of some 979rn: . "A
planning level of $86.7 million Ifor the schenel implies borrowing of
g44 nilIion. If the government wishes to irnplement [a] computerised scheme,
borrowing of $50 million would be needed." On 2l- November the CCEX,
"by consensus" agreed that the proposal to computerise the National Super-
annuation scheme should be given the highest priority for implementation
in L978/79. "Accordingly it would have first option on monies available
in L978/79 New Policies Review 6pd indeed may pre-empt any. other new Policies
being instituted in anything bJrt a minor way next year." At the same
ti-ne, the significance of this was alluded to in the recorded corunent by
Treasury that provisional indications of the capital works planning levels
approved by Cabinet for existing policies for 1978/79 were well over $86
million - and that simply making "source deductionsil from the National
Superannuation scheme to rneet telephone accounts and television licence fees
for superannuitants, and the use of on-Iine computer facilities of the Post
Office for the new cash National Superannuation payment system would absorb
most of this $86 million, with massive borrowing irnp1i..tiorr".304 The
policy $/as a financial nightmare.
Nonetheless, the CCEX was quite susceptiSle to the further arguments
put fonrard by the persuasive GiIt and his offsider, Walker, when
they sought more ne\ir resources for the same dernographic sector of the
electorate. The Cormnittee was advised that 10 projects for accommodation
for "the aged" were due to go to tender inrnediately. Gill assured the
meeting that only the consultants' fees for these tenders would fall into
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ttre current financial year, with "the rest'r spread over the next two
years. Treasury, represented by Battersby, retorted forthrightly
that the Health department had not even listed these ten projects among
ttre community health projects it had sr:bmitted for consideration in
Augrust, just a few months earlier. Gill replied with equal aggression
that it had simply not been possi5le, as Treasury implied, to finance
the accomnpdation projects out of the recently established "beer and
baccy fund" (tax revenue from beer and tobacco) 
- indeed, he stated piously,
he had never ever contemplated using this source of money, which everyone
knew was tagged for ne$t corununity projects, on a policy like accosunodation
for tlre aged. After all, he pointed out, this proposal was "an entrenched
;rolicy.... Ttre publtc wourd not have accepted the lewing of a new tax
for innovative conununity projects if they saw that the money was only being
used for guantitative inprovements to existing policies." Although some
may have been tempted, no one conmented that as yet the pr.rblic had not had
an oPPortunity to corment on how it felt about either the nsw tax or ttre
uses to which it was put, since the decision to tag funds from beer and
tobacco for corununity health had only been announced in July 1972, and
there had been neither a referendum nor a general election to record the
popular mandate on this question.
In any case, the Ministerrs policy was accepted. The roinutes recorded
that
ttre general consensus of the Conmittee was that as there
ltas some money, estimated to be abouE $5001000, availabJ,efor conununity health projects which would not be expended
this year, then this should be taken up in the community
health aspects of this proposal. Pmphasis addedi
The Committee, as it had aqEhority from Cabinet to act on
these matters (cM'17/45/13) noted
- that the Minister gives high priority to the proposal
for L978/79 New Policy review (part of the proposal becomes
Category A approved for New Poliry L978/791 t
- that the part of the proposal which is properly conununity
health services will be funded by beerTbaccy taxes,
- approved up to 100 percent increase o.n the subsidy for
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religious and welfare organisations for land, building
d.t.lop."nt of old p.op
(pmphasis addedJ
- noted that the initial provision Ln L978/79 estimates
iilaE Health: Programme 8r Welfare Servicesr Accorunodation
for the Aged will be $5.2 millionl
- deferred an additional $1.2 million $equestedf till the
Favt PoEcy Review LgTe/79.3-o5
During his term as Minister of Health, cill, himself a Roman
Catlrolic and a strong opponent of wonan seeking high quality'
readily accessible facilities for abortion, was highly sensitive to
certain electoral claims on the public purse. It was quite ln.keeping
with the ideological and political- interests of his party that he should
protect and promote the welfare of voluntary organisations who focused
on elderly voters. lltris gave then something of an edge over other sections
of the population wittr rather less success in attracting his political
attention, or gaining preferential treatment by hfun and his colleagtres.
Certainly, when the Minister of Finance presented his Governmentfs point
of vi.ew on health senrices in his 1978 Budget speech, the pathos of the
condition of the over-6os in New Zealand was poigmantly evoked,l
New conrnunity care policies planned for introduction this
year include a special subsidy for institutions caring
for the frail aged and the provision of additional funding
for hospital- boards wishing to develop horne help prograrunes.
Ttre next major Health items considered by the CCEX came before it
on 13 and 20 Decernber, straight after two exhausting meetings on the
erqrenditure strategy indicated by COPE as appropriate for the coming
fiscal year. We will return to those strategv meetings shortly, but
whatever their decisions in one direction, the CCEX ministers found (yet
again) that some collegial demands were simpl-y irresistible.
The pre-Christmas task of allocating funds to statutory bodies in
the education field had its counterpart in tJle annual review of Hospital
grants. In November L977, Treasury had recongnended to the CCEX that
tlospital Boards should be advised of their financial allocations for
L978/79 as soon as possible, and that any gro.wth :n this area should be
assessed in terms of the levels approved in December 1976. However,
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Treasury also 5r,ointed out that not only had there been a significant deteri-
oration in the economic situation during the past twelve months, but it
had also become rrcustomary" for policy reviews to take place in l4arch
each year, when "a total overview of Government expenditure was available."
llhe inplication of this was that any growth in Hospital Board grants
should be reviewed as part of the New Policy exercise some three or four
rcnths hence. ' Gill found this a very unattractive trnint of view. On
13 Decemberr before Gair and Thomson, he e:<pressed his concern that
rthe basic arowth component of HospitaL Board e:qrenditure should continue
as an essential part of Hospital Board financing." The Conmrittee was
prepared to see some merit in this, but on the other hand they could not
see their way clear to permit more than a minor allowance for growth.
They decided to tackle the guestion in a different way. The Pub1ic
E:<penditure Committee had recently recorunended that procedures for the
allocation of money to Hospitai Boards should be tightened upr' wittr
the establishment of a better framework for phasing resources into the
healttr system each financial year. The CCEX decided to use this suggestion
from the select conunittee, and recorunended to Cabinet that the following
"timetable" be approved:
(a) the level of the base allocation should be set in
relation to the level approved in December of the
preceding yeart(b) advice on the substantive portion of any growth
allocation approved by the Cabinet should be made
availabLe to Hospital Boards in December, together
with the main granty(c) as much as possible of any @
approved for Hosprtal Board use should be announced
at the beginning of the financial yearr with
adjustrnent "if necessary" by September $.e. aroundthe usual time for approving Supplementary Estimates
Payments](d) the last point was to include both "new commissioning"
and conununity care - an attempt to harpe-ss health
spending to a regular budgetary cycL".tob
The I'timetable" for Hospital Board grants, and the amounts approved,
were then itenised as followsl
l.
2,
3.
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Item
Basic allocation
Easic growth
Stabilisationr
l{age and sa}ary costs
of 1977/78 changesr
Price increasesr
lst six rucnths !
2nd six monthsr
New conunissioningsr
Ongoing projects:
New projects (part
year) as and when
approved by iloint
l{inisters r
.Comnunity care:
Ongoing projectsr
New projectsr as
in 4. above
3p1
The Minister of Health, honrever, did not respond well to disciplinary
regimes. He lost no time ensuring that his chagrin (needless, one rnight
have supposed, in retrospect) over this officious harnessing of a major
spending agency was recognised by those concerned. At its last pre-
ChrLstmas meetingl on 20 December, the Conunittee was not in festive spirit.
The l,linister had issued a press release which "Srositively indicated'r that
the subsidy for fees for private hospital geriatric patients wouLd be
increased, this to be effective from the beginning of iluly W. The
Conunittee requested his attendance at the meeting - a directive described
in the minutes as trby invitation.r, Gillrs press statement was read
aloud to the three CCEX ministers, a smal1 cluster of Treasu:ry men, and
two Health department officials. "In view of this public statement the
Corunittee consid,ered that it was bound to agree to backdating of the
Present request to I JuJ.y L977." It hras a small but significan" illustration
Tining for decisions
Immediate (December)
fnunediate
March 1978
March 1978
Sept/Oct. L978
ApriL,/May 1978
April,/t4ay 1978
Amount: L978l79
(9)485.148 milLion
2.424 nillion
To be determined
in March 1978
ll
fl
4.
5.
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of the efficary of the constitutional principle of collective ninisteriaL
responsibility.
The minutes for this somewhat tense meeting continued:
In iluly a report had been requested on the practicability
of Lntroducing a system whereby private hospitals accepting
Hospital Board geriatric patients should be required,tojustify any increases in their charges. fttis report was
not available as yet because departnents did not have the
manpotrer resources available necessary to undertake the
work. The Conrnittee was disturbed by the lack of Progress
in commencing work on this report and the hope was
e:qrressed that no further application by the l{inister of
Health for an increase in the subsidy in fees for private
hospital geriatric patients will need to be made before
his report is ready.
(lltre Conunittee then gggl to the recommended increase'
but noted that the report was to be before it by the end
of r6:-uary 1978.)3OB
13 December: To help boost corporate cash flows,
a temPorary tax relief scheme
estimated at $75 rnillion was announced.
16 December: Agreement signed on $45r500 nillion
revolving bank credit in Iondon-
We now retrace our steps in this brief account of how ministers
and officials tested the tolerance of the fiscal system to observe the
progress of two other matfers considered by the Committee in the end of
tlre year meetings. The first was the capital works prografiune, which had
been formulated during the COPE review, had gone to the Cabinet Works
Committee, and now needed another ministerial tick before it could be fed
into the finaL COPE report. The second matter was the Expenditure
Strategy for the coming year, we wiLl deal with them in the order in
which they were submitted to the CCEX.
On 22 November, the Coranittee had
PrograTge I978l79; tentative teve1s3oq
before it a paper entitled Works
(alonq with several new pol"icY
Ltems intended to go into the "Category A" list, and a paPer on Government
Expenditure as at October L977),
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Battersby and Hamilton represented Treasury, r*ith the Com-
rnissioner of Works, Mcleod, the Director of the Planning branch of MWD'
Wight, and two other Works officials. They reported that the prograrme
level for hcusing construction for L977/78 was $5815991000, but the cash
level (conventionally forecast a year before below the programme level)
was $58r7OOrOO0. They added that the indicative Prograrune and cash
levels f:or 1978/79 - $52 nillion - were only an indication for planning
and did not represent a lower housing construction target.
Overall, the cash level for capital works was estimated at'
$713r81OrOOO for 1978/79 - an increase of LO percent over the cash level
for the previous financial year, 1977/78. However, again it was pointed
out that there was no necessary cause for ministerial alarm in this,
since the amount "in effect" represented a "reduction in real terms of
4 percent against the L977/78 cash level which htas $646,688,000 [plus
gtO nillion unauthorised expenditure wtrich was allocated for additional
small works in october f.977) . "
lrlinisters were assured that the cash level indicated would be
sufficient to meet the department's inrnediate reguirements and "still
leave the 4 percent increase previously mentioned for latter modification
of the prograrnme if any projects are deemed necessary for implementation
in f978" 
- 
Election year. The minutes continued as follows:
The Commissioner or works was asked what this cash level
would mean in terms of the effect a lower real level would
have on the construction industry. He advised the Corunittee
that the construction industry was brought down to a level
which had previously been thought to mean considerable
trouble for the industry. fn fact this was not the case.
Those firms who had put off staff and complained to the
Government about the level of construction being undertaken
are those who have been used to more forward orders on
their books. only a few minor firms have actually gone
out of business. The bigger professional firms have, in
many cases, actually taken on staff and the MwD must
conclude that the current level of activity is satis-
factory for the nation's requir"*.ng5.310
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It was a masterly summary of the economic situation as analysed by one
of the executivers mcst significant agents of fiscal intervention.
!{hatever reservations may have been felt (or stated, unrecorded) were
swept aside by this confident, stoic, and reassuring report on the
health of the Labour market,
The opportunity was provided for anyone so disposed to feel that
overly generous fattening in the past was now under appropriate control 
-
if constnrction contractors or others couldntt take the heat, they should
get out. of the kitchen. ltre discussion concluded with a patient explan-
ation of the relationship between cash and planning progranme levels 
- a
device which often appeared to baffle and frustrate all but a few.in M!{D
and Treasury. 'rlt was stated that if both levels were the same and the
deparLments were instructed not to overspend, this had 1ed in the past
to under-expenditure. The aim was next year to keep the spending level
up by a lower actuaL cash level. Ttre lMD is keeping a constant monitor
on expenditure on construction projects." Again, the almost soporific
soothing of ministers by old hands.
The CCEX approved the Vlorks Prograrune, and the tentative alLocations,
and "noted'r tlrat the forthcoming COPE report would include the recotunended
levels in its forecasts of Government expenditure for the next three
3ttyears.
On 2 December, Treasury forwarded to the CCEX a paper entitled
Government Expend.iture Tarqets3/Z (b"".d on a sutnmary of the Review of
Existing Po1icy sr:bmitted earLier. ) fhe Associate Minister of Finance,
templeton, recommended that the CCEX agree with Treasury that
(a) government expenditure targets should be consistent wittr
Governmentrs medium term economic objectivesl
(b) the major mediun term economic objective (reducing BoF to manageable
level) i:nplied a growth target rate in real government expenditure
on goods and services of not greater than around 2 percent per annumt
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[cI the COPE report, which made no allowance at all for new policies,
showed that forecast expenditure on existing policies already
substantially exceeded the target of a 2 percent growth rate in
spending.
An accompanying Treasury paper (2 Decenber J-977) described two
referetcq points for such targets
(i) the outlook for the domestic economy in the coming
year, with a view to using variations in Govern-
ment expenditure as a part of Government's demand
management policy. rn this context the most
relevant item ls the projected deficit before
borrowing, or
(ii) the medium term outlook, with a view to ensuring
that growth in Government expenditure is consistent
with the Government's medium term goals.
The paper analysed both approaches, and reached the conclusion that
the major difficulties.were (a) early identification of recessions and
booms; (b) the long time lag involved in planning Government spending
changes; (c) uncertainty, because of this lag, over the effects of
increased government spending, and (d) the inherent rigidities in spending
on public projects 
- 
most particularly the rigidity caused by staff who
could not be dumped.
Treasury's careful economic primer then went on to suggest that:
a more useful and less costly approach would be to rnaintain
a stable growth in Government expenditure while more
actively employing direct and indirect taxation for
stabilisation purposes. This policy would have the
added advantage of producing a more certain economic
environment in which individuals and businesses could planl
and would permit more sensible resource management in both
the public and private sectors
Since Government spending is an unsuitable short term
instrument, it should be reviewed in the context of mediurn
term objectives .... The main medium term objective is
a sustained improvement in the baLance of payments.
Achievement in this will require a shift of resources into
export industries, plus restraint in the domestic --.'
A protected market allows inferior technology and lower
technical efficiency to prevail. [thus] in order to
have an increased proportion of GNP going to ex5nrt'
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domestic spending, including Govcrnment expenCiture, must
rise at a slower rate than the overall growth rate.
We should aim for the highest GNP growth rate consistent
with a return to a BoP equilibrium in the medium term.
The growth in domestic spending should then be stabilised
at a level below the GNP growth until a large enough
diversion to exports has been achieved ...
[e]olicies [must] stabilise consumption through the
more active use of taxation variations. l'loreover, any
changes in Government expenditure should be linited to
those areas which can be designed to terminate within
a specified period and avoid commitment to future expendi-
ture (for example, certain capital works projects). Thig
practice however, has an important shortcoming: projects
selected on this basis rnay be of lower priority on the
grounds of their economic or social worth, thereby giving
rise to efficiency costs Governnent spending should
therefore be set with reference to medium-term GNP.
Short-run variations should not be used.
The officials then set out the medium-term options, as they saw
them: The Government should aim at a BoP deficit by 1985 of 2.5 percent
of GNP, which would allow a substantiat growth rate of GNP of about
3 percent per annum, provided that real consumption was held to an
annual average of around 2 percent. This was seen as dependent on
(a) feasible growth rates for both agricultural and non-traditional
exports, and
reasonably favourable terms of trade outlook - say 80. That
meant in sunrtary, that if real government expenditure growth
exceeded the recommended rate, "rea1 private gonsu{nption Peeds
to be restrained to a lower level."
0c)
COPE forecasts for
spending of 3.8 percent.
departments (forecast to
a growth rate of total government
paper continued, when trading
Ln 7978/79I were excluded from
L978/79 showed
However, the
shovr a surplus
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this calcuJ.ation, therr growLh of government spending in rear terrns
becaTne 4.5 percent (including transfer payments and subsidies which grew
at a slower rate). "Therefore, the grow"th in spending on goods and
services i.e. the increased use of real resources is around 7 percent.
That 7 percent growth should be compared with the suggested target
growth rate of 2 percent."313
Appendeil to the Government Expenditure Targets paper was a
quantitative analysis, prepared by Treasury, of the medium-term
projections, giving details of the assumptions used:
(i) the present structural BoP deficit (after eliminating cycltcal
factors) was estirnated by deducing the trends in the ratios of imports
and exports to GNP between 1954r/55 and 1977/78 (using Officialsr Economic
Comnitteers OET estimates for the final two years). A terms of trade of
75-85 was assumed, which was the Officials | "best guess" at the average
terms of trade over the next five yearst
(ii) using expected New Zealand and world price movements, a real GNP
growth rate of 3 percent per annum (roughly the growth over the past
10 years) and estimates of the price and income elasticities of imports,
the likely growth in the value of imports was calculated.
(iii)- the level of investment requlred to achieve the 3 percent grorrth
rate of GNP was estimated, and subtracted from Gross National Expenditure
(GNe = GNP + imSrcrts - exports) to obtain a feasible consumption gt*th.314
This comprehensive paper was based largely on work done by the
officials Economic Comnittee, chaired and convened by the Secretary to the
Treasury, Lough, as the counterpart to the ministerial Cabinet Economic
Conmittee (CEC). Attached to the CEC was a working party, chairecl at that
time by J. McKenzie (later aptrninted deputy Secretary to the Treasury.)
and including various officials such as Stirling (Education TIO) r uP
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to the level of Section Head. Although the CCEX had behind it the
considerabLe services of the Finance and Investigating divisions of the
Treasuryl and was advised by a senior Treasury officer 
- Battersby
and other experienced men, it did not have the same symbiotic relationship
with a permanent officials committee as was true for most other rnajor
Cabinet Committees. The COPE group was not, essential-ly, a rninisterial
handmaiden, except insofar as it reported finally to the Minister of
Finance and -.hrough his office to Cabinet as a whole. It was primarily
a Treasury tool, however successfully the fiction of the autonomy of
COPE was maintained.
In any case, it had taken until the end of L977., when the CCEX began
to consider the thiril COPE report to the National government, for Treasury
and the other permanent advisers to accept the authority of the CCEX, and
its status and role in the existing networks of por,rer and influence. 
- 
But
COPE itseff did not have a pennanent all-year-rould, existence. Its
ongoing influence had to be sustained from December to Decernber by the
members of the COPE secretariat 
- 
and they were all Treasury people, witlr
a modest input from the SSC. So we may consider that the attention that
CEC and Treasury officials gave to the CCEX in providing this quite
detailed expJ-anation of er4penditure patterns and their economic impact
was in itself a token of the effectiveness with which the Gair conrnittee
had been incorporated into the centraL executive systems.
On 6 and 7 December, the three most confidential and vital paperg
then circulating irmong some small elite groups in the central system were
all before the CcEx, giving it comparable status with the CEC and a
significant 'rfiLtering" responsi-biJ.ity on behalf of Cabinet and the Prime
?rtMinister. These pagers were! Government Expenditure Targetsr-'- the COPE
report for L978/79 to Lgaf,/LLr3lb 
^rrd a paper on @
?r?
W...'A1.lpapers!ferehighIyc1assifiedwiththeusua1
pre-Budget rrsecretrr tag. The three ministers.- Gairr Thomson and
Templeton 
- 
r.rere advised by an unusually large group of Treasury officialst
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including c. Terry, the deputy secretary, with Battersby and de Jardine,
and three others 
- Chetwin, Ashwell and Prebble. I'larshall took the
mj-nutes, which began with a bald summary of the main points raised:
- 
cross National product (GNp) could be expected to show
no growth in real terms in L97B/79i
- 
Government expenditure should remain relatively stable
as a proportion of GNp;
- The COPE projections showed that the cost of existingpolicies would increase in L97B/79 at the rate of 3.8
percent over 1977/78, based on I JuIy 1977 prices:
With this economic skeleton before it , the Corurittee could now
address itself to developing an appropriate fiscal strategry to gtride
cabinet's behaviour over the next few months. Treasury had suggested
that taxation, both direct and indirect, was a more effective instrr:nent
for stabilisation than Governnent expenditure (a point we ngted in the
drafi of Loughrs opening speech to the new copE group some month.E
earlier). Gair expressed his concern that this may not take account
of the inflationary impact of raising indirect taxes. Treasury pointed
out that in New Zealand the indirect tax base, at present, was relatively
narrow, so that the "burden of stabilisation" would falr on direct
taxation. Steps had been taken already to allow for such a develo;ment 
-
9200 nillion had been set aside in the expenditure forecasts for the coming
year to aLlow for tax restructuring 
- not anything particularly radical,
but sufficient to perrnit a limited adjustment of the tax scares. The
alternatives, of course, lvere to rnake sr:bstantial increases in indirect
taxes - or severe reductions in Goverrunent expenditure. "Essential1y",
Treasury stated, "it [is] a choice between tax reductions or public
expenditure cuts." Treasury officials added that proposals for the tan
readjustment in 1978/79 were already being investigated.
In an almost exact replay of the advice given to the oLd CCPP in its
last year of operation, Treasury argued that government spending was ',an
unsuitable instrument'r for short tern', economic control, and shouLd therefore
be reviewed "in the context of medium terrn objectives," Since the rnajor
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medium-term objective of the present Government was "a sustained improve-
ment in the barance of paymentstr, there was no other means to its
achievement except to shift resources into "internationally competitive
industries as well as restraint of the dornestic market.rl
with this advice in mind, the committee now turned to the copE
reportr with its functional classification of net forecast expenditure.
Particular attention was paid to the division of the 3.8 percent increase
in voted government expenditure on existing policies Ln L978/79 among
A<iministration (an increase of over 3 percent)
Development of industry (nearry 2 percent up on Lg77/?g>
Education (J..4 percent increase)
Social Welfare (a massive 7 percent increase), and
Health (2.9 percent increase).
Treasury officers emphasised that although voted government spending was
expected to rise by 3.8 percent, the "gglgel outlay" on goods and services
("whictr is an important economic factor facing the Government") would rise
by up to nearly 7 percent overall. Although allocations to transfer
paYment $tas exPected to increase by weII over 4 percent in real terms,
this was a slight reduction in the rate experienced in previous years.
one economic problem in the business of budgetary pLanning was
explained by the officials. rt arose because various expenditure items
were bundled together in accounting categories such as "C,oods and Servicesrl
or "Transfer payments" which tended to mask the differing economic i'npact
of components in each cLuster. For example, the effect of HospitaL Board
grants was quite different, in economic ter:ns, frorn that of National
Superannuat.ion palments, although from an administrative point of view
both were labelled "transfer payments." Treasury suggested that the former
were more correctly regarded as "goods and services' - and their exclusion
from this category of expenditure meant that certain important considerations
were understated or obscured. For instance, it was pointed out, "expendi-
ture on goods and services in L97g/79 (would bd] of prinary imporlance
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because it fgepresented) final outlay, whereas expenditure on transfers and
benefits [!,ras) partialty offset by tax revenue and [representedl largely
a distribution of income.r'
The minutes did not record how far ministers took this point, or
iE.s effect, if any, on their deliberations. Instead, it seems, they
moved on to another problem highlighted in the COPE repo:lt 
- 
the probable
increase in personnel needed to service existing policies 
- 
the projected
increase of I percent represented 660 staff members, witJ: obvious and
massive sal-ary implications.
It was reported that the permanent heads on COPE had fett that the
"sinking lidl formula had now been "exploited,r' for as long as was tolerable.
However, the CCEX was disinclined to be moved, by this arg-ument, preferring,
as no doubt its Treasury advisers suggested, that "even if there lras sone
riberalisation of the policy, a rsinking ridt formula should stilr apply
in order to encourage control and mobility in Government staff as well as
to maintain a relativity with growth in the workforce generally.r' There
appeared to be no consideration whatsoever of the actual consequences of
ttris decision for existing policies themselves. It was apparently assu:ned
that slowing down the delivery of existing policies would not have any
necessary and fundamental. impact on the nature of the policies per se.
There \das no recorded discussion - and indeed no supplementary analysis -
of this question. By the end of 1980 it was still the subject of
considerable concern in many quartersl Dot only among departrnental officials
working under stress but among those in Treasury who believed that it was
a grossly blunt instrument, adrninistratively and politically convenient,
but with quite unexamined consequences for policy irnplementation, and the
achievement of Government objectives.
The discussion on the question of staffincr was recorded as follows:
It was pointed out that around 42 percent of Government
expenditure tras devoted to personnel.. The relationship
of Government staff numbers to the total work force was
therefore examined by the Committee.
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There would probably be no significant increase in the
countryrs work force next year. Tt had been assumed
in the COPE exercise that the total labour force $rould
increase by
0.5 percent in 1978,
0.4 percent in 1979 anil
0.5 percent in L980.
This represented an increase from Lr22O.OOO in the labour
force as at April 1, 1978 to Lr23lr000 as at April 1, 1980.
From the figures given in the COPE report it was seen that
State Services staff numbers had risen as a percentage of
the total labour force from 20.3 percent at April I, 1971
to 21.2 percent at April 1, L977.
In projecting staff increases for the next three years,
COPE had kept State Services staff numbers, as a percentage
of the estimated labour force, at a constant 2I.2 percent.
In the longer term, there should be a close correlation
between the respective growtlrs of the Governrnent and ttre
total work forces. This principle should be extended to
other parts of the public sector, incLuding Local AuthorLtles,
It is difficult to find records of any theoreticaL debate justification
of this argunent, other than references to trnlitical and administrative
symbolisn. It parallels the argnrment already quoted 
- that Government
expenditure is somehow usefully evaluated as a proportion of GNP. Slnce
the concept of GNP and the overall size of the work force are themselves
creations of nacro and micro economic factors, both unevenly susceptible
to, and variousJ.y created by, past Government decisions, both GNP and
the overall national l-evel of employment may be regarded, in trnrt at
least, as among ttre larger-scale consequences of past governnent decisions
and choices. Ttre welfare state context is critical to changes in bot*r
factors. The size of the public service, in staff terms, and the level
and rate of expenditure by the public sector are simiLarly both caused
by1 and the causes of, particular economic (and fiscaU circumstances.
A11 four factors 
- 
overall levels
tn
emplolment in state services, the
of ernpJ-oyment, 
.gp€ levels of
rate and level of 4!!!9. spending and
the size of
- 
have extremely complex historical causes. In the conte:<t
of the New Zealand welfare state, they are predominantly political in
nature. Comparing any two factors for the purpose of annual allocative
decision-making, or even for forecasting by central Government agentst
GNP
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is of doubtful value. ClearLy, however, there are rhetorical and
symbolic purposes which bear.Iittle obvious relationship to the
theoretician's need for politically neutral models. In any case, the
CCEX trod softly away from the shadorvs of conceptual analysis, and
addressed itself to more immediate questions.
drawn to the projected increases in
numbers of 942 in 1978
940 in 1979 and
L0O0 in 1980,
which seemed contrary to the nil trend in the other
Services. Health Service ernplolrment totals are ealculated
on averagie fulltime equivalents and as such do not represent
a rhead countr but only an indication of the industryrs use
of rnan;rcwer.
While hospital services have experienced substantial growth
rates in recent years, this l-evel of increase has slowed
ancl the COPE figures ry (sic) growth rates. of 2 percent,per annum for the irnrnediate future.
The question was asked (gs well it mightl) whether the
hospital building progranme generated scne of this increase
in staff levels. Hospital Boards had not been subject to
the State Services rsinking lidr formula and this had been
reflected in the continuing growth in staff nunbers in that.
field.
This discussion neatly illustrates a problem caused by a characteristic
feaLure of New Zealandrs state welfare administration. On the one hand,
the historical autonomy of hospital and education boards was desirable
in principle, in that it encouraged lay involvernent in the business of
running the state machine, with aII the attendant democratic advantages
ttrat this implied. On the other hand - as political evidence might
predict 
- the statutory boards gained substantial (and highly elitist)
po$rer, standing like equals against the central state bureaucracy. The
boards were buttressed by professional lobbies wilh real political and
economic clout: doctors, nurses, teachers, associated industrial sectors
with a large stake in the investment decisions of public policy makers,
and so forth. It was no wonder that when Gair left the CCEX and took
up the unwieldy double burden of the Health and Social Welfare portfolios
in 1979, most of his pr:blic attention'was directed towards the hospital
boards and their spending behaviour.
Attention was
hospital staff
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Again, no c€mprehensive discussion of this occurred in this CCEX
cont,ext. The pressures of time and the need for urgent decisions,
coupLed with the complexity of the whole staffing question in a complex
and highly bureaucratised system put it outside the scope of that
particular neeting. Nonetheless, somewhere, sometime it would have to be
tackJ.ed, since the application of a tourniquet like the SSC's sinking
Iid was a very crude approach to planning, for all its disciplinary
effects.
Another matter that had caused discomfort in the past could also be
traced, by irnplication at least, to planning deficiencies in the State
Services Commission. It rlas the question of growth in the nunbers of
"special workersr'. Officials reported that in some departments these
had become "an institution....
These departments had a continuing need for these workers
and regarded tham as a petlnanent feature of their
workforce. To some extent they used these special
workers to relieve pressure on the workloads generated
by the controls of staff ceilings and the sinking lidformula. Treasury considered that the number of special
workers in departments and the use to which they are
being put reguired analysis.
Whose task should that be? Lack of ongoing analysis to assist both
ministers and Treasury was a running sorec
Ministers quickly moved on to one specific aspect, and "expressed
surprise" at the COPE forecast of a projected growth in Post Office staff
numbers of 654 in 1978. Officials quickLy replied that this rLse
reflected. the rrability of the Post Office to recruit up to its approved
staff ceiling by 1978/79". It might have a;ipeared that some adjustrnent
here was required 
- on the other hand, like a few other areas, Post Office
work was a convenient blotting pad for "surplus" Iabour in the market.
Ttre Committee novir turned its attention to a guestion that was of
considerable moment - €D€r!ffr fn the COPE report it was stated thatr
ttre NZED (New Zealand Electricity Department) had
assessed fuel requir.ements for thermal power stations
at $54"17 million in L978/79
S59.03 million La L979/80 and
$46"01 million in i980,/81.
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A substantial drop in fuel requirements for ttre 1980/81
year was noted hrhi,ch largely reflected in increased
reliance on hydro and geothermal power stations by
1980/81 coupled with the Huntly power station corning on
stream.
It is not intended here to enter the dense thickets of recent energy
planning by central Government, Indeed, the CCEX dicl not attenpt to
expLore the irnplications of this poticy matter in any detail, but simply
received Treasuryrs report stating that COPE had considered ttrat the
NZED had introduced new pollcies, needing specific approvals outside
COPETs terms of reference. COPE had therefore reduced the Departnentrs
forecasts by 94.06 million in each of the first two forecast years. This
battle would be fought elsewhere.
However, an appendix to the COPE report pointed out, qonewhat dis-
concertingly, that when details of net forecast expenditure \^tere clustered
together in functional categories, "development of industry'r was projected
to decrease by nearly 2 percent Ln L978/79, by 4.7 percent in 1979r/80 and
by 5.5 percent in 1980,/8I. The explanation offered was that the Mines
department would have "surplus capacity'f by that time, with a iapering
off of mining over the next year or so. It was assumed, therefore that
the NZED would "be in a profit situation by L978/79." Laterr some must
have looked back wistfully on those fantasies from below the massive
battlements of the soon-to-be created Energy ministry.
Ttre tlriril paper was novr considered. Treasury had reported that its
qv{n research showed that the largest feasi-ble rate of growth in Governnent
spending on goods and services "consistent with the Governmentrs medium
term objective of reducing the balance of payments deficit to a sustainable
Ievel" Iras around 2 percent per year. The New Zealand Planning Council
had suggested that New Zealand "should be abl.e to maintain a real growtlt
rate of about 3 percent per annum" provided there was continuing e:rport
growth. Treasury saw no reason to compete with this projected overall
growth rate in pr:blic sector spending trends.
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The CCEX decided that the rnost helpful way to present a1l this
unappealing inforrnation to their colleagues would be through a visual
aid of some sort - preferably a graph, presented on a single sheet of
paper, showing alL the I'relevant figrures over a tirne-span of L977/78 to
L984/85 covering:GNP,
' Government expenditure in its rnajor divisions and
' State Services staff figrures.'l
The Ministers also felt that it would be luseful" to have an early
indication of New Policies likely to be put up by ninisters for funding
Ln L978/79, 49ing. any National Party L975 General Election Manifesto
items not yet implemented. Treasury replied that it hoped to have all
this information from departments by the end of January. The data would
then be collated and presented in a suitable form for ministerial
digestion. ft was agreed (significantly, for Harniltonrs argrument
earlier that there was no longer much point in sirnply repeating the
existing policy review exercise) that reviews of existing and new policy
would be held before t.he L978/79 Estimates were conpiled, probably in
Iate February-ear1y March of the nerd year.
Treasuryrs paper had included a number of suggestions as to how the
Government could extricate itself from the bind of apparently inevitable
increases in its own spending rates and levels. But old chestnuts looked
no more appealing now than they ever did I a 5-I0 percent cut in each
departmentrs Vote, with specific CCEX approval required before there could
be any restoration of funds still looked like a good way to lose your
friends and activate your enemies. On the other hand, there had been
some very stern warnings from creditors about spending, and they had
much the same effect on nervous National party ministers as they had had
on their luckless Labour predecessors. The IMF would look very unkindly
on any increase in Government spending as a percentage of G'IP - and
certainly would not favour anything over the rat,io achieved in L977/ia.
Since GilP growttr was likely to be "ninimal", spenders were going to need
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strong hands at the reins. Treasury reported that its own projections of
expenditure for L978/79 indicated a total of some S6t46g million - equal
to about 38.L percent of G.lF, and well in excess of anything the IMF had
in :nind.
The committee took a brave stand 
- steering itself, as much as
anyone else, against the coming late-sunmer reviews. rt would propose
a target of 36 percent of GIIP ($61100 milLion) for the next financial
year - but would recorunend that rrfor planning purtrrcses" that target
should be 37.2 percent of Gt{P, or g61300 milLion in cash terms. rt
recommended the COPE report to its Cabinet colleagues, and outlined an
e:<penditure strategy for adoption in time for the pre-Estimates exercisesr
Recommended to Cabinet that it
@n!, expenditure targets should be
consistent with the Governmentts meCi_um term economic
objectives of achieving a sustained improvement in the
EoP and provid:-ng a sound basis for economic Arowthl(b) note that, given average terms of trade of around gO
and feasi-ble growth rates in agriculture and non-
traditional export volumes (around 2 percent, and 7 percent
respectively) the achievenent of both a rate of growth in
G{P at 3 percent per annum and reduction in the Bopdeficit to a manageable l-evel by the mid 1980s will require
that the rate of growth in reai Government expenditure on
goods and services over this period should not exceed
2 percent per annum on averalte,(c) note that the COPE forecast of Government expenditurefor L978/79 which makes no allowance for New Policies
implies an increase in Government expenditure on goods
and services of about 7 percentl(d) note that if the medium term objectives of a 2 percent
growttr in Government expenditure on goods and services is
to be achieved for L978/79,
to be reduced by about 9170 nillion.
This would also have the effect of bringing the Government
expenditure as a proportion of G{P down to about 37.2
percent which is the same proportion achieved Ln L977/78
and is reconrnended by the II{F.(e) consider the target of either 35 or 3'7.2 percent of
GNP as the level of Government expenditure for L978/79,
which irnplies a reduction of $370 niltion or $170 nillion
respectiveLy below the projected levet of F6-ra69 million(i.e. to $6r100 or $6r300 million respectively.l(f) note that options which can be implemented to achieve
ttre target reduction in expenditure for goods and services
for the L978/79 I'ear aret(i) al1ow no New Policies until they have beenjustified and departments shc,vr equivalent
savj-ngs in existing expenditurel(ii) reduce specific expenditure groups by a percentagel(iii) restrict the 1978/79 Estimates to the COPE
recommended levels (at I July 1977 prices)
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plus salary and r./age. increases and benefit
rrrcreases and provision for New policy. Depart-
ments to absorb al-l price and volume increases
from I JuLy 1977 to I January 1978 unless
provision for all or part of this increase is
agreed to by the CCEX;(iv) similar to (iii) above, but to allow say a
3 percent increase in SEGrs 2 - 6:
SEG 2 - travel transport and communication3 - maintenance, upkeepr xen€wal
4/5 - materials, supplies and services
6 - other operating expenditure.
Any additional provision to be approved by the
CCEX (Treasury estimates that a 5 percent increase
in the SEGs from 1 July A977 to I January 1978
would total about $70 million);
hold functions of the reconrnended COPE leve1s for
SEGs. 2 
- 6 for !978/79 if they do not meet the
criteria of
- keeping down the demand for imports
- reducing the level of unemployment
- 
give priority to developmental progranmes with
export potential, for example, fand develotrrment,
rural water supply, forestry.3l-8
MilLen signed it off, and nine copies were made for distribution to
the three CCEX ministers, the Secretary of Treasury Ql anil the Prime Minis-
ter (4, interestingly not directed to Muldoon as Minister of Finance). Ttre
Committee, no doubt rather jaded by its intensive discussions, nor^r awaited
Cabinetrs reaction to this "strategic plan". The Minister of Health, Gil1,
kept them busy with his somewhat expansive arrangements for the health
system, as r,re have seen.
Surrnary of developments 1971-77
This break in the history of the CCEX as fiscal Tar-Baby provides an
period fron L971-1977 and to
the CCPP and the early
appropriate moment to cornment briefly on the
indicate the relationship between the CCEX,
National government experiment 
- 
lluldoonts Cabinet Comnittee on Government
Expenditue (CCGE).
The CCGE, a task force of ministers, convened by the Minister of
Finance, was a large and somewhat cumbersome affair. fts only
(v)
information was whatever the convenor chose to filter to it, and
Treasury reports on the arithmetic of adding expenses onto COPE.
no conceptual
developed to
or administrative base, nor was any specific sub-systen
service it. In effect it was a
reaL
limited
rt had
sub-comnittee of the Cabtnet
its conventional responsibilityEconomic Courmittee. The CEC still retained
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for hudgetary matters, although, as it remained under the National Party,
it was preoccupied with revenue guestions. The special CCGE task force of
I97I/12 had a brief paring role, and its relative success rvas tucked away
in ministerial and other memories to be dusted off and remode.l-l-ed later.
The (Labour) CCPPIs interest in the relationship between party
policy, departmental policies and re'source allocation eventually gave
Treasury the tool it needed to experiment with certain systemic
modifications indicated by the PPB "philosophy". As COPE generated more
and more potentiall-y useful information it became increasingly urgent to
reallocate decision-making roles. The CCPP showed clearly that ministers
could be actively recruited to authorise specific reviews of existing
poLicy. They could be organised so that they were reliably av3ilgble
for speeial pre-Budget reviews of new policy. They could be encouraged
to present themselves to their colleagues, to departmental officials and
even to outside audiences of "community leaders" as high-status offsiders
to Treasury and the Minister of Finance, the traditional minder of the
dublic purse. The CCPP should be regarded not as antagonists, spoiling for
resources which only the Treasury and the Minister of Finance could deny
or apportion, but as joint partners in expenditure planning. As alIies,
some of the load 
- 
and some of 
.the inevitable culpability - could be shared.
Among other things this great-ly reinforced the develo;nnent of
collective ministerial goverrunent. It also began to knit executive eJites
of elected and non-elected officials more tightly together. The networks
of formal and informal influence, authority and coercion in central
government became more compLex as ministers and officials worked
intensely alongside each other to "construct the National Budget. " The
gradual int-roduction of computerised management information systems both
slzmbolised and ernphasised these developments. Those who could not (or
would not) come to grips with either the physical data systems or the
preferred norms of resource allocation were forced to rely on other
strategies. This reaction in itself began to affect the political
7
329.
chatacter of the. central executive netriorks.
within two years of its estabrishment, the ccEX had becone an
essential component in the diversification of Treasuryrs powers. Not
only did that departrnent retain its traditional rnembership of Cabinet
sub-systems like the CEC, the Cabinet Works Comrnittee and the Cabinet
Conmittee on the State Services, it had effectively coopted rninisters to
assist it in forging a new channer to cabinet - the ccEx. This murti-
dirnensional network mirrored developments in prine ministerial roles and
functions. Murdoon not only acquired a new advisory group in the
remodelled Prime l'linister's departnent 
- 
a department headed by Galvin,
the heir apparent of Treasury, after r,ough. The prime Minister aLso
acquired another reg to the fiscal stool supported in the past mainLy
by the CEC, As Minister of Finance, he was superior to the associate
and deputy finance ministers. The CCEX did not need to directly occupy
his limited time or personal attention. His cormnand over the Finance
portfolio was sufficient. Buc the ccEX was becoming an invaluable
balance to both older-established and emerging Cabinet conunittee cliques.
Until J.980 at least, it appeared that the CCEX would move little further
ahead of colleqial opinion than the Minister of Finance-cum-Prime Minister
allowed it to go. It served both symbolic and informational pur5nses,
carefulJ.y manned, it could add another dimension to the powerful office
occupied by Muldoon, rnaster puppeteer and incrementaList whorn it would
be difficult to regard as anything other than profoundly cautious,
instinctively pragmatic.
The CCEX : the end of the second year
When Cabinet met again on 12 December 1977, it debated the economic
strategy proposed by the three CCEX ministers and their Treasury advisers,
In general, the plan was acceptable. fts disciplinary character was
appropriate to ihe prevailing economic circumstances, and its rigour was
consistent ttith the general stance adopted by the Go.Jernment's chief
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Financial spokesman in the preceding years. I! was agi.eed that wherever
public servants could take the strain, they should be made to do so.
Ministers were to be Left with as much political leeway as possible. But
the CCEX reconunendation contained scme political hooks that were too
sharp for Cabinet to tolerate at that stage. fn the end, the name of
the game $tas not exemplary government in terms of efficiency and economy,
justified outputs and well-analysed inputs; tt was winning the next
election, with aLI the political implicati-ons that goal entailed.
Sor departments were to be instructed to prepare their Estimates
for L97B/79 on the basis of COPE-recommended levels (i.e. in 1 July 1977
prices) uprdated only for'rknown wage, salary and benefit increases and
policies approved since 31 Augnrst L977.rr The freeze on staff ceilings
in the State Services was to remain in force until the end of the next
financial- year - 31 March L979. The sinking lid policy was to stay in
force for the same period, with staff levels held to those of the current
year, plus any approvals given since COPE reported, Iess a further 1l
percent every financial year. Post Office and Railways staff (hitherto
outside the sinking tid) were to be disciplined in the same way as all
other state servants - ministers stated that 'rthis (would) create a pool
of vacancies in each fpf these departmentsl which could be re-allocated
as need is established".
The Estimates provision for pLant and equiprnent !,ras set at 75 percent
of the L977/78 allocationl so far as possible overseas travel was to be
kept at the same level in L978/79 as tJ:at provided for in L977/781 warning
was given that reductions may be required before the Estimates in other
expenditure groups.
Cabinet agreed that "as a general principle" expenditure and staffing
restraints placed on clepartments should also apply to the funding of non-
government organisations 
- 
but ttreir political instincts suggested that a
loophole must be left here, and the circular finally authorised by the
CCEX on the basis of Cabinetrs deeisions stated that "it may be necessary
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to moderate restraints in those cases where approved revenue-matching,
dernographic or similar formulae exist." Thi.s was the first hard evidence
from the cabinet meeting that ord loyarties, o1,l priorities, were stilr
in good curxensya
Bot$ as a matter of administrative and financial necessity, and
as a neans of widening this loophole slightly, t] e Cabinet rninute of
12 December also recor<led that. the CCEX had been given full authority
to approve departures from any of the e>cpenditure rules except tgose
relating to staff levels and the sinking lid application.
Cabinet was not ready for the precise application of ,'tit-for-tat".
The l4inute recorded that "when New Policies are sr:brnitted regard will
Policies- In the absence of sigrnificant savings being offered, the ccgx
[wil1 havel the right to review recent e>rpenditure approvars.,,3l9
fEnphasis addedJ. Indeed, it is likely ttrat no element of the expenditure
system was yet geared up for a harrl tit-for-tat 1ine, since tolerance
of arl sorts, political, fiscar and economic precruded its rigid
application at ttrat stage, even in theory.
When ttre CCEX rret to promulgate Cabinetrs rulings on 20 December
it also had before it a summar"]r of what Treasury currently regarded as
areas of fiscal concernr requiri.ng special attention in ttre corning review
of existing policies:
(i) overseas aid: this had come up before ttre old c@p on a number of
occasions- goth Treasury and spending ninisters saw it as a somewhat
vulnerable conponent of the real substance of resources. The National
Party Prime t4inister did not share his predecessor, Kirkrs,
PreoccuPation witlr this expenditure policy, although its merits as a neans
of encouraging exports and trade (as well as some symbolic value) was not
under-estimated- Departnrents were warned that the CCEX would be looking
for a level of about $55 nillion for overseas aid in rgTe/79 
- 
,'which
fign-rre is based on conunitments.rl
be given to the abilitv of savinqs in Existi
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(ii) Wolks pro-gramrng levgls: the CCEX was direcied to re-assess these
with a view to reducing the allocation for activities which inrrclved
large arnounts of overseas expenditure. Domestic acLivities, even where
they had signif-cant inplications for employnrent, should not be perrnitted
to upset the prornotion of the Covernment's objective of an improved
balance of paynents situation.
(iii) Fertiliser subsidy: Although tJ:e proposed review of this transfer
payment might affect sometJring farmers regarded as a well-deserved token
of support in appreciation for their votes, it was not realIy a dangerous
directive. Ttre CCEX was sinply required to "review" the l-evel of
expenditure in tiis area "in t-l.e light of any new agricultural policies".
In the event, money for fertilisers was shifted from one pocket of the
agricultural community to the other in the 1928 Budg.t.3Zo
(iv) Finally, Hospital an9 Educational Building: The CCEX was directed
to review possibilities for slowing down the development and cornmissioning
of new works in these two sectors. The review would bear little, if
any, relationship to either educational or health policy per se,- it was
to be conducted solely for tJle purpose of economic regrulation of the
construction and associated industries. The CCEX was to put tJle brake
on only "where this could be acconplished without disruptions of a kind
which would result in unnecessary expenditure in the J-onger tenn."
''rFine-tuning" riras a pretty imprecise science 
- 
as Lough had pol.nted
out in his speech to his peers at ttre start of the 1977 COPE review:
Alnrost six nrcnths will elapse before L97g/79 priorities
tgill begin to be implerented and response, in terms of
domestic activity may take up to one yeetr to comnence:
the multiplier process may take an additional tine to work
itself out. In other wgrds, we are talking of a totaL
timespan of perhaps 18 nrcnths to two years. In simple te:ms
it'may mean that we end up operating on the wrong end of
the business cycle 
- rrcasures which were intended to be
anti-q1clical end up pro-cycLical and exacerbate al-I ttrose
problems we sought to alleviate. Weak trends originally
identified in private sector consumption and in'vestnent
could reverse themselves in a year and the addition of
strong C;overnment e>rpenditure may simply spill over intoprices and the bal-ance of payrenls.3al
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Before Cabinet and ttre C(3X departed for Christmas, the Cabinet Comnrittee
on tlrc State Services was invite<i (by Ur" CCS1.) to proceed wit} determining
staff ceilings in L978/79; Ministers were ; again for Manifesto items
not already inplemented 
- with costs separated from other urgent New
Policy costs, both to be included in their returns for tl.e N* policy
Review for L978/79. Treasury was instructed to send out to alt depart-
ments a circular advising them of ttre current instructions for the next
Review of Existing policy and the rgTg/7g Main Estiuates. As usualr.
departlental accountants would spend rpst of ttre New Zealand suumer iunong
their colleagues' policy bids and endless computer printouts. Finally,
departments were to be informed that a detailed tiroetabLe for presenting
submissions to the CCEX for the Existing, New and Estimates'reviews would
be circulated shortly' Ttrere was an alrnost palpable sigh of relief as
the pre-christrnas files for ttre crass of ,75 were closed for the
hoJ.idays.
fhe impetus for systernic reform, and a significant npdification of
the norms and criteria used in evaluating various erq)enditure options,
had been deflected. Arthough various officials, inside Treasurl and
elsewhere, lrere conscious of tJ:e need to keep reform in urind, it was
necessarily deferred until tJ:e housekeeping of putting t;le Estimates and
Budget for r97a/79 together r^ras completed. After that, history would
produce its own catalyst 
- we discuss this as part of the developrent of
the "Quigley school" of thought in part rv of this chapter. Ttre ccEX
Tar-Baby $ras set aside for the tine being.
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Putting the 1978/79 Estimates to bed:
Sunrner or winter, however, spenders hrere always susceptible to
pressure and continualJ-y on the move. It will be recaLled that on
24 November the Minister of Education and his officials had gratefully
assured the CCEX that its decision to support a 12 percent increase in
Education grants would suffl-ce until the next year's allocation. But
on 15 December, barely three weeks later, a paper was sent over to
Treasury entitled Additional Grants. It argued for increases in General
E:<penses grants over the 1977 Levels to take effect from l April 1978.
Ttrey were to be divided as followsr
Primary schools: 27.5 percent increase
Secondary schools: 18.L - 23.1 percent increase
TechnicaL institutes: 22.0 percent increase
The background paper to these figures, entitled Qual-itative Improvenents in
General Expenses Grants presented the Departmentrs case. It was to the
historian a somewhat superficial analysis:
(A) Objectives:
Secondary Schools: To provide for the necessary qual.itative
increases in the general expenses grant to secondary schools
to cover changes in the curricula.
(B) Present Policy:
Regulations provide for grants by joint ninisterial
approval (Education and Finance). The grant is reviewed
annually and provision is made for the increase in costs
incurred since the previous review.
(c) Alternatives:
The alternative is to continue to provide for inflation
in annual reviews and to make no qualitative improvements.
However, this would result in a further decline in
teaching standards.
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(r)
The
Justification:
Iast qualitative increase in ttris grant was 1966. A
"comprehensive review"was carried out in 1974 and very
substantiaL increases in the then provisions were
recommended ($2.3 rnillion, in fact). Subsequently
"the needs were re-exarnined and a ttpre conservative
estimate of ailditional requirements was 91-7 rnillion."
T,his represented a 47 percent increase on current rates.
"There is a need for qualitative increases in this grant
bearing in rnind that in the last 1o years there have been
many changes in the curriculum and there are more sophis-
ticated teaching aids in use....[the Treasury Investiga-
ting officer for vote: Education contnented on the rnargin:
How much use?]...in schools. Having regard to the current
econornic situation there is sti1l a good case for provision
in the grant to rneet the cost of school operations and it
is suggested that a figrure of $0.5 nillion would go some
way tcn*ards meeting sone of the higher costs which are
freeJ-y complained of by the teaching organisations...There
is nounting criticisrn by school principals in particular at
the need to lerry parents to supplement the General E:(Penselt
Grant. Although some schools can manage on ttre grantr an
increasing percentage are n:nning into deficit. whilst the
increase recornrnended for cost escalaLion will go solrp way
('
towards assisting these schools there is--a real need for
further grants to enable schools to balance th6ir budgets."
Ttre TIo corunented oratly E" *. write{on ttris that
"we need to delineate what a school spends money on, and
adopt a po!.icy of providing for racceptabler elernents of
this expenditure - i.e. chalk and dusters' But not school
trips or something like that - it would probably be essential
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for schools to know ttris...."
The oepartmental paper continued, this time looking
at Technical Institutes. :
(A) Objectives:
To provide for grants to technical institutes which
will adequately meet their operating costs, in particular
to implernent the proposals of a review comnittee set up
to investigate this question.
(C) Proposal: nevt fo:nru1a for determining General
Ei4)enses Grant "on a reassessnent of tlte present day
needs of institutes and the necessity to ensure a [D.re
flexible and equitabl-e system of determining grants."
(E) Alternativesr
(i) retain current fo:mula - "it is not expected
that ttris fo:rmula, even with upward adjustnents in
rates, will continue to meet the needs of institutes.
(ii) adopt new for:nula...
(F) Justification:
(i) "It is clear that the current forrmrla is not
rrceting the needs of institutes. Two institutes,
!{ellington and CfT, have incurred substantial deficits
over the years and have reached the stage where there
is no possibitity of the anount being recouped from any
increase in the present rates.
(ii) The current formula is based on a review nade in
1973. Since then the institutes have developed
considerably and consequently this forrmrla is no longer
appropriate to their needs...
(iii) The new formula proposed will be more flexible Ln
approach and will result in a more equitable distribution
of the funds made availab1e...than [Uefore]. Ttrese
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The
conditions wiLl considerably avoid [sic] the current
deterioration in the financial position of the insti-
tutes, providecl that provision is made for the deficits
of the two institutes rnentioned alovel
The TIO cormrented on this argnrment: "What about
the recent Review connritteers report? - $1291000 was
provided recently for an increase in the Technical
Institutes GeneraL E:rpenses grant to be apportioned
by the Department of Education 
- 
I understantl this
was used to offset deficits. in particular at the
CIT 
- 
what the hell do they need now: rl
[fhe nepartment of Education now asked for a further
$1601000 to cover deficits aloner exclusive of any
sums requested as part of a modified grant formula.l
departmental argument continued:
Primary schools:
(A) Objectives: To provide qr-ralitative improvenents in the
grant payable.
(C) Al-ternative: annual provision for inflation and
no grant
(F) Justification:
"During 1973 a comprehensive review was made of the
essential needs of school conrnittees for incidental expenses.
Arising from this review, a case was submitted to Governrnent
for a sr:bstantial increase in the al"lowance for items such
as classroom requisife5rsl..ning, maintenance art and craft
materials etc. Approximately half of the announts sought
were approved, the deficiency [sic] was 40 cents per pupil..
As the last qualitative increase was in February 1974 it
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would be reasonable to seek say half of the tleficiency
for this year and this would cost $lO0'000."
The TIO cormnented orally on this proposal that "the
increase in the grant at the time of the last qualitative
review was detailed, so much per major cost item - tbe
papers are on the file.... It would be interesting to
compare the old spJ-it up, as reconunended by the investi-
giting couttittee - with the rates as they novr stand -
further, get Education to specify exactLy where they
would put ttre extra few cents for each cost element" .'!
In his report on ttre departmental proposalsr the Treasury
officer pointed out that they were a regrurgitation of
arguments included in a paper that went to the Associate
!,linister of Finance (TemPleton) on l-7 November L977 
'
proposing increased grants for the L978/79 year. The
"terms of reference" now quoted by Treasury to remind
Ministers of the context of this policy gtere as follotls:
The CGEX approved the adoption of new procedures for the
future review of education grants on 8 October L976'
"These procedures r,rere used fOr the first time in settLng
grants levels for the current year. The principles to be
folLowed include:
(a) (i) quantitative increases established and aruror:nced
prior to the beginning of the academic years to which they
relate
(ii) qualitative improvements continue to be dealt with
under New Policies Procedures-
(b) grant increases may have regard to the movenent in
costs which have occured from the date of ttre previous
grant anct will not necbssarily be tied to movement in any
price index." The matter would go before the Conurittee
sometime during the new year's financial review period.
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But this request for additional funds, sought outside the "normal"
phase of the budgetary cycle to which Treasury tried to restrain them,
was not the only Education problem awaiting the CCEX in the ner" year.
On 3I January the Committee (Gair in the chair, with Thomson), met with
Gandar (Education Minister), two members of the University Grants
Committee, and Miller and Burns, the Department's financial officers.
Battersby and a representative of the SSC were at hand for tbe Committee.
The main item on the agenda was the University Block Grants, on which
Treasury had reported as usual. Marshall reported the proceedings:
It was pointed out, and recognised by the Cornttittee
that the Universities would have to cope with some
5000 more enrolments in 1978 than had been envisaged
i.e. 12L percent more students.
The UGC had adopted an extremely conservatiVe
approach in seeking to ameliorate major strains in
the system. The UGC had therefore requested only
$7 rnillion out of a possible $15 million increase
for the 1978 caLendar year which involved the non-
appointment of staff to the extent of some 550,
despite the growth in student nurnbers.
It was apparently a most effective display by the UGC of self-denial under
pressure. Although some, particularly in Treasury, had severe doubts
about how the UGC did its calculations, and the accuracy of its statistical
methods, the ministers were persuaded to accept that Treasuryrs reconrnenda-
tion - no more than $2 million - was on the whole unreasonable. The
UGC pointed out that of this $2 million, 91.7 million represented price
escalation in "operating items" other than salaries and wages, ttrus leaving
only g3O0r00O to meet the incidental costs of coping with the extra students.
The Minister of Education stated, with considerable effect' that he
was prepared to accept the $2 million increase as an interjm amount "in
line with the Government's directive that expenditure and staffing constraints
[were] to be applied to the funding of non-governmental organisations such
as educational institutes" lCabinet's pre-Christmas resolution]. However'
he sought an assurance from the CCEX that it would recogmise his "request"
costs, to be examined as "unavoidable
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for the balance of $s million for increases other than non-staff
Estimates of Expenditure.', [hrphasis added;
For reasons which were not recorded in the minutesr.the CCEX agreed
to this reguest to by-pass the existing procedures, and decided to
approve an additional 92 miltion for block grantsto universities for I97g/79 (no specification stated);
note that the UGC will be seeking a further g5 millionliTire 1978 Estimates Review recognising that the
amount sought is not to be treated as New policy;
note that provision for the additional grant would needto be made in Vote: Education for L97B/79 and L97g/eO.lZZ
Herein lay the seeds of much later contention, when the universities
clajmed to have been given an additional sum essential to their operation,
and thus part of the base, and.Treasury claimed that the amount approved
was a strictry tagged "one-off" anount, not to be buirt in to the basic
allocation to the UGC.
2 February 1978: Measures to increase lio-uidity and
relax controls on consumer
spending announced
During this period before the formal commencement of the reviecrs
of existing and new policy, the ccEx was mainly concerned with the
capital works programme, which had last come before it in conjunction
with the coPE report. on 14 February, Gair and Templeton were
informed by Battersby and Hamilton (Treasury) that most items on
the capital works Prograrune were "not contentious", and therefore it
ltas agreed that attendance at the meeting by Ministers and officials
[would be] "optional." This of course was because most matters of conflict
Idere resolved before they ever reached the CCEX - insiile the MWD itself,
in the carefully stage-managed meetings with Wight and his
colleagues; in the Cabinet Works Committeei and in the constant to-and
froing between the MWD and Treasury, where officials were both confident
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and experienced in handling this substantial component of public
spending.
Tvrelve departmental prograrnmes were to be examined and on almost
all cccasions only the Comrnittee, two Treasury officials and wight
were present, The CCEX first "noted" the usual quarterly progress
report on l{orks spending (up to 3I Decembet L977) and received an outline
of how t-h.e L978/79 prograrme was beginning to shape up. The Mt{D
suggested, anil the Ministers concurred, that they should present their
clients' cases individually for re-assessment by ttre CCEX. It vras
further agreed that this "re-assessment", where it inilicated a reduction
in al-locations for progratwre levels, should be "largely confined to
Defence, Education, Electric Supply, Health and Psychiatric buildings,
Transport (airtrnrts) ancl ttre Post Office teleconununication division,"
In addition, the Corunittee "noted ttrat the level of e:<penditure on
L978/79 departmental works progranunes anticipated [woufd beJ ttre rninimurn
level which lcould] be achieved without further adversely affecting
the construction industry.r'
The historical mission of t}e !tt{D was to build t}ringsr not to avoLd
building then. But if prevailing economic and other circumstances
indicated a need for the J.atter, then rninisters were going to be shown
that this would have its costs. Officials stated that "the real resuLt"
of their virtue in constraining public works to a "miniuum" would be a
downward. trend in the construction levels. In ad&ition, "the mix
betneen continuing works and new starts reflected in the L978/79 Works
Progranune will in future result in a further reduction in ttre pipeline
of completed works." It is doubtful whether CCEX rninisters fully und,er-
stood the complexities of works plaruring and programning, but during ttre
next rtpnths this hint of future problems would become a
matter of more intense electoral as well as fiscal interest as departmental
officials sought to explain what would happen if a school or a road or
an irrigation project did not materialise.
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One small item concerned "developmental roading."
unlike rnost other works items, the provisional progranurre and the
cash leveLs for this were identical 
- $3.250 million in bolh cases
for 1978/79. It was e:cpl-ained that the provisional programre provided
for "an increased allocation over previous years: approximately
$500,000 extra had been provided for Crown land roading, inclucting :nrra1
roading, reflectjng Government poliey to accelerate farm settlementr
while approxirnately $25O,000 had been added to both district roading
and backblocks accessr including rural bridging." llhere $ras apparently
no ministerial interest in seeking detaileil justification of-these
increasesr ."
Another programme with identical progr.unme - cash levels was in
Maori Affairs: Land Settlement and Housing. Both were set at
$Lr460,000 for L978/79 with the same amount for programne levels in each
of the tr,rro following fiscal years. Justice (Public buildings, Court-
houses) was set at $2.5 mirlion for planning purposes for three yedrsr
wit$ $2.25 rnillion as cash in the coming year. Ihe cash leveI for inost
other Votes was taken back from the progr;unme level to the neanest round,
million or some other minor ritual reduction. For exampl-e, in vote:
Education (University Buililings) the progranme provision fot L978/79,
L979/8O and l98O/81 was 917.5 nillion respectively. The cash level for
L978/79 was set at $/? million. Consideration of capital works matters
remained on the CCEX agenda for several meetings throughout March f978.3?S
1'4 February: Loan of $158 rnillion raised on the Swiss
capital market
fn tlte same period, before the start of the new policy review,
Education officiaLs kept up their pressure on the Committee. On 14 Febnrary,
for example, Ross (Education) was invited to speak to a paper entitled
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"Normal Growth in Technical Institutes, Community Colleges and Senior
Technical Divisions - 1978 and 1979 Academic years". The Department
was seeking a substantial increase in the funds provided for staff
in these institutions over and above the levels reconmended by COPE in
December L977. Treasury had contested the department's application with
some vigour, pointing out that the additional personnel represented an
agregate increase for normal growth of over 5 percent (and, if aII new
policies proposed for Education for staff were added in, costs for staff
were calculated to increase by 7.7 percent). However, the CCEX approved
an increase in tutors for all three kinds of tertiary institutions "for
normal growth for 1978 academic year to 100 e.f.t. (equivalent full-tine)
tutors", i.e. 20 more people than COPE recornmended 
- to the tune of
$280,O00 over the L978/79 level recommend by COPE two months before.
Treasury's counterpunching did have a minor i:npact on rninisters.
They agreed that for planning and forecasting purposes the Department of
Education should use "an assumed growth factor of 4 percent, equivalent
to 84 eft tutors for the 1979 academic year."324 From the Departmentrs
point of view, however, this was a distant battle and its most inunediate
"needs" had been satisfied.
Other departments had, similarly, "discovered" since COPE that their
earLier estimates and forecasts had been inadequate. On 2I February,
for example, with a very long agenda before it, the CCEX considered
numerous Capital Works matters, several New Policy questions, and various
outstanding review items such as the result of an earlier reguest for a
reSnrt on hostels for dental nurses. Again, Gair and Ternpleton carried
the burden for Cabinet, with Battersby and Hamilton as advisers, and
Marsha1l (Secretary) recording decisions. No other officials
appeared except Wight, on works items. ft was reported to the
Corunittee that since the tabling of the Supplementary Estimates, "more
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people hacl become r:nemployed t-han had been expected", so the Labour
department now needed, approval to overspend its appropriation by some
$4 million. After permitting this extra bite at the cherry, the
Conmittee then agreed to Treasury's suggestion that funding for publicitlr
and public relations activities in severaL Votes should be the subject of
special attention during the forthcoming Existing Policy Review. Ttre
departments of Railways, Post Office, Ministry of Works and Defence vtere
singled out. Eehind this suggestion lay some quite thorny matters, such
as recruitment policies, increasingly sophisticated consumers of their
costly services, and so forth. Apart from that, departments like the
Ministry of Works and Defence dependecl to a very large extent on the
in-house publications with which they welded their own
bureaucracies together, and atternpted to solve problems born of internal
commr:nication and "professional" education in r:nwieldy organisations.
At this neeting the Conunittee also dealt with a serni-housekeeping natter
which had become complicated because of Cabinetrs pre-Christmas adoption
of the e>penditure strategy. Treasury now sought, and was granted,
authority "to approve minor increases in departmental draft Estimates il
respect of price increases'which have occurred since 1 JuIy 1977 fot
normal operating expenditure which is incurrecl within New Zealand in eases
where. the departments and Treasurry agree to the proposed leve1s and there
are no curtailments in departmental services.rr On the one hand, this
wouLd avoid the situation where ministers had to be bothered wittr
unavoidable adjustments to individual Votes; on the other hand, it was
an additional responsibility for Treasury to iecord all these decisions,
as individual Treasury officers made them, and continue tc anal-yse their
impact on the built-in fat of departmental tutaing.3eg
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The committee was prepared to be rnodestly resolu,l-e on sone matters -
a Health departrnent bid for aclditionar money for capitar works for
hospital building was turned down. The department had argued that a
change in the location of a particnlar project involve4 more moniy than
i-nitia1ly reguested, and this wourd be spread over the next 3-4 years.
The ccEX saw this as an in-house problem for the Hospitar Boards, and
would not support it 
- at this stage at least. A week later the Health
department came back again, this time with more details on the proposal,
and again the CCEX held it off a little longer.32Q.
But the Education ilepartment adopted a different strategy 
- its paper
on the Hardship Allorrrance for tertiary students in receipt of a standard
Tertiary Bursary would lift the lid off a pandora,s box that continued
to buzz for several years. ., D. Garrett, the Education officiar rnost
involved in policies for funding r:rriversity and other post-schoor study,
r{as accompanied by ttre aggressive Ivl. Burns (finance) and J. young.
from Personnel. Gandar led these Education officials, and Treasuryrs
Battersby hras accompanied by A. Garden, one of a tiny minority of women
working inside the central executive system. she was handting this
aspect of Vote: Education, and was a colleague of N. stirting in the
Investigating division.
The brief record of
disagreement over how the
funded:
the meeting contained many hints of profound
public education system should be planned and
In the 1977 acadernic year, out of 11,000 tertiary
students on the abated bursary rate there were 420
approved applications for extra assistance. fn the1976 year 32O cases \rere approved. It was statedthat the t)pe of student applying for extra assistance
either had parents on a Low incorne, parents with either
more children as secondary/tertiary students, or were
supported by a solo parent. There were several
applications in 1977 from students whose parents weredairy farmers whose income had dropped sigrnificantly,
and who could not support a child at a tertiaryinstitution.
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Treasury, as usual, was presented by the would-be spenders as
unsympathetic to an honest welfare argrument. Habitual roles were
reaffirmed: Treasury as hard-nosed penny pincher, departrnent as
politically sensitive, socially responsibl-e Portia, protecting t]re
welfare state. The very suggestion that the departmentrs fiscal
policies should be based on incisive well-thought out economic and
social arguments was abruptly'rejected by these officials, as it had
been, by implication earJ.ier, by the UGC. Yet in many cases Treasury
was not averse to sound argument - what it diil oppose was transparent,
ii-I-prepared or sycophantic posturing with little theoretical practical
sr:bstance to back it up. In this as in many other such situations the
only appeaL made by a spending departrent was to ninisters' prejudices,
and in the absence of anything more solid to work on, ministers readily
dernonstratecl that prejudice would influence decisions.
It was stated that there were two major argruments
against Treasury's viewpoint [which compared the
Departmentrs] recommended 926 bursary palrment plus$5 hardship allowance, total g31, with the comparable
unemployment benefit rate for under-20 year olds of
$31.50 (the unemployment benefit for single benefi-
ciaries over 2O is $41.30).
First1y, [the DeparEnent arguedJ the unemploymentbeneficiary expects to be on a benefit for a finite
amount of time, the average being 3-4 weeks; whilst
the student is on a tertiary bursary for 40 weeks of
the year. To a certain extent the unenployed can
adjust their e:qpenditure to natch the benefit which
they receive, while a student cannot do this to the
same extent, especially if in a hall of residence.
The records do not state whether this patently weak line of argiument was
disputed at the time by Treasury, or whether any further supporting data
was reguired of departmental officials. The CCEX did briefly discuss an
alternative Treasury proposal for loans to students, but decided that the
interest rates available to students "tended to be prohibitive." Agaln,
there was no record of debate on how this could be e:cplored further,
although officials were instructed to give "more thought" to the proposal.
Eventually the Conrmittee gave the Director-C,eneral of Education authority
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to grant up to $7 per week additional harclship money for students on
an "unabated" bursary rate. ftris was to be classified by Treasury
and ttre Minister as Item 4 of Education New Policies, with a Catego4/
A rating - i.e. committed for inclusion in the 1978/79 Estimat"".3Z?
A11 this vtas sore time before the New Policy review proper actually
took place.
A week later, education officials were back again before the
Comnrittee, with the UGC responding to a Treasury report on the fees
payable by overseas students. Gair was i11. and his colleagrues
Templeton and Thomson, with Battersby, held the fort. Treasury
had suggested that overseas students should be charged higher fees for
study at New Zealand universities - a recomnendation in line with the
Governmentrs general argruments for increasing fees for services wherever
possible'TheCCEXwascurtly'.advised.'byt}reUGCttrat,'@
cannot set Universitv fees." This legal nicetyr which purported to
set the recipients of massive public resources outside the scope of,
ordinary ministerial investigation and control, was an abrupt surprlse.
It was stated that "the individual university ryilg set the fees' with
the concurrence of the UGC. Individual councils could refuse to differen-
tiate between local and (overseas) students, especially overseas Pg1glg
students [i.e. those not studying on the basis of some inter-governmental
agreement such as the coloribo PIan]. [eurphasis added] '
In tlre face of ttris show of confidence born of many years successfully
protesting the inaLienable rights to autonomy of tbese "seats of higher
Learning", Treasury argued t|at in the circumstanCes "the only way Of
enforcing the Governnentrs wishes on the individual University Councils
would be to set the quinquennial grants at a lower rate and instruct the
councils to recover the shortfall by setting a ilifferential rate for
overseas students". The UGC then quoted the United Kingdom example
where ',the universities had refused to set a differential rate for
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overseas students and had accepted a loss of revenue rather than try
and set up a cunbersome and expensive administration procedure".
However, the UGC had friends everyvlhere in court - it informed the
CCEX that its desire to continue the present guota system was supported
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both the UGC and the Ministry
considered that there had "been a tendency in the pastrr to use the
training of overseas students in New Zealand as a substitute for other
forms of overseas aid. However, they pointed out, it was a hidden
virtue, since this fact sras not able to be reported as overseas aid
according to the terms of reference employed by the Governnent's Develop-
ment Assistance Corunittee. But it was, they suggested, none the less
real. The UGC pointed out that a limit had been set on the nurnbers
of overseas students who could be adrnitted in 1978 - somewhere bctween
330 and 340.
Eventually the CCEX "noted" that the UGC had predicted a "sigrnifi-
cant reduction" of 55 percent in Malaysian students seeking 1978 adnission.
It was clearly uncertain what to do with this sensitive problem, and
ordered that it be referred back again to the CCEX for reconsideration
in a year's time, as part of the 1979 review of Existing PoLicies.
Officials were to recommend ways of setting total targets for achievenent
ly J.set.328
By the beginning of April, the reviews of New Po1icy had begrun.
First up, on 4 April, was Education with a paper submitted to the
Committee less than 24 hours before it began its examination-
Like his predecessor Amos, Gandar was not neutral about pr:blic educa-
tion. The rate of spending and the capacity of the Education sector to
comnand a significant overall share of public resources suggested that
it was pointless to give the portfolio to a skilted old hand with
Cabinet seniority. Better to experiment (as happened 12months later)
with a neophyte, M. Wellington, who might be less successful before the
CCEX and other guardians of the public purse.
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In the meantime however, Gandar, apparently not recognising the
invasion of hj-s own electorate by Social Credit, put his considerable
energies into advancing the cause of education. He was a mernber of
a university council; his academic qualifications and courteous
conscientious approach to his portfolio had recommend him highly to
the senior departmental officials. He was seen as neither gauche nor
ignorant. His urbane but persisLent style had proved invaluable to
the department over the previous two years. He acknowledged the
universities' claim to be independent of direct political influencer he
accepted the need to provide financial support for tertiary students;
he appreciated, and smoothed away, difficulties in finding resources
for his government's policy of integrating private schools (mainly
Roman Catholic) into the lay state system; in public he was apparently
sensitive to the claims of new contenders, like the advocates of
!:etter pre-school education or child care establishnents, and he adopted
a liberal public stance on a number of areas such as sex equality in
education.
Unlike Amos, who not onty irequently distressed his CCPP colleagues,
but had seriously alienated many povrerful bureaucrats with his idio-
syncratic administrative style and impulsive support for various educational
causes, Gandar was seen as a "reliable" minister by his officials,
and many established client groups. The period of his administration
was to become a source of nostalgia some time later, after the 1978
General Election and Gandar's abrupt dismissal by his electorate.
One of Gandar's interests was rural educaLion. This interest was
rooted in the demographic basis of the National party and his personal
electoral background. The rapid post-war urbanisation of New Zealand,
and massive surge of students entering the school and post-school systems,
was only now beginning to tail away. It was argued that history had
Ieft the rural sector ill-nourished and disadvantaged. Gandar therefore
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submitted, €rmong his new poJ.icy proposals for L978/79 (and bearing the
coming election in mind), a paper on improving the staff,/pupil ratio
in country schools. Ireasury had adopted a negative stance on this
since, as their report to the Committee suggested, the longer-term
impl-ications of an improved ratio were predictabl.y expensive. The
Minister wanted to change the ratio from I teacher to 27 pupils to
l:25, in rural schools. This would effectively give them preferential
treatment over their urban counterparts.
The Minister had been informed of Treasury's view, and had
decided to rnodify his original claim somewhat. He stated "I have
reconsidered the whole proposal in the light of (Treasury's) reservation
and I now sr:bmit a revised protrnsal providing for the implementation of
the I:25 teacher/pupil ratio in Grades If, IfI and IV rural schools".
The Ministerrs first bid had been dated 3 Aprili Treasuryrs reply had
been immediate, and on 4 April the Minister demonstrated the financial
revision he proposed;
New Proposal
$ 36, 000
$323,000
$94 r, ooo
Difference
L978/79
t979/80
I980/8r
OId Proposal
$52,000
$345,000
$581,000
$1, 013, 000
-$16,9OO
-$22, ooo
+$370, O0O
+$390 r 000FuIl year cost $Ir403,000
The revised bid suggested deficiencies in the Ministerrs initial
case for funding. Treasury remained unimpressed. Battersby, Hamilton
and Stirling stood firm on "the substances" of their argument: the
new policy now proposed would provide "an additional 187 teachers for
eight schools only. The reduction in teacher,/pupil ratio to 1:25
would not be applied to 'six-year schoolsr. It is considered that the
pressure may emerge for a reduction in ratio to I:25 for these rsix-year
schoolsr which would involve an additional LO3 teachers". The Minister
was backed up by his most senior men, Renwick, Director-General of
Education and MiLter, chief finance offieer for the department. They
retaliated energetically against the implication that they had devised
a strateg'y to keep Educationrs foot in the door. The Minister recommended,
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and the CCEX approved, the "revised" new policy proposal for rural
school staffing. The Committee approved the use of resources to
provide a 1:25 teacher,/pupil ratio in Grades :I, III and IV rural
reight-yearr schools, noting specifically that this provision would
not apply to six-year schools.
In all, 36 new policy proposals put up by the Education I'{inister
nere approved at this meeting, and Gandar was invited to identify
those he wished to announce before the Budget. The total anount for
the 36 new Education policies was:
(L978/79) $1,915,000(L979/80',) S4, 570,000(1980/8r) $6,125,000
The effect of these policies on the Departmentrs forecast "base",
would be the annual fuIl-year addition of nearly 98 nillion to the price
of pr:blic education in this Vote alone.329
When the State Services Commission officials presented themselves
to the CCEX on 5 April, with EDP new policies for 16 departr,ents, they
had ranked the bids, and, with Treasury officials, classified their
recommendations for earlier assimilation by Ministers. The SSC reported
that the priorities it accorded were based on the following factors:
1. the necessity to maintain existing EDP systems;
2. the need to implement Government policy, particularly
in the social service areasi
3. the feasibility of implementing each proposal: this
related particularly to the ability of the Comnission
and departments to provide adequately trained staff
for running the EDP systems;
4. the need to conserve overseas funds, as most of the proposals
had a high overseas content; and
5. the expected return to the Government on the prolrcsed
investment.
Officials pointed out that the shortage of skilled EDP personnel
or
no
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in New Zealand meant that there was a limit to the volume of additional
new work that could be undertaken. in addition, they stated, they
had been sensitive to the "need" to keep expenditure on computer
installation within the level- prescribed for 1978/79 - $8.5 million.
This money included two major proposals that had already been approved
(a) the "deduction service and new payment method" for beneficiaries
of National Superannuation payments (which was estimated at a cost of
$7-345 million over three years), and (b) the installation of an
"aeronautical fixed telecomnunication network" for the Ministry of
Transport, which totalled $3.037 million over two years, starting from
t}re L979/80 financial year.
Ministers were necessarily silent before the report on the price
computerising National Superannuation transfers. This cat needed
whipping by officials. The massive costs of the scheme were far
outside anything its proponents had had in mind when National party
policy-makers set out to win their share of the electoral narket back
from the Labour government in 1975. Nor was there any suggestion that
the hidden cost of payments to the over-60 year old section of the
population should be drawn to the attention of the electorate in any
public statement of Government's spending history. But the price of
introducing the two policies specified above would be carried elsewhere.
Given the costs of the new bids, and the decision to maintain existing
systems, there rras no need to observe that this was largely a political,
rather than an administrative problem.
The SSC and Treasury agreed that under the circwnstances "only
one nell rnajor EDP system could be established in any one financial yearrr.
Ministers whose departments found this hard to take would have to
devise their own strategies for deferral of bureaucrats' ambitions,
as weII as preparing themselves to resist the commercial pressures
of the sellers of the new technology. ft presented at least as
difficult a challenge to the SSC as it did to the CCEX. But the
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arguments for EDP installation were moie acceptable when ninisters
realised that reductions could be made in salary payments to state
workers. In oiscussing the Post Office new policy bids, for example,
it was pointed out that "the main saving which would result from
placing all telephone accounts (approximately $I million in the next
financial year) on its computer network would be the abolition of need
for current 15 staff employed on producing addressograph platest'.330
It was to prove an increasingly attractive line of debate.
This was a difficult area of expenditure planning - for one thing,
many officials, including ministers, were still either unfaniliar with,
or apprehensive about the technical aspects of compu-terised information
systems. It had been suggested on a number of occasions that the
replacement of manual systems by computerised forecasting in financial
matters in Treasury (FFS) was a marked advance. That this did not
show up in some compensatory inprovement in executive control over
expenditure in the public sector was a matter of bewilderment, as well
as frustration, to decision-makers. The professional EDP experts
were naturally enthusiastic, and presented their case with apparent
confidence. In any case, the E\nperorrs new computerised clothes
were clearly acknowledged by nost people in central government as a
fashion with impeccable overseas authority - and very impressive multi-
nationaL backing. Few were prepared to demonstrate either their
personal or their professional doubts about either the demonstrable
efficacy
business
or
of
growing cost of the "scientifically based" systems on the
government.
6 April: for L978/79, import licensing
schedule to allow increase in vaLue
of consumer and other goods of 7 and
12\ percent respectivelY.
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The next day (6 april), Vote: Education once more appeared on
the CCEX agenda. The UGC had been advised before Christmas that if it
accepted $2 million then, it could still come back to the Corrnittee
for an extra $5 nillion before the Estimates were finalised. By the
beginning of April the universities had additionaL complaints to make
to the Government. They had been successful in getting Treasury
and the ministers to recogmise tbat extra cash would be needed for Post
Office charges and technical ' equipment (the former a flow-on
from the Governmentrs decision to increase P.O. charges in October
1977). But now the Treasury was attempting to resist the UGCrs
expectation that itrs request for an additional $5 million for the
next two financial years would be favourably reviewed. Treasury
had gone so far as to recommend that the Corunittee (CCEX) should
make po immediate decision on this matter, but should agree to
reconsider a proposal for increased expenditure the following year
(i.e. in the second to last year of the last quadrennirn grant). lftre
notion was clearly preposterous, although Treasury appeared guite
serious 
- 
the presence of S. Mcleod, Deputy Secretary of the Treasu:ry,
at the meeting on 6 April, with Harnilton from the Finance division'
enphasised this. The minutes continued the record of the UGCrs
argunents:
The additional $2 rnillion approved by Cabinet in
February 1978 for block grants to universities
for 1978/79 and I979/8O would be largely taken up
by increased prices for heat, light, and water.
- 
The increased costs of these items 
"rur" =."riby the U@ as an
entirely undeserved burden over which the universities had had no
control, since the Government had made a general ruling about increasing
the charges for these essential commodities, independenb of university
advice. Further, the t*linister (Gandar) and officials went on, the
"additional provision" took no account of other increases in the costs of
running universities. It was pointed out that there had been major
increases in non-salary costs in the areas of equipnent and materials,
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especially library books and periodicals. While the grants were
protected for salary increases theywerenot for non-salary costs. The
present grants to meet the universities' running costs were apProved in
1975. They were
based on estimates of student nurnbers and costs as
these were in L973/74.
Enrolments $rere now running over 500 internal
and extramural students rore than were estimated
and the universities were short of about 670 teaching
staff.
To'give the CCEX some comparative basis for this report, the l'linister
suggested that 5000 extra students represented (in total) 5 secondary
schools or "one complete university. "
By now the advocates of preferential treatment for the universities
were in full flight: they pressed home the picture of tertiary penury by
asserting that "even after the $2 million extra grant had been paidr " the
universities would still be at least $I2 million in the red. The UGC
had reassessed its current budget, and suggested that over the three years
to the end of L978 the universities would have to absorb a shortfatl of
some 933 million. It was very big business in academia, and ministers
were asked to recall a Cabinet decision on university grants in october 1975:
(i) that the universities will be advised that compelling
circumstances may arise which could make it necessary
for the Governrnent to review the grants, and
(ii) if the financial circumstances cf universities are
seriously affected by inflation, the UGC may seek
a subseguent review (*175/43/30 refers).
The CCEX, haunted by the past and the Labour Governmentrs loopholes'
capitulated almost without a struggle. The minutes recorded their "con-
cern" that block grants should continue to be "viable" and that universi-
ties "should be compensated for increases in eguipment and materials 
"o"t=,
library books anC periodicals, postages and telephones, printing and
stationeryr and fares and freight. " It was decided to approve the
provision of an additionaf $533r000 for price increases, comprising
$350,000 for Post Office charges and $183,000 for technical institutes
eguipment in Vote: Education for L978/79. This was just a necessary sop -
the real meat of that decision came in what was added:
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It was ag.reed to note that when Cabinet approved on
20 October 1975 the quad,rennium block grants for
universities which run from 1 April 1976 to 3I trtarch
1980 the Cabinet noted that the universities [wouldbe entitled to come back for adjustments in the light
of compelLing circumstances and the financial conse-
guences of inflation];
approve an additional $l rnillion for block grants to
ttre universities fot L978/?9 and L979/8Ot
note that ttre UC;C had requested a total additionalprovision of $z rnillion for block grants to universitiesfor L978/79 and L979/eO, and that the approval (of an
additional $I million) together with the additional $2
nillion approved in Februaqr 1978 gives a total additionalprovision of $: million for block grants in each of the
next two financial years.33l
Marshall was extreme!.y careful to get the record right. As witlr
ottrer occasions of successful advocacy of specific policies, such as the
integration of private schools, it was obvious that political and fiscal
victory would go to whoever got his argument in hard cold print, able to
be quoted as an ununistakeabre precedent. The uc;c had a very long
merpry 
- even if Treasury officrals considered that this was well overdue
for challenge in tle light of more mdern methods of pr.rblic e:genditure
planning.
Various other rpre or less costly new policy bids were considered by
the CCEX after this e:<hausting battle, and at later meetings. Treasury
had prepared a paper on a proposal to set up trade centres in Nortlr
America and south East Asia. Like everything e].se, it seemed, nothJ.ng
could be done on the cheap and these were likely to cost more than
$600'000. the ministers were also worried about evidence of a continuing
rise in unernploynrent, and the consequent pressure for the State to employ
unre tempotiary.'workers: (TEps) 
. In an atternpt to mask the extent of this
probrem, it was suggested and agreed that alL the TEps em5rj-oyed by
the Forest Service (usually a reliable source of occasional jobs, but
now embarrassingly olverloadeil) should be reclassified under Labour detrnrt-
ment control. However, the ccEX noted that "only the cost of work
1.
2.
3.
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perforred under the TEP which clearly contributes to the formation of
forest assets will be reflected in the accounts of Production: Forests,
and in the [department's] review of its normal p]anting prograrne the
Forest Service will consult with the Department of Labour to ensure that
the emplolrment inrplications are fully taken into account.' It was a
complex and anxious business, particularly with so many eager dserrrers
ready to take ttre published Budget tables apart in Jr:ne anil deliberately
trying t'o confuse the prrblic with accusations of stress in Governnent.
Any project which seemed to have revenue-potential was considered
but they were disappointingly ror-e-. On 1I April the Comnr-ittee approved
a Healttr department bid for $98,500 in L978/79 and $73,000 each year
after that to be paid to the National Hormone Laboratory in Auckland'
1!here, under the guidance of a clutch of professors, experiments ltere
being conducted on pituatary hormone extraction, which appeared to have
a small overseas market. But this potential gain was quickly eroded
by the simuLtaneous decision to authorise the e><penditure of $1.5 nillion
in Vote: Health Estimates for a consultant firm's "assistance' in
developing computers for health services. This decision required endorse-
urent by the Cabinet Committee on the state S"trri""=.332 rhere was no
other recorded discussion of the topic, which was to becone the subject
of a publiccontroversy and an official inquiry by the Controller and
Auditor-General- a few years Iater.
The Pol-ice needed more staff - which was considered a neht policy
rnatter; establishment of a new Ministry of Energy headguarters would
require an initial allocation of well over $4001000, which included the cost
of employing 35 new staff menlcers and equipping. them adequately.
On 11 April appeals against past CCEX decisions were heard - nine
departnents sought to have their allocations reconsidered. The discussion
on Vote: Internal Affairs indicates what was l-ikely to move the CCEX to
nodify past choices. The MinisterrHighet, anC permanent h.eaq' P. OrDea, an
oldtimer in the business of government rituals, presented the departmentrs
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case:
As New Policy, the Department had requested an
additional $300,000 to bring the total funding
for the Queen Elizabettr II Arts CounciL in 19?8/79
to $2 million. [fney were allocated only $250,000'
and the department sought a reinstatement of ttre
outstanding $5O,0OOJ.
It was a modest enough request, and ttre Minister made his case
strongly. His colleagues could readily appreciate that he and hls
officials rnight be ardent in the cause of Culture, but they were not
without sorurd business acunen:
It was stated that the areas in which lottery Profits
could be distributed was restricted and the Minister
of Internal Affairs wanted to be able to apprr>och the
Lotteries Board of Control with an application for
additional funding €or the QUEII from lottery profits
while showing that the Government had increased the
allocation to the Council. In 1975 the previous
Governnent had approved the funding leve1 of $1.5
nill-ion to the Council and the Minister wished it to
be seen that a sigrnificant increase on that funcling
had been approved by this Government.
The Corsnittee agreed to an additional $50,000 to
QE II over the $2OO,OO0 (sic) given, egualling total
$2 milIion, provided the additional $501000 was funded
from savings rnade elsewhere in Vote: Internal Affairs.
In the interests of appearing at least as capable of appreciating fine
ttrings as the Labour party, this did not appear to present any insuperable
obstacles to the men from Internal Affairs. Indeed, the Minister had good
reason to feel he had ma.de a successful appearance, since he had also rron an
additional $1O,OO0 for the regional Arts Councils, which ltas an increase
of 102 percent on the 1977/78 appropriation.
Not only was the National party prepared to support the arts, however.
Highet was granted an aclditional sum for the departnrentrs Sport and
Recreation grant, which he r*as permitted to announce to a forthconing
conference of l-ocaL boclies. He was given this srnall token' the CCEX
nuinutes recorded, because "it would be the only proposal from the Local
Government Committee ttrat would be incorporated in ttre 1978 Buclget for
e:<penditure this year.r' It wasn't mucft to offer local bodies, but'it
would have to do in the meantime.
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Foreign Affairs had founil they couldntt live on their new policies
without support, and the Ministry was granted an additional Slo,oo0 for
a proposed PR scheme; Energy needed another $301000 for its energy
conservation progranme. But Social Welfare's reguest for additional
rnney for local support services (rnainly to be used by women) was declined.
The CCEX had received a copy of the Officials Econornic Conunittee paper
on the state of the economy as at February L978, ancl tbere was clearly a
limit to those charita.ble handouts they felt they rnust make. Gill. I s
department 
- 
Healttr 
- $tas one suchtunavoidablet)area. The Minister had
asked for a $3 nillion increase on the estimate of 912 nr.illion for daily
benefits payable to private maternity hospital patients and private hospital
patients. The ccEx allowed this to go through to the gstirnates.3B3
Betlteen rnid-April and late May, the CCEX met only three nore tires
before ttre Budget was announced on 1 Jr:ne. Its reviews of existing and
new policies were effectively over for this year, and only a few outstan-
ding itens continued to trickLe in as the centre of activity shifted back
to Treasury and the Minister of Finance. on 9 May, for examSlle, a rninor
sum - the reast ttre comrnittee felt it could support - was approved for
ttre Estimates on Small Business Agencies. There was much talk about
the desirability of the policy itself, but in view of the small arnorrnt
fhe rrir",istc-r's felt they could afford,, the CCEX decided that it would be
better not to draw any attention to this in the Budget speech. The
nanifesto conunitment would just have to stand on its owrr. If anyone had
an interest in it, the Minister of Finance could quite honestly report
that sustenance had been provided. Unforeseen matters, like flooding
in the Hutt valley' h'ere given finance: tlre member for Western Hutt, w.
r,ambert, whose electoral hold was reLatively slight, could do with the
opportunity to announce that the Government woul-d provide an imnediate
payrent of $501000 to relieve distress, and a further (unallocated) srurl
of $500,000 which would be nade available in the forrn of a concessional
- 
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On 23 May, just a week before the Budget was pr:blished, the
Committee decided not to meet again unless "anything urgent arises or
papers are referred to the CCEX by Cabinet." Nothing ilid. The meeting
scheduled for 30 May was cancelled, and the CCEX took a short break after
its strenous months of work. The l{inister of Finance paid tribute to
ttreir labours in his Financial Statement: "Since its estabListunent in
1976 the Cabinet Corunitee on Expenditure has contiaued to play a key roJ.e
in achieving econornies in Government spending programnes. As well as
appraising existing C'overnment policies the Cormnittee has contrilcuted to
the restraint exercised over the grovttr in State Se:rrices staff nurber6.
rn adrri tion to ensuring that its irnportant social and econornic policies
can be implemented the Governmentrs scrutiny of expenditure programnes was
aired at keeping down the demand for imports, reducing the level of
unemployrnent and giving priority to d,evelopment prograrurcs."335
AII this was by way of introduction to the somewhat unpalatable
announcement by the Minister that net spending was expected to rise by
16.5 percent on the previous year. The Public Accotrnts for the year just
ended, to 31 March L978, had shown that the actual outturn for o<penditure
had been nearly 24 percent over ilte L976/77 result, and despite the sterling
work of the clCEx it appeared that the trend would contjnue. Ttre MLnLster
estimated that the amount the Government would have to borrow in the 1978/?9
yeerr, to cover the predicted deficit of $1,050 million, would be almst
twice that actually borrowed in L976/77. Ttre l4inister was undergtandahfy
d,isinclined to d.emonstrate how far his Governnent had gone tffards its
goal of reducing pr:b1ic spending as a proportion of Gross National Product.
It was stated instead that the "estimated deficit for L978/79 [represented]
6.4 percent" of projected GNP. Since the 1975-76 aettcit had been 9.2 percent:of
GNP, thls was somehow more comfortabl-e and straightfor*rard than confusing
the public with a comparison of total spending -relative to GNP. One
360.
significant innovation appeare<i in Budget Tabl-e 2, where the estimate
for supplementary expenditure was increased from the traditional $5Om
to the more realistic prediction of $250 nillion.
I June: The L978/79 Budget introduced in
Parliament provided for a budget
deficit of $1,050 million compared
with an outturn of $694 million in
L977/78. Some important features
of tbe Budget \^rere:
- new tax rates introduced giving
income tax reductions of up to
$382 per year on taxable incomesin the range of $3000 to $22,000
per yeart
- single famiJ.y tax rebate raised
from $208 to $260 Fer yea+
- 
petrol tax raised to give 2 cents
per litre increase in price;
- Railrvay charges raised by 12L
per cent as from I JuIY;
- 960 million paid to farmers for
drought relief;
- Minimurn farm prices for wool, meat
and dairy products established;
- $55 million provided for a variety
of job-creation progralnmes.
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The Cabinet_ Commi.ttg.e ol Expcnditure: preparing for the new evangelists
As we have observed before' one of Treasuryts major functions is to
analyse and describe the econorn-ic and fiscal context for annual budgetary
decisions by ministers. By the rate 1970's, as we have seen, this
Treasury analysis was fed directly into a new ministerial sub-system with
a filtering responsibility on beharf of cabinet 
- the ccEx. unlike the
long-established cEC, the terms of reference of the ccEtspecifically addressed
its members to the expenditure side of the Budget. The committee,s role
was to reduce the level of "noise" causd.by disagreements beb*een spending ('r
and control agents. Unlike COPE, or Lhe Main and supplementary Estimates
reviews, where only officiars participated directly up to the stage of
final reporting to the Minister of Finance, the cctsx xepresented a network
of rninisters (spending and non-spending) and officiats (both spending and
contror agents, such as Treasury, the M{D and the ssc) . By the beginning
of 1978, despite the strong reservations of some officials in ttre Finance
and rnvestigating divisions of Treasury, this network was activated
principalry during two more or less ritualised phases of the annual financial
cycre 
- ttre reviews of existing poricies and of new poricy proposals.
concerns had developed mainly because the inforrnation circulated during
these reviews could not easily be processed into the pre-Budget period (say
February-May each year) , but spirJ-ed over into the post-Budget. period.
To some extent, this spill-over was desirable. Just as the parliamen-
tary Public Expenditure Committee was able to perform much of its most
useful work through its post-e4penditure reviews, so the ccEX needed tiure to
give detaiLed consideration.to matters of existing porJ.cy, outside. the
ordinary timetable of Estimates compilation. However, the permanent
status of the connittee invited spending agents to use the ccEX to exploit
any opportunities that they could discover to gain quasi-cabinet approval
for policies whieh were eittter clearly "newn or could. be disguised in sorne
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way as "existingn
Since at the beginning of 1978 neither Cabinet nor other control
agents had been able to agree on a sufficiently tight code of spending
lll.es-_(such as mandatory tit for tat) , the behaviour and. attitudes of
control agents in the CCEX network assumed critical irnportance. As
has been indicated, even quite vigorous and cautious CCEX ministers and
advisers found it extremely iliffieult to resist the appeal-s that spending
agents mad,e to the Cornrnitteers prejudices, fears, ambitions and other
points of political vulnerability.
It wiII be recalled that durirrg the 1972-5 period of Labour governnent,
a number of problems debilitating the CCPP were caused by the fact that
only this inner Cabinet was party to the full Cabinet-level discussions
about the parameters of fiscal planning. Initially, even Treasury and
other officials had been excluded. Irthen it was found that ministers on
their own could not handle the volume or the complexity of budget infor-
mation entering that sma1l, intense network, the CCPP was forced to relax
its own exclusive nature. Treasury officials were admitted; gradually
other control agents rrrere adrnittedi eventually officials from most depart-
ments, bent on tracking down the most powerful authority for spend:ing
decisions, were included. By the end of 1975 the number of rninisters
directly involved had increased. The original elit,e was invaded and the
purity of ttre inner Cabinet in effect, degraded,.
However, the Cabinetas a whole $ras never fulIy in control of (or priry
to) infornation (or expenditure rules) which guidecl the decisions of the
CCPP. For example, the debate over the export-oriented economic strategy
adopted early in 1978, discussed over many difficult months by CCPP ministers
and officials, was not replicateil in its entirety in full Cabinet. As a
result, either because of their relative ignorance of the economic conseguen-
ces of their ovrn policy decisions anil spend,ing priorities, or their l-ack of
agreement on the specific impact an agreed economic strategy should have
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on policies in their porEfolio-areas, many Labour ministers with spending
roles found it difficult to accept fiscaL restraint. This difficulty
could not be obviated by Labour's attempts to involve selected conuntrnity
leaders in the Government's expenditure problems.
Clearly, the incremental model of decision-rnaking, coupled with the
conventional WestminsterTWhitehall model of executive government, indica-
tes that most governmental d.ecisions will be the outcome of negotiated
agreement between parties contesting shares of limited resources. However,
the main problems in the New Zealand system of budgetary management derived
from the fact that not only were physical resources, such as money, limitedr'
fiscal information itself was treated as a scarce resource. Thus, gaining
access to essential infonnation was itself an outcome of success in
negotiated conflict resolution.
By early L9'18, Treasury anC some ministers had learned a great deal
by ten years experience. It was agreed that so far as possible the rules
and principles gnriding fiscal control agents must be made explicit. copE,
for example, continually refined, and often disseminated, the formal rules
and informal codes of behaviour that would be appropriate in any annual
exercise of cost prediction. Messages that were not suitable for communi-
cation by Treasury circular (either because their written specification
would unnecessarily alarm or forewarn rninisters,/spending departnentsror
because they were not capable of precise definition, given technical and
other clifficulties)-were conveyed by the setting of informal norms. On the
whole, COPE members adopted Treasury's ethic of frugality, reliabillty and
honesty. Wherever possible, the formal rules vrere overtly appliecl; when
this was impossible, or for some reason distasteful or inappropriater other
covert rules were applied.
Further, by early 1978, Treasury and other control agents operating
through the CCEX networks had learned that as far as possiJcle the ground-
rules for special exercises such as the new and existing policy reviews,
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and the preparation of draft Estimates, must be precise, and faniliar
to all contenders, The purposes of PPB were latent but none the less still
powerful towards the end of the 1970's, Departmental officials were
encouraged (and sometimes obliged) to examine the outcomes of spending
policies in other than financial terms. trhey were invited to describe
the reasons why they had developed particurar spending habits; they
sometimes even providleil with specific opportunities for fonnal educatlon
through Treasury/SSC courses, serninars antl so forth on fiscal nanagementi
they were eneouraged to enploy nanagement-level staff with special diag-
nostic qualifications in policy and expenditure audit,
At the same tirne, by early 1978, ministers on the ccEX had to a
considerable extent been taken into the confidence of Treasury. Info:nna-
tion that before 1970 was communicated to only a very snarl network
doninated by the Prime l4inister, ttre Minister of Finance and the Cabinet
Economic Cornmittee vtas novr circulated to the CCEX network, and some even
found its way into the sub-cabinet system of the parliamentara' caucus.
More ministers were familiar with the jargon of economic and developmental
planning; those who had gained experience through induction systems like
the PubLic E:<penditure Conunittee were acguainted with some of the urajor
influences on departmental spending, and the structural constraints on
effective fiscal control. By 1978 the rhetoric of PPB could not, generate
the same exciternent and interest iunong ministers as it had when Douglas
(ll.p.) and Winchester and others hurled themselves against tJre barricades
of pragrnatism, habit and caution during the mid-1970rs. These would-be
refornrers had misjudged both the political character of the executive system
and the complexity of changes that would be required in ttre minds, and the
behaviour, of spending and control agents as the reality of econonric
recession became aPparent. Nonetheless, they were able to demonstrate
that both administrative rationality and ernbedded e>rpectations of growth were
susceptible to logical and technical analysis, and perhaps, reform.
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on the one hand, by the end of the 1970's, political- preferment
was no longer an entirely respectable qualification for continued
control over a given (anil often major) share of pr:b]-ic resources' On
the other hand, shifting political and economic priorities were forcing
central executive agencies to discover more effective economic argn:rnents
for sigmificant refo:rn of the system for fiscal planning and tesource
allocation,
Over about ten years from the late 1960's, the COPE-based systeut
for (a) e>cpenditure prediction and (b) financial allocation had evolved
in such a way that responsibility for these tasks had been re-distributed
among'various executive sub-systems of interest and influence - a nelt divi-
sion of labour anong existing elites. As we have seen, one nodal cluster
had formed around COPE itseLf. Here Treasuryrs influence and control
were dominant, but necessarily in conflict with tlre behavioural and
poLitical norms of spending agents in departments and other control agents
in the lffD and State Services Commission. The information generated by
.the annual COPE exercise was constantly rnodified by experience and know-
ledge (political, adninislrative and technical), and provided the data-base
for other evolving networks at nr:inisterial level - the short-lived CCGE,
the CCPP and then the ccsxl36
As each of these Cabinet sub-systems assumed its historicaL shape, it
was subject to specific experimentation and generaL adm:inistrative influences'
and remoilelted in the light of political circumstances. But in aII cds€sr
ttrere were two constant factors: (a) the participation of Treasury (often
including the same individual officials as had advised ministers before
1970) and (b) the basic commodity (infonration about public noney).
From time to tine in the post-1967 period, after Treasury officers
vrrote their seminal report on financial rnanagement in central government,
other complex factors assumed particular significance. For instance,
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the quality of elected rninisters was usually crucial: their personal
intelligence, their inctiridual and collective learning capacity, their
individual conunitrnent to agreed purposes, their abil.ity to work on a
cooperative basis, the amount of energy and time they were prepared to
devote to specific financial tasks, the identity and effectiveness of
certain mavericks (we may compare the iliffering inpact of, say
Rowling and Irtuldoon' - their relative cabinet status'and opposing
party affiliations are only partial explanations as to why one was more
influential than the other in fiscal management and expenditure manipula-
tion). In addition, the timing of various attempts. at reform was
important: in 1967, for example, Treasury managers trere open to proposals
for internal re-organisation but less amenable to suggestions that the
departmentrs constitutional relationship with the Cabinet system, or the
parliamentary-based select conrnittee system needed re-assessment. In
December L972. new Labour minisi,ers !{ere prepared to embark on a detailed
analysis of the political desirability of their portfolio responsibilities.
However, within onl-y a few rnonths they were r:nwilring to risk exposing
their tender ambitions to ideological or technical re-assessment. rn
late L977, CCEX rninisters were at the point of accepting the deficiencies
of current expenditure guidelines for analysis, but incapable of persuading
their Cabinet colleagues that the coming election year was the ri-ght time
to sta.rt changing the rrrles.
Further, Bolitical svmbols, such as the "size" of the public deficit,
the "level" of inflation, the balance of payments "outlook" or the "Ievel"
of emplo|ment in the labour market, had fluctuating sigmificance. Labour
ministers, for example, assertecl publicly that fu1l employment was their
guiding principte. But in fact they marched to the beat of a different
economic drummer, and approved (or neglected to specify) other econornic and
social priorities perceived as having more immediate electoral importance.
National party ministers proclaimed t}te rhetoric of balance - in overseas
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payments, in the relationship between public spending and GNP, in the
relative shares of the labour market occupied by tlre public and private
sectors. But, like their party opponents, they too found that other
needs, such as electoral volatility or ttre approval of international
lending agencies, distorted their prefered symbols of governmental
Purpose.
From tjme to time, different clusters of interests assumecl varrrina
@ance in ttre execut:ive networks of information and control; on
occasion, officials in, sayr the State Services Comnission, or in aggres-
sive spending departments, took the limelight; particularly nuinisters,
such as Freer, Douglas, GilI t or, more notably,
Muldoon, with their own "teams" of officials or extra-govelrnmental allies
in the professions and industryrenjoyed tenporary dominance; serni-
autonomous actors, such as peopie in the r:niversities, the NZ Planning
Council, the trade unions or prirnary producers association, we:ce eittrer
coopted by poLitical patrons, or employed for specific administrative
purposes by officials; these and innr:merable other rninor actors such as
ttre Controller ancl Auditor-General or the occasional social or administra-
tive evangelist exercised strong, if r.urpredictable, influence over botlr
Treasury officials and decisions about money allocaEion. This influence
depended increasingly on how far such competing elements formed cybernetic
nodes directly invol-ved in the COpE-based networks.
Nonetheress, the single most important question was: who defines
the formal and informal rules for e:<penditure planning and fiscal alloca-
tion, on a continuing basis. Ttris had always been the key in<licator of
political Povter in the central executive netyorks. Ten years after ttre
institution of COPE its imtrnrtance had been significant-Iy re-emphasised
because of the changing economic. and political circumstances of ttre New
Zealand welfare state. Authority to define the formal rules need neg
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imply the right to define the informal rules, so that Treasuryrs
power rested on its ability to assume both formal and informal roles.
Since information itself is the critical resource in expenditure planning
and resource allocation, an understandirrg of the character of Treasury's
role is central to any analysis of political behaviour in the New Zealand
government.
I.
2.
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18. Education was, however, a rr:nning sore ttrroughout the decade. For
example in October L970, after ttre ltinister of Finance had asked
the Secretary of Treasury to amplify reasons for the increase in
go\retnnent e:<penditure for L9?O/7L forecast by treasury, Lough had
replied ttrat:
"46t of the increase [sic] can be attributed to increa.ses in
education ercpenditure; l3t to increased defene e>penditure and12t to increased healttr e:rpendituig."(i)
Early in 1972 in a paper to the Minister of Finacrre on forecasts
of expenditure for l97L/72, identifying the causes of anticipated
o\r€r-eq)enditure (by soure $II miUions), the A.ssistant Secretary
of Treasury (Shailes) comnented:
"On 9 December 1971 in report 8796 the forecast over-expenditurein Vote: Education qras go.5 million. Ttre departnent is norp fore-
casting a:r over-expend,iture of $8.0 million. I*ris major shift in
the forecast indicates ttrat ttris department's prcrblerns with regard
to expenditure could have yet to be overcone. For ttre past 4 years
over-expenditure on this Vote has been as follors:
L97L/72-
8r010
l*te situation revealed above shows a marked deterioration in tlre
department's ability to keep expenditu:re within reasonable li-mits.In an atterpt to prevent over-expenditure in this financial t€€rr1Treasury did not trim tJ:e departmentrs requests. Notwithstanding
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upward trend.
the deparhrent is reporting to the Minister of Finance on the
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reasons for the over-expenditure. you may wish to discuss the
whole situation wittr your colleague the llinister of Education."(ii)
In the eveni, the problem of Bducalicn spending ryorsened. Ttre
General Elections of November 1-972 brought the Labour party 
-
explicitly cornmitted to social services spending - to offioe. Inhis 1973 Budget, the new Minister of Finance (Rorvling) reportedprovision for a 14 percent increase 
-i-n the L973/74 Education
estimates over the previous year (iii); in 1974 the same Minister
announced an estimated 15 percent increase in expenditure over the
1973/74 financial outturn (i.e. actual expenditure) on Education(iv) ; in the 1975 Budget the ne.xt l{inister of Finance (R.J. tizard}
aru:ounced that estimated spending on Education in the coming fiscal
year would constitute a massive $216 nuillion more than expenditurein the sarne Vote in 1972-3. "These figures", he stated, ,'represent
a very substantial boost to investment in education and reflect ttre
importance that the Government attaches to t.Jle place of education in
New zealand." (v) Threre were undoubtedry listeners who felt tJlat
other factors, sudr as tl:e .:.pparently irresistible demands of the
education fraternityr may have contributed to this somewhatgratuitous ministerial assertion. Even the attempted determinedbite at this fat cherry by the first CCEX was rather feebly
reported by I'luldoon (then l'iinister of pinance) as follovrs:
"Itre restraints effected within Vote: Education have been minimal
compared with those in other areas and reflect the Governmentrs
recognition of the importa.nt place of Education in New Zealand
society. In fact, ttre Estimates provide for a total expenditure
of t696 million in 1976-77 for Vote: Education, an increase of
$66 nrillion. This rate of increase is nearly doublie that of the
rise in Government expenditure as a whole."(vi)
It was not, however, until the end of the decade and the commence-
ment of a series of annual reviews of existing and new policies by
a collectively-determined group of ministers and Treasury officials
that the psychologry of constraint began to impress itself on the
thinking 
- 
j-f not tJ:e behaviour 
- 
of education authorities.
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64- rn Jarruary L972, Treasury instructed Departments to prepare $reir
estimates for financial allocations Ln L972/73. (j)
(Educationrs Estimates t]:at year were prepared, r,in the ne$, voteformat which provides for both University and Technical rnstltuteBuildings to be absorbed in the new vote: Education',.) (ii)
A state services sarary order had been made on 4 Febnrary Lg72,
showing allonvable salary increases. The Education vote itiltincluded the Child Welfare division provisions (iie I}TL/72 year,$I,704,000 had been alLocated to child welfare; it was stated thatthis had been r:nderspent 
- $1,5361000 had been errpended in ttrat year).)
Ihe total requested fot L972/73 Estimates (rvhictr included se\fenitems totalling nearly $3 million over trr'e cops-approved base) wasas follms:
L972-73 LTTL/12 goooTotal vobd E:<pended
$356 ,51-0 , ooo 323,140 338,097 ( iii)
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A paper from Treasury to the l4inister of Finance (in the period
before ttre tabLing of L972/73 Estimates) noted that:
"In fixing tJ:e target. for e>rpenditure growttt in the current
financial year, Cabinet (in Ct'l 70/44/2L/L of 27 October 1970)
agreed +}tat COPE be i'lstructed to base plans for expenditure in
L97I/72 on an increase in real terms of 4 peroent. There have been
some disadvantages in the administration of the target set in
real termsl
Firstly, departments tended to Place different interpretations on
the meaning of 'real terms | , and
Secondly, they all tended to assune a minimum increase of 4 percent
for ttreir qrrl Votes.
It is therefore proposed for 1972/73 to convert the target increase
in Governnent expenditure into money terms, including an allowanae
for likely sa1ary and wage increases.
On tJlis basis... the increase in gross governllent voted e:cpenditure(i.e. excluding permanent appropriations) in L972/73 should be
limited to 15 percent over actual expenditure Ln L97L/72. Assuming
ttrat actual expenditure in L97L/72 will equate the Voted exPendituret
ttre posiLion would be as follows:
9n
L,974
296
Target for gross voted expenditure 2r27O
As estimates are being considered by the COPE comnittees for J972/73
and the two subsequent years are in present prices for approved
policies, ttre gruidelines should be calsulated as follols:
Target for gross voted e:rpenditure L972/73
$nt
2,27O
less allowance for general salary increase folloring
April L972 *t year review (say 12 perc€nt increase) say 12O
Estimated gross voted e:<penditure L97I/72
Plus 15 percent increase (to cover salary and
cost increases and costs of increased servies in
Le72/731
Iess
not
etc,
allowance for ottrer cost increases, nett services
yet approved, social security benefit increases
say 100
COPE target for Gross voted e:gendituxe 1972/73 2,O5O
Ittris target is $76,n(3.85 percent) above the e:<pected outturn for
L97L/72 and $51 million less tllan tlte request's submitted by
departments.
On the same basis, if $re assumed a sinuilar grorrrth pattern (say
3.5 percent) in tJre years L973/74 and. 1974/75 the target fignrres
for these two years expressed in present priC:es would be $2r120m
and $2r200m respectively. These suggested targets can be courpared
wittr the actual reguests of $2rl76m and $21245 million.
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Recomrnended COPE total linit of
L972/73
2050rr
Le74/75
229g*,, (iv)
During this period departments and Treasury debated whether
Estimates should be shown in Gross or Net terms. One subrnission
on Maori and Island Affairs noted ttrat "Parliamentary procedure
reguires that gross departmental expenditure be show in the
Estlmates. lfhis means ttrat it is not possible to offset rec€ipts
against expenditure, and merely vote the net amount. The reason
for this is to enable the House to see the full expenditure effects
of Government policies.
Ttris procedure is constitutionally sound and follows the provisions
of the Public Revenue Act. It can, however, impose a limitation
upon departments with trad"ing operations, particularly those rH&r,,,
could be subject to short term fluctuations in market conditions,rrrv'
On 31 January 1972 Cabin€t had directed tJle SSC to review its
staffing needs, to retain staff ceilings, to argrue for increases
only in special cases and in exceptional circumstances. Althougtt
no date has been set for the SS review, 'early Lg?2' was mentionedin Cabinet I'tinute. (vi) An undated draft review report l.ras sent to
Chaiman of the CCSS about early March. It noted that:
"Ttre staff ceiling system of control was introduced in 1967 as a
r€ans of controlling total nrunlcers of staff enployed in Goverrment
departments. Apart frorn consideration of special cases arising fron
time to tirne, the ceiling allocation has been reviewed arurually,
based on submissions from permanent, heads on staff requirements for
the next fj-nanciaL year.
In January L97L, Government deeided to tighten control of staff
numbers as one measure needed to limit the grcwth of Government
expenditure, and staff ceilings vrere reassessed on 31 January 197I
on tJ:e basis of actual staff employed plus an allcsrance of up to
I percent to provide for ccrnmitments for recruitment etc. fhis
resulted in a reduction of the total ceiling of ttre Pr:blic Se:nrie
by 1,529. Since ilanuary L97L, specific approvals have been gi\ten
by Cabinet to increase ceilings in departments by a totaL of[not given]."(vii)
(on 6 septenber 1971(viii) cabinet had decided t}at the ssC should
undertake a general review early Ln 1972 to ascertain and recommend..*r
requirenents for Ehe 1972/73 financial- year; and on 31 January L972'"^'
it was noted that ttre CCSS had directed the SSC, in conjunction wittr
Treasurry, to examj-ne areas of possible savings by the reduction of
adm:inistrative staff , and ttre simplification of internal departurental,procedures, and the SSC hras to report on staff reguirements by
31 March L972.)
llLre eventual recommended total , department by department was * (about)
8OO, i.e. from 58r200 as at 3l/3/72 to 59,000 for year 1972/73.
The CEC discussed a Treasury report on new policies on the 28 Mardr
L972.
"The Committee decided that before giving full consideration to
the report it should be referred to Cabinet and laid on the tabLe
so ttrat Ministers could be given an opportunity of comrnenting upon
Le73/74
2 12Onr
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the relative priority of the new policry items.
4 April 1972, Cabinet rrerely noted the report."
Iherefore Lough (Deputy Secretary of Treasury)
divisional directions to forward reports on new
along the foLlowing lines:
Education was allocated (L972/731 $356,50O,000(included Works
On 22 May 1972 CFhinet reoeirred Treasurjrrs various
In the event, on
required Tf,easury
policy proposals
(a) they must be referred to as a nex_p.flEa, and wittr a note
of the parti cu lar freasur-y r" tGg/"las s i fi cation i
Treasury must point out in each case that in considering
ttre proposal ttre calinetEffiould need to bear in rr.ind
all other new proposals contained in ttre 'rnew policy report";
if an item was given a rrcrr, then iL would be in order for
Treasury's report to the Minister to contain a firm recom6n-
dation for,/against it, "d.epend'ing of the merits of the case"(undefined);
(d) in aII cases t}re Treasury report should recouuend that tlre
CEC take the appropriate action;
(e) any proposal being reported on but not previously'includecl
in the new policry report should, unless there we:re special
extenuating circumstances, be reconunended for deferral:
i.e. "Treasuryrs attitude should be that the matter be
deferred for consideration until tlre following financial
year.il (x)
Notice of financial allocations for L972/73 were sent to individual
Departments on J.7 April 1972 (election year). As in t}re previous
year, when the Budget had been on 10;Iuxle, departments were told to
expect anr even earlier Budget in 1972, and thus would they pJ-ease
"give priority to ttre preparation of the Estimates".
(b)
(c)
and science Budgets(xi)
new policy reports.
"Lt was understood that these reports would be referred to when
individual Ministers submitted the respective proposal.s for the
Consideration of Cabinet." (xii)
Sone new policies (e.g. Education secondary staffing bids) referred
elsewhere by Cabinet
e.g. CC on Sociaf
met on 30 May. It
by Pickering, and
Affairs, for conurent.
was chaired by L. Adam
four officials.
lhis Cabinet Conrnittee
Schneider, and attendedl
By the L5 June, t}re Estimates had been tlpe-set at the Governrmnt
Printing Office. However, on 19 ,lr:ne additional Budget Decisions
were noted by Treasury (Note to B. Galvin from Lang).(xiii) lhey
had been 'phoned at 11.45 a.rn. by P. Brooks and concerned:
(1) Payroll tax (approved;
(2) Dividend rebate (approved);
(3) "Mr GilLrs Kindergarten proposal" (approved);
(4)
(s)
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$10 million "special assistance to farmers approved, to be
transferred to trust account to the extent that it is not
spent during the current year";
Add. $151000 to be given to SmalL Business Centre (i.e.
fron $20-301000 wittr $5000 of ttrat in Main Estinate and
$lOrOOO j-n Supplernentaries. (xiv)
Treasurry circular L972/3, 3I January L972. T3/4/72.
EL/3/a, 24 Marctr L972. In T3 4/72.
198O,/81: over $1000 rnillion in tbese EsLimates.
Subnitted to Cabinet for approval on 25 ilanuary L972.
B/4/72, Treasurar records, wellington, N.Z. Assumed SS
staff grorrth linited to 2 percent, i.e. drop off 3000 people.
Treasury 8768, 7/L2/7L, T3/4/7L, Treasury records,
Wellington, N.Z.
(vi) $4 72/2/13 Ln T3/4/72, 3L.Ianuary L972. Treasury recordst
Wellington, N.Z.
(vii) Treasurlf records, Wellington, N.Z.
(viii) Clr TL/35/6, Treasury records, Wellington, N.Z.
(ix) el| 72/2/L3r T:reasury records, Wellington, N.Z.
(x) 13/4/72, Treasury records, Wellington, N.Z.
(xi) 19 April 1972, Memo from r,ough to Treasury divisional
directors. T3/4/72, Treasury records, We1lington, N.Z.
(xii) i.e. ind.ividual Ministers, not the CC@X; then Cabinet in
full. el 72/2O/L6, 22/5/72 in T3/4/72, Treasur!' records,
!{ellington, New Zealand.
(xiii) l'tremo from Lang to Galvin 19 Jr.rne l':972' T3/4/72, TreasurT
records, Wellington, New Zealand.
(xic) Treasury 221, 15 ,June 1972, '13/4/72, Treasury records,
lfe]lington, N.z.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
379.
Chapter Four
Part II:
65. @l 72/52/27. Cabinet Office, parliament, Wellington, N.Z. Those
invoLved or interested in the historT of the CCPP suggest several
xeasons for its establishment. The present Secretary of Cabinet,
P. l4illen, for example, places some inrportance on the provision of
an alternative to the National Derrelopment Conference agencies,
which were croseLy associated with the previous governrent.
Initially only a small handful of senior nrinisters were to be
involved, to provide a "filter" before information went to the full
cabinet. "r was brought inr" ltirren recalIed, "as an honest broker,to assist t}te nembers of the CCPP and keep an eye on what developed".
Other officials consider that a major reason for the establishment
of the CCPP was Rowling's determination to keep the Prire l4inister
interested in econonr:ic policy. Kj-rk rarely attended Cahinet
Econornic committee meetings, and as time went on his appearanoes
there became more and more infrequent. Another official (now
Secretary to the Treasurlf) conunented that a senior Labour Irtinister,
M. Connelly, had been appointed to the Cabinet Economic Comrnittee
but were considered likely to be "so rlisastrous" ttrat his colleagrues
devised another form to which he was not, and need not be invited -the CCPP.
66. Cabinet office files. Parliament, Wellington. See also Treasury
pAper 4, 8 Decenber 1972, public Expenditure 1969-70 
- 
1972-73 and
COPE Estimate 1973r/74, from L*g, Secretary to the Treasury to ttre
I"linister of Finance, T3/4/73. Ia,ng summarised the current
financial position, noting, as a general comment, that rthe out-
standing featurne of the fublic finances at the present time is the
very large increase in expenditure which is rising even faster than
revenue. The result is a very snbstantial increase in the deficit
before borrowing for L972/73 with a further expected rise next year.
See Appendix 38.
67. cP (73) 25 and CP (721 1151, and Ct't 73/2/3 (Treasury Circular L973/L
issued on 19 January.) Cabinet Office, Parliament, wellington. See
Appendix 38.
68. Shailes to Iough, 18 January L973. T3/2O/72. (Ibo coples in
Appendix 38), Treasury records, Wellington, N.Z.
69. Treasury Circular 1973/I, T3/2O/72. 19 January 1973. To al1
Permanent Heads: Governmert n*p"rditure R"ri"w of .
Treasury records,
70. Ty 6L7, Government Expenditure: Review of Existing policies, 12
Mardt L973, Treasury records, Wellington, N.Z. See also Appendix 38.
7L. King, !!-inister of sociar vfelfare to the l"iinister of Finance,
Government E>rpend.iture, Review of Existing Policies, 16 March 1973.
13/22/73. Treasury records. See also Appendix 38.
72. For various examples of departmental returns, see Appendix 38, iten72. Includes Education (2 copies), l4inistry of Works, (2 copies) rPost office and Department of Trade and Industry. See also T3/2O/72.
Treasury records, Wellington, N.Z. (copy in Appendix 38).
73. rbid.
390.
74. Draft paper from Secretary to the Treasury to the l{inister of
Finance, March L9.73t T3/2A/72. See ApPendix 38 (2 copies).
75. Lang to Shailes, 8 March L973. See Appendix 3B (2 copies).
76. Ilt 617. Government Expenditure: Review of Existing Policies.
12 March 1973. I3/2O/72, Treasu4/ records, Wellington, N.Z.
See also Appendix 38.
77. Winchester, Creative Intelligence, op. clt.
78. f3/20/72, Treasury records, Wellington, N.Z.
79. Cabinet Office, Parliament, WeJ.lington. CCFP 22/3/73, Ln Prime
trlinister I s Office, Parlianrent.
80. E (73) and 36 and PP (73) !42 "Econonic Policy: Achievi-ng Faster
Economic Growtlr: See also notes towards this paper, in Appendix 38:
22 March L982, 'outllne of Possible Paper: Econonric Policy:
Adrieving Faster Econonic Growth' , T6L/L/2; and IY 526, GrorthStrategy, 28 February 1973.
l{ajor papers tabled and circulated during this period were:
28 February 1973: From Lang (Secretary to the Treasury) t E(73)42,
a paper addressed to the Cabinet Economic Committee 1ty 52L)
entitled Growth_Strategy., and another report (1y 528) entitled
lnflationffiic strategv. Both were discussed at the
CEC on I Marctr 1973. See C.AB. L2L/L/L.
21 March 1973 (ta.Utea at CCPP on 22 March f973): From Minister of
Finance for the @,C (2L/3/731 l E(73)35 and E(73)36 (also classified
as PP(73)142): "Economic Policy: Actrieving Faster Economip Growth".
lltre CCPP decided that this paper should be re-drafted and submitted
to Cabinet on 26 March L9'73, in abbreviated form.
26 tlarch 1973: Cabinet adopted the 16 point sunma4t of PP(73)l'42,
. 
arrd this decision was necorded as CM 73/L4/29, in CAB. L2I/L/L.
16 JuIy 1973: Cabinet affirnred ttre economic strategy of 26/3/73
in CM 73/3L/2O, in CAB L2L/L/L.
81. CCPP, 22/3/73. Cabinet Office, Parliament, Wellington.
82. rbid.
83. See Appendix 38: \l 528 Inflation Risk and Economic Strategv,
2A February 1973.
84. IY 521, T3/2O/73. Treasury records, Wellington. N.Z.
85. Budget Report No.l, PP(73)6 and 13/22/73 in Ci\B L2L/9/4 I'Finance
and @neral" 4 April 1973. Cabinet Office, Parliament, Wellington.
See also A@, PP(7317, 10.5.73. In CAB L2L/L9/4.
cabinet offieltingron.
86. CCPP. 11 May 1973. Cabinet Office, Parliament, WelJ-ington.
87. 8.R.16, loc. cit.
391.
98. CCPP minutes, 16 May 1973. Cabinet Office, Parliarent, Wellington.
89. Budget Report No.4, 8 June 1973.
Parliament, Wellington.
CB LZI/914. Cabinet Office,
90.
91.
92. 22 June, L973. CAB L2L/L/\ Part 10. Cabinet Office, Parliarent.
93. rbid.
94. CP'E LZL/L,/I Part 10. Cabinet Office, Parliarent. See Appendix 38.
95. CB LZI/L/L Part L0. Cabinet Office, Parliament.
96. rbid.
97. Ibid. See Appendix 38.
98. rY 2041. W L2L/\/L. Cabinet Office, Parlianent.
99. UB L2L/L/I. 20 August 1973. Cabinet Office, Pariiament.
100. fhe evidence for ttris conurrent is taken from documents in ttre CCPP
files and informal discussions with officials serving t}te governrnent
at the time. A former Secretary of the CCPP (also Secretary to the
Cabinet) recalled intense distrust of the Treasury and in particular,
Lang, by the Prine Minister, Kirk, during this period. This conflict
undoubtedly exacerbated other significant differences anong Labour
ninisters over the direction economic and fiscat policies should
take. A paper entitled Economic Strategry: Growttr Strategy (C@P(73) IO) dated I6/LO/73 eajointly by Treasury and the I'tinistries of Foreign Affairs, Agri-
culture and Fisheries and Customs. There rrras no explanation as to
why the Department of Trade and Industry did not parLicipate, although
the fact was recorded in the introduction to the paper. T.wo days
later (ne1731111 noted that DTI had taken part in the preparation
of a further submission to the CCPP entitled Economic Strategy:
Advisory Services. On I Novernber the matters under dispute were again
indicated in (PP(73)14), a paper entitled Economic Strateg.y: A
Prescription for Development. Significantly, this paper lrras tabled
by Freer, Minister of Trade and Industry and the introduction noted
that ttre document should be read 'in association with' the earlier
Tr,easuryr/Customs/Foreign Affairsr/Agriculture and Fisheries sr:brntssion(PP(73)f0). See Appendix 38.
10L. Winchester, op. cit.
Lo2. rbid.
103. CCPP ninutes and CAB L2L/L/L Part 10. Cabinet Office, Parliarent.
LOA. T3/2O/73. Accompany COPE report, 14 December 1973. CCPP lvlinutes,
Cabinet Office, Parliarnent.
w L2L/9/4. Cabinet Office,
CCPP records, Cabinet Office,
Parlianent, Wellington.
Parlianent. See Appendix 38.
I05. Treasury Report, 3570, 14 December 1973. Cabinet Office, Parliament.
392.
106. C!,1 73/56/62. Cabinet Oftice, parliament. See Appendix 38.
107. Treasury Report 528, 28 February 1973, Inflation Risk and'Economic
Strategv, CAB L2L/L/L Part 10, Cabinet Office, Parliament.
108. Winchester, Creative Intelligence, p.242, Cxlt 73/56, 62, p.2.
I09. See note L00 above.
1f0. IY 3994, 20 February, L974. T3/2O/73. The Treasury. Wellington.
See Appendix 38.
L11. Ibid., p.2.
L12. E.G. Devey, Secretary of Labour to the l4inistry of Labour.
H.O. 7/9/72, 28 January 1974. T3/2O/73. Treasury.Records,
Itlellington. See also Appendix 3B.. ALso in ttris Appendix are other
examples of departmental responses to ministerial requests for areas
where existing policies could be rnodified in Education (wittr
accortpanying T:reasury comments) and Agriculture and Fisheries.
113. Windresterr "Creative Intelligerlce,', p.244.
114. Budget Report No.I. (1923) pp(24)13 in CB L2L/914. CabinetOffice, Parlianent.
1r5. I!' 3570, L4/3/73 had forecast that the forecasted lever of e:pen-diture fot L974/5 would mo'rie towards a 20 percent per arlnum increasefor the third year running. Budget Report No.3, entitled Net
Gonernment Expenditure 1974175 (PP (74) L4) confirmed ttris prediction.
Budget Report No.2. (pP(74) 15) . Cabinet Office, parlianent.
L16. Bu9geg Report. No.4, L974. L4/3/74. Government E>q>endj-ture: New
.policieitsryts, in cAB L2L/g/4/ nt.
117. ccPP ninutes, 17 March L974. cabinet office, parliament. ttredecision to meet in this unusual way was taken by the ccPp at its
neeting on 6 March 1974. This was noted in the minutes as an
agreement to meet secretly in Auckland on Sunday L7 March to carry
out the New Policies Review. rnitialry, the meeting was to belguietly arranged" in a room in ttre Souttr Pacific HoteL, Auckland,but was later changed to Tizardrs home. All but watt (who wouldbe late) and WaLding would be available. Faulkner was nominated to
replace Walding, who was overseas. It !.ras suggested that the review
would take 5-8 hours to complete.
118. rbid.
II9. rbid.
1.20. Budget Reports Nos. 9,L0 and tl. pp(74r22, 23 and 24.
121. General Medical Services Benefit. pp(74)L7.
l-22. Review of Existing poricies, rv 3994, Budqet Report No.3 and
Economic Trends all in cpa L2L/g/4. cau@iarent.
123. CCPP uuinutes, L2/S/74. Cabinet Office, parJ-ianent.
124. CAB L2L/914/ Cabinet Office, parliament.
383.
fZS. pin@, 30 May 1974. Hon. W.E. Rowli.ngr Minister
ef Finance. AJHR, 8.6.
126. CCPP l4inutes, 2/e/74. Cabinet Office, Parliament.
127. Ibid.
128. Review of @, Ty 5042 tabled on 7 Augrust L974.liarnent, and, T3/4/74, Tieasury
records, Ihe Treasurl , Wellington.
129. fy Circu1ar. Noted in CCPP minutes, Ca.binet Office records,
Parlia.nent. L974/28, 9 August L974, T3/4/74.
13O. Winchesterr "Creative Intelligence"l pp.257-258.
131. Souree cited by Winctrester as "New Zeal,and Treasury Department:
Review of Government Expenditure" (2 August L974).. r'Creative
fntelligencre" p.245.
132. rbid..
13 3. Ibid . , p .24'7 .
134. PP(74)80. Cabinet Office, Parli.ament.
135. CCPP minutes, 28 August, 1974. Cabinet Office, Parliament.
136. CAB LZVL/L. P. l{illen to W. Rowling, "secretr', 26 June L974,
Economic Situation. Cabinet Office, Parlialrent..
137. IY 6557, Econoraic Prospects, CAB LZL/L/L, Part 11., Cabinet Office,
Parliarent,
138. PP (74) 81. Econonuic Situation.
139. Economic and Financial Affairs, CAB L2L/L!L. L2 September 1974,
Cabinet Office
140. CAB LZL/L/L. L8/9/74. Cabinet Office, parli-ament.
14I. llerno from P. ldllen dated 3 October L974. Econom,ic and Financial
Affairse CAB LZL/I/L. Cabinet Office, PariiarenL.
L42. "Secret" and "personal" note from P. !4i11en to the Prime llinister
and Mr Tizard, 1,4 October L974. CJ\B L2L/L/L. Cabinet Office,
Parliament.
143. Draft I'{lvrc to t}re }'tinister of Finance, 1I September 1975,f3/2O/75. Treasury records, Wellington. See Appendix 38.
L44. "COPE: A new perspective". 24 Augrust 1974. G.P. !{heeler.
See Appendix 38..
145. Winchester, ."Creative Intelligence", Chapter IVr pp.229^29I.
See Table 28, page 290.
146. Treasury Report 6042. B/4/74. Treasury records, WelLington, N.Z.
394.
147. Winchester, "Creative InteIligence", GrapEer IV for further
analysis of the value of this tlpe of exhortation.
L48. T3/4/74. 6 Decenber L974. Treasurl records, Wellington, N.Z.
149. Ibid., p.277.
150. CAB L2L/L/L, Part 13, Current Econom-ic Situation Report as at
February 1975. Cabinet Office, Parlianrent.
151. CCPP minutes, 5/3/75. Cabinet Office, Parlianent. CCPP authorised
by Cabinet to direct departments as necessary to reduce er<penditure:
sq/74/5O/2L.
152. rbid.
153. Winclresterr "Creatirre Intelligence", pp.27L-272.
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155. Budget Report No.3, 20 March. CeB L2L/9/4/ Cabinet Office,
Parlianent.
156. CCPP rn"inutes, 2l/3/75. Cabinet Office, Parliament.
157. CCPP minutes, 26/3/75.- Cabinet Office, parliament.
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I59. CCPP ninutes, 2/4/75. Cabinet Office, parliament.
160. CCPP minutes. 9/4/75. Cabinet Office, parlianent.
161. rbid.
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155. CeB DL/g/4. Cabinet Offioe, parJ.ianent.
166. CCPP nrinutes, 2I/5/75. Calrinet Office, parliament.
I57. Budget Report No. 34, L975. Cabinet Office, parliament.
cl,a L2L/e/4.
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22rttay 1e7s. @
169. Budget Report No. 2r, 197s. Budget strategy. cabinet office,Parliament. Approved by CabineL LL/5/75 in Cag L2L/9/4.
170. order in council, 19 May 1975. ccpp minutes, 14 May 1975. c:J"inetOffice, Parliament.
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207. rbid.
208. For an account of the establishnent and initial work of this
' section of the Prime Ministerrs department, see Jonathan Boston,
' 
"High Level Advisory Groups in Central Government,,, M.A. thesis(urrpublished), University of Canterbury, l9gO.
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2I0. OECD Econornic Sunreys: New Zealand, Augrust L976. (OECD, L976).
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concerning tJle Government during tlre first few years of the
CCEXTs activities.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Xhe Life and Death of COpE
Ttre annual budgetary process
Itntil 1970, there were only two regrular phases of the annual budgetarl
cycle when public expenditure was reviewed: during the preparalion of
ttre annual Estimates of Expenditure, presented j-n the form of Votes to
governtlEnt departnents, and in t]re preparation of t]re Supplenuentary
Estimates. rrregurar reviews occurred ,,in the light of changes ...
becorring evident in New ?eaLarrd.'s econonic position.,' (senior Treasurlt
'lofficial.) ' rn 1967, for example, a review of ',f.ikely e:<lrenditure'l
for L967/68 was conducted by the Governnent. As a consequence?
instructions were issued to departnents that tJ:e total increase in
e:rpenditure for L96?/68, conpared to L966/67, was not to exceed 4 percent,
including provision for aitditional vrages and salaries arising from a
recent ruling-rates survey.
In 1970, a new conuruittee of government officials was appointed 
-
the Comrnittee of Officials on ptrbLic Expenditure (COpe) 
- as part of
a wider series of changes in the central government's machinery for
errpenditure projection, allocation and review.2 ,t. establishnent of
coPE foLlowed the introduction of ppB as a system for inproving the
quality and usefurness of departmental expenditure forecasts and
strengthening the informational base for allocative decisions by the
C;overnment- Ttre central Government accounting system had been revised
tuder a (1968) srGMA format. srcr,lA 
- 
the Sys@m of rntegrated Governnent
llanagerent Accounting 
- 
provided "the basic r-rrified structure of the
Pttblic Accounts, the rethods by whictr receipts and payments transactions
are classified, recorded, and summarised, and the information reported
back to departments and the Governnent. Ttre SIGIIA codes are nunerical
ridentlfiers' used. to elassify eactr individual transaction ... analysed
by ttre computer centre for Treas[ry'r. 3 Ttre Estimates of exSrend.itu.r--e,
presented to and approved by Parliament each year, are the most faniliar
SrGuA-based accounting report, altlrough as it had developed by ttre end
of the 1970s the centralised, standardised computer-based accounting
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system of the Government could provide for a variety of informational
needs.4
over the next decade, untir 1980, the procedures, rures and
forecasting 
- allocative systems for the Governmentrs tiscat policy
imBlernentation were continually modified until, as we discuss later,
another comprehensive reform, similar to that which produced copE, was
Lnstituted with "the Quigley system".6 Between rgzo-19g0, the nu:nber
of reviews of public sector spending was extended to five more or less
regular phases of the annual budgetary cycle beginning around octoberTDecemberwith:(i) an examination of departmental forecasts of expenditure on existing
nt policies over a three year forward period. This review was
condueted by coPE, which, serviced by Treasury, investigated and
recommended approval for a1l government department bids for money for the
next three years (a longer period in the case of some items such as
capital works). The details of this review were forwarded to Cabinet before
_Christmasffor examj.nation and approval, with an accompanying memo from the TreasuryA
on the COpE-based proposals;
(ii) a small, three-man sub-conmitt,ee of
the Cabinet, the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure (CCEX) examined in some
detaiL selected aspects of existing policy costs, and reconmended changes
in these to Cabinet. Prior to 1976 this review lras carried out prin-
cipally by the Treasury; after that tirne the ccEX was advised by
Treasury. Any changes recormnended and accepted by the Cabinet were then
used to adjust the basic COPE figures for the costs of government pol5-cy
for the next financial year, and the two forLowing years, arthough in
general these were given less stringent attentioni
(iii) 
-review of new policies: the ccEX exarnined every new policy
proposal put forward by ministers and departments for introduction in the
next financial year, in addition to the agreed CoPE-based aLlocation.
Reconunend.ations on ne$r policies, which vrere presented to the CCEX and
Treasury by departments according to specific criteria of priority, each
graded in certain categories of desirability or necessity, were made to
Cabinet. Certain policy costs, such as those made for General Expenses grants
to Education Board.s, hrere generally not reviewed by the CCEX or by COPE,
but consid.ered during other phases, such as the preparation of the draft
Estimates. where the estimated costs of approved new policies were
accepted by the cabinet for the coming year, they were added on to the
coPE-adjusted totars. F.eviews of existing and new policy occurred
between February and late Apri1.
395.
(iv) review of the draft Estirnates: a small group of Treasr,rlz
officials prepared the COPEInew policy-adjusted totalsr and added
in, or subtracted any costs nr:inisters decided should be included in
the forthcoming Budget, usual.ly announcedin June,/,ruly each year.
After the Treasury draft Estimates review, and final adjustments
by the Minister of Finance and,/or the Cabinet, the Budget and Estimates
were publisheil as public documents showing estimated allocations to
government departments for the current financial yearr and changes in
allocations, classified according to existing functions such as adminis-
tration personnel travel, to the vote for the previous yeart
(v) review of Supplementary Estimates: at this stage (generally some
five months lnt,o the current, fiscal year, and around August-October of the
calendar year) unforeseen, overlooked, inflated or other costs were
added on to the basic Estinates, after a review of their necessity by
ttre treasury. Where d.epartmental submissions for adclitional funds were
approved for acceptance by Treasury, and adopted by the Cabinet, they
were considered by Parliament and publisheil as Supplementary gstirnates. 6
The COPE review usually bgan some weeks before the conduct of
the Suppl-ementary Estimates review by Treasury, and with COPE's annual
reappointment, the new budget cycle began. AlI budget proceedings are
conducted in strict secrecy, although during most phases constant
negotiations are conducted between the Treasury finance divisions, the
financial advisers in the government departments, and representatives of
various interest groups, statutory bodiesr advisory groups and so forth.
By the end of the 1970rs then, the published Budget and Estimates
of Expenditure thus represented the results of odvce cnd decisions made
by a variety of agencies:
(i) a variety of specially appointed agencies, such as the New Zealand
PJ-anning Council or agencies associated with the central government, such
as statutory bodies with responsibiS-ity for the provision of hospital
se:rrices or education, which either monitor aspects of government exPen-
diture, or review trends in their own receipts of public funds, and
advise the government, through departments or the Treasury directly'
accordinglyl
(ii) the government d.epartrnents which provided fo:nrard estimates of
their financial ,r".d", 7-
(iii) the Treasury Investigating officers and their senior col]-eagues
in the Finance divisions of the Treasury; I
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(iv) the conmi'ttee of officials on public Expenditure 
- that is,
a main committee of selectecl permarrent heads from government depart-
ments, plus a cluster of working parties of officials, mainly the
financial managers of government d.epartments and officials from the
Treasury, the Ministry of Works and Development and the State Services
Conunission;
(v) the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure (CcEx), a three-person committee
chaired by a senior Cabinet minlster with the two financial ministers
(Associate and Deputy) appointed by the Minister of Finance, ad.vised
and. serviced by the Treasury (Iinance division);
(vi) the cabinet, which examines the overall budgetary strategy, then
apProves or rejectsr/defers financial proposals in the J-ight of this and othe.r
recornmendations or decisions made by other Cabinet sub-committees such
as the Cabinet Economic Committee, the Cabinet Committee on the State
Services or the Cabinet Works Committee;
(vii) the Minister of Finance, whose final responsibility it is to
present the Budget to the House of Representatives and move that supply
of funds be made. to giovernment departments as detailed in the Estimates
of expenditure .'9
At various stages during the budget cycre, specific d.ecisions by
the Minister of Finance and, the cabinet may affect the preparation of
Estimates, or the actuar alrocation of funds. For example, as was the
case for several years in the rate r970's, it may be decided that price
leve1 changes occurring betweenr say January and JuJ-y will be accepted
by the government, but any such changes occurring between July and
January must be absorbed by government spending agencies. or, again I
specific or across-the-board changes may be made at Estimates time 
- 
for
example, Ln 1978/80 it was decided that $Xmillions must be found , fo!
financial reasons, from the COPE-adjusted draft estimates, while gy millions
weresubsequently added on, imnediately before the Budget announcement, for
economic reasons. Specific constraints, such as the mandatory lowering
of annual staff numbers in the State Services, or a reguirement that no
new policies woul-d be approved by the Cabinet unless it could be shovrn that,
their costs could be suLstituted for the costs of some existing activity
or Prograrune, arso have an irnpact on the finaL Estimates, in their
published forur.
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rt should be noted briefly at this stage that unLike, say, the
United States, members of ParLianeirt other than Cabinet ministers have
very little direct responsibility for, or detaited knowJ-edge about, the
preparation of the annual Estimates and the Budget. Although parliament
has constitutional responsibility for the allocation, nanagement and
controL of government funds, and although Government backbenchers may be
privy to some asSncts of pre-budgetary decision-making through caucus
discussions, this is largely a formal matter. The day-to-day decision-
making, much of it highly confidentiar, is carried out by senior pubric
servants and Cabinet ministers, who eventually submit their decisions
through the Minister of Finance to parliament and the public for
consideration and d.ebate, but are not necessarily bound to change their
decisions in the light of parliamentary comnent.
Peter Groenewegen identifies four major budget functicns of AustralLan
governments, which in general coincide with those functions perfornred by
the annual a:dget in New Zealand:
nl. an evaluation of totat government and public
authority receipts and expenditures within the
budget sectori
2. orcleaf.ng of priorities in expenditure and revenue
Aitems to determine the scale of public services and
also to implement the governmentrs objectives on
income and wealth distribution and on the allocation
of resources within the prblic and private sectors;
3. to act aS Parliamentrs instrument of accountability
' and control over the government in its handling of
financial matters;
4. to provide a means of control over the leve1 of econonic
activity of the nation as a whole in order to secure an
acceptable degree of price stability and unemplolment
as well as an adequate rate of economic Arovrth subject
to a constraint imposed by the balance of payments and
the leve1 of international reserves.
Functions 2 and 4 describe what are generally regarded as the
economic functions of the budget: the alLocation function, the
distribution function and the stabilisation function.,, 1O
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The all-ocative function, wittr which we are here concerned, is
performed by the cluster of decision-makers listed above, influenced
by a wide variety of factors such as tlre history and current circum-
stances of New Zealand's economic system and the preferences, past
and probable, of the electorate, as well- as decisions made as to the
fulfilment of the other functions of the Budget, such as stabilisation
or the miintenance of high levels of employment. The tension betrveen
the various functions of the Budget is itself a source of conflict among
decision-makersrand between decision-makers and the innumerabJ.e proponents
of various policies. While decisions about the aggregate level of
public expenditure, the relative amounts of public money to be allocated
to various purposes and the impact of these decisions are capable of
economic analysis, and evaluation in terms of economic theories, as well
as theories of fiscal- behaviour, they are essentially poJ-itical" in
nature, insofar as they demonstrate particular distri.butions of political-
Power. While some problems in the allocative function of the Budget
derive from limitations in knowledge (for example, forecasting problems)
or deficiencies in management or technical skills (such as inrnature
cost-benefit analysis or mis-natching between manual and computerised
accounting systems), so that planning how, where, when and to whom
resou.rces should be allocated via the public sector is extremety diffi-
cult, nany more problems arise fron the political nature of the Budget
itself. It is the politics of resource allocation via the annual
.government 
budgetary process which pri:narily concern us in this chapter.
Until 1980, few detailed accounts of the New Zealand centraL
governmentrs financial system of resource allocation had been published.
Relatively few people, including members of Parliament and many senior
public servants, outside the immediate Cabinet-Treasury networks, were
fully appraised of the structure or procedures of the annual budgetary
cycle. Even fewer members of the public, incLuding those pressure
groups and advisoryr/statutory agencies in fairly constant contact with
central government, had any means of learning about the system other than
through conments nade by the Minister of Finance in his annual Budget,
speech, or by a study of the published Estimates. The annual COPE
re;rort, and the projections of the cost of running the government's
various prograrnrnes, were not published, alttrough it had been tentatively
suggested initially that this might occur.l1'rfr. question of pr:blication
was frequently raised both inside Treasury and, for example, by members
of Parliament serying on various select committees such as the Public
Expenditure Committee. In 1973 the Treasury published a brief, although
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fairly detailed account of PPBS as it had then been implemented in New
'72
Zealandr- and occasional articles by info:aned officials and politicians
appeared throughout the 1970rs in different professional or small-
circulation journat". b
In J.98O, this major gap in public knowledge was partially plugged
by David Preston, a senior Treasury official, in a succinct account of
the formal outlir(es and procedures of the central governmentrs budgetary
system: Goverrunent Accounting in New Zealand: an explanation of the
accounting and financial system of the Central Government of New Zealand.
This useful book describes "the changes which have been rrade in the past
decade as the Governrnent system adapted to computer-based accounts and
at the sane time was reshaped to provide the greater depth of information!4
required for policy review and expenditure control."- To some extent,
the contents of the following chapter are intended to flesh out some of
the features of that government system, with a concentration on the
political behaviour of tlre various "actors" involved in expenditure
pJ.anning, resource allocation and financial and policy reviJw. It is
not intended to duplicate material now available publicly ttrrough
Prestonrs explanation. Since the review by COPE of the financial base
of governmentrs allocative behaviour was for a decade the critical
element in the budgetary cycle, we begin our discussion at that point.
The more detailed observations of officials' and politicians' behaviour
are drawn from a study made by the author during 1978' when COPE was
reviewing policy costs in preparation of the Estimates for the L979/eO
15financial year.
llhe Conmittee of Officials on Public Expenditure:
Wtren COPE was set up in 1970, it was modelled on the mechanism develop_ed
T6in Britain as the Public Expenditure Survey Conunittee (PESC) in 1961.
By 1970, New Zealanders had adopted from Canada and the United States
the concepts and approaches of PPBS (Ptanning, Programing and Budgeting
1n
Systems) . -' The exotic origins of these procedural developments remain
visible in the New Zealand budgetary system, and their manner of introduc-
tion and institutionrin central government, has already been briefJ"y
discussed. The theoretical basis of the management information systems
developed in support of COPE during the 1970's is similarly derivative.
The influence of systems theory, and of decision, information and con-
trol theories is evident in the particular systems devised and used
by the Treasury and other control departments, and in the occasional
18
analyses which are available in New Zealand.
400.
The essential purpose of the officials' review (COPE) was
cybernetic: to improve the communication of specific categories
of information ttrrough the central government networks, and to
improve the capacity of the government for fiscal control and manage-
ment. The Government needed some systematic me.rns to improve its fore-
casting capacity in relation to its own projected expenditure intentions
and commitments. Projections of probabLe future levels of Govetnment
activity must incl-ude sufficient inforrnation to indicate the extent of
future deficit funding. Three year foreward forecasts of fiscal policy
considerations, channelled through a filter such as COPE, in conjunction
with decisions made by the l,linister of Finance and ttre Treasury and
approved by Cabinet, should provide a nore reliable and rigorous contribution
to uracro-economic planning.
In addition, the information generated by Treasury and COPE in
the period six months pricr to the final publication of annual Estj:nates
for expenditure' and the appropriation of resourees for departmental use,
could provide a better basis for annual allocative decisions. Thus, a
COPE-based budgetary system would perform two functions: a sigmificant
contribution to macro-economic planning, through its three year fonrard
forecasts of the costs of existing government policies, and a similar
contribution to allocative decision-making in that the report of COPE
would provide the basis for the annual draft Estimates.
In the event, after nearly ten years of operation, it rrras apparent
to some most closeJ-y involved in the COPE system that while COPE's final
forecasts may be used as the basis of macro-economic decision-making,the
compositors of those forecasts, (that is the departments themselves), did
notr for a variety of relasons, necessarily include nacro-economic
considerations in their forecasts. They concentrated instead on the
composition of the first year of their three-year forecasts, since COPETs
approval for this was accepted as a pre-draft Estimates estimate, guaran-
teeing them a given level of activity for the coming fiscal year, regard-
less of future years. The tension between these tr*o aspects of COPE not
only generated modifications to the system over the 10 years of its
operation, but emphasised the need for changes at the end of the 1970rs
described later as the development of "the eui.gley concept',.
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!.tembership and the initial terms of reference
lltren COPE was first set, up as a small group of Permanent Headstr9-
convened, chaired and serviced by the Treasuryr aPProved by Cabinet
and required to report annually to the lilinister of Fjlance, its terms
of ref,erence included the following instnrctions:
(i) to undertake a critical survey of departrnents I reguests
for increases in_j1gslg on existing policy, particularly in
current and capital expenditure'
(ii) to analyse the effect on
target levels for the government
over a three-year forvrard period;
existing poJ-icies of keeping wittrin
expenditure over a three-year period
(iii)
nated
to indicate areas where expenditure could be reduced or elimi-
(iv) to indicate areas where expenditure forecasts were not in
accordance with existing government policy.
In the fi-rst year of COPE (1970) it was requested in the terms of reference
that new policies (i.e. those policies which ministers intended to initiate
during the coming year) be included in departmental subnissions. In
subsequent years new policies have been formally dealt with at a separate
review. Historica1ly, when departments prepared their estimates of
expenditure for the coming year, they loaded in bids for policies which
did not yet have fo:roral ministerial or Cabinet approval. They extended
existing policies in scope so far ttrat expenditure on a particular item,
activity or progranme increased significantl-y. Before L97l/72 there was
no adequate mechanism for ministers, or Treasuryr to distinguish between
existing policies, approved new policies' proposed new policies,
significant extensions of existing policies, or departmental wish-lists.
Treasury was thus unable to oblige rninisters to defend their departrnentrs
bids with acceptably-based, agreed justifications. Mi:risters were likely
to find themselves more subject to the vagaries of economic chance and
political preferment than the professional administrators in their
flepartments could tolerate. The capacity of etovernments to plan ahead
depended upon advice which in many instances could not be substantiated
through any existing procedure. By 1979, COPE's terms of reference
had been significantly modified to read as follows:
(i) to survey government expenditure over a three-year period., and
(ii) to establish that departmental forecasts represent a realistic
assessment of the costs of existing government policy.
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It will be observed that there are sigmificant, differences between
ttrese i-rnstmctions, and the terms of reference wittr which COPE first
began in 1970.
The formal task of COPE was to survey existing goverilnent expendi-
ture i.tems, and provide a realistic assessment of the cost of existing
government policies if these remained unchanged over three forecast
years.
Costs were assessed by departments in money terms, according to
instructions issued by COPE via Treasury. At the completion of the
Conunitteets examination, which took place over several weeks the COPE
secretariat prepared two reports:
(i) a "maxi" report, which described in narrative and computerised
fo::ur the specific forward leve}s of money reconmended by COPE for
all,ocation to individual departments. The departments themselves,
however, received only their own detailed adjustments and aggregate
total; (ii) a'tnini'r report, which was forwarded to ministers' with
an accomPanying Treasury note, at the completion of the COPE cycle.
lltris mjni report, and the Treasury contrnent' formed ttre basis for the
government's expenditure strategy for the coming year.
fn the strict terms of Treasury-COPE instructions, departments
should not inform their spending agents of the reconunended levels until
final Estimates rrtere approved by Cabinet. fn fact, large spending
departments are obliged to operate according to the demands of their
internal organisation and the anticipated future demands of Treasury
for updated draft Estjmates. "If ve donrt shoot the stuff out to the
field as soon as the maxi has gone through Cabinet we wouldn't survive
later - meeting the lvarious formal budgetary] dea dlines is almost
iqrossible as it is." [Departrnental finance manager].
The rninisters thus began the calendar year with information on what
constituted the base level of resources, expressed in money terms, as at
August the previous year, reguired to maintain existing policies. The
subseguent survey of existing policy by the CCEX was an attempt to remove
certain global items from this base. The review of New Policy ra'hich then
followed was an examination of those policies (expressed in money terns)
which ministers hoped to implement over the forecast period. The
addition of approved new policy costs to the COPE-adjusted base indicated
the levels of future government spending. This enabled the ministers to
identify the margin between available revenue and probable expenditure -
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$rpressed as the deficit before borrowing. As copE had developed,
hovrever, it had come to provide more than the Sase lever- of money
reguirements - i.e. a forecasting function. rt also provided the
basis for the following year's Estimates of expenditure, which reguire
the formal annual approval of Parliament, via the Public Expenditr:re
cormittee (see chapter 5) i.e. an al-locative function. year I of the
COPE forecasts lirere regularly rolled forward, with price adjustment for
inflation and other approved amend.ments, as the departmental Vote for
which ministers sought appropriation each year. It riras frequently
suggested by Treasury and other officials that Years 2 and 3 should ro11
fomard similarly, but by 1980 this had not occuned.
The initial COPE requirement that targets be observed and that
expenditure predictions be related to thern had been abandoned wittrin a
few years. rt was not only problematic because of governmentsr short-
tem wish-Iists. It proved to have inherent defects because targets
could not in themselves suggest a satisfactory way to relate essential
and irresistible growth in some areas to static or minimal growth in
others. Nor couLd targets, in themselves, demonstrate how the complex
range of departmental and ministerial interpretations of objectives
contaLned in uniformly 
- labelled progranmes could be equated. This
definitional probl-em meant that the force of adjustments down (i.e. Iess
money for some) could not easily be evenly spread.
Further, it was patently funpossible for officials, even those as
supposedly wedded to the public interest as Permanent Heads, to nominate
sacrifices for their own d,epartments, or to recommend the imposition of
involuntary sacrifices on others "of our own kind" (Senior official, 1978).
Not only did officials clearly recognize that this was essentially the
responsibility of erected ministers, but they al-so saw that it was
fundamentally destructive of the mutual trust whieh describes their
essential relationship with each other, and with their own ministers.
Finally' targets also allowed for tJ:e possibility of departmental
bidding upward, if predicted. costs in some areas could be padded
sufficiently to disguise a lack of actual need. The exlnnsionist
tendencies of the system could not readily be contained by this particular
instructiorr.2l
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(f978): COPE res for t}:.e 1979/80 Estimates:
The 1978 corunittee consisted of the permanent Heads of Treasury, the
state services commission, the Ministry of works and Development
(permanent members) and four other departments. COPE was supported
by a working Partf of officiars appointed by the permanent Heads of
each qf the current member departments. These officials were generally
the senior financial officers in their own departments. They were again
sub-itivided into four sub-cornmittees, each of which had a parcel of
departmental submissions to examine.
coPE was convened and serviced by Treasury officials from the
Finance I divisj-on which has responsibility for the preparation of the
annuar Estimates and other reviews in the financial cycle. The copE
secretariat attended each sub-committee, working party and main copE
group meeting, recordeddecisions and reconunendations made by each group,
and wrote the draft and final copies of the approved reports .to ministers
and departrnents. Responsibility for the operation of the SfGltA system,
and supervision of the Financial Forecasting System (FFS)was carried out
by the Financial !4anagement division of Treasury. Preliminary exami-
nations of departmental submissions to copE were carried out by offieers
fron the Investigating division of Treasury (TIOs). CoPE meetings thus
involved the following officials, onry some of whom had voting rights
i.e. authority to rnake a final decision.
(L) Main COPE: The Permanent Head.sr'who had voting rights.
They werg accompanied by those senior officers who had been members of
the Working Party, ttre deputy Secretary of Treasury, the COPE secretariat
and an official from RIvtS. COPE met at least twice during the year of
Its appointment (at the beginning and at the end of the exercise) and was
chaired by the Permanent Head of the Treasury.
(2) Working Party: A11 officials appointed as the Working party
(who had voting rights), plus the COPE secretariat, and an official from
R!'IS. Chaired by a senior Tteasury official, ttre tlorking Party met twice.
(3) sub-committees: working party members (three men, one acting as
chairman, and including a senior Treasury man who attended all sub-
conmittee meetings, but did not act as Chairman). This group had
voting rights. It was assisted by a member of the COPE secretariat; a
member of the RI4s division; the Tro responsiJcle for the vote of the
department being examined; an official from the State Serrrices Commission
(SSC), who in 1978 cooperated with the TIO in making a joint report to
COPE; members of the departrnent under investigation (usua1ly the senior
aceountants). The sub-cornmittees met as often as required to complete
examination of all departrlents.
401.
The network of cornrnunication represented by COPE included at
Least two constant elements:
(a) the Treasury officials, who are Cescribed later in terms of their
informal codes of style and motivation; the sr:b-committees, Working
party, main COPE group and senior Treasury officials were critically
dependent on the reports and reconunendations of the single official who
is constantly in touch with anit responsible for departmentaL Estinates -
the TIO; and
(b) the information considered relevant to the process, which was defined
in terms of the rules governing eligibility for inclusion on the COPE
agenda: existing policy expressed in money terms.
It will be suggested later that these two elements are anong the
critical components of the entire Budgetary cycle.
COPE at Work:
The COPE exercise began, for most large departments at least, some ti-ne
prior to the circulation by Treasury of formal instructio.ns from the22
Cabinet Economic Cormnittee for the conmencement of COPE. However,
the formal circular (,futy; was- headed: Committee of Officials on Public
Expenditure (COPE): Forecasts of net expenditure for 1979/80, 1980r/8L
and 1981,/82.
Each year the circular (which had a paral.lel version for TIOs) reminded
departments to be aware of "the need for continuing restraint in
Government expenditure throughout the forecast period." Departments
were warned that precise justifications would be required, and that
voluntary identification of any non-recurring or "one-tjtne" iterns - i.e.
areas where extended funding could no longer b6 justified, or expected.
Instnrctions were included as to1
(i) the form of presentation (e.g. narrative statements justifying
individual programme components; a statement of objectives for
the aims and objectives of existing policy, exPressed wherever
possibl-e in quantitative termsi presentation of- information by
Seg and PLCs (price level changes) in computerised form for FFS
departments, and on standardised worksheets for the few non-FFS
departments still coming onto that system.)
(ii) the assumptions accepted by COPE as relevant to the forecast:ng/
costing exercise1. e.g. X percent selected price level changes;
Y number of pay periods to be included in forecasting personnel
costs.
406.
(iii)theagreeitperioclforcalculationofpricelevelchanges
(PLcs): 1 January to I JuIY;
(iv)theextenttowhichdepartmentsmaybidformoneytocover
price and volume growth over and above the base 
provided in
ttrecurrentyearrs[;unelEstimates(annualallocations'or
Votes) ;
(v) items which would be examined on a global basis by a 
speciaL
procedure'oracommitteeestablishedforthatpurpose,srrch
asanofficialsorCabinetsub-conunittee,e'g.estimated
overseas Travel costs; Purchases of motor 
vehicles; CaPital
worksprogrammes;grantstosubsidiaryagenciesordependent
statutory bodies such as hospital boards; 
EDP 
:*;:*t"tt
local authority expend'iture; Personnel 
forecasts'
Asagruidetothebattlelinesforforthccmingwrangles,,,existing
policy.,wasclearlydefinedas.,thosepoliciesapProvedbefore3lAugust
19?8. No new policies are to be included"' 
To reinforce this
instruction'adefinitionofwhatconstitutednewpolicywasappended
to the circular:
,,A neri{ policy is an expendi'ture proPosal which 
introduces a new
activity, or significantly alters the size' scoPe 
or quality of an
existi-ng activity. New policy proposals include 
those which:
l
b
t
(a)
(b)
introduce new activities e'9' new grants
alter the size or basis of a subsidy or grant 
unless such
changeisinaccordancewithaGovernment-approvedautomatic
formula. - .
extend existing services where such extension 
has not been
apProved bY Government' ' '
cause a radical alteration in the performance 
or nature of
. 
an existing service e'g' computerisation of a 
service
previously performed manually; create an EDP 
Master Eile'
change replacement 1rcLicies of capitat or eguipment
re-programme funds' i'e' shifting funds between 
progralnmes or
24
activities 
"'
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Thisdefinitionrepresentst}reilistillationofTreasury
experience over past CoPE years' During exaninations' 
practices were
occasionatly identified by Working Party mernbers 
as qualifying for
addition to the definition'
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In 1978 the Working Party and sub-committees looked for
a statement of predic€d need, expressed in net money
termsr. to cover future delivery of existing government
lnlicies
. an indication by departrnents of non-tecurring items (which
the COPE rules said may not be built in to bids)
an indication that departments had followed earlier cabinet
instructions to introduce new policies ggla where these had
been substituted for existing ones
an indication of alreas in which existing policies might be
terminated iluring the forecast period
itens and activities, presented as programme components,
whose costs maY be reduced bY COPE
the effective realism with which price and cost leveLs had
been estabLished
ttre methodology emptoyed by itepartnents to calculate costs
compliance with the instnrctions and requirements of the coPE
circular.
T'he relevant information:
COPE trad a number of items on its hidden agenda. Whatever riding
instructions were introduced in any current yeErr, there were a number
.of pressures which COPE attempted to deploy in order to mould the sort
of infornation departments submitted.
Departnents were urged to -
(i)act@'Cabinetgaveitsapprova1sforpoIicychan9es
(anendments or new policy) on a three-year basis. (fn factt
unless such information is specifically required by cabinet'
nost approvals are given on a one-year basis only')
(ii) act as though the ministers had actually set an agreed target
IeveL (in average annual percentage tsms) for the real consump-
tion of resources in the public sector over a three-year period'
(Infactrsuchl-evelsrwhentheywereestablishedbythe
ministers, were stated in terms of the Post-COPE annual expen-
diture strategy.)
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(iii) act 
.q!!cagI, the ministers were fully competent to
select among options iilentifiecl by COPE as areas or
items of discretionary growth. (Treasury men on COPE
constantly looked for growth items to puL1 out and flag
separately as discretionary expenditure proPosed by
departments, but not necessarily justifiable in terms of
the mi.nistersr own PurSnses)
(iv) act as though the ministers, when making such sel-ections,
would naturally choose on the basis of the current ortho-
doxy: e.g. Programmes which would provide the greatest
contribution to export-led or productivity-promoting
developments.
Alternatively, COPE i:nplied tJlat given all tJ:e available infonrntion'
ministers would naturally prefer to select anong it on the basis of some
unspecified but nonetheless extant list of priorities for social and
economic development.
The cost and benefits of acquiescing to these Pressures were
frequently reiterated by COPE. During Sub-Conunittee examinations,
appeals of all sorts were made wl-th considerable subtlety, r;ith the
instinctive skill of men who had worked together for so long that, Iike
a practised music-hall team, ttrey knew precisely when to pick up their
cues. Departments were left in little cloubt that there we:ecosts.
Absolute integrity with regard to the COPE :rrles, total commitment to
economy, comPetent resource management and vigilance in the face of
field inefficiencies woul-d be required. Deparfinents must learn to accept
cuts graciously, or, if COPE had screwed therr down too tightlyr use only
the reconunended alternative channels (i.e. those which Treasury controls
and approves - the New Policy review, the ministers appeal hearings, the 
^F
- 
cA,
review of Existing Policy, or the system of ilojnt-ministerial delegations).
Ihe review of existing policies always constituted a minus - BS on€
senior departmental man commented "it can never be used to restore cuts".
But the benefits are proposed with equal generosity. Departments
were encouraged to believe that with greater ministerial commitment
(basecl on better infcrmation) to their particular fields of endeavour,
they would flourish. A richer and better guaranteed flow of resources
into their departments would result, giving them an enhanced ability to
resist unwelcome pressure from the public and interest groups for effatic
spending. The message was that compliance wouldproduce more information
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for the ministers. Policy changes would thus be more successfully
justified, accepted as such by Treasury monitors, and conseguently
the departmenLs would be rnore comfortably reivarded.
In more inmediate terms, COPE really had only one guestiorr to ask
of departments: What do you count as "existing policy"? The answers
were then compared with the various definitions approved by COPE, and
adjustments made accordingly. The implications of the question were
twofold: what is a"commitment", and to whom has the conuriEnent been
made.
In 1978 a raft of variations on the COPE definitions was apparent.
The basis for a bid could come under any one of six broad groupings:
(i) inclusion in the l-ast annual Estirnates; (ii) prior approval-
given by the ministers, (iii) prior support stated in the election
manifesto of the current government party; (iv) the irresistible force
of pressure from outside influences such as acknowledged pressure qroupsi
(v) the irresistibl-e force of undeniable factors such as changing demo-
graphic trends; (vi) the flow-on effects of policy changes elesewhere
within the adninistrative system.
Thus, in quoting the last Estimates, departments and COPE would
haggle over whether an appropriation was actually made. This was critical
because although a minister might have the necessary delegated power to
authorize departmental expenditure, he could only d.o this if the money
has previously been permitted in the annual Vate allocation made at
Estimates tirne.
Prior Cabinet approval was the most favoured justification. This
might be an approved planning level, an approved programme levelp or
specific Cabine.t approval for a particular expeuditure item. The
Cabinet !{orks Committee had the same permissive power as Cabinet itself,
and its stamp of approval was accepted. However, a Cabinet decision did
need to have gone through all the relevant channels of consequent approval
before it was readily accepted by COPE. In effect, this meant that the
Treasury Investigating Officer rnust have actually sighted the relevant
"Cabinet green".
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Existing policy was also covered by Cabinetr/Treasury agreements
to flatten out the expenditure trends for the coming three years - for
eranple, should Year 2 prograrmes be flattened by the deferral or delay
of some existing policy funding, even though the progranmes may in them-
selves have perm:issibl-e growth expectancy?
An indexing system approved in advance (i.e. before 31 August) by
Cabinet was warmly received: increased costs tagged in this way rarely
caused problems, except where there lvas a debate over the timing of the
index. Alternatively, earlier Cabinet decisions to defer expenditure,
or spread it over a number of years, or reclassify an item as non-tecurring
expenditure, caused. enormous difficulties. Departments stung by past
rejections, and unwilling to tread ttre thorny path of the new policies
review, constantly attempted to reintroduce such iterns, and have them
safely reinstated as existing policy, part of the inviolate "base".
The thircl broad category was covered by party election manifestos.
Promises made here are very nearly irresistibLe, and have enormous
;xrsuasive power. But they depended very much upon the year in which
they were guoted. 1978 was the year of a general election, and most
departments had sufficient sense to realise that a pronise made three
years ago to the electorate would not, if quoted,, move COPE nearly as
effectively as the same promise- in the f irst year of a party'" tut-*.26
One contentious aspect of this did, however, rernain. If a department
could verify that the government's policy w6literally stated as 'expan-
ding", then the particular activity to be expanded became less important
than the verbal insbrrction on which it wapredicated.
The I'irresistible force of pr:blic pressure" iras a fourth category
of definition. It varied: from (a) the justification that existing
lnlicy merely represents the ongoing practice of some historical (and
popuLar) commitment (e.9. planting progratrmes for trees which nay never
be absorbed by present domestic or export market plans, but which were
first declared desirable at a public planning conference held over a
decade ago) to (b) the popular expectations raised by the pubJ-ication
of some government-sponsored report; (e.g. government's intention to
develop national energy resources such as oil and gas reserves).
Sirnitarly proposed, and sini 1arly debated, though with more d5-fficulty,
hrere pressures for more money to cover changes in the size of the client
population served by a department. For example, more school-aged
children require more trained teachers, who require more classrooms,
materials, transport, light, equipment, salaries etc. (The reverse of
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ttris argument, specifica1J-y suggested by COPE in the light of a
declining total populatiollr w3s extremely unpopular with the spending
departments). Even where increases in money terms were shown to be
demanded by demographic clata (which are notoriously unreliable) then
departments were often made avrare that questions would be asked in some
other forum about the quality, and objectives of such open-ended policies.
lltre flow-on effects of decisions, including legislation, nade else-
where was the sixth mode of justification. For exanple, deparfinents may
quote the international reputation of New Zealand, unwelcome pubJ.ic
pressure on ruinisters, the minister's own preferences, the Cabinetrs own
preferences, the indirect and unanticipated effects of other legislation,
l.€. there was no money for it in the Estimatest public welfare i.e.
the administrators' code of support for the public good; the costs of
reorganising a department without altering the leve1 or the quality of
the pr:btic goods and services administered by the department; ttre price
l-evels demanded elsewhere in the goverrunent system e.g. the cost of paPer
supplied by ttre Government Printer, the cost of interest rates set by
ttre government for departnental credit in order to pay out government-
approved grants; alterations or additions of past legal or regulatory
codes.
Finally, however, COPE had some simple rules of thumb:
Is it existing policy, approved before 31 August and expressed
in cash terms on the basis of prices as at 1 ,July; and
Is ttre department attempting to bid for any siqnificant extension
to an existing policy, or is it inserting a new policyr. which
cannot be justified on the basis of demographic trends, specific
Cabinet approval, inflation, or changes in price leveLs. Any
iten of expenditure which could be identified as existing policy
adjustect for inflation and approved volume changes was rejected
- when COPE could fincl it.
Noise in the system:
The COPE group was fully aware of three significant realities:
- the essential and critical influence of Treasury
the awlsdard irrevocability of tabled data
the power of ministers to thwart, ignore, promote, defLect or
cormnand advice from their professional- servants.
lltre first of these vras a major producer of noise in the system;
the second and third factors had differing impact during the whole
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Budget cycle. Department officials suspectecl (and indeetl were even
prepared to demonstrate) that Treasury had a hiilden agenda which would
in fact determine their fate. An examtrrle of this and other deviant
forms of behaviour affecting COPE is described below.
l
An agenda problem: the Supplement-afy Estimates:
(a) In any COPE year, the two reports described earlier (p.27) were
forwarded to departments and ministers. The mini report, which was
the authoritative basis for Cabinet consideration, was always accompanied
by a Treasury report. It was alleged by Permanent Heads at the final
COPE meeting that the previous yea-r the report of the Working Party had
been substantially re-written by Treasury before it reached the rnain
COPE group. This suggested to non-Treasury officials that the COPE
Sub-Conunittee examinations rr'ere either farcical or, worse, so inconsis-
tent with government expectations (as these are interpreted by Treasury)
that trouble was likely to follow. In 1978 the draft mini report
included the following staternent: "The review provides Ministers and
officials with an agreed assessment of the cost of current policies.
The base level expenditure figures also assist Minist-ers to set expendi-
ture objectives in conjunction with the reviews of existing and new
policies. The COPE projections provide the basis for the preparation'
of the draft Estimates."27'
At the finaL COPE meeting, non-Treasury Permanent Heads argrued
successfully that the difference between a COPE report and a Treasury
report was not sufficientl,y clearly spelled out in this statement.
The COPE circular (f978) had inctuded the fol-lowing directive;
"COPE projections are prepared j-n 1 JuIy I9?8 prices and with certain
exceptions, no allowance is made for future increases in vJages or other
Government expenditure. Furthermore, the L978/79 Supplementary
Estirnates are excluded from the projections... lfhe use of the I JuIy
date means thatrsre projections inilicate growth in Government expenditure
in real terms.t'
In the annual timetabLe of the b:dget, COPE submissions incLuded all
existing policy approved up to a given cut-off date, which in 1978 was
Augnrst 31. That is, all policies approved by goverhment up to 31 August
r,*ould be accepted as "existing policy", and as such must have been costed
f,or the fo::ecasts in July I current year prices. Since the draft
Estimates approved by the government in its annual alloeation in the current
year (June, in 1978) were costed in prices current at January I' COPE
allowed for a six-monthly updating of all price levels. llowever, between
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ilune and the cutoff date for COPE, Supplementary Estimates were
prepared by departments, and approved by Parliament around August
or September - i.e. after the cutoff clate for COPE.
It was clearly Treasuryrs intention, as a member of COPE, to
take as much as possible off the coPE agenda (i.e. out of what the
departments claimed as their base level of resource need, o<pressed
in noney terrn). Therefore, Supplementaries like approved new policy
costs were J-oaded into the draft Estimates the following year by
Treasury, but in 1978 were specifically excluded fron cOPEr definition
of existing poJ-icy expressed in cash te:ms. At the final Permanent
Eeadsr meeting, Treasuryts argrrment for doing this was consistent with
that given to inquiring departrnental officials at earlier Sub-Cornmittee
meetings:
"Supps. fgupplementary estimates] are not included because they
are approved after the cutoff date, 31 August. You &he departmentqJ
will pick then up again when you prepare your draft Estirnates next year,
and they will go in automatically then. It was inflation which hit you
betr'reen July I and August 31. this year. tast year COPE did include the
Supps., and it wasn't acting strictly within the COPE rules in doing so.
Ttre idea is to look at existing policy in a tjme-slot. So we wanted
to see the base, plus Pl,A's (price Level aliowances), which is the
inflation factor." Another senior Treasury man reiterated this: "We
wanted to be able to say specifical-Iy that B) equals the base, Cil eguals
growttr and (N eguals inflation. When the ministers get to read the COPE
report, we G.e. Treasury) will send a covering report which will have
the Supps. added in, as the basis for the expenditure strategy paper.
Your ninister wouldn't know from CoPE the impact of ttre details of the
Supps., but then, would he need to?"
But ttre Permanent Heads were disinclined to accept this. They
pressed the Treasury men to specify the meaning of the totals described
as "ttte base". The Treasury men replied that what was agreed to by
COPE equalled the base, onto which Treasury would subsequently load the
Supplementary allowances, the increases for wages and salaries approved
since 3l Augiustr any other adjustments to prices approved by the govern-
ment, and agreed new poticy costs approved by Cabinet. Al-I these items
weteexpressed in money terms, as nearly as possible in constant prices.
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Treasury also argued that there woul,d not have been tinre for
departments to add in the supplementary annual allocations, and that
in any case, unlike the experience of PESC (IJK), where projections
were not converted into cash terms, Treasury vras concerned only to
provide a base for decisions, not to use COPE itseLf as the basis for
decisions three ye€rrs ahead.
Finally, Treasury suggested that the refinements then possible
under FFS allowed for the postulation of alternative price bases: (a)
the total demand expressed in money terms at constant (I JuLy) prices,
and (b) the total demand expressed in money terms after supplementaries
and other price and volume changes have been added in. r'ft keeps COPE
pure 
- it was a conscious decision. cope is a snapshot in time - the
Treasury report brings in what amounts to a cash flow staternent.'
The permanent heads objected on the grounds that the "purity" of
COPE nay produce such a rarified report that it had no value: that the
relnrt which went to the ministers rrras not the one they were approving,
but a Treasury report they had not yet sighted: and, finally, that "you
seem to be saying Donrt worry you blokes, lre (Treasury) will fix up any
l-ittle adjustments. But we need to see both reports, if they are going
up over our names.t'
ft was eventually agreed that the draft mini report to the ministegs
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should be amended to take account of the Permanent Heads' objections.
However, Treasury did fire a parting shot by conunenting that the need
for an accomp:rnying Treasury report, including Treasuryrs adjuslments to
COPErwas a function of the fact that in the past departments were not
willing to take responsibility for making adjustrnents which would fit
with targets, so Treasury had been obliged to appropriate this task.
The significance of this incident should be emphasised. It
demonstrates not only something of the relationship between Treasury and
the Permanent Heads, in the forum of COPE, but the relationship between
the formal nembers of COPE and the officials who comprised the COPE
Working Party and Sub-Conunittees. It also suggests that there was less
than unanfunity on what constituted relevant information, as this was
processed through the networks of COPE.
There were other examples of noise in the system, created nainly by
deviation from the CoPE,/Treasury codes of behaviour - both formal and
informal-.
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The State Services Corunission (SSC):
(b) The SSC operated in a manner clearly not approved by Treasurlr people
and their COPE coLleagnres. Not only were SSC officials quoted dispara-
gingly during COPE exasrinations, but the reliability of their info:csration
was constantly questioned. For instance, the SSC is one partner in what
a Treasury man descrilced as "an unfortunate maniage" with the Computer
Senrices Division. Ttre CSD is the division of government responsible
for the purchase and management of aLL government EDp hardware. Its
ability to cost accurately, and produce prompt, reliable information
for coPE was openry doubted. However, ttre coPE exercise did not, and
probabLy could not, provide the appropriate fonrm for discussion and
analysis of Treasury dissatisfaction with aberrant agents like th; CSD.
The intensity and complexity of the interdepartnental relationship is
such that only specific audiences will produce certain kinds of infor-
mation disclosure. In the COPE network, some deviations were permitted,
albeit with patent dissatisfaction, either because it was believed that
they could be re-examined at a later date, or because by chance, in an
unexpectedly slmpathetic audience setting, criticism could be made
extrrlicit and behaviour-rnodification attempted.
The SSC is responsible for the provision and employment of staff
for.the state services. Throughout the 1978 COPE exercise and lndeed
the entire Budget cycle, Treasury and other officials (e.g. Audit Office)
worried about the reliability of personnel forecasts, ttre lack of guidance
from the ssc on employing temporary staff, the lack of evaluation and
the lacl< of financial control over the increasing nurnbers of state
wage workers.
As wittr the CSD example above, COPE was unable to handle certain
sorts of infonnation exchange and disclosure. Either Treasury people
suspected that more detailed analysis during the crowded tiuretabl-e of
coPE would overloacl the system, and cause a breakdown, or because (as
subseguently proved to be the case) it was anticipated that noise of
this tlpe was best dealt with through another network, in a different
part of the cornrnunication system and during another phase of the Budget
cycIe, the devianE SSC was allowed to perform unsatisfactorily during the
COPE exercise.
While occasionally admitting the difficulties of managing such a
complex and politicalLy-sensiti're field as personnel, COPE men did. not,
however, concede a great deal. The SSC apparently neither conformed to
Treasury's informal codes, nor adhered to copE's definition of what
constitutd relevant information (existing policy, expressed in money terms).
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Capital works allocations:
(c) An entirely different situation existed with the snrall COPE
sub-cornmittee responsible for examining departmental bids for money
for capital works. Ttro senior men, one from Treasurlr and one from
ttre Ministry of Works, controlled this sector. For a period of years,
preliminary approval for fo:nrard estimates of capital expenditure passed
through ttris narrow channel. In this phase of the budgetary cycle,
bottr nen appeared to march to a different drum from that which dictated
the rest of COPE.
Works progranmes are planned on a five-year fornrard basis, although
approval was given in COPE for only the next financial year, with an
30indication of levels for the folLowing two-year COPE period. In recent
years, the planning capacity of the Minist:ryz of works has been greatly
e:rpanded by the development of a computer simulation model as. an aid
to selection among various investment options in the build.ing and construc-
tlon industry. ftre raw data is collected from the Ministry's national
and regional surveys of the three relevant sectors: govertrment, local
authorities, and private industry. The model now relates this total-
industry data to the overall economic structure. Use of the model
should enable ministers to select a preferred means of future capital 
?1
fo:mation (i.e. new work) on the basis of existing, approved commitments. "-
Wtroever controls this source of information could have strong influence
on the allocations of public resources.
Historically and culturally, public works development in New Zealand
has occupied a central place in all government planning. Initial and
dramatic progress under a very strong minister in the first Labour govern-
ment established a tradition of irresistible demands for resources for
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capital works. 'lltris was reinforced by the rapid post-war population
growth, which was only levelling down to a zero growth trend by the
197Ors. By 1978, when the position of the trtinister of Works and Develop-
ment had declined on the Cabinet pecking-order, the last of the o1d guard
of Works men still held key positions. Without adrr-itting the niceties
of their computerised info:mration services, this srnall' highly profes-
sionaLised clique of ex-architects and engineers dominated public capital
investment planning and all significant expenditrrre-control mechanisms.
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Given the time-lag involved in arl major works developments, the
two men reguired by COPE to vet the bicls of client department.s were
inevitably dealing with tasks begun or committed sometimes many years
i-n the past. Thus, old debts must be paid and earrier bargains
honoured. Ttrere was less scope he::e for the flexible financial
management preferred elsewhere in copE. Along with the Ministryrs
inbuil-t suspicion that governments would cut capital works funds because
the economic effects of such suts are more easily diffused, and with the
extended time-scale involved, ttre sub-committee r^ras also affected in its
mlings by the relatively private nature of its deliberations. Ihere
vrere virtually no witnesses. Not even the MWD's other top men made up
members of the aud.ience. Unlike other COpE Working party meetings,
where anything that was done must be done before an audience of peers,
only two or three men, closely identified with the Ministry of Works and
Development, guarded this particular channel. rnformation passed in,
decisions were made, and, once approved by the cabinet works corunittee
and Later the Cabinet Conrnittee on Expend.iture, resources were parcelled
cut. But there was little if any expticit exchange or d.ebate over the
precise nature, or the economic conseguences, of the decisions. Here,
particularly, pragmatism rather than educated techniques based on academic
qualification or technological nastery was the key to decision-making.
Examinations which unfairingly began with the dry words "welr, are
you brokes going to spend your dough this year?" were distinctively
different fron the more intricate exchanges conducted elsewhere by COpE.
The rules, and the rituals, were well-known:
Establish what the suppliant officials believe to be the
eriteria for naking bids, then disabuse the luckless
departments;
(ii) little truth, if any, in the
the work forecast, and in need
on Cabinet approval as existing
(iii) Press the officials to describe precisely whether or not they
can satisfy the one criterion that counts here: has the first
spade been put in the ground. In other words, all preliminary
Cabinet and Treasury approvals must, have been obtained, and work
must be in progress on site.
(i)
Assume that there will be
ubiquitous claim that all
of money, is firmly based
policy;
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Discussions were brief - occasionally aLL the relevant decisions had
been taken before the officials arrived - what followed was a mere
formality. Departments were fully aware that this is only the first
round, and that all that was reguired at that stage vtas a sufficiently
reputable figrure to add in to the total forecast levels reconmended by
COPE. The real bargaining came later, outside the sphere of COPE,
between the departments and the Cabinet Works Cohmittee, which is advised
by bottr the Ministry of l{orks and Development and Treasury.
Treasury investigating officers were permitted only a very limited
input, and occasionatly it was made clear that they were present only on
sufferance. One dogged TIO atternpted to dispute the justification for
a very large sum of money described as "the ministerrs slush fund".
His complaints were good-humouredly over-ruled on the grounds that this
particular item was a traditional appropriation to be used at the
ministerrs d,iscretion. It had been made "without difficulty" in the
past because "past Secretaries of Treasuryl had "understood the need to
turn a blind eye." The bewiLdered TIO had yet to learn the finer points
of established politicat porrer. Such an attempt, and.such a reply, Yras
scarcely conceivable in the exaninations conducted by the main COPE grouP.
Mavericks fnc.:
(d) Another deviation was demonstrated by departrnents which acted.above
all, Iike pressure groups. In adhering to their own professional (or
qultural) norms, they were outsj.de the mainstream, yet ttrey were confident
of theii rights because they passionately believed that the mission of
their particular department was based on a good idea whose time had come.
34lltris group is typified by three large spending departments which
had discovered special skills enabling them to absorb, interpret and
transmit enormous guantities of information in a style of their own.
It was not without coincidence that two of these departments had
ex-Treasury men as their financial nnnagers, while the third (DSrR) had its ow
device: a "sophj-stication factor".35 The translation of Treasury
training to an alien setting provoked the same irritable
reaction in COPE as the qualitative device put fo:rr,rard by the scientists.
All departments defend their oern corner - usually vociferously
But none was so unwirJ-ing to accept a rebuff at the hands of copE as
men who had themselves once evaluated the raw departmental data upon wtrich
COPE was nourished. Pressure-group standover tactics ranged from
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categorical refusals to accept the dictates of COPE, to open
accusations of iluplicity: "Yourve obviousry changed the rules since
I was jn Treasury..." Inferences of shady dealings by COpE or Treasury
were invariably rejected by the consrnittee and the intractable department
duly punished. A cut might, then be made for no more logical reason than
ttrat "it deserves to be". Treasury men stayed out of direct conflict
with such officials, but only after making it perfectJ-y cl-ear that COPE
should not tolerate any departmental attempt to mystify or patronise ttre
officials! committee.
What counts as success?
"The measure cf any budgetary system is the way it
changes peoplers behaviour...while this nray have
happened (through coPE) at the centre, it doesnrt
really apply outward...but we aim to do it through
a minjrnum use of technique..." (Senior TreasuryOfficial).
"Part of this exercise (COpn) is an education process"
Bottr formal and informal norms or codes of behaviour and style affected
the success enjoyed by participants in the COPE network. Success was
not evaluated in terms of "winning" - arthough winning was clearry
important. Capturing at least your fair share of resources was the nub
of the coPE ex^egcise. rn their anarysis of the IIK Treasury, Hecro36
and Wildavsky describe this sort of success essential.Iy in terms of
reputation-building 
- enforcement of the myths of influence 
- a powerful
consideration in New Zealand COpE 
- circles.
We may also evaluate the norms of COPE in terms of their effect on
ttre wider government networks of cotununication. Did the adoption of
C1cPErs codes of behaviour forecasting requirements and allocative rul-es
facilitate the flow of infomation through the system? What effect did
they have on the complexity of information passing in to and out of the
budgetary system? CouLd they influence future informational inputs by
the way they nodified the outputs? If information is the essential life-
blood of any communication network, and feedback the dynarnic element which
regulates and determines the level of nourishment available from that
energ'y-source, then "success" may be described in cybernetic terms.
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It was the function of COPE (which necessarily included Treasury
officials) to describe the rules which controlled the rate and complexity
of the information-fl-ow at that stage in the budgetary cycle.
It was the function of Treasury (as a menber of COPE, as the agency
which investigated and evaluated the raw data, as the agency which
trained the departments in the Treasury-developed techniques employed
in COpE forecasting, and as the operator which controlled the various
gates through which information;nssed around the system) to translate
these mles into persuasive, interrogative, directive or i:nperative
tetms.
It was the function of the departments (as suppliants or petitioners
to COpE) to re-inLerpret these rules in any way they considerd would allow
ttrem to protect their sources of information, control the subsequent
distribution of information throughout their oYen networks, and. retain
ttreir primacy as necessary_ and legitimate interpreters for the ministers'
At tSat early stage in the budget cycle, feedback largely depended
upon what officials could glean from the ministersr subsequent decisions.
Although "knowing COPETS mind" (which was almost the sane a.s knowing
Treasuryrs mind) was an educated skillr there were few ways to acquire
it except through intuition and experience. Both were deficient.
I'luch energy vJas wasted, much information fell through the gaps.
Without ministerial commitment, and in the face of necessarily parochial
departments with insatiable appetites, Treasury must concentrate, during
ttrat phase at least, on maintaining its own systern, rather than pursuing
its allegedly preferred goal: to improve the planning and alLocative
capacity of the grovernment.
The existence of several critical stnuctural elements in the
budget Process were demonstrated during the COPE phase. For example:
The central position of Treasury, which has a criticat determining role
in the information flow;
the extensj"ve power of Treasury, which, in conjunction with key
officials from departments like the Ministry of Works and Develop-
ment and the state Services Comrnission (and, as wiLl be seen later'
the Audit Office) dictates whether or not certain types of informa-
tion are appropriate for circulation in any one sub-systemr €.9.
COPE;
the resistance offered to Treasury (and thereby to other significant
educators and manipulators such as ministers) by agents such as the
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State Services Commission, anrbitious departments like Education
or Transport, or newcomers like Energy whose future d.epends on
the rapid accumulation of an empire with its own distinctive
style;
- the residual nature of the alien system of administration and
planning, developed for unigue historical reasons, of the
Ministry of Works and Development, which has declining influence
due largely to changing economic circumstances. The IMD needs
to retain very close guard over its parochial networks if it is
not to lose audience support in every theatre of action, or aI!-ow
its billing to sLip below the front-of-house lights.
The miLls of Treasury, via coPE, can grind very smal1 indeed. yet the
offending departments may never know the precise natrrre of their trans-
gressions. The maxi report forwarded at the completion of COpE contains
few hints of the unqualified rule that aLl departments are educated to
accept: you must persuade Treasury before (and after) you have persuaded
the ninister.
rn recent years, departments using the FFS met with officers
from Treasury at the conclusion of the COFE exercise to exchange views on
the value of the Process. There is no evidence in officiaL files of
these evaluation sessions that the tension between the fonral and informal
codes governing information flowwas everovertly identified or collectively
analysed. Even a device deveroped by Treasury to grade departments
according to their compliance with the COPE instructions in the late
LgTO's was retained exclusively within Treasury. Tros were apparentty
unavtare of this device, and, in any case, as one commented.: ',rt probably
wouldnrt have any effect if departments did get it. That,s not the sort
of thing that gives us headaches 
- 
its trying to finit out what theyrve
got built into their base that matters." Departments themselves were
unaware of the comparisons mad.e in the grading, and internal corunents
on the device languish embryonicarly in the Treasury fires.
From I97l onrinternal Treasury evaluations of COPE proliferated.
From 1977 on, Treasury files include Planni.rg Council comments on CoPE:
exchanges conducted just below the most senior Treasury 1evels. But
very few opportunities were provided to permit tjrne or staff resources
for Working Party officials (frorn CoPE's member departments) and Treasury
officials to consult fuLly on the forthcoming COPE exercise. fhey only
occasionally shared detailed accounts of the examrnations (and in any case
there hras no verbatim record of any COPE meetirg). Formal coLlective
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eval-uations of the exercise by the officials who did all the examining
work were almost non-existent. The reriance praced on the Tros by
those who chaired the COPE working party meetings was thus reinforced,
since only the'TIo could corunent wittr any accuracy on the actual situa-
tion of a departmentrs finances.
In 1978' after a review of the nanagement procedr:res of administra-
tive departments by the controrrer fnd Auditor-G.rr"r.tr32 a task force
was set up to examine the guestion of budgetary management in government.
This devetopment is discussed/FSt8ftlcnapter ?), bur even in 1978 it
appeared unlikely that the Task Force activities would red.uce or modify
the significance of two constant erements in the budgetary system:
first Treasury (whose officials, and their capacity to obtain, analyse,
store and retrieve information, was critical in the allocative and fore-
casting functions); and second, the information counted as relevant,
i.e. policy expreised in money terms.
fnformal codes of behaviour: The COPE mode:
Everything counted during a coPE sub-connittee examination. officials
aay be described according to a number of informal characteristics, each
of which had some bearing on ttreir value to CoPE, or their effectiveness
in justifying the presentation and the reception of a departrnental bid.
officials in the presence of each other, without ministers or any-
other audience, behaved as in a peer group where only those of ttreir own
species are significant, and needed to be influenced or persuaded.
lrtreir behaviour varied with other audiences and, predictably, one does
not find precisely the same departmental and individual styles demonstra-
ted when officials are working, for exanple, with ministers present.
It was characteristic of the COPE exercise that here any poor or yrrong
choices or lapses of judgernent and discretion nere open to inspection
by their Peers. As has been shown elsewheref the civil service system,
as this centres around the whitehall modeL of Treasury, represents a
particular and identifiable subculture. While not all the features of
the vil-lage of mandarins described by Heclo and wildavsky exist in
ex-colonial Wellington, there is a distinct kinship among officials which
refLects the penrasive effects of an anonymous, confidential, hierarchical
professional public service adrninistration.
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Having to perfor:n before their own peers had several effects
on the officials. rt strengthened the natural arLiance of the
permanent public servants vis-)-vis the rninisters, and vis-)-vis
their clients - the anorphous and ubiquitous pubLic. rt produced
a herd instinct for ttre protection of the weak 
- aLthough this did
have some clearly defineil limits. Even the weak must make some
efforts to behave according to the trj-bal norms, and rmrst not endanger the
security (i.6. professionalisrn) of the group. rt also induced a sense
of canaraderie under seige: the officials at one vitaL CoPE meeting
joined in decraiming "Arl or nothing - for everyone or for no one" when
threatened with a proced,ure v*rich was not gruaranteed to benefit all
detrnrtments. The experience of perforrning before you! peers arso
produced a shared and openly-observed responsibility for punitive actions.
If a cut had to be made, no one person present could act vindictively,
or snap back in retaliation to the provocative rernark from the Treasury
nan' or the chairperson, or. be seen to be repaying old debts. Anyone
doing that did it in the sight of arr, and would be rsuccessfuJ.' only so
long as the others explicitly went along with him. Reasons for
criticising one's peers, or cutting their bids, or requiring additional-
and time-consuming information-gathering were expected to be stated
explicitly. Oners motives may be implicitly r:nderstood by the others,
but in this forum they must be made specific.
Only certain demonstrations of individualism yrere acceptable. On
the whole, the Working Party and Sub-Cornmittee officials expected each
other to act in a team context. Hogrever, there hrere certain weLl-known
departmental "characters', (familiar or stubborn eccentrics) who were
accepted without apparent resen/e by the examining officials. Certain
high-status reputations or styles of behaviour which would normally be
considered deviant were pennitted on occasion because their credentials
had been estabrished as sound at some time in the past. on the other
hand, certain forms of individualism among suppliant officials were not
readily accepted by coPE. For exa-nple, men who appeared to fail in
this fonrm (e.g. ttreir bids wereseverely cut back, or they werri'reguired
to produce nice justifications for vaguely-based costs) may have done so
because they wereexcessively "trendy" in their dress, or speech or
personal style of presenting their case. They may be adjudged sharp,
overly-ambitious ("he fancies himself as some sort of television oil
tycoon"), or disloyal- (for exanple, the ex-Treasury official who inclu-
ded in his oral presentation of the case for his new department a costing
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out of the work done in preparing the COPE sr:bmlssion). A depart-
mentaL officiaL may lack discretion or judgernent: "He [the official]
is implying that we [COpn Working eartyJ do this si:nply as an academic
exercise - showing off to ttre ministers by cutting things down. I
consider that that impugns the integrity of Genior Treasury officefl
so bugger him, he deserves to be cut back". Others ltere clearly
naive - for exanpJ.e, the officials who, in preserrting their cirS€,
indulged in chatty anecdotes about how they plotted to beat the COPE
rules. Unwisely, they misinterpreted their courteous reception as
connlvance...a cut was rnildly made after they had left the room. Stil-l
others were patently worthy of kindness: too o1d, too tired' too
embattled, too new on the job; too slow to keep up. lfith few successes
on their departmental records, their history of failure preceded thern,
and their depressed apathy when they lost, narked them as ineffectual.
There \ivere some clear COPE norms, demonstrated during the examina-
tions: Dress nay be almost non-conformist (leather jacket, no tie,
beard), tasteless (loud suit, acrylic tie), or conservative (neutral'
anonymous and plain). But it. may not be too flashy (high-heeled shoes
on men, cbromium cuff links in a pink shirt) or plainly sloppy and
careless. Voices and langruage may be firm, enthusiastic, nervous,
over-refined, rforeignt, boring, vulgar, stubborn or id,iosyncratic.
But they must not be querulous, shrill, arrogant' disdainful, sulky'
crude, or waffling.
Sex was not a probtem. Despite the fact that most participants
were mal-e, female officials were neither patronised nor pandered to.
I'hey were taken as seriously and as courteously as all comers-
Machismo was not the apparent norm, intelLigent, conscientious profes-
sionalism was.
A very diverse range of personal styles was permitted, within
the accepted nOrms. But certain excesses were not pe::nitted. The
ostentatiously casual, the indiscreet, the unmistakeably seedy: any
symptoms of a visible decline in self-respect caused not by self-
criticism but by continual failure, loss of face or professional optimisn
offended the codes' on the other hand' persistentLlr calvinistic
parsinony in examiners was not favoured. Frugality must be leavened by
wit, acidity, or, at the very least, good humour. Zeal was not allowed
in performing the task of cutting: genuinely confident acceptance of the
worth of the exercise was assumed.
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Standards were thus established: a good COPE man, and a val-uable
TIO, and an effective deparUnental advocate must, with only two excep-
tions encountered in this stuily, demonstrate the following:
integrity.: this was both professionaL and personal, in the
forum of COPE
reliability: your word must be good,
neutrality: if you have an interest, you must declare itl
application: tiredness, even exhaustion, was no excuse for
lack of dil-igence and conscientious persistence over timey
appropriate knowledge: you must know the current rul-es,
and the ruling ratesl
insight: you must be demonstrably sympathetic to rel-evant
nuances - or at least be sensitive to the insights of othersl
relative modesty: ager seniority, experience or a recent run
of luck htas no substitute for the justifiable confidence. engen-
dereil by arguing a good case, or defending your corner when you
know you are right.
Some unnecessary extxas, which may at times even prove to be disadvan-
tageous, were!
absolute honesty (which may be rnistaken for a bleeding heart) I
knowledge outside the corner you are defending (just do your own
job well),
knowing the ministerrs mind(and reporting it to COPE)t
knowing the preferences of Cabinet (the others may either know
more about why Cabinet gave you that previous supgrort, or have
engineered it thenselves for reasons of wtrich you remain ignorant).
Absolute sins did exist, although the inherent position of COPE in the
overall budgetary systen meant that forgiveness was tlpical:
failure to defend your own corner (whether you are a TIO' a
departmental advocate, or a member of COPE);
- failure to justify your case,
failure to know the alternative routes to success (or to dismi-ss
the advice on these which COPE from time to time dispenses);
faLlure to admit that you were wrongr oE rnisguided, or failed to do
your homework.
COPE's place in the communication network could not affoid these errors.
:Ihe examining group was not anti-intellectual - it assumed intelligence
until presented with overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The group
was not anti-individualistic 
- 
it simply could not afford the luxt:ry.
I'he group was nct cynical 
- 
it accepted the significance of political
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accountability, but it did not preclude the possibility of i-rrationaL
trnJ-itical preference paraded by its ministerial masters as rational
choice.
The Treasury Mode:
While COPE freguently asserted its autonomy within the budgetary cycle
of approvals, this was more symbolic than real. For example, all COPE
circulars, instructionsrinvitations to participants, reports, schedules
and nanuals were issued by Treasury. The retrnrts which sununarised
COPE (the mini and maxi reports described earlier) were both prepared
and written by Treasury, and, in the case of the mini report, accom-
panied on its way to the Minister of Finance by a Treasury interpreta-
tion. All meetinlJs, except those specified .bot"39 were held inside
the Treasury, at times arranged by Treasury officials who comprised
the COPE secretariat. The main COPE meetings were penranentJ-y chaired
by the Secretary to Treasury, regardless of ottrer membership changes.
Treasury provided all the servicing for COPE, and tras responsible for the
overalL nurnagement of the computerised information and accounting systems
used by departments. Al-I investigations of departmental submissions
were done by Treasury officials (the TIos) who were also responsi5le
throughout the year for investigating all the department's expenditure
and other financial proposals, and reporting on these to the Minister
of Finance.
Treasurry men on COPE would from time to time say such things as
"Speaking as a member of COPE, I would vote for XYZ, but wearing my
Treasury Hat I must recommend ABC... (or) I must inform you that T:ceasury
this year will not be recommending xYZ...(or) my rid.ing instructions do
not allow me to support xYz... (or) you perhaps should know that in the
past Treasury has not allowed XYZ, and witl not be recommending that it
be allowecl this year either."
One impression gained from observing Treasury officials associated
with COPE was their profound attachment to the notion of integrity.
They work, in many cases, stupifyingly long hours, with intense diligence.
Certainly, the professionalism which they claim as motivation may be
explained in terms of their assured political influence: "!{e11, yes I
grress f do it because I do have an over-riding concern for the wellbeing
of the government. And of course I have always been interested in the
logical- presentation of facts and ideas, But reall-y, I would most like
to be thought of as a fully professional member of Treasury." (Senior
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Treasury man). fn the Wellington-based sub-cuLture of the public
service, reputations are formed on the basis of known skill, appJ.ied
intelligence and studied opportunism. over and above that, the
relative anonymity and extensive responsibility which mark Treasr:ry
people off from other state departments offer powerful blandishments.
But this does not quite explain the curious and misleading cosiness
of Treasury people. Inside Treasury there is a preference for logic,
but if logic cannot prevail, then they fall back col-Iectively on a wry
and enbattled common sense. There is an acguired protective nr,ask of
simplicity before the compJ-ex posturing of other departments who know
from experience that they must deceive, in order to win. with an air
of corrplacent righteousness, Treasury disdains to pick up the available
perks. Treasury men d,rop homely, domestic references into official
conversations (e.g. in an edgy discussion about dayright saving,
Treasury men exchanged notes on the difficulties of getting ttreir off-
spring to bed during the long sunmer eveningsr at the commencement of
a notoriously contentious examination, a senior Treasury man disarmingly
encouraged a chat about how irritating flies had been at a famiry
barbecue, immediately after letting it be known that he had devoted most
of the same weekend to an exhaustive penrsal of the tabled submission).
There are the unsophisticated, and even slightly pas=J, social and
crrltural preferences of Treasury men (e.g. the senior officiaL who was
affectionately permitted to deal briskly with a piece of COpE business
so that he could attend a departmentar "knees-up"; the Treasury man who
was taking his falrily to the state-subsidised ballet even though',I d,on't
know anything about ballet, but we sanr on televj-sion that they couldnrt
get audiences because a nevrspaper strike cut their advertising"). Or
again, the earnest opinion solemnly proferred that "Treasury people are
much less permissive in their rnarital relationships than other public
servants and academics" 
- which reflects the undoubtedly equally fallacious
view held outside that most Treasury men are menbers of fundamentalist
religious sects, such as Baptist or Brethren churches. Considerable
attention is paid to the business of seeing themselves as sober, ordinary
peopre, quite unrike the "bright, young ideas-men" pu::rreyed in the daily
Papers.
Socialisation into the Treasury norms appears to be specific to that
organisation, powerful, and J-asting. Even though the narrowing.hierarchy
is wasteful of talent at the top, the determined application of cultural
norms, which derive more from stolid secur.arity than any intensery-
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educat'ed jesuitical elitism, is a definitive element in the
professionarism of New zealan<l Tre..sury officials, These norms
appear to be so well-establ.ished and influential that this survey
could identify only a small minority of COpE rnen who were not
apparently governed 
- almost cross-fertilizised - by ther. ft is
significant that most official-s serving on the copE work-ing party
adopt (if onry temporarily) the Treasury morality. But a number of
deviants did exist, and as we have alreacly indicated coutrd cause
consid.erable noise in the system.
Deficiencies of COPE
COPE was established to provide better information for those making
alrocative decisions at government lever. on the one hand, in
conjunction with PPB, and the SIGMA and FFS systerns, it was (and stil-l
is) seen as providing a more systematic approach to forecasting fiscal
behaviour and to data-coltection. on the other hand, it was seen as
a cybernetic tool for the ministers and their principal advisers,
Treasury officials, providing the clearest focus trrossibre on the
financial inplications of government policy. rf policy now in place
could be accurately costed, and those costs later placed alongside the
probable costs of desired new policy, the sum of both should describe
the amount of money which wourd have to be raised through the various
sources of government revenue.
Over a ten year period a great deal was aceomplished in bottr
directions. Departments became so familiar with the established rules
distinguishing existing from new policy that their senior men often
argued that this was now mere housekeeping; that the costing out of
existing policy could now be done in Treasury itself. They claimed
that there \,ras no longer any need for the tirne-consumingr protracted
and costly inter-departmental examinations and evaluations conducted
by COPE.
It is true that by 1979/80 there was considerably more precision,
more attention to tJ:e financial implications of continued spending on
existing pol-icy than ten years before. It is probably equally true
that more of the'rhousekeeping' could be done inside Treasury, without
the ritual of COPE - were the staff and other resources of Treasury
substantially enlarged.
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ff they had chosen to use the COPE-based system as it had been
designed, ministers could have identified much more clearly the
intptications of approving new policies which Loail additionaL costs
(with implied or specified future monetary conmitments) on to the
existing base.
Since any decision nade today about tomorrow is slmonlmrous with
planning, it is true that during the past decade, the technical
refinements developed as the handnaidens to COPE significantly increased
both the reliability and the volurne of data available for collation and
evaluation in making such plans. The Einancial Forecasting System,
in conjunction wittr SIG,IA, provides an increasingly more accessibLe
supply of the various sorts of inforrnation required in goverment
decision-making. Treasury and other official"s themselves suggested
that, at least for the present, the rate of refinement should be
sLowed down, so that the full potential of computerised management
information services could be "internalised" by the various operators
in the network.
Much of what was radically innovative in the 1960s had become part
of the jargon of the capital city by the end of the r70s. In
Wellington at least, public senrants at the highest levels had been
persuaded by each other that, "efficiency and economy" 40ir, the dglivery
of goods and services selected by the political system for pubtic use
did have at least a li:nited quantitative meaning.
l{ithin the networks of conmunication generated by COPE, the J.anguage
of persuasion, intimidation and demand had become more sophisticated.
Further, it was obvious that with every skill offered to the departments
by Treasury, and, developed by the departments for their own advancement,
another stick was laid on the camel's back. As one Treasury man agreed
"with every modification to FFS, we are creating another cross which we
have to carry ourselves 
- the departments get stronger, and their
bargaining power improves. "
However, COPE had several inherent deficiencies, some of which could
have been anticipated in the experience of other systems, such as
PESC, some of which were identified but not avoided at the time.
Firstly, moving the consideration of departmental estimates of expenditure
back from the draft Estimates period to the COPE period (thus giving a
six month lead-time) had improved the preparation of the Estimates, but
diminished the force of future scanning. COPE required departments to
state their minimal financial needs as precisely as possible. The
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departments knew that this figrure (expressed in cash tems) was
the least they could expect to get from grovernment ttre following
year. Inevitably, less attention was paid to the following two
years of the COPE forecast period. Getting costs built into ttre
base was all-important. Once there, the stamp of COPETs approval
(which implicated Treasury) had ttre political effect of writing the
sums in tabl-ets of stone. Despite Treasuryrs attempts to make them
interesting, years two and three were necessarily of less significance.
Secondly, coPErs terms of reference, which were circulated for all
to read,, reguired only two things: a sulr\rey of future monetary needs,
and a realistic costing of existing policy. copE had no standing to
direct 
- except that which came from Treasury's interpretation of the
statutory bases of the executive's fiscal authority. The spending
departments, and the ministers, knew that no matter how assiduously
COPE nay protest every example of untagged, open-ended spending, every
gtoLicy proposal which had any financial irnplication at aII, the
conunittee itself had no authority to do more than advise.
COPE members, particularly the Treasury men, were acutely aware
of this dilemma. Indeed, it was even protested as a constitutional
virtue 
- on several occasions senior Treasury officials cormented
that "public servants do not have the right to abrogate the powers of
the ninisters", or "We {COPE) are no substitute for our political
masters". On the other hand, the advice that was given is governed
by the. formal and informal codes and the commitment developed by
Treasury itself. Certainly, political accountability lies wittr those
elected to office. But the assumption 
- 
that the information passed, on
through Treasury !{E;as accurate as possible meant that a great deal
of COPE's advice had directive force sirnply because alternatives to it
appeared neither politically nor financially feasiJrle.
A third important deficiency of COpE appeared to be information-
overload. Departmental financial managers complained that far too
much data was reguired, in far too short a time, and for little apparent
purpose. History had produced few skilled accountants and auditors for
the public service, and a mixture of economic recession and popular
myth hail severely limited the nr:rnbers of skillecl persons who could be
employed in the public service. Thus the demands of every government
for more, and better, advice had been translated into ubiquitous
resentment of Treasury. The traditicnal dislike of the usurer,
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exacting compliance on unpalatable terms on behalf of a government,
was exacerbated. Treasury still held the purse-stri.n9s, but from
the departments' point of view its legitimate powers as an allocative
gate-keeper had been exceeded. Treasury is "fuII of economistsr';
Treasury I'makes uS vtork to produce submissions for COPE on a Cost-
accounting basis, yet no-one in there really understands the rneaning
of financial managenent. They spend too much time and ene,rgy on
giving economic advice, when their proper role is budgetary management'r.
Fourth1y, in the sfurplest termsr the first (anct basic) Phase of the
budgetary cycle system depended on corilnunication netrorks which were
imperfectly connected. Much of the information generated on behalf of
COPE depended for its value on three sets of gatekeepers:
(a) those who initiall-y filtered it into the network
(ire. the TIOs, governed by Treasury modes and
trained in Treasury-initiated techniques) ;
(b) those who evaluated it according to the question:
how much is existing policy worth in money terrus?
(i.e. the officials who comprised COPETs Working
Party); and
(c) t.bose who eventual-Iy filtered the information out
again, to the ministers (i.e. the pernanent heads
who comprised the formal coen group).
Each of these sectors included innovative intelligence which would
permit a more effective feedback function.
Infonration is the source of energy: feedback is the nourishment.
Yet only a portion of what the TIOs saw (and that was generally lirnited
to what they asked for) was passed on to COPE itself. A great deal
of the information they collected r./as unsystematicalJ.y circulated
within Treasury itself, but not captured, stored or transnritted
directly into COPE. Before it dissipated into files and faIlible
memories, that information could have been examined within Treasury,
after COPE. But the pressures of the rolling budgetary cycle, and
the perpetual fire-fighting which occurs in a highly permeable
political system meant that the opportunities tc do so were often lost.
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A collective approach (even within the inbred structure of
Treasury) and a more flexible arrangement for reporting-back between
the "boundary men" (the ffOs) and the final monitors (the senior
Treasury men) could have avoided obvious but less acceptable sugges-
tions: more staff, more tjrne, more resources.
Further, the extreme fragility of the one direct link (the TIO)
between departrnents and COPE might have been strengthened if the
time al-located to COPE had been deliberately abbreviated so that at
least a week of the financial year was set aside for colLective analysis
and wound-licking by the departmental financial managers, ttreir pernanent
heads, thel-r TIo and the senior Treasury agent for CoPE. Nothing
should depend upon this entirely private conference except the exchange
of views. The only term of reference would be to talk about thej.r
cotlnron problems in quantifying the nature of "efficiency and economy"
in public expenditure. No output, in terms of a report or a set of
minutes, would be required. Since in reality the budgetary system
justifiably depends almost entirely on trust, this should be extended
by the hierarchies to allow for an exchange of information upon which
no tangible sustenance such as money sums depend and for which it is
accepted that there will be no published winners. The timing of these
neetings, across thirty odd departments, would doubtLess cause problems.
But these are not insuperable, and unless e:qlectations were entirely
unrealistic, this could be balanced by the gains in coLlective under-
standing - difficult to achieve in a t1picalIy competitive, confiden-
tial, hierarchical- system.
A fifth probl-ern arose from the difficulties of providing a realistic
assessment of the cost of existing policy. Wittrin the liuritations of
various conflicting eodes of loyalty to each other, to theii ministers,
and to their own departnentsr the officials attempted the somewhat
schizophrenic task of responsibly forecasting costs which they knew must
sirnultaneously represent their own actual income in the next year's
al-location of funds. Departments were explicitly conscious of the fact
that in the fine print of the COPE instructions was the exhortation to
transl-ate objectives into quantitative terms. This immediately raised
a number of difficulties. What is the objective for any comPonent of
a departmental prograrnme? Who has approved it, and on what basis?
Is it capable of quantitative definition? How should cornpetinqt
objectives be weighted, so that differing amounts of money are allocated
to thern? At what point could it be sai<l that the objectives had been
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achieved (i.e. the component no longer needed a supply of money
for staff, materials, etc)?
A great deal of information was generated in order to approach
an anshter to these anticipated guestions. Departmental finance
nanagers htere constantly beset by them, in dealing with their
professional colLeagues. But too much depended on the allocative
outcome of COPE for any predictive revelations of honesty and self-
doubt in that forum. If their colleagrues in the field clid not provide
acceptable justifications for existing policy, the departmental accoun-
tants who fronted up to COPE on their behalf were left with three
options: bluster, mystification or abandonment. They were uriserably
aware that any or alL rnay fail.
If, for example, the question asked at the beginning of most COPE
sub-conunittee meetings (but alnost never referred to in any report
emanating from COPE) had any meaning, then the answer must be heard:
What restraints do you exercise over your field-workers? These
fiel-d-colleagues may be as crose by as the professionaL cuniculum-
developer in the next room, or the line-manager who decides to begin
a planned progranme of planting in the state-forest nurseries. The
costs of educating a service-wide Labour force in the niceties of
fl,nancial management are considerable and the educative process of
staff training now underway is the soft victim of any economy drive.
But since the reliability of all the conseguent decisions depends upon
the expectations generated at the base, there are dangers in neglecting
the familiar question asked by COpE officiaLs.
It is part of the colLective wisdom of the officials who operate
coPE that money grants made to any subsidiary organisation such as a
hospital board, are difficult to hold down. It is part of the
collective experience of the departmental seniors that the political
difficulties produced by tampering with local-Iy-ilispensed grants are
acute, In their separate cells, each man repeats the same m'essage:
we know what should be done, and we think we know how it coul9 be done.
Like bits of gord, these remarks were dropped onto the floor of copE.
They were never swept up in a verbatim record, they were never trans-
muted explicitly ox comprehensively into the final ministerial report.
Officials themselves suggested several reasons for this, some of which
were susceptible to reform:
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1. Recording COPE meetings. verbatim, and circulating these,
would certainly add to the indigestible quantity of paper now
passing across officials' desks.
2. Collectively evaluating detailed
raised. during COPE, without.regard to
only for the systemic implications,
supervision.
accounts of the guestions
the f inancial- aspects, J-ooking
would take time and logistic
3. Technological mastery of the tools of financial control is stilL
tenuous. Any attempt at evaluation of the underlying information
on which the imrnediately-relevant data is based would be premature, and
confusing.
4. The minister to whom COPE must report is unlikely to be persuaded
of the benefits of a systernatic analysis of the process of resource
allocation, past what he and his Cabinet colleagues now understand.
The pressures of the present political system, with its Cabinet-
dominated, three year cycre do not permit the necessary ministerial
commitment to refom.
5. Potentially "independent" auditors of the comprehensive range of
information which could be systematically recorded during the copE
exercise are in short supply within the public sector. The planning
councir, for example, already tagged as a partner in the copE exercise,
was constrained by its statutory origins. rn its inability to avoid
the typical fate of most government ageneies - prompt reaction to
immediate problerns 
- 
it already paid such attention to the current
year's deadlines that its varue as a forward scanner was in itoubt.
Further, the pool of available talent is severely lj:nited by the surall
population size of New Zealand, and the cultural and vocational
preferences of trained observers and auditors. !4any apparently prefer
the private sector to careers in the state servicesr encumbered by a
vertical system of occupational classifications.
Objections of this sort to a more collective approach to the
evaLuation of information are entirely realistic. Yet there rvere other
factors, some of which suggested possible modifications.
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The first (and most subtle) is that, most of the questions raised
during COPE were a reflection of the underlying and increasing need to
establish tolerance levels within the system of government. Innumerable
variables must be loaded in, weighted for the effects of Parameters
peculiar to any government decisions taken in New Zealand, and passed
on in the form of advice to the ministers. COPETs report established
the base: X amount of rnoney would be reguired, over ttre next three
years, to maintain the status quo. Beyond that, tolerance levels
would be surpassed. Less than that threshold, and the system may
collapse.
The second is that most officials, no matter how solemn, suffer
from insatiable curiosity. Ttrey want to know what other people think.
fhey infrequently admit it, but they also need to know what other
peopte think - of ttrem. It is significant, for example' that
experienced, senior COPE officials asked an observer: "Do you think werre
too soft on departments? I often rtorry, since often they look so
pJ.eased, and sometimes I kno+r there is more I should have done."
If there is only lirnited, relevant feedback, the network is denied
nourishment. Information flows at an increasing rate, and with
growing complexity, through the system. The people required to
evaluate it, and filter it through, are denied some essential means
of support.
Although publication has been mooted since 1970, when it was
announced in the Budget that fonrard predictions of expenditure would
become a matter of pr:blic t."orar&l the findings of coPE !'tere not
published in any form, and were circulated only as described earlier.
Planning agencies, including those quasi-government bodies which
advise the government on fiscal and economic matters, such as the
New Zealand Planning Council were not present at COPE. meetings' nor
did they receive detailed accounts of the department's submissions
(bids) or the COPE-adjusted levels recommended to the ministers.
Ottrer interest groups which have a near-formal historical role in
advising government, such as the Federation of Labour, the Manufac-
turersr Fed.eration or Federated Farmers, vJere informed of the gottern-
mentrs future intentions in other ways, such as during the announcement
of the national Budget.
436.
Schemes for emulating the aritish Ishite Paper were constantly
touted about inside Treasury. Speculation was spasrnodic, as with
any proposal which has been on the agenda for years, but never
actioned. The possibility of published forecasts was used by
Treasury officials. on coPE as both a carrot and a stick. some depart-
ments, apparently introduced to the idea for the first time, reacted
with sLartled dismay. Other departments, contemptuous of what they
saw as both ministerial and Treasury prfocrastination, dis:regarded the
gentry-applied stick. The non-Treasury men who chaired the copE
working Party, and who heard Treasury drop the promise (or the threat)
of publication into the examination, were not themselves party to this
particular "riding instruction".
The implications of publication are considerable - even legendary.
There are two options: (a) fulr publication of aggregate figures, which
would be a public declaration of political intent; or (b) Ijmited
distribution of aggregate and detailed figures throughout the governnent
system, in order to provide planning information.
Either way (and both present real difficulties in a typically
'closed, confidential government systern), some of the pressures would
be removed from the officials and shifted onto thei-r political masters,
rt is not necessariJ-y the case that relocating the cause of stress
wourd improve the quality of advice given to the ministers. rndeed
the consequences of widening the scope of any conununication network cannot
be anticipated as automatically beneficial. But it wouLd provide one
discernible solution to the problem of infornation overload: a
tangible public consequence to the work invoLved in compiling, and
examining, a COPE submission.
As a result of non-publication, the pervasive problems of relia-
bility, accuracy and consistency in pred,ictions of future expend.iture
were not tested in a public forum, and only the first year of the fore-
casts had reaf political impact. The implications of pr:blishing
future demands for money (which include a public assessment of probable
future taxation leve1s) were thus defused, This threw massive
additional responsibility onto the chief advisers and assessors inside
the government system 
- 
particularly Treasury officiats, and increased
the potential significance of later phases in the Budget
cycle, such as the review of existing and new policies.
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Thirdly, there was the enormous problem of any conventional,
rigicl, hierarchy: the officials who comprised the COPE working
Party conmr'.rnicated with each other across the usual barriers of
rank and function. However, the CoPErs final- discussion inside
Treasury, attended by the COPE secretariat, was heLd without the
TIOs, No reasonable allowance was made for an exchange of views
between permanent heads and the TIos - probably the most critical
operators in the entire network. Againl this sort of exchange could
onJ.y be conducted when there was no money at risk. No furunediate
fiscal decision should hang on the discussion. It should not inter-
fere too much with ttre small breathing-spaces which are available to
officiaLs between one budgetary phase and the next. Nevertheless,
ttre procedural clifficulties of nursing a large neeting into worthwhile
exchanges were demonstrably not beyond the ability of some imaginative
officials. A direct opportunity to cross the vertical divisions of
staff levels may have enriched the value of information which could
be absorbed immediately within the COPE reports.
The peruranent heads who sat on COPE demonstrated more dramaticalJ.y
tian their subordinates the division between Treasury and other depart-
ments. For example, on the one hand the final COPE meeting was
tlpical. of earl-ier working party and sub-corunittee "washup" meetings
observed by the authorrin that these post-mortem sessions shared
various characteristics :
(i) experts in various fields, or novitiates to the process, were
given an opportunity to establish a reputation, e.g. for attention to
detail, or for an ability to ignore the trees and concentrate only on
the wood.
(ii) officials checked their own consistency, e.g. in adjusting
an item or a progranme in one department, have we remernbered to make
a parallel adjustnent elsewhere?
(iii) the meeting acted as a reminder to each other that the COPE
secretariat (Treasury) had kept a surunary account of the transactions,
that it did check these out, and that COPE did expect compliance with
the bargains struck.
(iv) the meeting established for departments that COPE had e:<pec-
tations - in other words, that COPE had a normativeras well as a
descriptive function, if only because it was so cJ-osely associated
with Treasury. The discussions implied that excellence was expectedl
regardless of how disappointing things may be,
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(v) the meetings offered hints of the i.rnovative possibilities
of COPE, For example, in the business of financial managenrent and
control, is there any way at all in which restraint can be enforced,
or are we merely engaged in a cosmetic exercise? COPE constantly
needed to reassure itself (albeit in private) that it had creative
possibilities 
- 
perhaps because rvithout these, the degree of anonymity
and neutrality demanded would be intolerable.
(vi) a washup also served as a quasi-public check on the internal
consistency of Treasury itself. For example, whcse advice should be
taken by COPE? That of the TIO, that of h.is/her seniors from Finance
I division, or that of Internal Economics section of Treasury? llhe
Treasury man on COPE must demonstrate his ability to select among the
internal sources of Treasury advice.
But at the final COpE washup , the main (permanent heads) COPE
grouP was sharply divided. The permanent heads resisted the moul.iing
effects of Treasury's influence. They pressed the Treasury men to
demonstrate whose side they were really on - theirs or the Ministers.
rt is both a strength and handicap of the system of exequtive adminis-
tration that each sector relies upon the others to defend their own
territory. Even where this assumption could not be made, copE had
demonstrated, for instance, in its sub-committees that it would move
to protect the ailing and may even conceal inforrnation from the
ministers in order to present a united front.
Treasury is peculiarly immune to the pressures which stimulate
other departments. There are very few interest groups within the
wider community which focus on Treasury as their primary benefactor.
The rore of Treasury as Mr Bumble is widely accepted. Ex;rectations
of all sorts would be over-turned if Treasury were recognised as Lady
Bountiful- And yet, throughout the entire copE exercise, Treasury
men invited departments to just such a re-appraisal.
The permanent heads and their subordinates lyere disparaging of
the turnover in Tros. "we just get to know him, and after a year or
so hers whipped off to some other section of Treasury". They pretended
great disnay over what they perceived as the near-total ig.norance of
Trosr and most Treasury officials, about their particular field?
"fmagine argnring that XUZ should be cut downj Ihatrs the sort of connent
that makes you rearise they donrt know anything about lwhatwe do], and
alI their experienqe comes from what they pick up inside Treasuryr'.
Permanent heads echoe<! each other in remarking that rreasury people
lvere preoccupied with giving eccnomic advice, instead of doing their
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"principal job" - financial management and control.
Like successfully conditioned wives, the departments acted
out their traditionat, suppliant role. Like an echo, Treasury
officials flexed their muscles, and responded with droll paternalism.
Neither really wished to excite the attention of the ministers. llheir
symbiotic relationship would have suffered if they admitted that the
improvements they seSnrately envisaged were either dependent on, or
dictated by, their political masters.
Although the senior officials who worked alongside Treasury to
examine the departmental bids were adept at picking up each otherrs
uroods, and clues, the pelstanent heads themselves were less sensitive'
On the floor of the main COPE neeting, they reverted apparently with-
out recognising what their subordinates had achieved, to the battle-
Iines drawn up between them and their own ministers, and Treasury.
It would be unrealistic to expect that an in-house exchange of
views could remedy this, since negotiated bargains are an essential
feature of the allocative s:'stem. But for both atlocative and
forecasting Purposes, by the end of L97g a collective assessment of
t.he state of the art appeared overdue. Attention must be given to
evaluating the political refevance of the type of information souqht
by COPE: policy as expressed in money terms. The men at ttre head
of over thirty state departments represented an enormous reservoir of
e:<perience and knowledge. At the end of the 1970rs COPE provided the
only forrum in which they officially drew on that source in a
collective manner.
Ten years after the devel-opment of COPE, it was obvious that
the government system could do a great deal to quantify, in cash terms,
some of what it used: p)-ant, eguipment, supplies, material-s, transp'ort
and freight costs, fuel, J.ighting, heating - these could be itemised
and costed vtith reasonabl-e accuracy. But the allocative and produc-
tive value of these costs depended on two other critical factors: the
numbers and the quatifications of people paid to achieve the desired
objectives (which involves training, statutory authority and other
nanagement-related functions) and an appreciation, and lucid definition,
of what the desired objectives were.
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,rust as the permanent heacls, once before, could not bring
themselves to self-injury, so ministers are incapable of denying
public claims, at least without adamant support. External planning
bodies are unlikely to modify the behaviour, or the relationshipsl
of officials because theyhave always lacked the authority to commit
others to their plans. Public servan'bs' palticularly those in the
most senior positions, are unlikely to pronote any scheme which
implicates then in the abandonment of what they define as the goals
of their own organisations.
But given acceptable protection and a sufficiently sheltered
workshop, they could agree on what is politically essential.
Officials who have been persuaded to produce a schedule of their own
minimum needs could also be educated to produce a schedule of what
they collectively believe to be the minimum needs of the public sector-
Some items, some activities, some programmes coufd be eLi:ninated on
a global basis. Only those who work permanently inside the networks
can identify these initially. Ministers may approve or reject their
choices, but they are not in a position to make the initial selection
themselves, apart from picking out the occasional sf'tred cotnt r such'
as Accident Compensation or National Superannuation.
COpE was establ-ished because Treasury and other officials recognised
that incrementaLism in government decision-making was approaching a'
dangerous level. The history of COPE demonstrated that atternpting to
water down policy through diluting the supply of money avaiLable to
adninistrators \^ras no substitute for incremeutalism. Setting targets
into which the full range of arbitrarily Lrimmed policies shouLd be
fitted was not successful, A further oPtion was to reduce the range
of policies, not merely the monetary base on which they were built.
This was clearly more difficult than diversifying COPE's networks of
communication. Eventually, the ministers, working collectively,
would have to consider and accept the revised' collectively-determined
objectives presented to them by the joint-permanent heads, if they were
to be effective. By late in the 1970s, moves to reform the COPE-
based, system (described in - Ct-radter 51x)
these problems and deficiencies into account'
' took a number of
2.
3.
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Chapter Five:
I. In the Treasury Study Group Report, p.46, it is note.d that the
coLlection of fo::l'rard estimates of all government errpenditure rdas
instituted by Cabinet directive in 1962 (the same year as the
Public Expenditure (ParliamentarT) Corunittee was estabLished) .
lltris suggests that it was intended then to use the projections
in the Finance Divisj.on of Treasury in Estimates preparation and
budgeting control.
See Chapter I\iro for brief surunary of developments.
David Preston, Government Accor:nting in New zealand: An Enplanation
of the Accounting and Financial System of the Central Govern-
rent of New Zealand, (Wellington: Goverrunent printer, 1980),
@ended to Frestonr p.lo3, particularly
ttrree Treasury publications. See also E. Winchester, 'IncreasingCreative Intelligence'. This thesis was not accepted as a
sufficiently satisfactory submission for Winchester to be
granted a Ph.D. degree for reasons which remain somewhat unclear.
It is obvious, however, that during his time in New Zealand
Winctrester was somewhat insensitive to the particular political-
nuances of adrninistrative and political relationships in the
capital city of Wellington and severe in his criticisms of the
Treasury. There are numerous errors of fact - and some sweepinggeneralisations in Winchester's sulestantial thesis on N.Z. PPB.
However it is also possible that Winchester's disconcerting
interest in the use of transcendental med:.tation as .err adnini-
strative tool was unacceptable to some of his former New Zeal-and
colJ.eagtres. Stories about Winchester, ranging from unsr:b-
stantiated claims ttrat he was a CIA 'plant' to egually unsub-
stantiated assertions of his analytical brilLiance and impact,per TM, on the Defence Department (USA), contribute to a curious
nythology of afnost apocrlphal proportions about ttris US
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CH/TPTER STX
RECENT DE\IELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PLANNING
Interest in reform :
By the late 1970rs, in a variety of official guarters including the Treasury,
considerable dissatisfaction was being expressed over the COpE-based system
of public expend,iture p)-anning and financial control . From one viewtrnint
in Treasury, the problem centred on
the dualism of COPE as both an allocation and a forecasting exercise.
For both macro-economic (level of Government activity) and macro-financial (deficit funding) reasons, the forecasting is necessary.
Howewer, because COPE is also used as the basis for the draft Estimates,it has a micro-financial function as well. This dualism creates
nany tensions.
As [copg's] exercise is not a purely forecasting one, it is not a
straightforward and rational affair; it involves the gualitative
assessments which are a necessary part of allocations exercises.
Much of the tension relating to the arlocation aspect of copE
arises from the vagueness in the interpretation of 'existing policyt.Because it is loosely defined, allowing historical practice rathe=
than being strictly dependent on C,overnment approvals, many
extensions of existing policy get into COPE. Thi.s leads to confLict.
Treasury adhere to strict rules, departments seek to get round
then.
Hence, in the context of COPE, Treasury is consistentLy seeking to
enforce the discipline of formal- codes and departments are seeking
;rlways to bend them. Because of the judgmental nature of the allocation
aspect of COPE informal codes are important; mutual trust is needed
to ensure that the unwritten rules are observed. In this, COPE and
Treasury are united. A 5shizophrenia occurs in COPE when deviations
occur (e.q. 
' 
B [departmental finance managerl and his over-exploit-
ation of the informal codes, the 'historical practice of existing policy',
corresPonding to his deviation from norms of acceptable'behaviour).
COPE signals to Treasury to correct such over-exploitation in another
context; to correct them itself would destr?y the entire practice of
the informal definition of existing policy.
From a.nother Treasury viewpoint the main problern was the inadequacy
of existi-ng systems for (a) review of departmental forecasts and arlocations,
and (b) restraint of actual expenditure in the public sector:
... Government expenditure has increased in real terms fron 1974
to 198O by approxirnately 30 per cent. fn the same period expenditure
has gone from beinS 29.2 per cent of GDE to 37 per cen! of GDE.
Progression has not been steady. Major variations ... disguise the fact
that vithin existing policies there is a tendency for incremental
'creep' to take place each year ...
In recent years our efforts to control expenditure have taken four
fom.s, [the first of which is thatl ttre rbase load' represented
by existing policies has been assessed by an annual interdepartmental
COPE exercise modified as necessary by (generally) across the board
reductions where the need for these is indicated - by macro-economic
or financing considerations ...
!/hiLe each of t-he ... elements in the control process has been
reasonably consistently applied, each has demonstrated certain
fundamental weaknesses. In r:he aggregate these have Led to our
relative inability (and/or unwillingness when it came to the making of
7
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individual decisions) to obtain the control over qovernment
expenditure that we could well have achieved. To be more specific! ...
The COPE exercise, which has certainly resulted in a lower leve1 of
expenditure than we would have seen without it, is nevertheless
essentially a cost-plus exercise which inevitably results in a degree
of expenditure creep from year to year. There is a constant, and
very understandable, temptation for departments to adopt an expansive
viewpoint when determining their needs in t.erms of personner, goods
and services. once this claim has been accepted and the figure
added to the base then there it remains to be escarated at therstandard' rate from one year to the next 
- except in the event thatarbitrary cuts off the copE figures are made at Estimates time in
response to a feeling that the final copE figures contained some
r fat' .
Add to this the fact that many of our policies are open-ended in the
sense that we do not irnpose an expenditure ceiJ-ing on a poticy
when introduced 
- and that the expenditure incurred on some
depends upon the vigour with which they are pursued or the sfunpre
compl-iance with certain rules (e.g. unemployment benefits, national
superannuation). In the latter case the Government automatically
spends more (or ress) depending on factors rargery outside its
control unless it changes the rules. rt is not difficult, therefore,to see why, despite the copE exercise, we have had dilficulty inholding the overall level of Government expenditure.
The senior official who wrote that comment on COpE in 1979( cn behalf of
the Associate Milister of Finance, D.F. Quigleyl added that the
greatest value of COPE in the past had been its use in maintaining the
status guo 
- that is, he claimedrthe expendi-ture process had been relative-
ly stable- In addition, the annual COPE exercise provided a disciplinary
system whereby departments r*ere obliged to discriminate between what they were
already doing and what they proposed. to do, in financial terms. Departmental
financial controllers were forced to focus on the total expenditure
Process, to cost policies carefully and adequately in terms of probable
need, to identify areas of growth, to be both more methodical and more
systematic in making their clairns on the pubJ-ic purse. However, he
conclud.ed, at best copE had remained a costing, not a priority-setting
exercise. I'Al_though it is ternpting to radicall-y alter the existing system
for annual and future policy costing and approval, it is [nowl
proposed to build on what COPE has achieved - discipline, establishment of
planning requirements and improved internal departmental'house-keeping,
and evolve a more effective emphasis on expenditure planning',.3
A more senior Treasury official with long experience in the COPE
system corunented that in fact only one of the original objectives of that
exercise had been attained. In 1971, he said, COPE's responsibility had
been threefold. The Committeers task was to identify:
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First, the longer term costs of Government policies at lrresentt ettto put it another wayr rr,rhat share cf national resources does C,overrrment
need to carry out its policies? The committee (cops) has been giventhe job of establ.ishing these costs and resources and this is the
survey aspect of its vlork.
secondly, what share of national resources is likely to be
available to Government over the forecast period? This informationis given to Government and, in future, will be given to the Conunittee(COPE) through the normal eeonomic forecasting function of Treasury.
rn effect it sets a limit upon total expenditure if c"overnment
economic and financial objectives are to be obtained,
Thirdly, what wourd be the effect on poricies if the forecast lever
of activity is to fit within the limits of the total resources and
expenditure likely lo be available? This is the ANALysrs aspect ofthe Comnitteers [CopB's] work and irnplies that ultimately the Committee
will have to evaluate existing as well as new policies.
The Committee would link with C,overnment decision-nakingby reporting at the time (Decernber) that Government is consideringits expenditure gruiderines. rt is expected that, eventually,
[COpB'sJ work could result in Government setting guidelines for
several I'ears in advance. This eontrasts with the present procedure
of Govgrnment setting guidelines each year merely for the followingyear.
The predomirrance of COPE's first task , in the minds of the officials
involved, reduced their perception of the importance of the other objectives
designed for the Comrnittee by its pioneering Treasury planners. problems
and deficiencies in expenditure planning and control, during the l97O's
were exacerbated by the fact that
'we still donrt have an adequate system for pAR (folicy Analysis
and Review). No one wants to do it _ we did have a couple of people
recentLy, for example, but in general Treasury people want to get
on the divisions because that is perceived asubeing where the
action is 
- and where promotion starts from-..
In August 1979 the sane official described his concerns over COPE
in a slightly different way:
'To date COPE has not carried out its initial terms of reference in
fu11.5 This is because the members [i.e. the permanent heads and other
officials comprising the various sub-committees of COpE]
have feLt that it is not possible for a group of permanent headsto comnent on the effect on another per:nanent head's departrnbnt of
keeping within some overall financial limit. Over the years COPE
has merely performed the survey part of its functions ...
COPE thus presents the Government with a forecast of the cost of
existing policies. This is a most useful job although the COPE
procedures cErme in for some criticism by the Auditor-Genera1 inits report on Financial Management and Control in Administrative.
Government Departments (BI [Pt.IV] 1978). The Auditor-General did suggest that COPE could be replaced by a system requiring
departments to prepare projections for revi,ew by Treasury ...
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In some cases the innovations lsuch as ppBS, introduced and
implemented in New Zealand since the late Ig6Orsl have
not developed as originally intended. This applies especially to
the COPE procedures. lt was thought that COPE would develop along thelines of PESC in the u.K. This was not to be . pESC is a pubLic
forecasting exercise that places Government expenditure firmly
within the context of economic Arowth. As developed,it involves departments, Ministers and Parliament and in effect
commits all parties to a future expenditure pattern. COPE on the
other hand has developed so far into an annual budgeting exercise
that starts about nine months before the financial- year begins.
coPE establishes the cost of existing policies, conunits no one andis rin house'. Its usefulness is largely as an agreed base forpolicy reviews and estimates bids there is a definite
need for greater emphasis on the analysis of existing 4ctivitiesto gauge how effectively they neet policy objectives'.'
other senior departnentar officiars outSide Treasury shared these
concerns over coPE. rn early 1979, for example, one financial mErnager
with many years experience in government and on COpE sub-committees
wrote as follows :
Recently r read 'zero Budgeting comes of Ager. My impression \,yasthat given the present staffing standards in the public sector,Zero Budgeting would be difficult to introduce. There is no guaranteethat it would be more meaningful than CoPE is at the present time,for the reason that since the review of the copE forecast issuperficial, is there any reason to expect that we could do betterat reviewing zero based budgets.
Things about COpE which disillusion me are :
- rt is now only a facet of the annuar forecasting exercise sinceit is subject to restraints and arbitrary reductions imposed byTreasury and Government. There is a substantiar overkill in the
coPE review. Flcr inst.nce departments put a rot of effort into
equipment forecasts, and the Tro's and working party sub-committeedebate their labours with much earnestness. on numerous occasions wethen get Government saying something like: '75 per cent of last yearrsallocation'. Perhaps these situations would be avoided if we hadbetter crystal balls, but r think they should be looked at, arl the
sane, and better gruidelines given at the outset ,..
Does Treasury 'forlow through' every proposar? Two about which the
outcome is unknown to myself were the across-the-board reviews ofPublicity and rn-service training which Government requested inL977 ... It could be that the result of studies on this scale
should be made available to the COpE working party. We [i.e.
coPE officials] would then know what attitudes to adopt in thefuture.
r agree .. - that what emergfes as the vote alrocation sel-dom bears
any resembrance to what went in as the forecast. rt is arso afact that departments re-shuffle expenditure but this is to amelioratethe harsher rearities of our financial environment. rt has to be
remembered that:
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estimates are always subject to refinement as new facts emerge,
staff numbers firm up, and plans are completed; and
(b) some of Goverrunentrs cost-cutting economies are inposed
without much thought of ttre consequences; e.9. no PLCrs
as at I January.E
I think we must be allowed to move our foot a little when the boot
is pinching our toes too much.
[ln surnrnary] cope is too big an exercise and needs experimentationin examination under otier headings to break it up. Since DI'IVC and
the Works Progrannne have been cut out already, why cannot some
other groups of either items or activities be similarly treated
where ttrey are sufficiently cornmon. Overseas travel, staff training,
publicity, build.ing maintenance, rates, grants to organisations
in New Zealand and overseas, office furniture, office equipment,
computer services, aII suggest themselves. The review of otlrer
activities may be able to be scaled down or, as in ttre case of trad.ing
activities and votes, dealt wittr on an entirely different basis.
Finally, can the emphasis be positively shifted away from masses
of paper to a concise presentation of the forecast.9
At ttre end. of ttre previous year (November 1978) the same official
had signalted his growing disquiet over the COPE system; with which he
had been involved for over a decade. He was then concerned about the
lack of standardisation and coordination of departmental forecasts, as
submitted to COPE; over the lad< of "quantifiers" - quantitative neasureg
defining the assumptions behind forecasts and enabling efficient
evaluation to occuri over the loose, vaglue, uncrj.tical presentation by
departments of what constituted "existing policy":
quite apart from tJle fact that some votes appear to classify
[some tlpes of] expenditure as an item while others treat it as
an activity, there [is] no valid way of deterrnining how nuctt should
be spent otlrer ttrarr by reference to ttre base year 1L978/79 i.e.
ttre irunediate past fiscal year]. Therefore spending patterns
get aggregated.IO
Itre official did not recommend targets for e>rpenditure forecasts. As
he knew from personal e:qperience, such fiscal devices had been little more
than a licence to reach ttre higher permissible sca1e. He favoured a
Treasury-set "formula" which would define the upper limit of e>rpenditure.
He had concluded:
If I may be critical of Treasury, it seems to me that having
developed the concept of COPE forecasts some ten years ago,
there has been litt1e on-going improvement. I know ttrere has
been F.F,s. [rinancial Forecasting System] Uut in essence this
deals nainly with the presentation of the forecasts. There is
still no alternative to t.l:e value judgement as to rhow much is
enough'. I am not advocating the scrapping of COPE and the
substitution of an entirely new system - the process of retraining
a large ntunlrer of technical officers does not appeal. However,
it does seem desirable that some review be made of COPE
(a)
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so that nore evolutionary changes may occur.ll
In 1980 a relatively junior Treasury investigating officer, fresh
from his first COPE exarr"ination, and still'somewhat outraged by ttre
arrogance with which a large, confident spending departnrent asserted,
its cLaims on pr:blic funds, epitonr-ised COPE in ttris way: r'1lhe way COPE
functions no\,v meErns that ttre barbariarrs (spending departments) ttremselrres
are manning ttre frontiers while the Treasury legions are lod<ed up in
their camps". He continued with a sense of righteous indignation,
asserting tlrat certain accommodations rnade by COPE were a priori wrongs
In partj.cular, I find it extremely disturbing that:
(a) volume increases above the previous yearrs appropriation
are a priori regarded as being reasonable, i.e. ttre
existing appropriation is not regarded as an e<pression
of existing Government policy;
(b) unjustified volume grorth according to Governnent-approved
formulae (e.9. bursaries, formulae grants etc.) ib
agreed with, despite Treasury reservations;
(c) volume growth according to Departmental lsicl fomulae is
agreed with, even though no doc..rmentation is provided to
show that the formulae are approved by Cabinet or Cabinet
Committees;
(d) volurne gror'rth is agreed with even when this effectively
reverses decisions rnade by Cabinet and Cabinet Coruuittee
at the Existing PoIiry Review;
(e) volume growth is agreed with even ttrough it exceeds ttre
volume growth specified in a Cabinet Comrittee approvill...
In my view, COPE should eittrer be abol.ished or purified... ifpurification were achieved, ttren three objectives would be
attained,:
(a) Cabinet and C.abinet Comrnittee decisions would not be pre-
empted and. negated by officials acting in accordance with
what they see as individual [sic] Ministerrs wishes;
(b) expenditure grcnrttr would be controlled wittr less difficrrlty;
(c) COPE would become a forecasting rather t:han an allocation
exercise (at the moment departments treat COPE basically
as an allocation exercise, as a way of obtaining resources,
and consequently their forecasting is piEiful); this would
enable COPE to become the forum fo:: developing sound and
sophisticated data bases for assessing the resour€ irnpli-
cations of existing policies (which is probably what COPE
should be in t-heory.J-2
- The cumulative irnpact of these and other carefully considered
criticisms on those responsible for the maintenance of the annual COPE
exercise was inevitably powerful. Ttre effect was to refine and emphasise
various informal and quasi-formal complaints about COPE elsewhere in ttre
department networks, Some officials, particularly departmentaL accoun-
tants, undor:btedly partisan, grumbled that the COPE rules vrere both
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implicit (therefore not open to their attack) and inconsistently
applied (therefore open to abuse by COPE sr:b-comnittees). Others felt
that the massive paper-work, and relatively routinized nature of the
annual COPE exercise implied that "this sort of housekeeping should now
go back to Treasury. Werve got the point, we've learned how to be rno:c
disciplined, but we simply don't have the time or the trained staff to
tie up in such an exercise any longer".I3
While most officialJ-y agreed that COPE was "essentialty a good idea,
in t}at it [gave] an approved base for t]re Eslimates", t]ris was precisely
the area of greatest conc-ern to Treasury officials 
- what one person
called the "tablets of stone syndrome". O.re departmental manager who had
"battled with COPE for the past ten years" consid,ered that COpErs
"constitutional basis" was "only insecurely related to Treasury instruc-
tions", but \i{orse, "itts an awful- lot of effort for the benefit of a
very small nurnlcer of people. Who reads COPE reports? Vltro actions
decisions made by COPE? The real problem is ttrat Treasury is not looking
hard enough at ttre consequences of not giving us the money we cLaim.',I4
It may have been true that only a very small nr:mber of persons
actually read the COPE reports. These were not, howerrer, insignificant
persons, since they included influential politicians suctr as the l4inister
of Finance, Muldoon, and his Associate, Quigley.
While l'linisters like Muldoori and Quigley vrere receptive to complaints
reactring them about COPE, their principal conc€rn was not so muctr with
whidr particular rules diil or did not work, with the constitutional
proprieties, or the behavioural inconsistencies of either bruised depart-
nental officials or affronted COPE and Treasury adjudicators. Ihey were
motivated by two other pressing preoccupations: the unacceptabLy high
aggregate l-evel of e>rpenditure forecast each year by COPE (eventually
necessitat5-ng increasingly emlcarassing budget deficits) and the political
costs of this. Their own party (Nationa1) was explicitly committed to
two ends: a nedirection of public funds into fields suctr as energv develop-
ment, and a limitation on public consumption in ttre interestg of ttre
private sector.
There $rere, of coursel apologists for COPE. Prom late 1979 to rrid-
1980' as proposals for budgetary reform were deve!-oped in an atmosphere
of rumour and speculation, departmental officials who had earlier e:rpressed
their disendrant{r€nt began to worry whether or not some ne!r, time-
consurning, technically sophisticated sr:bstitute rnight be foisted on them
by Treasury. One form of this reaction was to beLittle the importance of
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COPE in the annual budgetary procedures, to imply
were as exaggerated as its perceived instrumentaL
that its deficiencies
role.
Lang, for exampJ-e,The inme&iate past-Secretarlr of the Treasury,
asserted that:
COPE is not a major area of po\.rer negotiation. Most
permanent heads are simply not interested. in COpE....
In any case, the nain problem is that specific management
information is missing, just not getting ttrrough the presentdrannels. It's not so much what's wrong with COpE thatrs
the probJ.em 
- itrs that financial management information
is not properly Lied in to a system for macro-economic
resource use. Itrs fine inside Treasury itself 
- I would
have designed anottrer system if I had not thought that this
one [i.e. COPE-based Estimates] would work. Ttre departnents
are npre or less in toudr with ttre New Zealand version of
PPBS, but there are some problems. For example, after the
COPE report, is completed, the Education people suddenly
discover tley've got 200 more teachers than they thought
lney had. Or, again, budgetary information is not tied into
a system of macro-economic resource use. Ttre Department ofStatistics nolr has better information to offer but we still
havenrt tied in public sector resources. So there 
.is a
major e:<penditure planning problem here.... However, one
shouldn't exaggerate the importance of permanent heads, and
one certainly shouldnrt exaggerate ttre importane of COpE.15
llhe basis for redesign: A Cybernetic perspective.
At this point we turn to examine what came'to be kno'rn as rttre
Quigley conc€pt' - a set of specific propcsals for reforming the COPE-
based system of expenditure forecasting and ttre aLlocation of resources
for the maintenance and implementation of existing and new goverruEnt
policies. The brief history which follows is described fron two
inevitably partisan viewpoints 
- 
that of ministers and their officials.
Neither fulry rehearses the range of views held by various agents in
central government; neither attempts to assess the range of reactions
to reforrr outside the inunediate expenditure planning systerns.
In an account, of ttre application of systems theory to budget pJ.ann:ing
and fiscal control, Lloyd Aney notes that:
[a]' good p1an... 'does not necessarily yield a good control...good planning data and good control data are not necessarily
the same'. ttris introduces the question of motivation andincentives.... It, seems quite c1ear... that behavioural
considerations, in the form of the motivation and personal
aspiralJ-on level of employees, and how far they are influenced
by tJ:e level of the control target set and by the form thepenalty-reward system takes are [significant factors] when we
are considering controL.16
Altltough, as we sha11 see, both ministers and officials placed
considerable emphasis on their own education and cooperation and on
partieipation by all concerned in "hard decisions", this was largely a
II
I
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matter of in-house rhetoric. For a nurnber of re'asons (j-ncluding the
organisational ei<perience, ideals and preferreil rnanagement style of the
principal participants, the hierarchical conficlantial natlrre of the inner
executive systems, and the constitutional and political'necessity to
maintain viable budgetary procedures) coercion, rather than education,
dominated the reformed design. Changes made to the COPE-based
system woul-d in fact require, if not compel, specific behavioural
changes on the part of spending agents recr-arrlless of diverse levels of
departmental and mLnisterial consciousness and consensus.
Theorists such as Anthony Wilder and Russell Ackoff, contributing
to a recent conference of social scientists and engineers interested in
cybernetics, emphasised the necessity for participative systern desigrr.lT
Their arguments, in conjunction with Lloyd Amey's, enable us to assess
how far the "Quigley reformersrr flsysloped an effective system for
budgetary preparation and management. Wilder is preoccupied with what
he calls the "deep structure" of cybernetics - that is "the web of under-
Iying, primarily epistemological. assumptions that are taken for granted
when applying cybernetics [i.e. theories of comnunication and control]
to solve practical problems".IS He sees one fundamental obstacle to
changing frames of order and acguiring a proper understanding of system-
atic behaviour (both of which the Quigley schooJ. was attempting to do).
That obstacle is the extent to which those affected by change perceive
it to be J.mposed, designed and controlled from the outsider "Instead of
examining the question of restructuring the system' [reformersJ
tend to concern themselves only with the surface-structure question of
the redistribution of the present inputs and outputs of the system,
Ieaving its fundamental organisation, and of course its ideological and
economic values, essentially untouched - as if they were beyond question."Ig
One insight to be gained from the following history is the extent to which
the system designers tried to avoid this obstacle,
Ackoff takes Wilderrs point further in discussing what he
calls the aesthetics of management. Ackoff states that in problem solving
(as the Quigley reformers attempted to do) "we have preferenge€_:E,cl_ngg4q
as well- as ends ... (that) set of preferences (we) have that are independ-
ent of considerations of efficiency constitute our sty1e... Desired outccimes
are performance objectives that impart extrinsic value [i.e. the
efficiency of a means relative to an endl to the means we emplqgto pursue
them. Uses of preferred mearns are stylistic objectives that have
intrinsic value, value that is independent of the outcomes they bring
about. If and when our theories of decision-making, problem sol-ving,
manaEement and control do not take style, intrinsic values, into
account, they are seriorrsly deficient".20
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Ackoff goes on to argue that style is at least as irnportant
as efficiency and effectiveness, particularly in any situation in which
the objective is to increase one's control ove:r a situation. Since, as
we shall see, this was precisely bhe objective of the Quigley xeformers,
Ackoffrs thesis is relevant :
.It has often been observed ... that individuals enjoy power -
which is the ability to control 
- 
for its own sake. This means that
control can bring its own satj-sfactions. A control system, even
a self-control system, that does not matcit the style of the con-
troller witl either not be accepted, or, if accepted, will lead to
dissatisfaction and ultimate replacement.
Thus, the designer or planner of control systems must
understand the style and ideals of not only those who are to be
in control, but also those who are to be controlled if,he is to
design or plan a system that wiII work effectively. .tt
Ackoff further observes that "Style is multidimensional,,.
However, in developing an effective control system for a structure as
complex, d.iverse and historically and politically deterrnined as the public
sector, the designerrs capacity to cletermine different traits of behaviour
is severely limited. Hence Ackoff suggests that the best solution would
be to coopt and encourage the involvcment cf those(will control, be
controlled, or otherwise affected blr the system being designed, in the
design of that system. "A system designer who is aware of the
relevance of style can learn about the stylistic preferences of stakeholders
in the system by making its redesign as participa_tive as possible.
Participants in the design process cannot help but put their stylistic
preference into their design. Nor can they refrain fromincorporating
their ideals into these designs.r' IEmphasis in original ].
The number of stakeholderS in the systen of public expenditure
planning and government financial control may for some purposes be regarded
as incl-uding the whole population of New Zealand. However here we will
categorise as "stakehold.ers" those in central government with explicit
delegated authority to plan for, e>rpend and control public funds. The
account which follows, for example, indicates who was actually
involved in re-designing the COPE-based system. Their identity, and
their preferred stylistic means to a desired end may be assessed in
the light of Ackofffs thesis. We may also observe that although the system
desigirrers attempted far more than a mere "redistribution of inputs
and outputs", and speculated on changing some structural aspects of the
central allocative organisation (for example, by instituting sector
committees on an "envelope" basis), they sho\^red reLatively 1ittLe
interest in examining the ideoJ.ogicaL and other socio-economic values
of those whose wiJ-ling cooperation would be essential to the scherne's
success.
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Tbe use of a qibernetic motlel, which fosuses on feedback
coitrtituieation processes, is. justified on the grounds that the "sectorst'
involved [i,e. the varioug executLve agents of governrnentsJ are
interdependent 
-'rdecisj,ons tn one sectof, are eodgnunicate4 aad may altef
:the conditlsas fqr ecietiou-rnakinE in alrotler",23 S.i.nce this was preeiseJJr
ttre intention of, the 'Qnlgley Sehool. , the model ts htghlf'retrevaut. It
should, howe'ver, be nqted that trvr,hat s,eryes one seetor we].l may- be
detri.rnental to anottrer."24 At, the ,efld of the l970rs the coPg-based
sy tem was ref.orrned beqause J,t appeared to be serving too f,ew trpwerful
ln-Lerests effectively. The success o-f any reforen of that system, hotvever,
wars 11ke.151 to depend on lrcrs far account r*as talken of the varied sigmificance
of inforcrnation feedback t-o controlling agents, and their understandl.ng of,
ard aitaptation to, the folnnal and infirrrnal codes of, political
arrd organi,sationaL behaviour of those ttrey sorrght to cont ol,
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Ttre ltinisters' Tale:
During J-979tdiscussions on the COPE-based system of public e>qrenditure
planning contirrued inside the central government networks. For example, on
28 June the Planning Cor-rncil submitted to the Prime lrlinister a paper entitleil
Options for the Future. The paper said that;
June, J-979
-:nm-previous 
reeting, you (the Prinre l,tinister) e>rpressed ttre hopethat the Planning Council would give more attention in its reports
to 'the extension of options into the future', The council is
anxious to do this in its work prograrune which, you wilr recarl,
airns to produce an overall study of options for the future in 1980-gl,
after a series of nrcre detailed studies ttris year.
The Cor:ncil has been estabtished as a focal point for consultativepranning. rt is itself srnalr, and its success must depend largery
on provoking others to look ahead, and helping to pull the resultstogether. To this end, it is working closely with a nuniber of private
groups e.g. with the Manufacturers' Federation and Manufacturing
Development Corrncil on the possibilities of increasing the proportion
of manufactured output which is exported. However, if the'@vernrnentts
unde'rtakings on planning for national development in its last Manifesto
are to be fulfirled, it is essential that more work be done wittrin
Governnent itself on options for the future.
The }4anifesto enphasized a rTtore systematic appraisal of future
levers and patterns of pr:blic expenditure and the use of manpower,
leading ultimately to pr:btication of the results. rt also envisagedthat each department shourd explore options for the developnent of
tlte sector or sectors for which it is responsible, usualry in
association with an advisory cora'rcil or ottrer nechanism for consultation
with people from the private sector and local or regional governnent.
Much work is, of course, arready being done towards planning of thiskind, but it is patchy and spasrnodic. rt arso needs nore positive
and systematic auidance and coordination.
Your recent Budget has set the stage for a new initiative inplanning. It is reconnrended that you authorise the Treasury, in
consurtation with ttre chairman of the Planning cor:ncir, to set the
necessary work in train expeditiously. Ttre first step will be
recommendatj,ons by officials to Cabinet on gmidelines to be used in
assessing options for the future. This will provide the necessary
background for further J-mprovements in ttre education of future public
expenditure and manpower policies and in nationaL and sectoralplanning, along ttre lines indicated. (25)
From Jr:ne, discussions betrpeen Treasury
continued 
- members of ttre CC1SX (notally
and Planning Cor:ncil officials
of Finance) were closely involved and lines of
Quigley, Associate I'linister
inquiry began to firn up.
Augmst
--7rr the end of August, the New Zealarrd Institute of Pr:blic Adrninistration
had heLd a conference in Wellinqton. llhe Secretary for Justice, Robertson,
had addressed the conference with his views on the present system for pr:blic
expenditure managernent and control.26 Robertson's comments, reported in the
news-nedia, had caught the eye of Quigley (Associate Minister of Finance) and
on l7 september 1979 the Minister for:vrarded a note on this to g. \ler,
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Assistant Secretary of Treasury (with whom the Minister had already had
discussions) for comment. The note from the Ministerts executive assistant
(ex-Treasury official, R. Tanner) said: "The Minister has commented to ne
(Tanner) that his initial thinking is that a Cabinet paper should be prepared
on the topic, but he would be interested in any 'informal' Treasury comrnent
first."27 Robertson's chief conplaint had been that there were no clear,
explicit Governrent policy guidelines (for either policies or expenditure
targets) to control departmental budgeting. Nor, Robertson was reported as
sayingr"do COPE officials have a base against which to analyse Departmental
forecasts. "28
Although there is no evidence that Robertson was personally consulted
again until several rcnths later, when he was invited to join an Officials
Comndttee on E:<penditure Planning, his public cornments added to, and had
aPParent influence on, the climate of opinion novr deveLoping among the principal
financial advisers of ttre Governnent.
October
On 8 October 1979, for exanple, a Treasury draft paper (internal circulation
onlyi was written, entitled Public Expenditure Planning: Econouric Considerations.
Throughout this section the term 'Government E4>enditurer is defined
as the C'overnnent's claim on real resources i.e. payrnents to personnel
employed by the Government and for goods and services purclrased by it(both current and capital). This excludes subsiilies, transfers and
financing transactions where the Government merely acts as an inter-
rediary for ttre transfer of claims on real resources from one group
in the private sector to another,
In Deoember L977 Cabinet agreed, on the recommendation of the
Cabinet Comnittee on E>rpenditure, that 'Government expenditure targets
shouLd be consistent with the Governnent's nedium terrn economic
objectives of achieving a sustained inprovenrent in the balance of
payrnents and providing a sound basis for economic Arowth' (C!l77/47/L3 refers). Treasury considers that the basic approach
endorsed by Cabinet in 1977, which concentrates on the allocation
of the additional resources created by growth rather than shares of
total resources, is stilI appropriate.
It is clear that, if adeguate employment opportunities are to
be created for a relatively rapidly growing Labour force, let alone
increases in reai standards of living, New Zealand will have to
achieve a significantly higher rate of economic arowth over the next
5 
- I0 years ttran it has, on a sustained basis, for many years past.It is equally clear that tJ.e major constraint on growth has been for
nany years the balance of paynents - ttris constraint has become eventighter since J.:974.
Tttus ttre first charge on growth must be e:rports. Achievernent
of faster growttr also implies a minimum conrnitment of resources to
investment, both private and public, but with tlre emphasis on private'
sector investnrent in the production of tradeable goods and services.
This leaves as the residual private and pr:)clic consumption.
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fhe allocation of resources as between private and public
consumption is nore a political than an econorric question. [he
economic aspect essentially relates to efficienry. It has becorne a
commonplace that the private sector uses resources more efficiently
than the public sector. Given the size of the protected private
sector in New Zealand, and the form and level of that protection,
this is at least argnrable. However, there is little concrete
evidence either way.
In Planning Perspectives 1978-83 (sic), the Planning Cor:ncil
suggested that a rate of growth in real G.N.P. over that period of
3 percent per Ernnum was feasible, but only if exports grew by 5 percent
per annum in real terrns. Failure to neet at l-east 3 percent grovlth
would inevitably result in a combination of high unemployment and net
emigration. The Planning Cor:nciL estimated that this rate of G.N.P.
growth would require a 1.9 percent per annuin increase in real investment
and would allow private and public consuqption, taken together, to
rise by 2.6 percent per ;rnnum in real terms. Given that the capitals
current balance in Governnent e)<penditure is normally aror:nd 25t75(current,Ly 20:80), and assuming that it is desired that the Covernrentrs
share should not grow at the expense of the private.sectorrs, then the
upper limit of growth in real Government expenditure should be 2.4
perc€nt per annum, As the risks would seem to be downside i.e. that
$re are more likely to rrnder-shoot than over-shoot the overall and
export growth ob jectives, a targiet rate of growth in real C'overn[Ent
expenditure of 2 percent per annum would be more appropriate for
planning purposes.
The second najor economic consideration is ttrat growth in
Governrnent expenditure should not fluctuate r:nduly around the target
rate. Ihe reasons for this are two fold:
(a) Governrent expenditure is not a particularly effective
countercyclicat instrunent. This is because the time lag
between decisions on and implenrentation of new expenditure
Progralrunes can be so long that, rather than damping a down-
turn in econoraic activity, the addiLional e:<penditure merely
reinforces the following up-turn.
(b) Another reason ties in the ratchet effect - itrs much easier
to increase e:<penditure ttran to reduce it. AIl in allt
C;overnrnent e:pend"iture controls are likely to be npre effective
if applied in a consistent fashion from one year to the nextr
rather than on a stop-go basis.
Ttre approach suggested above irnplies that for demand management
purposes ttre appropriate fiscal instrurents are taxation and transfer
paylents, sr:bsidies etc. This, in fact, is reflected in recent
practice when instrunents such as income tax cuts and farnily benefit
increases have been employed for demand management purposes.29'
November
On 20 Noveniber I9?9 a paper written by Treasury official-s (notably
Tyler, Assistant Secretary) was produced in the nar€ of the.
Associate Minister of Finance.30 The paper, which represented a summary of
joint ministerial-Treasury-Planning Council discussions to that point, was
entitled "l'!erno for the Prime Minister: Public E '.
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Ihe paper referred to a Cabinct d.iscussion of 23 octoh'er 19?9 when
l{inisters had been asked "to revier.r all functions within their portfolios".
fn the light of this discttssion and request, the Associate l"linister of Finance
had "atternpted to bring into sharper focus a number of ideas concerning the
control of Government expenditure which could welf be considered for intro-
duction for the 1981-82 expenditure year, i.e. the budgetary cycle which will
begin inunediately after the 1980 Budget". After illustrating the major problerns
identified to date (e.9. historical increase in real terrns in government
e>rpenditure during the previous six years; incremental tendencies (both in
policies and e>penditures)), the l{inister briefly sununaris,ed t}e main procedures
introduced in recent years to control the situation. He suggested that
although developments such as the COPE exercise had "certainly resulted in a
lower 1evel of e>genditure than we would have seen without it", both systemic
and behavioural problems remained unsolved. "What is (now) reguired", the
Ivlinister continued, "is an incentive that will induce departments to exarnine
their expenditures not in terms of their desirability but rather their necessity
and priority in the light of our policy objectives and tJre resources available.
At the same tine, the possible benefits of the trade-off between giving up old
policies for new needs to be more clearly understood at both the official and
political levels.'r The Minister added, sigrnificantlyr that "unless the decisions
of C"overnn:nt, day by day, recogrrize that its self-imposed spending constraints
are in'fact binding, (i.e. on t'linisters with non-finance portfolios) then all
the statements of best intent will be for nothing. " Ttre paper proposed a nurnber
of approaches:
e.g.; (a) determination of aggregate expenditure levels
deterrainalion of expendi ture priorities
setting of annual cash limits
allocation of volume increases from a collectively-
generated spending'pooll
(e) specific financial ceilings for all- new policies
(f) rrtit for tatr i.e. substitution of new for old policy costs
(g) sinking cash levels,/'lids"
It also suggested sone structural changesr e.g.
(h) development of inproved poliry review capacity inside
departnnnts
(i) estabLishnent of a special Cabinet Conunittee, "supported by
a srnall team, probably based in Treasury", to evaluate
particular policy areas identified ("by Cabinet?") for review
and analysis. Ttris was described as an approach "based upon
that recently adopted by Mrs Thatcher" (p.t't., U.K.) . The puqpose
of such a "tean" (i.e. CC plus 6fficials) would be to "increase
(b)
(c)
(d)
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the influence of the political arm of C'overnment over ttre
administrative arm, and... provide the avenue for the exam-
ination of major policies (and rsacred co{ds') that would
tend to be excluded from the tit for tat procedurerr.
(j) examination of "tax expenditure" - i.e. revenue foregone,
which probably n:ns into ttre thousands of rnillions, *rough
no figures rrere incLuded by the !4inister.
(k) grouping of Votes 
- i.e. "tlte so-calLed 'envelope' approaclr
recently adopted by the Canadian Governmentrr.
The paper concluded that:
!'lhile there is no magic wand that will of itseLf provide us
with the control over Government e:rpenditure tJ:at \ile are seeking,
it is my view tJ:at the mechanisms discussed in ttris paper would
represent a co-ordinated and mutually re-inforcing approactr to
Government expenditure control. TIee key concept is the rnore
explicit fixing of the limits within which expenditure decisions
are made and shifting more of the :responsibility for e>penditure
control and poIiry review to where it most effectively belongs -
with individual l'linisters and the departments for whictr they are
responsible.
ftre l4inister ttren stated that he woul-d "appreciate the opportunity" to
discr:ss ttte "concepts" raised with the Prime Minister "and subsequently with
Cabinet". He added ttrat further discussions with Treasurlr. "and other interested
deparements" would be necessary in order to "fuIly evaluate their (i.e. tJle
concepts) feasibility and their implications as to ttre operation of ttre overall
?'lBudget c1rcle. r'--
Ttre Prime Minister apparently gave his approval pro forma to the idea of
bringing the rest of Cabinet on board (though not, as yet, any ttpre explicit
approval to ttre content of the paper itself).
December
on 6 December 1979 TlJ.er (Treasury) drafted a letter, approved by Quigley
on 11 December for circulation to Cabinet, with "ttre Quigl-ey paper".
*te attactred paper has been derreloped wit} a view to exploring
ways in which the planning and course of Government expenditure
may be improved.
lthe first draft then read: "TLle Prirne llinister has already indicatecl ttrat the
paPer proceeds along lines he favours". Quigley amended ttris, honrever, as
follows: "As tlre Prime l.t:inister has already indicated that the topic is one
whiclt is worth pursuing, I wiLl shortly be requesting Treasury officers to
develop the concept further". Clearly, Treasury's wording implied stronger
commitnent from the Prine Minister than the ltinister was prepared to risk.
462.
There vras - and some six months later therd remained - a tangible sensation
that those involved most closely in the experiment fel,t they were walking on
eggs.
The l{inister invited his colleaguesr reactions, sinc.e "this would help
to ensure that any changes to present practice wiJ,I fulJ.y take into account
your ottn views and experiences".32 By mid-summer l-979-g0 rninisteriaL and
other comments began to trickle into the Minister's office, and hence to
Treasury. fhe first response came from Hon. W.F. Birctr, ltinister of National
Developrent (20 December L979, received, in Treasury on 3 .Tanuary 1980).
Birdt, who also held the Energy portfolio, was a rember of neither the
Cabinet Economic Committee nor the Cabinet Comnulttee on E:<penditure, and he
apparently had felt, for some time that he was both disadvantaged, and excluded
??by tltis fact.-- His National Development portfolio did not have an adrnini-
strative departnent beneath it, and, possibly seeking to widen his own net-
works of influence, Birch had turned to Sir Frank Holmes, Cha:irman of tlre
Plaruring Council for advice. He wrote, briefly, to euigley, that he
would support a new approadr to the constraint on Governuent
spending based on absolute ceilings but with ability for
Mj-nisters to introduce ner^r policies on a 'tit for tat' approach.llhe cbjectives in the paper shouLd be pursued vigorously.34
He then attactred Holsesr comrnents, whieh were in tJ:e form of a letter to
Birch written on 6 Decernber 1979, ancl classified tconfidentialt,
Holres, who had apparently not been kept totally in toudr with eyents
since mid-1979, wrote rather dispiritedly as follcrrs:
Dear l{inister,
David Haryer [a Treasury officer seconded to Birctr,s office]
has told me tJ:at you would like a note on public expend.itune
planning and control
Since our meeting with tJ.e Prime llinister on Options for the
Futurer35 I have kept in touch with Treasury from Lime to time on tlre
means of giving effect to the ideas in ttre memorandum (attached) r.rhich
the Prime l4inister initialLed in June. Sr:bsequent correspondence with
the Prime l"linister indicated that the Government does not wish to changeits policy on t}le pr.rblication of the coPE estimates. However, ttris does
not rule out improvements in the system of planning the level andpat'tern of public expenditure. I have had several diseussions with
sen'ior officers of ttre Treasury on possSSle improvements. Ttrey in turn
have pursued tl e issues with l{r Quigley and the Prime l4inister. Ilre
outcorne so far is represented in a paper lttre euigrey paper] which Igather I{r Quigley is circulating.
I am assuruing that this paper will take a form sinrilar to adraft upon whj-ch I was consulted by Treasury a Iittle while ago. I
agree with Treasury that ttre present system of planning and control
of expenditure needs substantial modification if l'linisters 6rre to be
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able to determine priorities in the light of their policy objectives
and the resources likely to be available. It is important that the
decisions should be made witJl a forvrard perspective of at least three
1'ears, as they suggest.
I agree with nost of the changes suggested in the paper, and
see the Planning Cor:ncil being able to assist at certain points
especial-Iy in advising on what ttre growth of GDP is likely to be over
the next few years, what the level of Covernment er<penditure might be
. relative to GDP given Gotternrent's other objectives, and what changes
in the pattern of public e>rpenditure rnight be consistent with a
desirable strategy for New Zealand's economic, social and cultural
development in the medium term. It would be a great advance if the
steps suggested in Sections A and B of tlre proposed new approach were
adopted as a basis for decisions on e>rpenditure. I believe tiat it
woufd make it easier for Cabinet to see that ttre leveL and pattern of
e>rpenditure reflect their party's priorities and strengthen their
feeling of collective responsibility to ensure tJlat the targets agreed
upon were adhered to.
The setting of cash limits to prevent rexpenditure creept and
'policy creep' is, I believe, of great irportance. Itre danger of
rigidities arising from these lirnits would be reduced if the 'enveloper
approach suggested in Section H were adopted. lftrus, it would be in
tr:ne with the approach suggested in 'The Welfare State?r if the votes
of several departrents in the welfare field were grouped and
considered together for tbis purpose, as well as for any al-locations
from the proposed 'additionar spending poor'. we believe srrongly in
ttre collective scrutiny of related departmentaL expenditures in this
way, with a rnedium-terrn focus and with a major aim being to prevent
problems from arising rather than curing them after tJ:ey have arisen.
In thinking about specific policy reviews, f would emphasize ttre
need to provide adequate tirne for both Cabinet and officiaLs to
examine the desirability and practicability of changing some najorpolicies (and eren taking a sho.t at sore sacred cows from tirne to
' tinre). Continuation of existing policies under the constraint of
sinking lids and ottrer sirnilar devices will- not, I believe, be adeguate
to give Ministers the degree of control they need over total
expenditure and the ability to change the pattern to conform with
the changing requirernents of new circumstances and desirable newpolicies. All in all, I hope tlrat the proposal.s are supported by
l{lnisters. 
. 
36:
On 19 Decerber the Minister of Defence, Hon.F.GilI, sent a brief letter
addressed more effusively than was ttre style of his colleagtres, to "!ly dear
Minister" (i.e. Quigley), His approach was characteristically
different from ttrat of Holrnes 
- 
and, ind.eed, he appeared to feel,
if only tacitly at ttris stage, that there could be some r:ndesirable leakage
of power from the whol-e Cabinet in what Quigley's paper suggested.
Gill wrote as follows:
I have read with interest your paper.,. and f believe tlrat a
number of the nachinery proposals you make cculd nake a
contribution to our general aim to reduce Golernnent expenditure,
but I consider (and I have advocated this jn the past) that the
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key to our problems lies in a s.erious consideration of your
paragraph 8. and your paragraph 2L.(37)
In my view, we will never sofve this probLem unles-s we neet as
a Cabinet and give it seriow consideration and decide, after fulJ.
discussion, that rde are going to make economies and then decide
as a cabinet in which areas the economies wilr be made. For
example, are we to reduce Social Welfare and by how much on
Health or Defence...
I would have liked Cabinet to harrc met for three, four orfirre days late in January, not necessarily in Wellingtonr to
thrash out ttris problem on whether reductions shouLd be nade. r
d,o not believe it can be done by individual Ministers of individualdepartnents' rf we had delayed our first cabinet meeting for a
week next year we could have tackled ttris problem. In rny view tlrisis the sort of approach we need. 38
Not onJ-y does this Letter demonstrate the desire which others in central
goverrunent have er<periened 
- to get out of the We!.lington vill.age atmosphere
and hold collective discussions in a Less hothouse atmosphere; it also implies
an experience of political wishes and personal ambitions thwarted or set aside
by others with rnore power in the system. A Treasury note in the margin
corunented' r.e. ttre joint Cabinet suggestion, "the UK Governrnent does (or at
least used to) just this 
- also away from London. It has narit.rf
February I98O
The Minister of Works and Derrcloprent, W. Young, sent his responses
to Quigley in early February, as Cabinet began its annual post-vacation
activities.
Youngrs orrerall reaction was favourable.. He wrote:
ttre existing system is no more than the product of thoughtful
evorution over the years, and no doubt can be further improved.I do think that success depends as much on political. judgenrent
. 
as on any system of rneasurenent
He pointed out, mildly enough, that the section in euigley's paper on
new policies made no reference to ttre introduction of manifesto items. He
argrued that:
Ttreir place in ttre gueue wilr not necessarj-ry be determined
solely on their economic rnerit and the I tit for tatr approaetr
may not be sufficient to accommodate them. Ttrey may need to
have a separate mechanism designed to incorporate them into
the departrnental budget. "
While Ministers and officials can be er<pected to adapt to a
new budgetary managenrent system, it will be necessary to
regularly inform the public of our objectives so that ttre
demands of pressure groups do not get unreasonable priorities. 39
A Treasury officer closely involved with developrnents at the time.conmented,
in reply to the auttror's query, that atthough aspects of this letter from
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Young did indicate a limited grasp of the neani;rg of planning, it also
demonstrated that the Minister (whose oi.rn departmentaL expenditure was formally
justifiecl more by client-demands than its own rmissionr) recognized the
necessity to provide ministers with safe arnour aqainst J-obby groups outside
Governnent. Nevertheless, for Quigleyts and Treasury's immediate purposes,
the word "favourable" early in Young's letter was tJ:e only rnessage ttrey
needed at tfrat 
=t"g..40 An internal Treasury note by gJ.er attached to
the Gill and Yor:ng letters comnented that "We should put these fconunents by
l4inisterif together arrd discuss their overall reaction leading to. a discussion
as to how we next advance the cause (e.g. individual discussion, concentration
at' P/H [permanent head] level meanwhile, etc."4l The evangelists' sustenance
wab feedback.
On 8 February the Hon. L. Adans-Schneider, (l4inister of Trade and
Industry) , replied witl. a brief personal note and a full paper of comments
written, at his tieguest, by his permanent head J.w.H. CLark. In ttris four
page paper Clark concluded that:
Like Mr Quigley I feel ttrat tJle real problem in contro!'ofpublic er<penditure is an adequate review mechanism for existingpolicies, Unlike him I think it can be achieved only by a
continuing centrarised reviery of such poricies with alr ttre
trauma that goes with such an activity. 42,
While Adams-Schneider did not explicitly agree with his permanent head,
nor did he e>rpress any other critical corrEnts, but simply sent ttre report.
There was no attenpt to rnask the political reality of whose views on pr:blic
e:{renditure control were critical , and rust be identified and accomrrcdated.
By the same token, the tutinister declared no e>rplicit responsibility for his
chief adviserrs views, either.
D. Mclntyre, l"Li-nister of Agriculture and Fisheries, replied on
1O I'ebruary, and his letter, which appeared to be written personally, vras quite
direct. Employing a rather sparse, ironic and critical styl-e, Mcfntyre
wrote as follows:
You have sought rqz reactions to your paper on pr:blic e:<penditure
planning and control.
f accept that there is a need for rnore effectir.re measures to
control Governurent e:<Slenditure growth. Ttre record shows clearly
the desirability of a nrcre rigorous approach. I see merit in
tlte concept of expenditure ceilings determined havcing regard to the
considerations listed in your paras 10 and 16. Such ceilings
could well involve the operation of sinking lids. You indicate the
desirability of retaining present staff ceiling controls. If we
were to adopt the concept of firm expenditure ceilings (sinking,
in real terrns, if necessary), then I think that the staff ceiling
controls should go. One of our problems in controlling C;overnment
466.
elpenditure is that there are far too many controls at the micro
levels (staff nunbers, plant and equipnent, motor vehicles etc,)
and not enougfi emphasis at tie macro level (total expenditure).
Thre result is the sort of unintended effects to which you refer.
If we were to place the rnajor control on the aspect wittr which we
are most concerned 
- total expenditure - then l{inisters and
permanent heads wouLd have greater flexibility in obtaining
maximum benefit in terms of achieving poricy objectives from afinite expenditure resource. rf the fixing of expenditure ceilings
is done properly, ttre pressure will sti1I be maintained on such
things as staff nurbers.
While I see the logic of the I additional spending pool' , I
have reservations about how it would work in practice. There is
nothing wrong with the concept underrying the present new policies
exercise but the practice leaves a lot to be desired. It is
cluttered up wittr a miscell-any of relatively ninor items. Ttre
resurt is ttrat we have pressure on Ministers in a tight tine spanin a process where the wood can easily be lost among the trees.I suspect that ttre operatip;1 of an I additional spending pool' would
produce the sarte result,.
I am not attracted by ttre rtit for tatr approach. The.scopefor savings is not uniform across departments nor are tbere
necessarily savings to be made in departments which may have nery
worthwhile new policy proposals to be put forvrard. The better
approach is ttre specific poricy review to tackle those sacred cows
which graze peacefully on the comfortabLe pastures provided by ttre
present expenditure levels. 44.
A Treasury finternaf note attached to this letter read as folrows:
He i.e. [t'lcfntyre] makes 3 main points:(i) Fix expenditure limits and drop staff ceilings(ii) &re additional spending pool will flounder rnder
its own weight(iii) Tit for tat should be replaced by pAR type operations.
whil-e having sore trouble with the above, we should take seriously
coming as they do from a senior minister whom we would ratlrer
have in our team ttran out. 45
It is interesting that:
(a) althougtr the fulI Cabinet had been invited to corurent, only five rninisters
(b)
put their responses on paperi
of these five, all but one [eirch, Energy] had held rninisterial
posts since at Least L975, and in most cases longer ttran that;
(c) Mclntyre, Yorngr GilI and Adams-Schneider were all senior rninisters -
either high-ranking in Cabinet or secure in Prine Ministerial and
National party preferrnent;
no recently-appointed, or younger ministers, other ttran Birch
(whose arilritions wittr regard to gaining rnembership of ttre prestigious
CEC were casually touted at officialst level), lrrote to Quigley -
and certainly none of the Ministers rost likely to be in line for
(d)
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special attention (-e.9. Healttr, Education, Social Welfare) returned
a written conunent.
(e) llhe diversity of views, their general agreement on the need for
reform, and the benefit of sharing the collectirre political nous
gained from ttre replies from senior minlsters, particularly those
crosest to the Prime Minister (whose views on reform proposaLs
remained an unknown quantity) gave modest confidence to the ,'euigley
scltool" of system designers - including the Associate ltinister of
Finance himself.
Elsewhere, experieneed Treasury officials in Finance I division were
generating reactions of their o!{n. on 12 February r98o for example,
Hamilton, annually responsible for shepherding everyone else ttrrough the
Budget ryc1e (an exceptionally demanding task which continued J.iterally
uP to a few days before Budget and Estimates when tabled in the House) had
set dortrn his interim suggestion for timetabling and expenditure criteria 
-
the rules of the gare.46
Marclt
Senior accountants in various selected departments 
- Statistics,
Justice, Energy and Works 
- had been surveyed for their views on a proposed
new COPE format and definitions for expend.iture evaluation and control.4T
The results were circulated to a limited audience in Treasury on 5 March
1980. The report included ttre following comments:
(A) Clarity and Distinction of Definitions
Few probrems exist over items (a), (b) and (c) [aata aggregated toprogramme level: i.e. cost of inflation, forecast year cost of newpolicies, non-recurring expenditure. ] ...(c) demographic Aror.rttr. It would seem that a wider definition is
required. [Oefi-nition proposed was ', (c) demographic (i.e.
unavoidable) growth"]. rt wourd have to take into account
"externally-generated'r growttr 
- 
prevalent in tJle case ofilustice; courts, probationrprisons 
- and a variety of ,'unavoid-
able" and "formula-relatedr, growths;
(d) Demand growttr [i.". definition proposed was " (d) demand growt]ri.e. growth whictr is in xesponse to demographic arowth but whichis abre to be stopped 
- "e.g. night school rcraftr crasses', 1.(e) Discretional growth [i.e. definition proposed was "(e) dis-
cnetionary growttt i.e. ttre department and not necessariLy ttrepublic wants to do more, e.g. pr:blicity"].
The distinction between (d) and (e) is in the minds of the accountants
a grey area. Departrentrs honesty in differentiating was thoughtto be a factor that would affect the value or meaning of definitions.
Accountants e:(pressed grave doubts about the ability of component
managers et. aI to make sense of those definitions.
My only suggestion [i.e. Kevin Hyslop, Treasury report writer]is that (c) (d) and (e) be reduced to two categories only, of a
more single description suctr as I have hinted at in the section ondefinition (c) i.e.
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Definition One : Demographic, formula related, unavoidable,
externally generated
Definition T!uo: Other volume growttr.
(B) Aggregation to Progra$rr': LFveI
This was generally regarded as much inferior to aggregation to
componen.t level. Ihe reason advanced was that in the case of larger
departments conponent managers are persons'who would have to provide
this information and interpret definitions which seems r€Ersonable.
Aggregation to programme leve1 would simply involve a lot more work
as FFS is set up primarily to focus upon compcnents.
(C) Capacity of Department to Provide
Departrnents had serious doubts about their ability to handle
the additional workload even assumino tl:e new instructions could
be successfully interpreted.
Other
Energy suggrested an additional- definitional category along the
lines of trrcvenue-relatedt growth, i.e. growth in a trading
environment where a profit would result, i.e. net e4penditure
would not gror,.r.
[ttot included here]
Works advocated a thorough approach in developing a new
systern/information base as problems in tlte present COPE
are often due to the poor information base.
Energry suggested this innovation be raised at r'.O.a.C.48
On March I0 Cabinet invited the CCEX to "submit to it a short general
paper togettrer wittr the memorandum circulated by Quigley on 12 Deceriber
1979 entitled Public Extrrenditure Planning and Control on a nert approaclt
for tlre conduct of e>rpenditure reviews for l98L/82."
A member of the Cabinet office staff suggested ttrat tJle Prime Ministerrs
support for this proposal had been niggardly rather than neutral - a fact
which co.ntinued to bother the Quigley School.. However, when the CCEX met
on 14 llarch it had before it a paper (formally in the name of the Conunittee
Chairman, Ttromson), prepared for Quigley by Treasury. this paper was
to be considered for possible submission to Cabinet later in the month.
llttis draft (still classified confidential ) began with an affirmation
of the CCEXTs full support for the quigley concepts and recormended
tJlat a paper stating ttris be forsarded to Cabinet for "discussion". [sic]
(D)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
fhere were three CCEX recommendations, none of
faster or any further than it felt comfortable
whidr need take Cabinet any
to go: Cabinet could
(a) note the concepts contai-ned in the [euigley] paper(b) instruct Treasury to discuss with other interested parties
the feasibility of fthe guiglefl concepts and their imptications
as to the operation of the overall Budget cycle, in particular
on the workload of llinisters, Treasury, and the expenditure
departments thernselves ;
(c) d:Lrect Treasury to report to the CCEX by mid-I980 on the results
of those discussions with a view to the irnplementation of the
proposals contained in She CCEX submission, based on the
Quigley paper] for the 1981-82 financial year.
The paper itself read as follows :
3. The Associate Minister is concerned, as is the Committee, that
Government expenditure continr:es to grow in both monetary and real
terms each year. He notes particularly that whereas llinisters and
departments pronote many new proposals each year, there is not the
same willingness to review existing policies with a view to
phasing the lower priority ones out. The continuing grorrth in the
cost of existing policies of course inhibits the facility to finance
new proposals.
3. In brief' the concept being developed by I{r. Quigley is the introduct-ion of a co-ordinated self reinforcing public expenditure systen that
wou1d, contain the following elernents I
(a) The determination by the Government of the desired levels
of Government expenditure in real terms. This wctrld be
derived from a consideration of the share of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) which we wish to allocate to the public
sector associated with an estimate as to the medium term growth in
GDP.
(b) The division of the total field of Government expenditure
into a relatively small number of broad categories. l{e
would. then decide to which of these categories (if any) we roould
wish to give more (or less) emphasis over the
forecast period.
(c) The allocation of the total 1eveI of Government expenditure(as provided for in (a) above) as between sectors r.ould
then be possible.
4. The objective is to give individual menbers of Cabinet a clear
idea of the lirnits within which they will be expected to operate,
and, by ensuring that we all have a collective responsibility for the
expenditure targets agreed on, both in the aggregate and by sectort
will increase the probability that those targets are in fact
achieved.
5. The mechanisms proposed by l4r. Quigley which would lead to better
control of Government expenditure both in the agqregate and by sector
include :
(a) the specific identification of all increases in expenditure over
the previous year, to bring all allocative decisions together
and allowing the relative merits of runavoidable' extensions of
existing policies to be weighed against those of new trnlicies
that could otherwise be introduced;
(b) the placing of specific financial ceilings on all nevt policies'
so avoiding the expenditure creep that arises from the introduction
of open ended basicalty uncontrolled policies (in the sense that
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once the rrulesr are set, the Goverrunent has relatively little
control over the consequenti1l level of expendibures);
(c) a continuation of this year's 'ti'E for tat' policy whereby depart-
ments are expected to mdke room for new poJ.icies by specifying
how compensatory s:rvings could be achievecl in respect of
current expenditures;
(d) the identification, on a very selective basis, of major policy
areas for evaluation, and the responsibil.ity for evaluation
being vested, in a Cabinet Committee supported by a small team,
probably based in Treasury;
overall expenditure limit and a.Llocatingr to a Cabinet Committee(comprising the }linisters concerned plus the l4inister for
Finance) the primary responsibility for determining expenditure aqpriorities within the sector (Lhe so-called 'envelope' approach)
The most significant advance in the paper that went before the CCEX
on 20 March l9B0 over the initial Quigley paper (written as a memo to the
Prime Minister on 20 November 1979), was the specificity of the wording of
5 (e). Up tiIl that time, the Cabinet-tevel machinery had been dealt
with vaguely, but the opinion conmonly held among sorrle Treasury officers
(particularly those with a very cautious approach, in contrast with some
of their more enthusiastic colleagmes) was that the Minj-ster of Finance,
Muldoon (aIso t.Jle prime l4inister), was unlikely to buy
a scheme which leaked any more of his discretionary power over expenditure
to a Cabinet Conunittee. The solution while not necessarily a decision -
suggests that the Minister of Finance should bec-ore alr
rai-hcr Lhan that he should r**rely br: an ex officio one
active comnr-ittee rnember
[as Prime Minister]. '
The CCEX discussed the paper at some length. All three Ministers (Thomson,
Qlrigley and Templeton) were present, witir Tyler and his subordinate
colleague R. Wilderspin, from Treasury, and P. Bygate frorn the SSC.
Although as is customary individual remarks are not usually attributed
explicitly in the minutes of a cabinet corunittee, it was clear from the
record, and suggested by Treasury officers that TyJ.er took a very
lnsitive, even assertive role during this and other CCEX discussions.
Tylerrs predecessor on the CCEX, Battersby, fldy not have had a
"trendy, go-get-'em reputation"; he had, nonetheless, an instinctireand
highly-developed sense of constitutional and political proprieties - an
"institutional memory".50 This essential bureaucratic virtue , coupled
with a detailed knowledge of departmental policies and histo?ical expenditures,
may have given ministers more leeway than some officials considerd desirable -
but by the same token it also avoided the situation in which an overly
enthusiastic Treasury got itself out on an insecure limb. Dnrring the
].:979/80 CCEX meetings and the Conunitteers reviews of 1980r/81 expenditure
plans, however, Tyler and Qtrigley reportedly acted in tandem,
as peers, with a strong shared interest in pursuing simirar objectives.
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The ninutes of the ccEX meeting (20 l4arch 1980), as recorded by the
Committeers permanent Cabinet Office secretaryr Marsha1l,
included the following report :
It was explained to the Corunittee probably by T\ller] that
a concept had been deveroped under which a number of steps wouLd be
taken towards the introduction of a co-ordinated self reinforcing
public expenditure systern, which would contain several elements.
Ministers would be asked to decide the desired level of Government
expenditure in real ter,ms a4d this would, in turn, be divided into
a relatively sma1l number (-about six to eight) of broad categories.
Control would then be delegated to rrenvelope" committees of l"linisters
who would be called upon to operate within the total cash ceiling
decided by Cabinet for that particular sector. The Conunittee would
have to agree on the amount availa-ble to meet Existing and New Policies
and further sub-divide the total cash available for that sector amongst
departmental functions, which would have to be funded from that
sector. Departments would have as of right funds for the ensuing
financial year as set for the preceding year, plus inflation adjusted
annually. A11 other areas of growth would have to be separately
identified and justified. There 
'rpuld be a continuation of theItit for tatr approach adopted during the present Expenditure
reviews and the aim would be to identify major areas of review where
the sector committees could concentrate their energies on
redirecting resources. The sector committee would, of necessity,
have to be small (about three [inisters on each) and each would'
cover those adninistrative functions which the Government had to
provide for society where the user-pays principle could not be applied.
The three major spending departrnents in the social policy field
could be amalgamated^ in one sector and similarly the trading functions
of departments which could be funded by the private
sector would faIl into another area. It was not essential that the
existing functions of a particular department had to end up in the
sane sector. The British experience was quoted where small committees
covering about. half a dozen sectors had been set up and Ministers
had taken the time to sequester from their port.foLio work to caxry
out a major expenditure exercise.
The Committee considered that it would be useful for the matters
covered by the paper ... to be discussed with the Minister of
Finance before the paper was placed before Cabinet. The Corunittee
further considered that it would be useful for Treasury and the State
Services Commission and selected Permanent Heads to analyse the protrnsals
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contained in the paper.
the Conrnittee deferred further
r.:ntil nembers of the Cornmittee
the Minister of Finurrce.5l
lLr J.F. Robertson
Mr S.J. Callaharr
Mr J.W.H. Clark
of the proposals...
tlre proposals with
consirleration
had discussed
From the point of view of the prouoters of the scheme, this dangerous
corner was passed five days later when witlr the same rninister:s and
officials present the CCEX, sorewhat trnex;rectedly, decided to:
agree to recomnend that Cabinet
(a) note the proposals contained in the paper entitled rpublic
Expenditure Planning and Controlr attached to X(BO)51;
(b) agree to the formation of an officials Corunittee with the
following nenbers to study the proposals contained in the
paper in (a) above:
Ilr N.V. Lough
Dr R.M. Williarns
Itlr V[.L. Renwick
Secretary to the Treasury (Ctrairrnan)
Chairman, SSC
Director @neral of Education
Dr H.,l .H. Hiddlestone Director @neral of Health
Secretary for Justice
Director Gcneral for Social Welfare
Secretary of Trade and Industry52
Ihe CCEX determined that this Officials Comnuittee should recort back to
its pa.rent body 
- 
i.e. the CCEX.
. 
At this point in ttre history of the reform developrents, (i.e. l,tarch
1980 on) there remained an explicit awareness that either Tyler or Quigley,
(or botjr) and those npst closely associated with the Quigley concepts
could be walking a tighttop..Ut Firstly, from March until July, there was
the unseen but ever-present hand of the Prire t"tinister. Although his
formal imprimatur on continuing discussions of the Quigley concept had been
obtained, no-one really regarded this as anything npre than a licence to
trade in ideas and arnbitions. Although the CCEX was the format (and neces-
sary) patron of the Quigley concepts, it was itself continually aware of
the Godfather powers of ttre priue l{inister.
Secondly tlrere was the residual, habitual bedrocJ< of rninisterial
resistance. this riras a ulixture of ignorance, laziness, incompetence,
shrewdnessr political instinct and straightforward collegial envy of anyone
(e.g. guigley) who put his head up too far or showed too much style and
fLair. And behind both were the departlents, full of skill-ed strategistsr
J-iftely to support the rdnisters for varied reasons, but, above alJ', reposi-
tories of organisational pride and insularity which could subvert the rrost
shining reform plans.
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Thirdty, although the CCEX was prepared to take time out to pronote
ttre reform plan, the I'tinisters were simultaneously engaged in an extreneJ.y
demanding schedule of existing and new poliry reviews on this Cornmittee,
as well as other Conmittees, Parlianentary Caucus arrd electoral activitles.
ltrus they \^tere necessariJ.y reliarrt on two factors.
(a) tbeir own political instincts for "what would go" (in lieu of any
lengthy or e:<plicit analysis of the inplications of what they were
contemplating) and
(b) the sustained, energetic, constitutionally-responsibLe and politically-
sensitive attention which their principal Treasury advisers could girre
to the schene. Discussion on nembership of ttre Officials Comnittee
(apparently "dreamed up" by tlre l4inisters above) reportedly took
about 5-l-O urinutes of their tinre on 25 March 1980. Ttris may accor:nt.
for who was included in the recomnendation, who vtas not included -
and who was later added.
According to soue Treasury nen working on the scherer and the
Director @neral of Ed.ucation and his chief policy adviserrs4 a number of
criteria (rostly tacit) were applied by CCEX lrlinisters in reconunending
nembers for tl:e new Officials Cornmittee.
(a) permanent heads of tlte "big-spenders" i.e. Education, Health and
Socia1 Welfare;
(b) permanent heads who had shown a particular interest in the general
field of pr:blic e:qgenditure control and planning and had spoken out
on this, either in other settings (such as the PEC) or in Pr:blic,
e.g. J. Robertson (Justice) or H. Clark (Department of Trade
(c)
and Industry);
permanent heads of tlrose departments believed by Treasury to have
the most efficient and effective chief financial officers' e.!t.
Murray Burns, Departnent of Education. In soIIE cases, these finance
officers were ex-Treasury tteni
(d) permanent heads who had to be there, by virtue of their rninisterrs
seniority, Cabinet work or particular portfolio, e.g. Treasury,
S.S.C., Tracle and Industry.
Apparently such criteria were neither all-enibracing nor consistently
applied. As signrificant ornissions from the recomnendecl list indicatet
they did not include all control departments - ttre l,linistry of Works and
Developnent for instance, is conspicuous by its absence. Ttris conflicts
wittr criterion (b) above 
- 
J. Green, Chief Accountant for the l{inistry of
Works and De'velopment, was both e:<perienced and highLy regarded as a
thoughtful, shrewd and reliable official by sorne senior Treasury ren, but
not invited to join ttre new comrnittee.
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Again size or tJ:e significance of any departnental Vote did not
necessarily apply to all possible candiclates - the permanent head of the
Energy Departnent, for example, was not included - no rrlajor trading depart-
mental head was consiclered. Some departments with h-istorically-deternr-ined
acoess to other prestigious Cabinet Cornmittees such as ttre CtsC were absent -
The Customs Departnrent, for instance, was not among the canilidates for
Cabinet consid.eration.
In the eventr on 3I March 1980 Cabinet approved, without arnendnent, the
recomnendations of the ccEX.55 This Cabinet ![inute, written by Cabinet
Office secretary, Mi1len, includes one slight arnbignrity, noted in a later
anrrotated marginal query by a Treasury official. CM BO/IL/8 states that
Cabinet "referred X (80) 51 lthe CCEX submission paper] bacl< to the Cabinet
Committee on Expenditure so that the Officials Comrn-ittee can be instructed
on the report tobe made by it to cabinet".56 lsmphasis added]. Suc]r is
the significance of the actual wording of any Cabinet minute that the identity
of that "it" (Cabineta Officials Comnittee? CCEX?) could later becoue
critical-. There is no evidence to suggest that ttris ambiguity was intended
by the Cabinet secretary; nor is there any evidence to the contrary. lltre
CCEX's own rninutes had clearly identified that the proposed Officials
Committee should initially report back to that Cabinet Conmitt"".S7
May
Events now acquired a different pace, and style. Between 31 March 19BO
and 20 May 1980 (nearLy two months) Treasury officials (in consultation wittr
guigley) and. other d.epartmental officials, busied themselves with ttre various
nachinery and policy questions raised by the reform proposals. lltre terms of
reference for the Officials Committee were not approved by tJle CCEX until a
meeting of that Comrnittee on 20 Uay (discussed in detail later), and even
t}ten the CGX decided that:
the Officials Committee should informally discuss with the CCEX
the results of its findings at an appxopriate stage before it
reports to Cabinet.53
(Again {-he "it" is arnbiguous: would CCEX or the Official-s Conuaittee
report to Cabinet?)
On 27 May, one week Iater, an amendment to t}te Officials Cornrnittee member-
ship was made, by decision of the CCEX to recommend to Cabinet ttrat:
Ii|r B.V. Galvin, Permanent Head, prine Minister's Departrent,
should be added to the Officials Comrnittee appointed by
Cabinet, to consider proposals to changes to ttre present medranisms
for planning Government expenditure (cl'4 !O/IL/8 refers).59
We return novr to traverse some of the same ground again, and to continue
the history of ttre Quigley reforms, tJris tine from tJle perspective of the
officials most closely involved.
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Working Out How it Cou1d be Done or A1l I Want is a System that Wonrt
FaII Apart in my Hands: Ile OfficiaH Tale
September 1979
On 11 September L979, R. Alexander (Director, Finance L) received
a note from fller (Assistant Secretary to the Treasury). T?re note read:
At CGX ttris morning the guestion of departmental e:qpenditu:re
restraint was consid.ered and the relative absence of control
nectranisms \ras noted.
Would it be possible in those cases where particular votes were
over-expended for a sanction to be applied to ttre department
concerned by way of a commensurate reduction [sic] in t}re vote
that would othe:r,rise be provided in-E--roffowing year? If tlris
was practicable, we could, when circulating departrnents as we
propose following the publication of the Supplementarlt Estimates,
indicate that this would be ttre result of any over-expenditure in
the current year.60
Iylerrs colleagues consulted their collective experience - one
wrote, for examtrrLer to another:
Irm not sure (X [senior Treasury finance officer] would kno'r)but I think ttre P/Hrs (i.e. permanent head) designation as
'accounting offierr implies he is personally accountable for
the use of funds, Would tlis be a better sanction? Ttrat is,
is C(EX empowered - or could it be - to summon a Prltl a.nd require
him to conunent on over-expenditure and what rrEasures he took to
avoid it? If nothing else it might make the dilletanlish [sic]
take more interest in financial management. Briants [i.e. Mr Q'ler]
suggestion seems fraught with loopholes.6l
On 14 September, Iller circulated another internal menp, addressed
to Mcleod, Deputy-secretary of the Treasury, but also distributed to
seven otber colleagiues. T!'Ier referred to an earlier discussion of issues
associated with public expenditure "whictr warrant early study". "I
reconnrended,", he said, "an early nreeting of the C'overnment Finane
Coordinating Comnittee (GFCC) lan irihouse Treasury sr.rb-cormrittee]... to
discuss the possible development in pr:blic expenditure plaruring and
control with [other senior Treasury persormel)."62
Ttre paper attached to ttris menro (which fornred tlre basis of the
proposed GFCC discussion) was headed Forrrard Planning Publ-ic Expenditure.
lthe gratuitous 'rFonrard" was presumably intended to emphasise the
direction of the Assistant SecJretaryrs thoughls. "the steps I would seerl
Tller wrote, "at€ as folLornrs:
L. Determination of share of tot-a1 resources whidt shouLd be
allocated to the public sector.
2. Determination of GDP grcnrth.
3. wtrat 1. and 2. above nean in terms of publ.ic expenditure.
4. Analysis of copE forecasts to see how forecast years relateto Government expenditure as determined in 3. above.
Analyse coPE forecasts to see how weightings change duringforecast period.
Obtain direction from Government as
welghtings during forecast period.
Determine rate of change required indirection.
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to any change in expenditure
order to meet Government
tr
6.
7.
8.
9.
Develop mechanism to produce change in weightings to accord
with Government directions. These could include :
(a) develognent of pAR unit;
(b) reguirements that departments, whenever they propose
new initiatives, should drop off activities in such a
uray as to move them towards the c.overnments objective.For example, a department whose relative share of the
expenditure cake is expected to fall could be required todrop off activities equar to $2 for each $1 of new initiative
reguested. Another department in any activity which
Government favoured may on the other hand be expected to
drop off only say 50 cents of "old" expenditure for
each gI of "nevr" expenditure.
Review of the 'sinking Lid' concept (i.e. rts continuation,
modification, or replacement) .
rt is possible that underrying some of these issrres is the needto develop new concepts of pranning and course of Government
expend.j,ture. For instance the present reviews tend to consid.erincrementat change a'd usuarly ignore programmes arready in prace;
accordingly departments have expectations of grow-,h rather than
substitution.
we must consider too Treasury's ability to pursue some of the[issues] noted. above. Some are clearly the responsibility
of rnternal Economics while others falL within the scope of
Finance r. The latter Division is fulry conrnitted in processingits rroutiner responsibilities and has no capacity for undertaking
R and D responsibilities of the scope envisaged. r see merit,
however, in the Division being the prime area of development withMr. Alexander (director, Finance r) and myserf being closely involved.
Two solutions offer themselves to mind:
(a) The 'Task Force' approach whereby an experienced officeris detached from both Finance I and Internal Economics;
(b) The PAR section be formed immediately (including any
transfers as appropriate for 'Internalr) but its first
assignment being R and D of the type referred to abcve
instead of ,issues, studies.
Neither approach woul-d abrogate Internal-,s responsibilitipq which
already exist, regarding Iterns I and 2 in rny list above. vJ
Hamilton replied, characteristically,inunediately :
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The whole guestion of existing policies reviews needs
reconsideration 
- a feature which should f,orm part of our
revlew of public e>rpenditure planning in any e\rent.
Past reviews have varied, from Treasury promoting lists of issues
en the expectation [of] departrrents providing nil returns andleaving the qr:estion of issues solely to the departrents.
The 1979 review was a conbination of bottr.
It should be noted that the Go\irerrunent has not been recomnrended
to conduct a review ttris year (for effect from next year). As it
stands now, no review is on the stocl<s. Nevertheless, tired conoept
though it is, the requirement for another review ensures ttre needfor constraining is [sic] kept on departments.
As a forerunner to any other changes we could recomrend the
Governrnent issue something like this:
Follcrvring a preamble on the level of grortlr in net e:<penditure -
'Cabinet is strongJg of the view that tfte evaiuation of exlstfngpoTicies, both as to theit continued need and as to thejr
TeveL requirenents, shouid be an on-going function within aLj
departments. Although no sgncific across-tJte-boatd surrney
of existjng policies is contemplated this gear, Cabinet has
ditected that except where proposed new initjatjrres faJ-L within
the Govetnment' s econonr-i c ptiorities (which freasurg has to
esta.b-Zish, the present ones bejng ,,dated',) depattments
preparing new policies yjl,l. have to derpnsttate the [gap in
original] ... bg which theg can be tunded if theg were to be
approved.
-Furtherrp re, d.epattnents are to note that a77 najor new ynJ.icies
approved for impTementation in I9B0/B1 will be subject to
evaJ.uation and review as regards thejr continuation no Tatet
than three years aftet implementation. Departments wiJ,r
' therefore need to devefop infonnation sgsterns bg which cpsts
and benefits mag be npnito,r€d. I
I feel that this is still not meeting the main concern: as long asdepartrrents harre e4pectations of incrernental increases for dis-
cretionary growth and for new policies there will be little incen-tive for their reviewing their bases.
At the sare time, an apprcach is required which facilitates the
fundi-ng of new initiatives in departrnent A by effectir,ie savingsin department B (whictr may have a d.ifferent ninister) . rn ruy
Land Use days we had some success (bitterly opposed by !,tAF (Ministry
of Agrieultur:e and Fisheries) at increasing expenditure on, say,
rural water supplies from fertilizer subsidy savings.64
In the papers by Harnilton and T\rler, as elsewhere in Treasur?, the
outsider (in effect eavesdropping) is struck by the er<pricit manner
in which constitutional and poJ:itical guestions are discussed
inside that central organisation. rn one sense, Hamilton's paper is
a manual for the perfect civiL servant: the administrative arm of the
democratically constituted cabinet. Attuned to both poJ-itical and
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organisational realities, he defines'the public interest, quite simply,
as whatever the governrlent (i.e- the Cabinet) wants, chooses, or aims
to do, according to whatever objectives ttrat C;overnrent chooses to promote.
On the other hand in this Treasury sub-sysEem of central Government'
officials like HanLilton and Tyler have the clearest possible trrrderstanding
of what political power means: it is the authoritative power to al.locate
resources
It is the enorrnity of this power whiclr morred one member of the
Quigley school to a bitter, even savage, denunciation of rninisters lvhose
habitual assumpt-ion of political authority led them to "treat (i.e. to
distribute) pulclic funds as though they were a form of personal patronage -
a sort of huge, private, slush fr:nd". It is equally the enormity of this
polrter which brings Treasury officers hard up against the seeming imposs-
iJcility of ensuring either efficiency or economy in the planning and
control of pr:blic expenditure in a democratic system, Where election
to political office depends on public favour, and with the social and
econorric variables influencing public choice so varied and complex, t}te
likelihood of the successful application of concepts and techniques
like "PPBS', or "demand,' (or, indeed any other kind) of economic and
fiscal managenent, appear almost illusory. Yet it is characteristic
of'Ireasury officers (like many other senior public servants observed
in this study), that hcrwever secretive and elitist their style seens I
(viewed from the outside) they consistently attempt to maintain both
tJle form and fiction of consultation, participation and collective agree-
ment - critical theoretical components of dernocracy.65 ,h" flaw in their
attempts is ttrat ttrey in fact occur within an hernretically-sealed
central government system with only arbitrary use of approved, in-and-
out-flow chanrrels.
Another note written by Hamilton showed that. by September the
internal Treasury debate was acquiring its own momentr:m. He wrote to
his senior colleagues :
In my note of 19 September (i.e. earlier the same day)
on the prospects for annual review of existing policies
I rcferred to tlre need to reconsider the Governmentrs
economic priorities. You witl recall that these relate
to the promotion of export-producing industries, the
reduction of the demands for imports, and the reduction
of the Level of unemployment.
Apart from the fact that these priorities have been 'in
situ' since Decerber 1977 sonre suggestions have been made
that they are not consistent r*ith each other.
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As a forerunner to the development of expenditure strategy
I consider it appropriate to urgently revien the status of
those priorj-ties and recommend either their re-confirmation
or their arnendnrent to ttre Government.
Hamilton then went on to suggest the
lished for the dj-stribution to departments
and existing policy reviews - mid October
date at which anytlring should be sent, .if
feasi-ble by 1980.66
timing which should be estalc-
of Treasury circulars for new
was, he emphasised, the Jatest
a nrodified system was to be
An anonymous (i.e. no author's name recorded) draft paper dated
20 September 1979 was prepared on the CIOPE exercise, as this would be
affected by current Treasury thinking. It had been written in response
to a specific request from the office of the Associate Minister of
Finance, on the 17 Septenber for sr.rbrnission to the CCEX. ft read:
It is true that no policy guidelines are issued by Governnent
prior to the @PE exercise being started in departrnents. It
is not true however, to say that dcpartnents have no limj-tations
agaitrst which they must budget or that C:OPE officials have no
base against which to analyse departmental forecasts.
The object of the CQPE exercise is to establish for each of tJ:e
next three years, the cost of providing Government services
wiEhout the addition of any new policies. This essentially
costing e:rercise is therefore based on existing policies and
on prices prevailing at I July preceding the COPE cyc1e, and
' these criteria provide the linitations against which departnents
must budget and the base against which COPE officials must
analyse departrrental forecasts.
While broad policy guidelines have to date not been issued
before the COPE exercise, the Governmentrs targets have been
notified to Permanent Heads at the conclusion of the COPE exercise.
The targets (or guidelines) issued in recent years (in Oecernber)
have been in the form of both overall expenditure limits and
broad economic objectives (e.9. the reduction of d,emands for
. 
imports).
Concurrent with the preparations for this yearrs COPE exercise,
Treasury has been considering possible methods of altering the
COPE procedures so as to improve their effectiveness and the
overall plannilg of Government expenditure. Consideration is
being given at present to increasing the econonic input into
COPE before. [sic] the study of departmental forecasts conmences-.
rnitiEf:ufrTnking is that a more logical approach to COPE could
be to first determine the tctal resources which should be allocated
to the public sectori then to determine GDP growth and to establish
what these two factors mean j-n terms of public expenditure. This
would then provide the paranneters for the analysis of the COPE
forecasts. Treasury is giving further study to the developrnent
of this and alternative approaches to the planni-ng of C'overnment
expenditure, and will seek to discuss possible variations to the
CIOPE procedures with Ministers when the study is further advanced.
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It is agreed that only reductions in Government activities witt
reduce the resources required by the Government sector. It is
with this in nind that the annual review of existing policies (to
determine their effectiveness and continued justification) has been
carried out in recent years. The purpose of this review being that
the e]iminati-on of current policies and activities no longerjustified or of low priority would facilitate the
introduction of new policies and activities without any increase(or at least without a correspondingly large increase) in Government
expenditure. The achievements of those reviews in terms of savings
has, with very few exceptions, been unspectacular.
The foregoing comments which refer to the l Government processi
of reviewing existing policies and activities (to make way for new
proposals) indicate that the review is effected on the initiative
of individual Government departments including Treasury and State
Services Commission. Following the review by officials, they are
then submitted to Ministers and the Cabinet
Committee on Expenditure for consideration and some reviews are
referred on to cabinet.., [the next three words, "and to caucusrtlrere queried in the initial notes but not, apparently,
deleted] for final decision. However, as suggested, if some
mechanism could be instituted by the political party for the
time being providing the Government, to conduct an independent review
of current policies (thus complementing the rGovernment processr)
this would have a great deal of merit and would probably increase thepossibility of providing cancellation of an existing policy for every
new policy desired by the political party in power. As indicated
above, Treasury is giving further thought to how the existing processes
can be improved and will be reporting to Ministerp"l'in due courset
was subsequently deleted from the initial draft].-'
No status of confidentiality classification was stamped on this paper.
Indeed, at one leveL, there is nothing in it which could conceivably
jeopardize nationaL or bureaucratic anonlmity or security. Yet it represents
possibly the most explicit analysis of a number of major problems of resource
allocation located by the author in many departmental files. No attempt
was made (and indeed as litt1e effort as a walk to the next office would
have done) to identify the individual author, since its anonlmity is part
of its inherent interest. It was distributed to a very select grouP of
officials and, at most, three Ministers through their private (ministerial)
secretaries. During the course of research of this sort it was rare to
fin&
(a) any explicit mention of "the politicaL party in power" - let alone
"the political party for the time being providing the
C'overnment" in inter-departmental or internal departmental
officials' correspondencei
(b) any explicit written plea by officials for assistance by some
credible "independent" review agent. This is of course,
the grrintessential anti-democratic dream : that a proPerly
elected najority party in Government would voluntarily submit to the
judgement of an uncommitted Solomon.
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November
In late November 1979 (as described earlier) the Quigley paper was
drafted for subinissionp on behalf of the CCEX and the .Associate Minister of
Finance2 to the Prime I'4inister. In Treasuryrs Finance I division, the
implications'of ttre paper for those who actually had to manage the budgetary
cycle (including finance officers in the various government departments) were
discussedl and memos on this circulated internally. In most cases, the shape
given to these memos was that of a calendar: what to do, at what time in the
financial year.
December
On 20 December L979, for exampler in one analysis of the revisedr/probable
financial year, Hamilton noted that if preliminary estimates r^rere prepared
under a new system, Cabinet sector committees (discussed. in detail later in
this chapter) rvould receive these at about the end of the calendar year -
"together with Treasuryrs recommendations on possible ways of utilising
Cabinetrs sector allocations. The decisions remain the Sector Conmitteers
prerogative 
- subject to Cabinet notificatj-on. The Committee will decide on
the appropriate split...." Hamilton noted that the points to consider
included the following:
1. The (proposed) cycle cornbines COPE and the February Estimates.
The exercise becomes a Treasury responsiJrilit!...
5. Determination of Seetors. W€ think the Minister of Finance
should be represented on each one.68
6. Notel there will be no one major new policy review.
7. Ttre onus is on a Sector Committee through permanent heads
to undertake reviews of existing policies.
8. Pre-determined planning levels provides incentives for
. 
departments to seek savings.
9. Role of SSC (?) [sic]
10. Treasuryrs capability for recommending sector priorities.
(Septernber) 
.
11. Do we stil-l control:
- Works progranme )
- P and E (plant and equiprnent) progranmes ) Planning and
- 
overseas travel prograrunes ) cash levels?
- Dl"lvc 69 )
L2. The Sector Cornmittee concept reguires a major clarification of
departmental progranmes e.g. Foreign Relations:
Vote MOD (Defence)
Vote t"lFA (foreign affairs)
Part Vote UIf (Trade and Industry)
Part Vote MUf (Transport: part civil aviation).70
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1980 January
On I0 January 1980 Hamiltonts "Discussiorr Paper on the Discussion Pape_r
on the Quigley Paper" again referred to ttre Budget cycIe, with some refine-
rnents, but with the December "points to consider" still outstanding.Tl (A
colleague (John Chetwin) replied to this on 30 January: "I refer", he wrote,
"to grandson of Quig1ey...". The Quigley paper and its history was beconring
part of the folk lore of Treasury. The Finance Co-ordinating Conunittee at
whictt these official.s met, for example, was itseLf known (on paper, and
informally) as "the Karori School Conunittee", It is this sort of jargon
which keeps at hr:man-size the usuall,y serious matters under discussion.)
February
One illuninating rlemo, written in nid-lEbmary 1980 and circrrlated..
amongst tJ:ose in Treasuly most closely involved in the budgetary reform
gives a good idea of the climate of thinking by that stage. It incLuded
the following observations:
Budget CYcle Developnrent
l. Although we alre.now embarking on the development, of therQuigley' concept overlapping to a large extent the 1980 COPE
review, we should recognise tJ-at thq.sector cosualttee has support only
in Treasury. The concept has sLill to be tested with its main
clientele: the I'linister and the permanent heads. In fact, judging
by only a little feedback, there is considerable nulsunderstanding
about what the concept implies e.g. 'the budcet of gold'?
It would be good PR to liaise with f'fnisters and their permanent
heads to exSrlain what it nueans, It may well be tlrat these peopLe
on whom the nrain burden will fall, wilJ. be as sceptical as the
officials with whorn the sr:bject has been tested.72
fhe paper continued with a discussion of tasks to be performed in
the light of the arguments above.
By the end of February it was obvious that if any tasks were to be
effectively carried out, staffing and management requirements for
promotion of the Quigley concept had to be met. It was suggested that
an internal Treasurlf management comrnittee, possibly called the Budget
CYcl-e Review Comsdttee, should be set up to "monitor new medranisms until
the end of ttre seoond cycle of ttre proposed budget tinetable plansr',
(i.e. about May 1982). Among other things, this would require ttre appoint-
rent of an exesutive offic-er from inside Treasury.
Ihe problem of information overload was raised - for example, one
memo from Hanilton to his colleagues noted rather dispiritedLy:
I feel, as Stan [t'lcLeod, deputy Secretary of Treasury] does,that it would be a retrograde step to stop collecting year trro and
three data, but on the other hand if Treasurry doesn't use it, why
cornpile it? I would have thought that the data would be of
value in shaping nedium term poliq/ - or erren foreshadowingproblems 
- but apparently it isnrt.73
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Discussion on this issue was amplified in a paper dat,ed 26 February
1980.-
Economic Divisions's COpE recruirements
Projections of the cost of existing pclicies two anrl three years
ahead are a mixed blessing. on the negative side they are probably
an under-estimate of wh.rt Government expenditure rvill actually be
once new policies have been adclecl and thus on their own are not a goodindicator. We cannot assume that the value of nerv lrclicies is the
same each year, so that existing policies could be grossed up togive a forecast of expenditure. Furthermore, the production of theseprojections has the dangei ttrat it can encourage the belief that
existing policies are sacrosanct, and make it more difficult to
implement reviews or rtit for tat' substitutions of new for exisEing
poJ.icies.
on the positive side, the projections can provide an early warning
of the creep in the real cost of existing poLicies and
result in a closer examination of them in time to avoid the problem
of accelerating expenditure.
Because of the difficulties of reducing Government expenditure
at short notice it is most desirable that it should be kept on agradual arrd fairly steady growth path rvith the rnajor burden of
any desirable changes in net fiscal injection being placed mainly
on the revenue side. For this reason constant do'*nward
pressure must be kept cn existing policies to be introduced each year. I
Perhaps an element of 'self-destruct' should be builtin to existing policies thereby forcing departments to rethink theirpositions and resubmit portj.cns of their prograrTmes in a
revamped form as new policies to be considered against neer new policies .
Alternatively, we should expect a regular improvements in the 'prod-
uctivityr of existing programnes by reducing slightly each year the.
real resources going to produce the sarne output.
The inforrnation on existing policies of most use to the
economics division are the trends in the major components of
Government expenditure 
- salaries,/other current,/capibal/transfers anddomestic,/foreign. A split by progranune is not really
reguired but would presumably be useful to financgoand investigating
divisions if early reviews are to be undertaken.
As the debate inside Treasury - and the search for a suitableravailable'
Executive officer 
- continued, officials out in the other departments were
beconing slightly restive. Financial managers who liked to get started
on preparations for the annual COPE exercise as soon as possible after
the Estimates review began to sound truculent about delayed information
_on b_oth intended COPE nembership and the current year's rules .April
These anxieties were quickly conununicated via the central information
network. On 23 AprS.L Hamilton pointed out to his colleagues that many tasks -
including the critical (or fata1, depending on oners perspective)
decision on "whether something other than fulI price compensation" would
be allowed in COPE - remained either undoreor incomplete. "We are",
he added warningly 'rabout one to two months behind schedule given our
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target date for ttre issue of the cirsular of early April [i."' on COPE
changes f980l:
T. Berthold, a political science graduate, previously in tand Use
division, Treasury, was appointed Executive Officer in april, and relierred
much of ttre strain carried by the original Finance division offioers.
Ttre draft "Quigley paper" (dated 14.3.80 and authorised by an in-
vitation from Cabinet in early March) tt h"u by now been circulated to
various interested parties, including ttre SSC, HoJ-mes (Planning Corrncil)
and Henry Lang (fonner Secretary of the Treasury, and uember of the
Planning Council). These men (Holmes and L*g) were c-onsulted by Treasurlt
(particularly by ryler) on an entirely info:mral- basis 
- 
indeed, no trae
of Langrs contribution to the debate appears to remain in t}te Treasury
files. It was retained by its author, with, perhaps, on€ ottrer copy heLd
by ttre Assistant Secretary of Treasury, 1!1er.
Confidential comments on the Holmes and Lang papers lrere however, in
the personal file of one senior Finance division offier. Ttris Treasury
officer observed that reading Langts paper, as he had done, from ttre view-
point of "one of the participants in the system", many of the forrer
Secretarlg's comments had been heard before. He decided, horever, ttrat
ttris simply r:nderlined what trlittle inclinatj-on... we in Treasury hanre
shovrn... to effect improvements" 
- for reasons, he noted, he had discussed
elsewhere. He acknowledged that the Plaruring Council Aid have j-nfomal
and unofficial access to COPE data. He did not, hol'rever, belierre that,
given its present terms of reference, the Council could add much of valte
to tJ:e COPE exercise (if, for example, the Council's access to data were
regularised or formallsed in some way).
In a section entitled Planning Public Expenditure tlre Treasury
officer commented (on Lang's paper) iJrat:
A nurdrer of economists also have queried the apparent boundaries
of the public sector as represented by our Budget Table II. For
instance, they have argnred that resources used by State Corporations
are public sector resoulc€so
If the problems wene confined solely to the areas where ta:( e:q)en-
diture are atrrplied, this is largely Consolidated Account agencies
except with regard to tax revenue foregone policies,..,
re. Pulclic@ 
- 
I agree, but why not also show 3 year estimates.
ffiegone' items are of courde subsidies; rrve always
thought these should be identified a1on9 the lines of the interest
subsidies 
- these are specifical-Iy appropriated. However -- it
would need to be recognised thaE pr:blished forecasts can prove
inaccurate. . . .
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re- Grogping of expenditure 
- the sector approach should improve
matters insofar as kindred. programmes car be grouped.
r have some reservations over the presenL classification 
- ACministrationfor example includes 1aw and other (excLuding traffic enforement).It also includes Water and Soil
re- 'other Agencies' rs Mr. Lang saying that the present controldepartments are ineffective 
- therefore set another one up? ...
{e. Planning council - is this promoting the council being anotherdepartment of state? r would have thought its rore would be better
as 'rwa.tch dog" to one side of the systern.
re. ''Cost
- eflqctiveness' analysis etc. - Treasurythese for years - the problem has been finding the
them.
?
re. rnput 
- output anarysis ... we are in fact moving away from
evaluating on the basis of inputs.
re. Control Techniques
Attitudes 
- couldn't agree more. we need to recognise that good
resource management attitudes 
- stem from the top - takeJohn Robertson as an example - r can think of no others. Too
merny pernanent heads think resource managenent is something for
accountants when in fact it is for all management.
Te- 'objectives'- agree entirely but who is going to revive the
].SSUe
has pronoted
people to use
- we must recognise that the
financial management and this
the concept but prefer it to
with Treasury in the
re. Existing and New policies reviqnrre"G ir
area is already overwhelmed.
re. Zero-based budgeting 
- agree withbe a department management fexerciseJ
management team supervising it.
re. Cash Limits 
- 
part of reuigleyr'
Mr- Lang correctly points out problems of open-ended policies butdepartmentar forecasts are arready not too bad. on balance
though we would folLow the British example of excLuding thern from
cash limits if the present system were to continue.
re. 'Tit for Tat' 
- our second attempt ffirst one, rejected byCCEX' was in I97Q shows that it really doesnrt work in the context
of the present system. I think ,euigley, wiJ.l give it a better
chance, however ...
General
!4r. Langrs input is appreciated. However r wourd be cautious about
anyone other than Mr. Lang formally GicJ associated with oui'budget cycle review. In ny experience (albeit limited) academic ad.vice
can fall down through a dated and/or inadequate understanding
of the mechanics and the poritics within fsicl the departmentalstructure. For instance, an idea may be sound in principle hltfail in its irnplernentation because there are too few peopre in thefinancial management area or simply because there is not enough
will to do better. we onry need to look at the implementation of
PPBS in the U.S. and New Zealand for an example. The present
apathy in many departmentsr senior management provides problerns for
the present system ... r therefore inject a note of caution
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about too much non-service involveneg! in what is as much a systens
review as well as a coneept review. t r
A handwritten postscript to this paper added :
You [i.e. Treasury officer,/s]l will appreciate Lhat my comrnents apply
more particularly to the systems side not the philosophical side(for the want of a better terrn). Sir Frank and H.G.L. LL.ttgJin a way are referring as much to attitudes as to systems.
r donrt disagree with their views but r know that the state
services are a culture in their own right and as such can
be highly resistant to change - especial-ry when it can adversely
affect their status. Treasury cannot impose a successful system -the present one could be successfur if part,icipants wished it -
senior managementr[as to be persuaded. Leadershipis also involved-'-
Again, one notes the characteristic style and tone of thLs
Treasury letter: a mi:rture of tired optimism, cautious openness to authorit-
ative advice, sardonic acceptance of some seemingly immutable political
and institutional realities - and considerable (albeit through
clenched teeth) politicaL self-constraint.
The material described so far indicates that however complex existing
systems for public expenditure planning and control- had becone over the
previous decade or more, the sophisticated printout and the truckloads of
paper had not in any way affected or al-leviated the central difficutties
of executive government. Control over any part of an historically-developed
financial/resource base (whether exercised by individual
ministersrpermanent heads and their satellite clients or "field'r agents,
the permanent public service correctively, the "contror" departments,
the Cabinet, the Cabinet corwritteesr of, the Minister of Finance-crmr-
Prime Minister) was, it seerned, extremely difficult to reconstitute and
redirect in response to some general incentive such as "planned national
economic development". Numerous cornrnents in the Treasury files under
review in this chapter illustrate this point - for example (in an
internal memo bn a draft Treasury circular):
(a) For cosmetic purposes, suggest deletion of 'trial basist andInevrt, Finance Officers are so disenchanted with Treasury now[that) any suggestion of a system that wiII inevitab)-y change procedures
and timetables will sour them enough without suggesting a
trial.
(b) 
- Minister of Finance already has control over expenditurepatterns, I think this fsection in draft] - is intendedto refer to the involvement of speruli3g. Ministers in the decision-
making processes. I woula stit-u-urprised if the Minister of
Finance concedes much of his power over the actual allocations no
matter what system is in effect.
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(c) Ttre 'hagglingr stage is the most internesting. Unless
departments have done a COPE-type exercise how will their
advocates (i.e. the l4inisters and Pzteads) know how rnuch or
how little they will need? Without access to comparable infor-
mation about their colleagues' votes, how will they know how
muctr their 'oppositions' really need? In tJlis situation I havelittle faith in ttre 'aII reasonable men' concept. I recall
Did< Battersby's connents on how we are suggesting that COPE
sub-corunittees wilt be replaced by Cabinet conunittees - of
course l4inisters would delegate tJ:e evaluation function down
to finance officers (sound faln:iliar?).79
May
During raid-May, the terms of reference for the now-urgently needed
Officials' Conmittee on public expenditure were being drafted by Berthold.
He comnented in his draft that "I'ty view is t]:at ttrere is sufficient tine
to impJ-ement ttre whole paclkage, including 'envelopet committees, for
l98L/82 if there is a will to do so. If ttre will is lacJcing, no anount
of time will make up for it." one colleague noted in reply that he
agreed with tllis - "we must test ltinisters' resolve (as well as officials)
as soon as possible." Another added "I agree. Would you [senior Treasury
officer] be happy to raise this as an oral item at CCEX on ... and request
that a formal rninute be issued so that we c-ould include the tenns of
refe:ence in our memo to the Permanent Heads cormittee?"8o Not only are
the small sources of energy for action located in such comnr:ntsi one nry
also note the procedural delicacy with whictr the relationships between
ministers and officials are gently nudged tonrards formal action.
A COPE circular dated 13 May was prepared, in fuII detail, but not
distributed to perma.nent h""ds.8I rnstead internal Treasury discussions
quicJ<ened. Assistant Secretary Iller (presumably invigorated afresh by
the formal inprirnatur gu;rranteed by tlre CCEX on 20 l'lay to go al.ead) 82
wrote two detailed papers (20 and 21 lttay) drawing previous discussions
together:
In brief we are trying to:
(i) set a ceiling on total expenditure, a ceiling deterurined
by ourselves, rather ttran one that fl-ows from a separate cron-
sideration of a whole series of bids rnade by individual
deparfunents;
(ii) determine a 'basic entitlementr based on - but not necessaril,y
eguivalent to - the current level of activity;
(iii) inpose a discipline on departments whidr requires them to
iilentify all areas of growth, justify ttreir growth, and fund
it from wittrin tleir present activities insofar as it is
possible to do so.83
The various st€ps by which ttrese aims
under various headJ-ngs e.g.
L. deterrnine ttre aggregate lerrcl of
Lest/82
could be actrieved were defired
Government expenditure in
438,
2. Determine the relevant ex1:enditure weightings as between
votes .84
Critical comments
principal
from his three,/colleagues were returned wiEtrin hours.
Berthold, for example, listed further questions: e.g.
1. What is to happen if the economy actually shrink^s, as j.squite possible? In other words, is the target a given real level
of e:<penditure or a given percentage of GDp or GDE?
2. Will there be targets for Government consumption (as againstprivate consurq>tion? This woukl imply a ratio between these two
as well as a ratio between @vernnent expenditure and GDP or GDE.
John Chetwin [Treasury Internal Economics] ttrin:<s that it is
essential to contain or drive down Government consunption, and
that if Government consumption rises as a proportion of GDE,
N.Z. will be worse off even if total C,overnnrent expenditure falls. [sic]
3. What happens if a Departrnent wants IO0 percent of this year's
allocation to do exactly the same things next year, but... is given
say 98 percent? How does it make a case for the last 2 percent?
Would its case be considered along wittr nevr npney bids? If so,
should. it not be defined as new policy?
4. If a Departnent is prepared to Iive within its allocation of
say 98 percent of this year's provision, and to'tit for tatr any
' growth proposals, why should it have to justify the growth proposals?
A huge amount of rvork could be involved. If the justification is
held to be not good enough, what happens to the proposed equivalent
savings? How would vre prevent later respreading, perhaps unreported?
Why should we?
5. [ne ttre argurent t]rat sorne growth would not be subject to thetit for tat] : Knowledge of this could not be kept from !4inisters
and enthusiasm for this "free" rtoney will be keen. Why should a
I"linister agree to a tit for tat- when he can hope to dip into LhepoUl WiIt a Department or Minister have to prove that no ,tatt is
available, and if sor how and to whom? What happens if the proved
and accepted claims bust ttre pot? Is the ceiling to be raised or
is a further across-the-board reduction to be imposed on Departnents?
How would appeal.s against such a further cut be dealt with? What if
sone of those appeals were allowed? Whence the money?
What, would be ttre base for forecast years 2 and 3?
I consider that the way out of all these difficulties is the envelope
conmittee system, to
(a) deterrn-ine vote allocations;(b) approve expenditure plans rvittrin allocation provided tJrey do
not contain offensive policy changes;(c) recoghize that poticy changes are political-.
No 'PoLt would be needed (PLA's lPermanent Legislati.;e Authorities e.g.for debt interest] .would be claimed as the first charqe against the
ceiling before the rest was distributed amongst envelopes). 85
Yet another draft budget cycle in calendar form was prepared by
Han:ilton and Alexander. On 27 May (one week after the distribution of
fller's 20 May paper) a full, S-page critigue of the state of the
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artr was returned by Battersby, a very e:4>erienced senior Assistant
Secretary to the Treasury. Battersby began wittr a clear statement of
an essential political truth, as he saw it:
It is useful to consider the theory of resource allocation as a
gruide to the machinery we should adopt. First of all, howeverr there
is one objective that must not be lost sight of. That is, whatever
we do, the Treasury must retain control in the sense that we know
where we have been, where we are, and where we are going. Even in
the dark days preceding ghs 1975 election Henry Lang was able to
tell the covernnent where they were heading. At least the systert
provided that inforrnation. Tt also proviCed the incoming C"overnlent
with the ability to review expenditure priorities quickly and
effectirrely. George Gair carried out a rnassive exercise in two
nonths. This would not have been possibLe without the detailed
forecast data we collect.
Basic Systern
Stated sirnply, resource allocation involrzes a trade-off between various
levels of activity for different programmes in order to meet sone
overall objectives, e.g. a planned growt| Ievel; a planned borrowing
requirement; optirnum voter satisfaction. A display of information
can be provided to decision-makers to show the costs and benefits of
say three different positions for each progralrune elernentl
A. present level of e:<penditure
B. Ievel of extrrenditure necessary to cater for client dernand
assurning present policies continue
C. Ievel of expenditure necessary to cater for client demand
assurning a change :n the quality of servic'e provided.
A. and B. can be regarded as the cost of existing poJ-icy, C as new
policy.
Ttrere are, however, nlny good reasons why this nodel is not used:
(a) it is not possible to set out in objective terms tlre
benefits of many progranmes, especially those in the
social services areai
(b) the vast anpunt of data to be digested presents a practical
problem tJlat has not yet been overconet
(c) the distinction between 'new' and 'existingr policy is not
always cl,ear cut.
Systerns ttrerefore tend to deal w:-th the decisions sequentially, e.g.
PESC gathers A. and B and puts C in as a contingency 'wedger in
adding up the total e:<penditure package. This practice of course
leads to the comnent that most systems tend to favour continuation
of existing policies.
At some point in ttre system the forecasts gat-hered need to be evaluated
against overall objectives. PESC achieves this by putting the fore-
casts into an econonjc context - converting gross departmental
expenditure into econornic terns. If the forecasts do not fit the
criteria then analysis is necessary to show the effect of neeting
the econornic objective.
A summarized cycle for a typical resource allocation exercise along
PESC lines is:
February/March : forecasts prepared
June,/Ju1y : forecast investigated and validated
Augrust : economic evaluation; analysis of effect of
economic objectives
September/Novernber : I"linisterial decisions enabling
base to be decided;
Decernber I publication of forecasts for debate.
[the two following paragraphs \^rere on
argued that July 1980 prices were more
Econorr-ic Objective
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meeting
estimates
price base,/timing 
- 
Battersby
appropriate. l
the major fault of the system described is not that it leads to
favouring existing poi-icies but that it commits everybody to
funding departments in real terms on the basis of the forecasts.
Financing aspects need to be considered fully before real forecasts
are translated into current cash estimates. FaiLure Effio this can
result in the inposition of another control mechanism 
- cash lirrits.
The characteristics of a system can be described as incruding:
(a) forecasts of the cost of achieving established policy objectives;(b) evaluation of forecasts against econornic, financiaL and other
criteria;(c) analysis to show decision makers the effect of rreeting overall
criteria;(d) involvement of departnental officials to ensure rlegitimisationl
of forecasts;(e) procedures to aLlow appeal against decisions
As I understand. it, the proposed systern would also invelve the setting
of a d,epartmental e>rpenditure 'limit' on the basis of economic growth.
The major problen here is conceptual. Gross Covernnent expenditure(Table I) and GrlP are not directly related, Gross e:<penditure requires
considerable adjustnent to convert to economic terms. It is possiblelfor exanrple, for gross expenditure to increase by 2 percent yet stilr
be consistent with 1 percent increase in G{P. It depends on the growttrin the several economic categories, i.e. goods and services, capital
and transfers.
There are thus two practical ilifficulties that need to be overcorre.
First, conversion of central C,overnment expenditure in economic ternsinto gross Governrnent e>penditure in Table I terms. secondry, ttre
apportionnrent of gross @vernment expenditure into departmental
allocations. unless these problems can be solved in an objective
way our nethodology will be suspect, and could not be defended properlyin discussion with departments.
October rcircusl
. -. e)q)enditure decisions to be taken from about October will involve
consideration of the foltowing elements:
(a) 'e:<penditure lirnit" set by Treasury and based on econonic
criteria;(b) 'base' clained by departnrents;(c) 'volume growth' claimed by departments;(d) new policies subrnitted by l"linisters,.
(c) and (d) are to be ranked in priority order.
The major practical problem that now occurs to ne... is the handling
of this mass of data in a logical and objective way, and within the
present staffing resources of the department and the Treasury.
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[re proposedl Envelope Comnritteeg
ftris is a Canadian idea introduced by Clark last year and probably
based on simil-ar budget connnittees which operate within sorne US
Government departnents, e.g. Department of Justice. However, we do
not know how the Corunittees fared in Canada (except that Clark was
kicked out) and Mr de Jardine [oivisional Director, Treasury] will
be making inquiries on this matter. f suspect that Clark introduced
the idea to give his inexperienced Ministers a quick appreciation of
ttre outgoing Government's pol.icies to see what room could be made for
his own C,overnment's policies.
If we are to pursue the envelope idea, decisions are needed on their
composition, terms of reference and secretariat. We also need to
define the methodology whereby gross expenditure is to be divided
into the various functional areas under each comrnittee - is ttre
apportionnent nerely an addition of the e>rpenditure limit given to
departrnents earlier or are new linrits to be struck? Procedures for
ensuring overall controli where comnr-ittees have delegated authority
and for dealing witlr trade-offs between corunittee areas if overnrns
occur also need to be decided upon.
These problems need to be tack,led now before we go into departlents.
Designing a system during its implet*rrTfElSi- is a recipe for disaster.
The overall impression I have is that the proposals will- nean tpre
work for departments and the Treasury. It is important therefore ttrat
we define the procedures closely now so that we can gear up for the
work.
The areas that need urgent attention are:-
inclusion of 'price update' in forecasts,
conversion of econonr-ic objec*-ive into grose
Governnent expendi ture i
apportionnent of gross Ciovernnent e>rpenditure
annongst departments.
urachinery for handling forecast data;
role of officials in legitinising forecastsi
composition of envelope couuuittees, terrrs of
re ference, secretariat;
apportionment of gross expenditure to conunittees;
procedures for ensuring overall control is
,retained. 86
Forecasts (a)
(b)
(c)
Decision system
(d)
(e)(f)
(s)
(h)
The inpact on Battersby's colleag,ues of this slightly ex cathedra
staterent was not imnrediately apparent from a reading of the relevant
Treasury files. It must have produced, however, a sornewhat salutary lowering
of the increasingly hottrouse temperature througtr its judicious reaffirmation
of a basic bureaucratic verity : Treasury must retain its pre-erninence as tJle
principal adviser to successive Gorrernnents.
Drafts of circulars announcing the new system to Treasury divisional
directors and departrental heads had been simultaneously being prepared.
Gaining authority for distribution of the final draft circular took the
conventional form: i.e.
(a) Treasury d_retls Cabinet office circular, and recomrnends that
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(b) the cabinet cornrnittee on Expenditure approve the draft for
reference to
(c) Cabinet for final approvaL and authority to circulate to relevant
agencies.
The circul"t87 naned ttre officials Conunittee on pr:b1ic e>rpenditure
(OCEP), their terrns of reference, and noted sorne of the justifications
for the changes ahead:
The background to the appointrent of ttre officials Committee is t$e
concern of l4inisters at the strong tendency of @vernment expendituretc grow in real terns year by year. proposed new policies for which
good cases can be made are necessarily denied fi:nds because real
expenditure on existing policies has not been effectively containedby existing review procedures.
These considerations point towards the replac.erent of the present
system of expenditure planning, whereby nehr e)q)enditures tend to be
added on to old, by one in which expenditure aggregates are determinedfirst, and all proposed spending whether existing or additional, mustfit within those aggregates. It is on the feasibility and desirability
of such a change that the Offi-cia1s Conunittee has been instructedto report.
The committee of officials of pr:bric E:penditure (iopn) has not been
constituted for 1980, pending decisions on the future form of the
e:<penditure planning system. Departments should nevertheless continue
or corrm€nc-e the assernbly of basic information rerating to planned
e:<penditure during L98L/e2 to ]983,/84.
A subsequent, Treasury circular will set out the form and tinring of
submissions required from departnrents in respect of expenditure,during L98L/82 to I983l84. 88
The ccEX approved this drafE on 27 May, at the same tine agreeing to
recomlend to Cabinet that Galvin, Permanent Head of the Prirne Ministerrs
Departr€nt, be added to the Officials Conunittee. ln March, Cabinet had
adopted the CCEX recommendation on the proposed officials and their terms
of reference without arilendnent and in June approved the addition of Ga1vin.89
A meeting of ttre OCEP was planned for 30 May (later changed to 4 Jr:ne 1980) r
when Quigley would address the Committee.
Another corner had been turned. Holrever even wittr this degree of semi-
public commitment,ttrere was, as yet, no firm indication from the Prime
Minister as to how far past the stage of an e>rperiment he would allon ttre
scheme to go. In addition, Battersby's problerns still awaited attention -
ttrere was a great deal to iron out in a very short time. It. could not yet
be asserted with any confidence that those who wanted a system which would
"not faII apart in their hands" would be satisfied, nor indeed was it clear
whether the thing could be done at all.
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The Officials Committee on Expenditure Planning : Which costs more 
- 
the
babv or the baLh water?+
An 22 Mayrwhile internal debates were be:ng actively conducted inside
Treasurl ,
( Lough)
Committee
the convenor of the recently appointed Officials Cornnuittee
wrote to the other permanent heads who were to comprise the
(Galvin's Letter was presumably sent later, after Cabinet
had approved his joining ttre Conunittee). The letters were all along much
tJ:e sare lines - for exanq>le, to Williams, Chairman, SSC:
Dear Dr Williarns,
As you know Cabinet (CM 80/IL/8) has appointed you to an officials
Conrmittee to consider proposaLs for changes to the present nectranisns
for planning and controlling pr:blic ex.penditure. You have been
notified of the Corunitteers terms of reference (X(80) 1,t.24 Part VfI).
The issues for consideration are set out in the enclosed paper, dated
14 March 1980, prepared by the Associate I'linister of Finance in
conjr:nction with Treasury. By way of background, llinisters are
concerned that Governnent expenditure shows a strong tendenry to
grow in real terms each year. Despite ttris tendency, the scope for
new initiatives is tightly constrained because present rethods of
reviewing existing policies have not brought about savings of the
order required. Now that growth in the economy is no longer providing
an annual increrent from which the resources for new initiatives can
be found, ttre need for adapting policies to fit resource limitations
is apparent.
The concept norr being explored is that Cabinet, having regard to the
forecast performance of the econoq/ in the rnedium term, will" determ:ine
the aggregate Ievel of Covernment expenditure for the foJ-lowing
financial year. Cabinet may also set levels of e:qpenditure for broad
sections of activity resembling the present functional classes of
C'overnrnent expenditure. Ministers would be responsible for diwiding
new sector allocations among Votes. It is contemplated that for this
purpose Cabinet will establish sector comn-lttees including Ministers who
have portfolio responsibilities in the Sector.
It will be appreciated that allocations to Votes under such a system
may not always be sufficient to fund the continuation, unchanged, of
existing functions and services and the introduction of any necessary
new initiatives. It will be seen too that the change proposed wouLd
have irnplications for departrnental expenditure planning procedures
and for the rel-ationships among Ministers and departrents. Changesj-n information systems may also be needed.
Ministers have expectations that the new concepts' if adopted, will be
implemented in time for the 1981r/82 financial- year. Ttris would place
sone pressure on the decision-making rnachinery at both political and
departrnental levels, and lends urgency to the task of the officials
Committee. The identification of any practical, as well as conceptr:al
difficulties and/or possible solutions will be important.
The Associate Minister of Finance wiII address the eomnitteers first
meeting, which will be held in ttre Conference Room (corridor 4.1) on
the 4th floor of the Beehive on Friday, 30 May at 2.I5 p.n. If you
have any queries before then Mr Brian tyler of this office wiII
answer them.
Yours sinc.erely'["ig,n.d 
lloel rough] 90
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As tJ:e first Officials Committee meeting approached, Finance
divisional officers in Treasury continued. to worry. In one rremo, dated
29 May, for example, Hamilton commented: "I remain a little concerned
as to how ttre riew approach will be e>qple.ined and how it will be operated.
One of my problems is that as it is described in the note [to permanent
heads] the system appears plausible when, as we know, it has several
areas of uncertainty. " Hamilton detailed a long list ,>f as-yet r.nsolved
difficulties as. be saw them: e.g.
We will require a working definition of I commitmentsr e.g.
r:niversity quinquinnia, uncompleted capital projects, Govemment
Superannuation.... I prefer Mr Berthold's terrn 'contingency fundt[rather] than the 'sum for hard cases' This fund [t]re
allocative 'pool'] wiII be regarded as 'fair gamer by all
l{i-nisters. .. uncierestimation of the size of the fund wi]-l be as
serious in effect as overestimation although the incidence of
effects may vary.... An assrmption will need to be made as to
the extent rtit for tatr will work i.e. provision wiII be required
for slippage including new policies... (do we mean) 'allocation'
of 'planning figures' - the former is the prerogative of the
Minister of Finance just prior to the meeting of the Estimates -
the term also implies (Lo me) a hard and fast figure... guidelines
for TIOfs [Treasury investigating officers] required.
WiIl CCEX be empowered to increase provision [annoted note
replies 'yes' to this]...
... we should recognise that we now have to plan, budget anC
monitor the equivaleht of three-year Estimates. Changes to plans
must be in three-year terms, not one as at present. !{ill all
subsequent variations require CCEX approval? ... how will this
operate il atr election year... Ca.binet should of course truler on
changes to policies as a result of expenditure constraints...
What happens (given the time frane) if in economic terms about
December 
- February t}re expenditure bill is Loo high/too low?
Do departments completely review their three-year expenditureplans? WiIl new policies (now to be submitted by Septenrber, not
October) still be classified as secret...(and finally) I have two firndamental dcncerns:
(a) have we in Treasury sufficient time and resources to develop
and promulgate the detailed ilstructions to departments,
otlrer central bodies and TIO's to enable 30 Septenber dead-
Iine [as ttren planned] to be met?
(b) what happens if the Minister of Finance rejects the motion -
we would have difficulty in meeting the December deadline,
of tl:e present (COPE) system.9I
This last was, of course the twitchy "Godfather" question. Yet until
other problems 
- constitutional, systematic, procedural and professional -
could be sorted out, the Prime Ministerr s views must be assuned to be
favourable.
Jr:t:e
On 3 Jwre, Cabinet approved the augmented OG;P (eight meuibers,
chaired by the Secretary to the Treasury), The minute of tlris meeting,
distributed to all l4inisters and all permanent heads, confixred that
COPE had not been reconstituted for l98O "pendi-ng decisions on the future
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form of tlre expenditure plaruring systsn."92
In preparation for the first neeting of the
Expenditure Planning (OCEP) on 4 June, gler drew
(which at least one of his colleagues, Berthold,
variety of reasons").
It said:
Officials Conrnittee
up a brief paper
[didnrt like, for a
1.
2.
Officials Corunittee on Expenditure Planning
t{eeting on Wed. 4 June 1980 at 3.15 p.m.
agenda
Address by Hon. D.F. Quigley, Associate l'linister of Finace.
Consideration of the following suggested crycIe for the
implementation of the concept set out in the paper of 14
l{arch 1980 previously distributed to ttre Cornmittee.
(a) During I98O Cabinet, after being advised of ttre forecast
performance of the economy in the rnedium termr'would
decide (in 1 July l9BO prices) a firm planning level
of aggregate Government expenditure for 1981-82 and
tentative plaruring levels 1982-83 and 1983-84. Itris
decision night be made in July.
(b) A sum would be set aside from each year's planned
aggregate for identified conunitments suctr as debt
servicing.
(c) An additional sum woul-d be set aside from eactr yearfs
aggregate for contingencies.
(d) The remainder would be apportioned among votes by tl:e
I4inister of Finance.
(e) Departments would be advised of planning allocations
to their votes and instructed to prepare, for the
approval of the l"tinister in Charge of eactr vote,
e:qpenditure plans for I98L/82, I982/e3 and J.983/84.
(f) Each such expenditure plan, acconpanied by a Treasury
report, would be considered by the CCEX.
Cabinet would finally determine any unsolved policry or
expenditure issues and the l{inister of Finance wou1d
confirm the 1981r/82 Estinates provision for each Vote(subject to Vote updating for inflation if maclo-
econonlc considerations permit) .
In 1981, Cabinet Conrnittees would be constituted for
each broad category of @vernrnent activity and these
would deterrnine allocations to individual Votes and
exarnine expenditure plans.
(s)
(h)
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Expenditure plans vrould conrbine new polj.cies and any gror.rt-h in
existing policies i:-ogether rvibh the reductions in other existingpolicies necessary for the pranning a.llocations not to be exceeded.
r'irnitations would appry.as at present to irems such as personnel,
capital works a:rd overse.rs travel. Tlrese liroitations and details
of the form of e>rpenditure plans, wouJ.d be set out in the necessarydetail in a Treasury circular simil,ar to thc copE circular of pastyears' and expenditure plans would resenrble COPE subrnissions in their
form and information content.
3. General discussion of the feasibility and desirability of
implementing the proposals set out in the paper of 14 March
1980.
4. Arrangenents for future meetings93 of the officials Committee
and for the production of its report.g4
Notes for the l'linisterr s inaugural speech were drafted by his Treasury
(Finance r) advisers. rt was a careful rnlxture of fact, optimistic
assertion, flattery, realism and moral exhortation.
The total- of C'overnment Expenditure tends to grow each year in real
terms. The problem of financing this expenditure, by taxing and
borrowing, is becoming increasingly acute. Ttre total of Governnrent
consumption 
- that is, expenditure net of transfers 
- 
is also growingin real terms. In a period of low or nil economic growth, such as we I
unfortunatery have now, this means Lhat private consungrtion is
reduced. The consequences of squeezing private consunption includeindustrial unrest, diminisiring incenlives and high ernigration,
especially of people whose contribution to the economy is positive.
The Governrnent attaches importance to the role of market signals in I
the allocation of national resources. Growttr of the public sector at
the expense of bhe private sector reduces the size of the market place
from which these sigarals cone, and makes an informed allocation of
resources rnore difficult.
These considerations were of small irnportance when the relative size
of the public sector was itself small. Now the public sector accor:ntsfor sornething like 40 percent of gross domestic e>rpenditure - to me an
appalling sum - and but for strenuous efforts in recent years it would
be higher still,
However, the er<penditure growth that has occurred has not followed
from ttre wholesale adoption of new policies. On tJ:e contrary, it has
happened in spite of a rigorous selection process.It is clear to my
colleagues and to me that the steady tendency of existing policies
demand more resources, has put us in the bind of high total expenditure
and little money for new initiatives 
- ttre classic public expenditurebind.
T'he annual review of existing policies has not got us out of the bind.
There has been a reluctance to offer up policies for review, and the
savings achieved in the last three years have been small. Better
results were achieved from last yearrs 'tit for tat' approach, andthat approach should be taken as an earnest of the C,overnmentrs deter-
mination to find a way out of the er<penditure bind.
The 'top-down'95 method of e:<penditure planning wouLd be a natural
progression from the rtit for tat'. Its premise is that the expenditure
4g'1.
total is no longer the aggregate of the costs of fixed policies but
is the central poticy issue itself. If total e:<penditure is to be
fixed, fr:nctions and services must become variable, and e:,rpenditureIneeds' be seen as relative instead of being thought of as absolute.
Gentlemen, you were appointed to the Officials Committee on E:<penditure
Planning because of the interest you have demonstrated in the issues
and because your departrnents, among them, spend rather nore than haLf
of the taxpayers' noney. My colleagues and I beLieve that you will
tackle your task energetically and constructively.
No doubt the concept you are to examine wouLd encounter difficulties
of application in particular areas of e>rpenditure. I want you to
identify these and advise us how they should be handled. But try not
to throw out the baby with the bath water. You may wish to comllent
on the special rules that now apply to certain items like capital
works, overseas travel-, staff nunibers 
- 
irnportant, though ancill.ary
issues. Your suggestions will be valuable.
The main issue, for your attention is the possibility and desirability
of introducing a fundarnentally different system of pJ-anning expenditure,
and my hope would be that we will have your report within a rnonth from
today. 95
Alttrough (as is the case in almost all official ueetings in centraL
governrent) fornal, full minutes were not kept, hand-written notes were
taken by Berthold, Treasuryrs executive officer seconded to the builget
nanagenent group. Berthold noted, in reporting ttre ltinisterrs "additional
comrents", thatl
Ctrange [is] necessary. C,overnnent expenditure as a percentage of GDPis too high. Sorne have pointed to areas of potential savings, and to
possible changes. [rt is] not change for change's sake.
[re. the general econornic situation]:
We canrt afford some of the econornic efficiences [sic] of the past.
Scarce resources [are] needed for growt]r. Easier to maintain existingpolicies than to get new ones. Hence the rtit for tatr - which has
been dramatically successful, therefore the criticism. It needs
refining.
But there is no policy gruideline issued by Government before COPE.
Lack of economic growth leads to no such pressure on permanent and
financial [officers] who have had to deal with very small sums indeed.
We get very little support for the savinqs we propose. 'Confrontationl
[occurs] between spending t'linisters and the CCEX: some tend to suppor+-
each other. Big spenders get least scrutiny sometires.
What's suggested is a way for making collective decisions according
to the prioritiesgto you could get on with adrninistering your
departrents ... -'
At this first neeting, (which in toto lasted an hour and three quarters)
discussion apparently circled around a nunber of issues which were c.entral
from the permanent head's perspective, e.g. !
(a)
(b)
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the "fixing of the magic percentage. This could be based on a redium
term forecast of GDP and designed for a stable course."
Lough's occasional- dry (if not disapproving) rerninder of the rate
of past expenditure growth in real terms, and the fact that "the out-
look is for about 28 growth over the next five years - none in the
short term.'
(c) basis for political approval
get "first crack" - in vlhich
other criteria?
- e.g. would denographic considerations
case there would be "nothing left" for
(h)
(d) impact of salary adjustments which are "already 72t of vote :
Education", for exatqlle.
(e) staff c-eilings 
- would these be replaced by cash controls?
(f) degree of tolerance that would be available "within which to play".
. Tyfer suggested that the establishment of an "envelope" system
(s)
would aLlow for this.
impact on existing poliry, nohr controlLed by departrents. Lough
suggested t-}tat "macro considerations could be taken into accornt in
deciding broad priorities 
- 
e.g. need for econornic.growth points to a
need for technical education." Renwick's (Education) response to this,
apparently, was that it then gets "irq>ossibly r:nwieldy". It was no
doubt an rmderstatenent of the Director Cieneral's personal view of
such t'macro considerationst'.
inpact on I'linisterial behaviour 
- 
only the involvernent of Ministers
early enough could confront ttrem wittr the necessity to rnake difficult
droices. But (as a Health department official pointed out) behind ttre
ministers Lie "the manifesto and the caucus."
during a discussion of whether rninisters themselnes should be asked to
rank policies in terms of what they saw as their relative "sacredness",
Qrler pointed out that the Minister of Finance wanted to retain
"flexibility" 
- 
which could mean leaving room to al-lorry for price level
changes before the Estimates were firnred up.
Renwick (Education) pointed out that the 'islaughtering of sacred
cor.rs is a Caucus matter rather than an officials' matt€r". Responsi-
bitity for "sacred cor,rs" remained contentious - one departnent
(i)
(Education) claiued to have none suitable for slaughter. grler
asked that ttre big spenders shouLd prcvide Treasury with an indication
of whether they would "prefer to have sacred cows' throats cut, or
simply have them strangled slowly because price level changes (including
infLationary impact) were not allowed. rr @neral agreer€nt was reached
on conpiling an officials.r list of sacred cows.
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(j) significantly enough in view of information received later from
de Jardine, the senior Treasury divisional director (Financial
Management Division), consensus was recorded on the "envelopes"
approach, with its proposal for sector, councils.
(k) the corunittee decided that a draft report on agreenent aheady
reached should be prepared by the Treasury secretariat and a
further meeting "to consider the draft" shoul-d be held in one
week'r ti*.98
(Not incLuded in Bertholdrs notes, but:reported to ttre author latcr
was Renwicl<rs accurate observation ttrat if debt servicing was to be the
first charge on the available, limited fr:nds allocated for @8, the
inevitable consequence would be that everyone else must get less.)99
The follovring day, an officials' conunittee called tJe Finance Officers
Advisory Group was circulated with a notice of meeting to be heLd in
Treasury on 10 ,firne (the day before OCEP ret again). Papers attactred
"for your information and informal discussion" included ttre.sLill
'confidenLial' Quigley report to tJ:e CCEX ( l-4 Marctr) , ttre Cabinet of fice
circular of 3 .fune, and an agenda made up on ttre basis of the O@F
discussions on 4 ,June (including "suggested revised financial cycle".)tOO
this informal group of some 12 departrnental financial offic€rs was con-
vened by Treasury on an ad hoc basis only - it is part of that seni-
permanent, serni-unofficial network at the level of those who, wtrile ttrey
do not have ultimate decision-making polrers, must be able to make arry
system work, if it is ever going to work at aII.
A brief srunmary of discussion at the FOAG meeting was p!ep.[ed on
11 June. It was headed "Roundup Corunents Made at Finance Officers Advisory
Group on the Inplementation of the 'quigley' concept - 10 June 1980tr and
read as follows:
Mr ,J. Green (MOWD): He would prefer the present system to remain.
Reference was made to ttre various sub-systems within departments of
whicfr Treasury w;ls unaware. These should not be terminated overnight.
Mr R. Janes (Energy) was not persuad.ed that ttre present system wasfaulty. He was also concerned about departmental systens and the
re-training required if the nerrt system is irnplemented at short notice.
It was suggested a pilot sdreme (say, 2 deparEnents) could be run in
tandem for L98J-/82.
He (and others) expect to be consulted in derrclopment of a new
system and deternining planning figures. Energy could not meet the
30 September target date for the new concept, Others were of ttre
sarne view.
NB. Mr Janes circulated a separate paper querying features of the
proposed system.lol
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Mr Brewerton (Transport) likes the concept but can't see it beipg
implernented this year. He rnade similar corunents reqarrling departnrent's
management abilities as l"lr Janes.
Mr Pritcha€ (IrtaoriAffairs ) would be preparecl to.'give it a gor but
would be unable to comply with information requirements this !-ear. He
e>rpressed sone concern at t}te mechanics.
Iar Tpohill (Defence) described hirnself as a fataList in terms of the
concept being implemented but questioned the timinq of its irrtroduction.
He made the point that under cOFr departments were responsible and
suffered for their own rnistakes. Under the proposed system depart-
ments would suffer for Treasury mistakes.
Mr Patterson (audit) was impressed on the first reading of the concept
thGh appe"red to nreet most of the Controller and Auditor @neral's
criticisms of COPE in his 1978 reposg.102
Mr Johns (SSC) favoured bringing politicians into the allocations
exercise. At the adnui-nistrative level he liked the rnove away frominput controls but saw much npre ahead.
l"tr Burch (MAF) found the concept attractive but saw it emphasising
increnental expenditure. He saw a need to be certain over reviews of
'sacred cows'. He also wanted more flexibil-ity. Mr Burch thought
the new concept needed to evolve over a year or l-wo and noted that
the present system had valuable features.
I"lr Sceats (Customs) agreed with l4r Pritchard's views but wanted more
information on tlre npchanics. Ile also wanted nrore information on the
autonomy of pe:manent heads and the apparent contradiction regarding
. 
specific progranme constraints (e.g. DMVC and Capital Works).
I'lr Mol-es (Health) although liking the concept in principle saw the
need for a massive input of resources to effect implenrentation. Ttre
sinking lid is constraining Lhe type of staff (administrative) who
would have to bear the brunt of the work. He also questioned termin-
ating the present system as appeared to be envisaged as not beingdesirable. The systern should be run in parallel if introduced.
Mr Burns (Education) did not believe that COPE was a disaster (this
view was echoed by some other members) and saw it as providing benefits
to both Treasury and departnrents. COPE currently lacked auttrority but
this could be rectified. The real defect in ttre present system may bein reviews of new and existing policies. In his view more concentration
on poliry reviews is required (see paragraph 26 of euigley's paper,
14 March). Also, improved information systems are a pre-:requisite to
any concept. Mr Burns was against the proposed implementation timetable,
Ittr Dick Wood (Treasury) considered that the existing system had not
been proved faulty and guestioned the assumptions r:nderlying the
proposed approactr,- I03
It is of interest to note a nuniber of points related to this I.I)AG
nreeting:
(1) Three of those present (Janes, Brewerton and Burns) were youngish ex-
Treasury ren who had themsel-ves, at different stages in their careers,
been responsible for establishing and enforcing aspects of the
existing financial systems.
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(2) several members of the FOAG - notably B.rcwerton (.Transport) , and
Burns (Education) 
- both of whom had been observecl (during this stucly)
in other contextsr e.9. during the 1978 COPE working party and other
meetings 
- had been stron91y, e,ren vociferously, critical of Treasury
and the COPE systern. Notes in Appendix 3A for example, illustrate
the style of discussion and negotiation favourecl by Brewerton and
Burns where their departrnental estimates were being investigat d.lO4
(3) Several members of FOAG had had long experience in the cOpE system,
and had served. at least one term as chairman for orre of the COpE
working partyr/sr:b-comrnittees. Green (I"1OI{D) for example, was a verl,
experienced, observant officer rvho had on a number of occasions o\rer
tl1e previous years submitted memos to Treasury on how COpE and other
phases of the budget cryc1e nright be inproved.l05 1t.rohil1, Burch and
Pritctrard had all served on COPE sub-comrnitteesr Only Johns (SSC)
appeared to have litt1e direct personal experiene in the budget
management system - indeed, comments by Treasury officials on an
informal paPer Johns sr:bnuitted. in confidence, on the Quigley paper.
was seen by them as both too academic and too out-of-touch wittr
"reality" to have much authority. Ihis view, however, was in general
held in relation to most contributions by the SSC, whaterrer the forum.(4) In general it was obvious that rvhatever their seniors agreed to do,
this more hard-headed group of nen was r:nlikely to show any great
enthusiasm for any reforms which courd not be proved to be more
workable than tJ1e system to which they had, in fact, becore accustomed,
The idea of turning-around., given the pressure on them of staff
ceilings and generally lcrvr level of bureaucratic morale, was obviously
not seen as the answer to an accountant,s prayer.
O@P met the day after these FOAG discussions (tune 11). Doubtless
each of the permanent heads attending had been briefed before t]:is meeting
by his own departmental financial officer on the general clinrate of opinion
about the Quigley paper anong those who lived, so to speak, belovr stairs.
The evaluation tJ1at had taken place in the FOAG, would, as pennEurent head.s
knew, give them a good steer on any difficulties they nr-ight later confront
if ttrey went too far or too fast arrcng their own peer groupr
It was an interesting strategy on Treasurlg's part to have given this
extra little poke to proceedings 
- since Treasury, alone, of course, courd
act as official (if not honest) broker. rf, later, permanent heads were
merely to ape their financial advisers' views - Treasury would know. If,
o$ the other hand, pe::nanent heads made corrnitments to eactr other, or to
the Quigley evangelists, which were more lavish ttran their or,rn departmental
people could tolerate 
- Treasurx/ would know. If the prejudices of permanent
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heads and the FOAG were collectively opposed to Quigley-type changes, the
Treasury would know what had to be reported to the Ministers, notably
Quigley and Muldoon, and to the CCEX.
In a retrospective comment on the above anal_ysis, Berthold
(Treasury) added tJ:at after the iirst permanent headsr meeting (4 June) r
one of the departnental finaneial officers, presumably alarnred by the
speed witJr which changes were runoured to be taking p]_ace., terephoned
Hamilton. He asked Harnilton whether the FoAG would be convened, and
whether group nembers would be privy to the debate before decisions were
reached by t]:e permanent heads. Hamilton had assured hirn that FAOrs would
be consulted. The Treasury finance people, thus cor,nnitted, then debbted
(more or less on the lines above) the pros and cons of scheduling an FOAG
rneeting, and decided "to take the risk,,.106
Between 4-10 June' a Paper had been prepared in Treasury (probably by
Berthold) in readiness for officials' discussion of the new rsectorst
or renvelopes''. It was entitl-ed :
Number of Votes, portfolios, and Mj_nisters by
Functional C1assi fi cation
(Figures have been corrected for double counting to obtain totals)
PortfoLios MinistersFunctional Classi fication
Administration
Cene ral adrninistration
Law and Order
Governnent Services
l{iscellaneous services
Stabilisation
Total adninistration
Foreign Relations
Defence
Foreign Affairs
Total Foreigrr Relations
Education
Education
Total Education
Votes
14
4
2
4
I
26
1
1
13
3
2
4
22
I
I
2
I
I
6
3
2
I
1
t-1
I
L
2
I
I
2
I
I
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Developrnent of fndus trT_
Land Use
Fuel and Power
Other Industrial Services
Total Developrnent of Industry
Social Services
Social Welfare
Other social services
Total Social Services
Healttr
Health
Total Health
Transport and Conrmrnications
Transport
Communications
Tota1 Transport and
Communications
5
1
4
IO
I
3
4
1
I
3
I
4
I dated 6 Jr:ne
; dated 9 Jr.rre
r dated 9 Jr:ne
: dated IO J,rrre.108
6
1
4
10
1
3
4
L
I
3
a
4
3
I
4
7
I
a
4
1
1
2
1
^ 107J
It had been suggested on 4 June that permanent heads should send in
comrnents on discussions so far. fn the event, only four permanent heads
did so and only the comrents by Callahan (Soeial Welfare) were received
on Bertholdrs desk in time to be incorporated in a paper he wrote for
11 
'June. Berthold described the function of his own paper as "a
consensus of views enpressed at the meeting, based on notes [described above]
he took at the tine." Replies were received from:
Callahan
. Renwick
Hiddleston
Williams
These four papers r^rere later tabl-ed arpng the Officialsr papers on
lI Jr:ne, plus a paper of rrecommendationsr (which Berthol-d described as
"not really reconrrendations, nore a sunmary of tlre paper itself").109
Ihe draft report on public
by the following OCEp group : Nr
expenditure planning was discussed on 1l ,fune
Lough (Chair)
Williams (SSC)
Hiddlestone (Health)
Ashton (ex Treasury, Director of Finance,
Justice)
Hensley (P.M.'s Department)
Callahan (Social Welfare)
R.
J.
B.
G.
s.
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N. Suttorr (Ass. Secretary, Education)
with \'ler, Alexander, Hamilton, lvrde.rson (all Treasury) and l.Iilliams
(SSC) in attendance.
It should be noted that as on 4 June only some of the permanent heads
appointed to OCEP lyere present in person - Lough, Williams, Hiddlestone
(first tire) and Callahan. Galvin, CLarke, Rerrwick and Robertson were
absent, and only the first three sent a substitute delegate.
Bertholdrs draft paper suggested five secLors for public e:(pen-
diture planning:
Adruinistration (which comprised 14 existing departmental and. other agents
including the Treasury, SSC, and the PMrs department; all law and
order departments (justice, police, SIS and Crown Law); Government
services (l'{O!lD, Government Printing); nuiscellaneous (CLI , P. Trust
Office etc.) and Stabilisation; a total of 26 current Votes, 22
current portfolios, and 1l Ministers.
Foreigrn. Relations (Defence and Foreign Affairs - 2 Votes 2 portfolios,
2 Ministers).
Development of Industry (Land use, fuel and power and other industrial
agents, including Labour and DTI - 10 Votes, 10 portfolios, 7
[inisters) .
Education, Social Services and Hea!!\ (includin9, in addition, Housing
Corporation, Internal Affairs, Maori Affairs progranmes -
6 portfolios, 5 Ministers).
6 Votes,
Transport and Communicationg (4 Votes, 4 portfolios and 3 l,tinisters). 1r.0
1!:e paper stated that the Officials Committee accrepted as feasible
(a) the principle of an upper allocative linit, from which wouLd cone
pro'rision for debt servicing and contingencies, with "the balance"
divided among ttre suggested sectors (or "envelopes!'). All expen-
diture against each Vote would be found "within the plaru:ing level."Il'l
(b) a financial cycle which would allcnr the sc*reme to "be inplemented
in time for ttre Jlgg1/82 expenditure year.'112
The case for the scherne (as drafted by Treasury) seemed to ttre outside
observer rather more generous than either the first discussion report of
the meeting on 4 June, or the FOAG discussion on f0 Jr:ne, appeared to
warrant. It d.idr'however, make explicit that 'ra system of plaruring
expenditure whictr begins with aggregates would, if adopted, inply that the
size of those aggregates is the central poliry issue.... Tlris would annount
to the reverse of the present system, under whidr tJ:e individual expenditure.
policies tend to be treated as fixed and the aggregates of expenditure as
variabletr.
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The draft paper added that, with the implications of the scheme in
mind, Officials nonetheless felt that a "suitable mechanism" could be
developed "below the level of the fulL Cabinet, which [it aaaea reassuringly]
would, however, retain overall authority and responsibiIity,"II3
Bertholdrs notes on the Cornrn-ittee's discussion of this draft suggest
that arnong permanent heads present nrost interest lay in
(a) the sectoral (or "envelope") system and its impLications;
(b) the point in the financial year at which rninisters themselves would
be obliged to "front up to the hard decisions" (a conment by
roudr);
(c) the leve1 (i.e. CCEX or Cabinet) at which decisions would be taken;
(d) any sanctions which cou1d,/night,/would app]y, either when departments/
I'tinisters attenpted to win extra funds from the collective "pool",
or (using tbeir "sharpened-up" tal"ents for debate, Iearned through
years of COPE confrontations) through "coming back" by other channels
for extrasi
(e) 'FAO's willingness to rliver wittr the scherne.
Overall , the sector,/envelope scherne did not receirre much st4>port
(e.g. at tines Education, Prime Minister's Department, Social Welfare and
Trade and Industry officials stated more or less serious reservations about
its possiJrle efficacy) . Sorne rnen were concerned about whether they could
stitl "get a day in Court witlr senior Treasury officials"; others wanted
sonre kind of "super Cabinet" group to deal with one leve1 of decisions,
and a "working party" group possibly at Cabinet Consrdtt€e Ievel, to work
out the "fine print" i some felt that splitting a Vote between sectors would
be "a handicap if you're looking at structural reform" - others felt that
this was ttre only way to separate out the areas "where the big rnoney is"
from "the mass of snall issues." In general, there were soEE explicit
objections to the 'tit for tat' policy, which was seen as neither logical,
nor equitable, nor productive of any "real'[pney. At one point
Hensley (P.l{t s departrrent) surnmed up what appeared to be the point of
agreement ancng those present - and ttre gaps which still existed: "Agree to
drop the lsectors' ... but there's therefore a gap between the aggregate
[which had sorrehow to be decided upon within the established aggregate
Iinits] " . ll4
The meeting concluded shortly after fyler (no doubt feeling
sorewhat bruised by ttre fairly solid working-over his 'baby' had received)
agreed to e:qreriment (through three of his Financial Officers) witlt the
question: "How would you handle an allocation?".I15 Ttre Conrrrittee agreed
to neet again on the 19 Jr-rne to discuss this and related issues, to be
circulated again in a new draft.
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On 16 June a redrafted paper on 'timingr (i.e. the annual budgetary
cycle) was circulated by I,:r Tyler, inside Truu"rrry.116 Hanilton,
replying to Tller the next day, indicated that not only did he retain
some guite strong objections and reservations about the continued use of
devices such as rtit for tatf (e.g. departments would e>pect a tit for every
tat), but he was becorning seriously concerned about how he and his division
were going to work up to the 1981r/82 Estimates while COPETs replacenrent
was still so far in linto.117 Tyler rnodified his draft sonrewhat, in
line with ttrese comments, and completed a S-page "Di".roi-on Pup.r", drawing
the various lines of discussion together, for the OCEP meeting ttre foll.owing
- 
118oay.
In a discussion with tJre author a few days earLier Tyler had
indicated that arnong the major shifts in his orrrn thinking over the preceding
rncnths, one was significant - and had been influenced very largely by
feedback to Treasury after their release of 'the puigley conceptr to those
who were prinarily affected by it - the permanent heads. glhere, say six
of seven months before, almost radical change, in the direction of greater
efficiency and economy had seenred possible, he (TYler) was now persuaded
that any change must be strictly evolution"ry.ll9 Like other evangelists
in Treasury before him, the Assistant Secretary had e:rperienced at first
hand the collective resistance which even carefuJ-ly selected senior depart-
rnental officials could offer the reforrner. It is an indication of the
capacity for sustained campaigrning which characterised the first PPB-COPE
pioneers t.llat far from becoming disheartened, Tller becare increasingly
anxj.ous to discuss and debate his cause with anyone (including an academic
student of governnent such as the author) so long as he could be sure of
their loyal.ty to the notion of "official. secrecy". Various competing
influences affect such officials 
- 
personal arnbition, peer-group scrutiny,
subordinates' reaction, departmental vagaries, ministerial pressure, r:nknown
and unknowable rgodfathersr such as ttre Prime Minister, administrative and
statutory necessity, constitutionaf propriety and politicaf feasibility,
Given the force of such variables, we are struck by the fact ttrat to many
such officials the anonymity offered by a "closed-system" must be seen as
absolutely essential camoufl-age.
For both individuals and the executive arm of central governrnent, the
stakes, of course, are high. As one Treasury man close to \ller
remarked "There are absoLutely no prizes in tlre system for coming secondr'.
Although this remark was directed nainly towards Ministers and departments
in general, the politics of resource allocation in central governnent are
such that the bleak rules of the game apply to aI1 participants. Certainly,
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through June and July, thc sensation that the reform advocates (incluclj.ng
the Associate Minister of Finance) were still wa.tking on eqgs was pal1>ab1e -
and if any one of the eggs broke, no one rrranted it on his face. rt is
rather savage motivation. Whether it tends to encourage good gove.nnrnent -
let alone "good" expenditure planning - is (at this stage, at least) a
moot point.
When the permanent heads assenrbled on 19 June for what turned out to
be the final meeting in this phase of the euigley pap€rr history, they
had been given (in addition to \1er's discussiorr paper) 120 . r*ry
brief sheet of headings outlining a Suggested FinanciaL Cycle Based on
Discussion Papers.12l Ttre meeting was attended by alt the men fonnally
charged by Cabinet to conduct the exercise except Clark (his
representative from ttre DTI was present), and a number of other lesser
officials. Notes were taken by Berthold and the au'Lhor (al-so present)
and the latter are appended to this study. I22
Discussion concentrated on four paragraphs (2r8, 15 and 15) in the
draft paper, and on the revised financial cycle. General agreement appeared
to exist, tacitly at least, for
(a) the general reform approach i.e. the euigley concept ;(b,) the fixing of e:rpenditure ceilings;
(c) as early a fixing of expenditure allocations as was consistent
with officialsr needs, their ministersr needs and the "politi.cal
wilL" of ministers to ma)<e any agreed rules stick 
- 
uniformly;
(d) tolerance, or flexibility, sufficient to permit "unavoidable"
adjustnents e.g. those flowing-on from government,rs approval
for wage and salary increases.
Overtly discussions focused on one particularly sensi.tive area 
- the
pricing base for policy costing. It was asserted (anil accepLed) that prices
'would be'adjusted twice in any one financial cycle, but would be based on
"current" Levels (supposing that these - and some appeared to dor:bt it -
could be real-istically gauged) .
The underlying debate 
- 
ttre hidden agenda - \ras about the key question -
what counts as political comrnitment: for example, whr:n r.ras it made, and who
were the parties to it? vthat depend.s upon it (and ca'rnot, therefore, be
abandoned) and what flons from it 
- 
that is, what are its poliry (and
e:<penditure) consequences? ff, as, for instance, Tller considered in
hindsight, the previous meeting had been about who really or{ns'public
resources 
- the Covernment (on behalf of the departments) or the departnents
(in trust, for the Government),t" an. ernphasis (on 19 June) was basically
on what counts as conunitment 
- and, thus, what cotrnts as need , As one
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pertnanent head had put it "On definitions
definitions of need; definitions of need,
of 'availability' - e.g. of rnoney,,.
commitment depend
turn colour: interpretations
one argument which received l.ittle overt attention amorrg most par-
ticipants was put forward by Garvin (rlead of the prime l{inister's
Department) in his first attendance at oGP. He argued that behind all
oT uty of these definitions there musL be some overall 1>olitical and
econornic assumptions such as the desirability and attainment (or other-
wise) of fulI employment. Such an assumption, C,a1vin srrggestedr w€ls
neither " need.'/ nor '/avai labirity" but provided a vital ,:riterion for
tl.e assessrent of both
As the meeting drew to a close, RenwicJ< (Education) remarked -
more- or less sotto voce 
- 
that "the hard [decisions] an: going to be
the political injections at the point before they [l,tinisters and treasury]
fix the final a1locations". fhe clearest opinion seerned to be that,
despite the simple, efficient, good sense whictr men like Lough and [1er
could see in tl:e Quigley concept, the ltinisters would, quite simply,
lacl< the necessary will to carry it through. And without ttrat, the
permanent heads would themselves lack the necessary rnotivatio;r to irpose
"hard decisions" voluntariry on each other or themselves.
The Treasury officials agreed to circulate a sunmary paper and a
flow-chart of the suggested budgetary cycle - and €!€:r]ror€ appeared
to acc€Pt that tiis had, been the last neeting' of OCEp eit least for the
'laAtime being.-'-'
July
on .Iu1y 7, \ler agreed that a Treasury circular j-nstmcting depart-
ments to prepare 3-year forward estimates of cost of eixistlng policy,
based on l,July rggo pries, shourd, be prepared and ci::curated.
Ttrere had been (and there rema-ined) a critical and centrar difference
of view among Treasury officiats on the function of thr: formal new and
exisLing policy classifications. rtris d.ivergence was 'Etre major reason
for ttre protracted delays in issuing the new circular. Berthold and a
nuriber of his colleagues had argued that tlle differencr: between new and
existing poliq; was that of an adrninistratively conven.ient artifice or
device to facilitate a division of labour between ministers and officials.
If every identified volume change in exisling policy must be explicitly
recogrrised and approved by ninisters, the allocative system would break
dcn'rn. Existing policies, Berthold argued, represented tlle outcome of
of
in
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historical negotiations and 
.agreements between interesbed parties.
Annual re-examination of these by ministers was not only impractical
but in most cases unnecessary. Where, foy exanple, the extension of
a policry, for, say, the payrent of a grant or a welfare benefit could
be justified on demographic terms, ttris volume growth came properly
within fonnal definition of existing poJ.icy. Ministers could deal
effectively with the srnall percentage of policies catec;orized annually
as "neld" (and indeed tttis was the area where their keenest political.
interests lay). Given the conflict and generally demanding role of
the exesutive in central government, their capacity to review muctr
more than that was necessarily liuuited.
'gler, on the other hand, argued then (and again .in L98L) ttrat
all volume growth, including tJlat clearly based on dem,rgraphic changes,
must be idenLified and defined as new policy. wtrile in 1980 this
argunent was resolved in favour of Berthold,s point of view, it
remained a major sourc\s of conflict in Treasury itself.
Ttris circu1ar,125 wtrich was drafted by Berthold and distributed
on 9 JuIy 1980, has a nunber of interesting features, sorre of whictr
are typical of sirnilar directives,/reguests for inforru,tion. For
exarq>le:
(i) Like COPE circulars issued in tJle pastr it did not cite any
Cabinet rainute or Cabinet committee instruction to dernonstrate its
authority. Berthold. considerd that its distribution, oner the
signature of Alexander (pirector Finance 1) , fot the llecretary to
the Treasury, courd be justified in terms of Treasury's regal powers
as these are defined in the pr:bric Finance Act, 1977. rn a later
d.iscussion witfi tl:e author about this, Berthold expressed sore
reservations as to whether any specific section of the Act couLd be
interpreted to cover such a Treasury request for information (or
for estimates) 
- indeed, no legal. opinion on this matter had been
sought. Nevertheless, it was at that tine his view tJ:at either in
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terms of the general authority available to Treasury under the Act, or
under the por'rers delegated to the Secretary of the Trcasury (and l-hence to
every Treasury officer acting on the Secretaryrs behalf) by the Minister
of Finance, the constitutional precedent, according to v'hich Treasury did
in fact require such informacion from t-ine to tinre of de:partments, would
ha've imperative force. In any case, it was his view th;tt should Treasury's
powers in this respect be challenged (e.S. by any depar'l-mental official
through hislher permanent head) an explicit Ministerial or Cabinet
directive would be prornptly forthcon-ing. It vras Bertho.Ld's tentative view
that possibly Part IV, s,10 of the Act, and s.96 of the Act, as defined
in s.2 of the preamble to the Act, would cover the case "in gener.t terms"126
In any case, it was not a question which arises frequenEly or causes much
concern on a day to day basis. Ihis is interesting in that departmental
financial officers frequently made informal comrnents along the lines that
Treasury is "getting above itself", "trarsgressing its proper authority"'
"expects other people to provide proper authority for their actions, but
doesn't bother to do so itself".
( ii) lhe circular re-iterated the Cabinet statemcrrt that COPE would
not be reconvened for 1980, "pending discussions on thei future form of the
expenditure planning system...." It noted, in the introduction, that
"forecasts of the future costs of existing policies, atrd of new policies
to be proposed for adoption, are basic to subseguent e:Kpenditure decisions.
Such forecasts will be needed under any of the expenditure planning systems
being considered, and whatever the economic clinate in which expenditure
decisions are taken." The irnplicatlon of chis statement was to persuade
the departnental reader that he/she shoul-d not consider current derreLopnents
a mere reflection of counsels of despair. On the contrary, officials
should note tlrat the system of expenditure planning was under constant
review in ttre longer-term interests of inproved financ'ial management, and
that changes implernented at this unhappy point in the Ciovernmentrs economic
circumstances were not cosmetic, but part of a fully c:onsidered move towards
greater efficiency and economy.
the bite was added in tJle following paragraph: "I)epartments will be
advised as soon as possible of the decisions made as ':o the future expendi-
ture planning systems and the continuation of the 'tib for tat' balancing
of new expenditure against reductions elsewhere in a 'fote." This much-
disliked device was not, apparently, to be automatically discarded.
(iii) An appended tirnetable of "events and document flows" reiterated
that tinre was, as usual, a scarce commodity. For its part, the Treasury
undertook to inform the departments of aII reLevant pricing information by
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nr:id-Augtust, and by Augrust 29 aE the latest (some seven weeks away) depart-
$€nts were to return to Treasury their ful).y costed forward analysis of
existing policies for the years L98L/82 to 1983,/84.
A definition of what constitutes "new policies" was aPpended - with the
firrn reminder that no item corning within the terms of this definition was
to be incLuded in ttre forecast of future costs for existing policy. In the
same way, aII non-recurring costs lrere to be excluded, as were the costs
for bids included in the l-980,/81 supplementary Estimates, or any extra-
polation of ttrese. AII costs were to be expressed in .l' JuLy 1980 Prices,
and only policies explicitly approved before 29 August were to be included.
At tlre sarile tire, departments were directed that an initial statenent,
showing the three-year fo::ward forecast for their costs, of all proposed
new policies was to be for:vrarded to the Treasury by the end of Septerber.
Although details of such policies and the ranking of priorities was not
required at that stage, an earlier than usual indication of po1iry costs
L27was called for.-
t{hen t}ris circular was being drafted it was anticipated in Treasury
ttrat, as had happened wittr COPE forecasts in tlre past,, sone departrents
would be late with ttreir returns. No penalties for late returns were
suggested in the circular (and indeed it is difficult to iragine what
forrnal measures night be constitutionally available, qqsn to the Treasury) .
But the question had been discussed, particularly by cfficials in Finance I
division, on occasions in ttre past. In Septembet, L979, for examplel orr€
senior Treasury officer noted that over 50 per cent of the C€PE forecasts
for that year had been 1ate. He suggested a number c'f solutions - for
exarple, perhaps departrnents could subnrit only year 3' forecasts, with a
price update for years 1 and 2, and a statement justi-fying any volune
changes in the sarne period. Such a proposal inrplied that forecasts could
be simply rolled fonrard by departments, rather ttran being part of an
annual departnental exercise in which the COPE return was unigqe -to the
year in which it was construct"d.I2E A colleague in t}re Financj.al Management
/tt'"r!t*=",lly) conrented on this suggestion. He noted that in fact simple
rolling fonruard of COpE forecasts from one financial year to another, updating
as perrnitted, hardly ever happene<lI "This year only one department did so,
and only Year I figures are rolled fonrard.ul29
A further conplication in this suggestion was that if it were adoptedt
e\rery amendnent, such as additions for new policies,' supplemntary estimates
and ,'most irrportantly draft Estimates" would have to include three year
adjustrents. Despite the desirability of this, and the freguent conplaint
that rninisters, for example, too readily approved n':w policies and other
annual changes on a one-year costing basis only, it was seen to be
problematic, particularly because
investigating officers and people
5.12 
"
the time it rvould <lemand of 'Ireasury
the Finance I divil;ion.
of
in
One suspecLs a l-ingering desire on the part of Finance 1 to abandon
any attempt at polite consideration, and just muscle tlr::ough. The idea of
more pr:nitive steps was toyed with: "It is tempting nor^r [Septeurber 1979]
to advise late respondents that COPE will update last y,:arrs [feZA] fore-
casts by PLC's and treat them as final." But the probaoilities of a future
situation in which Treasury might have to concede additions because depart-
ments had failed to take all the politically necessary arnendments into
account in conrpiling their COPE returns gave this idea only a very linited
chance of success.
"A rnore extrerne suggestion" (which could also be regarded as more
comprehensive, and more in line with discussions held in the past with
such interested parties as the Public Expenditure Comnd.ttee, the Audit
Office and Treasury) was for a "rephasing of the COPE, Estimates and new
policies reviews" so that there rrras a telescoping of b:-dding. For example,
would it be feasible for COPE and the draft estimates i:o be combined, or
could COPE forecasts and new policies be subnitted con,:urrently? This would
at least give earlier indications of the sorts of tradr:-offs departments
were prepared to make between existing and new poliry ,Jeveloprner,tr.l30 rn
the event, ttre circular of 9 July represented only a r:latively modest
attempt to tighten up various phases of the annual bidding cycle without,
for example, necessitating any change in the Parliamentary year.
(iv) With sonre difficulty, Berthold had been successful in ensuring
that the new 9 July circular did not include any of th.e hornilies or caveats
incorporated in the introd.uctory preamble to previous CoPE circulars. There
ftras, for example, no reiteration of the necessity for departrnents to "have
regard for" the need for economy or expenditure restraint, and no attempt
to ernphasize the econornic clirnate in which the government would be making
its e>penditure decisions. Not only had such warnings been disregarded in
ttre past by tJle departments who felt (and who arnong them did not!) that
theirs was a special case; they had also acguired a cr:mfortable nroral.istic
fanuiLiarity which r^ras no rnore effective than a mottrerly reminder to take a
clean handkerchief on a childhood visit. It is nonethel-ess significant
that when the economic environnent appeared genuinely difficult, the tire
for stern injunctions appeared to have passed, "AII we want now", Berthold
remarked, "is a clean, straightforward, rpure' set of costings, based on
l July prices for three forward years assunr-ing no change in Governmentrs
1 
"lpolicy" .'-^
Ttre guestion'of purity was the sr:bject of much interest arnong the
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architects of the Quigley reform proposals. P.rrt of thr: drive for.
improvement in tbe systems for financial management and expenditure coirtrol
over the.past decade had been an attempt to anaesthetiz,: policiesrt" ,.
tJle sense that thei:: costing was to be carried out as cleanl'7 and as
objectively as possible. This was inevitably a major cause of tension,
since most departnental agents argued, an approach that was too stringrent
and standardized not only reduced their operational capacity to deliver
policies already weII understood and historically embedded in t-he governrnent
system, but lowered their tolerance levels, with adverse inrpact on essential
politica.l flexibility. Financial managers protested that unknown and
unknowable factors, which they allowed for in estimating both existing and
new po]-icy costs, should not necessarily be regarded as part of sonre
irresponsible attempt to conserve fat to which they I'ere not entitled.
Officials bidding for reserves in fields where qualitat-ive neasures are
difficult to apply, such as education, argued that the wide range of
justifications offered to Treasury and COPE in their expenditure bids
were as much a part of their attempt to protect a vuLnerable political
tolerance level as they were simple trucul-ence in the Jlace of demands for
economy.
Ttre problem posed by Heclo' and Wildavsky: hcw arr: expenditure and policy
linked? Does policy determine expenditure rather than the other way around,
or is this a distinction without a differ.r,r.?133 remained tacit and
r:nresolved arnong the "Quigley school" in the New Zeala:nd Treasury in 1980.
Here the debate centred on the implications of changing expenditure levels.
For example, what was t}te flow-on effect of applying and maintaining cash
ceilings? Would departmental spending capacity a1ter, or would policies
themselves change? It was suggested that a change in the availability of
money would inply a change in levels of activity; this would necessitate
a change in poliry, which would have implications for the costing of existing
policies. If this was a possibility, it was argTued, and in order to ensure
as rmrch consistency as possible, the initial costing rnust be as pure as
possible, uncluttered by any consideration such as a crn€-off, unsustained,
effort to be econornical in any one year. If those reviewing expenditure
forecasts could not be confident at the bidding stage, tJ:en there could be
no subsequent confidence in the consj.stency of any ottrer applied neasures
such as 'rtop-down aggregate ceilings within which departmental all-ocations
were made". Nor could, there be any hope for the eguiLable application of
any other rules for departmental gnridance and e:,'lcenditure controL.
After the distribution of the 9 JuIy circular, the task of drafting
tlre final OCEP paper for circulation to the comnr-ittee and subndssion to the
CCEX remained. There was still no firm indicaticn of the t{inister of
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Financers reachion, and indeed none vras expected untit Septenber at the
earliest, when tlte Minister would be "between trips overseastr. However, in
anticipation of questions from rninisters an<1 departmen:s as to the pricing
basis for government e>rpenditure urrder the proposed syritem, Berthold
initiated a Treasury subnission on pricing indice".134 The passage of the
final rpdified schere for public e:rpenditure pLanning 'rhrough the Cabinet
was in fact to take place about one rnonth later. Befo:re drawing this
chapter to a close at that point, however, it is appro;criate notr to return
to another sr:b-plot, as it nere, in the officials' TaIe: a review of the
history of "guigley" as told by Brian Tyler, chief architect of the 
"y=t"r, 
I35
Tfrler, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, had worked directly
on the Treasury system for e:<penditure nanagerrent and control for only a
relatively brief period before our story began. His style of participation
in the 1979 reviews of existing and new poliry and other phases of tlre
(1980,/81) budgetary cycle had already created ripples of interest amng his
collgagues, and slight concern among other departnental personnel. Those
experiences had persuaded \ller that the main problem, given general
econornic circumstances which appeared to call for spending restraints, tas
to separate out, and identify, growth, and provide procedures and incentives
for the explicit justification of growth, where this could be shown to
occur.
After ttre coPE report had been accepted by the gcrV€rDr€nt (as it
inevitably was 
-
Battersby, for example, could re.call no occasion on
which CoPE figures had been queried by the rninisters in cabinetl36l, tlr.r.
ttas' Tyler argrued, little incentive in government, particularly in the
departments, to look at existing policies, and their costs, again. Depart-
nents lacked tJ:is incentive partly because of the "tatrlets of stone" syndrone,
but mainly because tlte review phase for existing policies (i.e. early in the
calendar year) on an ad hoc basis occurred at almost the sarne tine as ttrey
were fighting for new policies. Battersby aLso saw ttris as a problem 
-
he had commented on another occasion that topics were arbitrarily selected
for existing policy review: they may be generated by Hamilton who noted
areas of interest through the COPE cyc1e, or nominated by ttre TIOs; they may
be offered up by the departnents themselves, under pressure; ttrey were in
any case unlikely to comprise a corrq)rehensi'le 
.list.
It was rlrlerrs view that "until the late 19?Os, general economic
growth, both in New Zealand and elsewhere, had Lubric,ated the decision-
making allocative system. Now, however, instead of determining how to
allocate a surplus, the decision-makers must address themselves to the problem
of how to reallocate the base." Economie cbanges and sLow growth necessitated
managenpnt and control procedures, and this necessity qras accompanied by what
515.
Tyler sa\4' as strong, almost moral r'rbl ic revul_s,r.on <lqainst waste.
one device which counte:red intentional or unintentional financiaL
waste was the tit for tat directive for new pr:licies review. "Compensatory
savings", as the device was more elegantly known, hacl provecl relatively
effective in the e>penditure reviews for the 19BO/81 financial year, and
Mr Tyler was convinced that the tool had further potential value
fn assessing why, in November 1979, Cabinet agreed to the irnposition
of tit for tat again, Tyler suggested three reasons: firstly, the prime
lvlinister-curn-Minister of Finance wanted "a worka-bl-e sol.ution',to the expendi-
ture problem (much like Hamilton, but f,:om a differ.ent perspective)
and real expenditure restraint. His deternr-ination in t-hese matters was
critical: a paper was submitted to Cabinet by Treasury recommen&ing the
endorsement of this self-denying ordinance, and althouglh the prime Ministerrs
support for it did not make the ciecision a fait accompli, it was considered
unlikely that the Cabinet would resist. rndeed, in the event, they did not.
secondry, inside cabinet itself there was strong support for the use of
tit for tat , 1ed by the Dcputy Minister of Finance, Quigley and other
"free-enterprisers"''!'rho were persuaded, and, supported on this in caucus,
that a real reduction in pr:blic spending would benefit the private sector.
Finally, Tyler considered that some rninisters may s:Lrnply not have sensed
the danger to themselves of the continued application r>f "compensatorl
savings" as an e>penditure decision principl-e. Some m.ty not have realised
its full irnplications, rDr berieved that it would actuaLry be put into
effect; some may have seen it as desirable for others, but unlikely to hurt
them because they felt that their own departmentar cas,a would always
require special attention.
These attitudes were not peculiar to rnembers of the Cabinet. \ler
observed that despite the fact that the CCEX had made its intention to act
on the terms of the e>rplicib Cabinet directive widely known, sonre pernanent
heads continued to dor:bt the applicability of the tit for tat principle.
Although gler preferred not to identify particular sceptics, he had
observed some pernanent heads who considered their own rninisters stronger
than any existing system of across-the-board restraint. rndeed, lyrer
added, in the past this may have been a valid belief, in tlrat sone big-
spending departnrents had had effective rninisters, or trecause the team work
carried out by the minister in conjunction with his derpartmental strategists
had successfulJ.y resisted, encroachrnent of any sigrrrifir:ant kind. However,
the particular strategry adopted by the CCEX early in j.980, (encouraged by
the developing thesis of the Quigley concept, and reinforced by both Caucus
and Treasury), vras to make it consistently explicit to departmental officials
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aPpearing before the committee that there was an absolurte limit to the
CCEXTs discretionary powers. "we constantLy pointed out that any departure
by departments from ttre 'tit for tat' principle was beyond our (CCEX)
authority and could only be argued before, and agreed to, by Cabinet itseLf."
The application of this principle generated systen-wide reactions. It
has already been noted earlier tJ:at interdepartrnental gossip about
the CCEX "bleeding departrnents white" exerted symbolic force. Further,
Cabinet office staff noted with surprise (and sone cynicism, in the later
light of relatively nodest gains by tJ:e CCEX in real f:Lnancial terms) ttrat
hearings during the e:rpenditure reviews prior to the L98ol81 Estimates
sometines extended well into the evening, and that the Treasury official
working with the CCEX' Ty1er, took not only an unus'ually active part in
exarninations but, with his Minister, euigrey, "operated on a unique
first-nane basis a two-man team of aggressive attack on eveal open-ended
item, to the point of e:<traustion."137 rn a brief pulclic account of the
sare period, the same tlinister confirnred that however painful it appeared
at the tirne, supplicant officials were obligeC as often as possible by
the CCEX to apply the conpensatory principle.I3S
Iller considered, further, that the application of the operating
rule (i.e. ttrat of Cabinet-lirnited CCEX authority) served another purpose.
It demonstrated the clear recognition by CGX ministez's that individual
ministers appearing before then, and the government as a whole, must have
an "escape hatch - it must be acknowledged that sone Erreas sinply cannot
be cut by an agent of the government such as CCEX unle:ss the governnrent is
fu1ly aware of, and prepared to take, the political costs". Nonetheless,
Tller considered that the "success" of t-he 1980 CCI:X reviews, which took
place when tJre embryonic Quigley concept was being derreLoped, depended
mainly upon
(a) the willingness of the Cabinet corunittee ministe:s to "take the heat"
of collegial opprobrium and apply a consistent policy of denial unless
convinced that they should make a concession.I3g
"!{e made everlr post a winning post, and every departu.re from the rtlt
for tat' principle was an e>plicit exemption.... In Eotal-, exceptions might
have amounted to about $I0 niLLion - for exanple, maternity benefits, fees
for Crown solicitors, or an adjustrnent for-----t who had got Cabinet approval
for (a policy extension) before the Cabinet directive on rtit for tat' went.
out'.
About $I80 million worth of policies had actually been proposed by
rninisters at the beginning of the new policies revieu's - and Treasury had
already informed the CCBX that it would in fact have at the rnost about
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$8 million for this purpose, what interested Tyler intensely were the
sorts of "philosophical. and politicaL principles" evoked by the difficulty
of ttris problem. Departments cLaimed (and in some cases with truth) that
they did not know what constituted a "compensatory savingrr - indeed, the
very pronunciation of tlre word had required a sonewhat frivolous Treasury
- 
140e>qlanation.--Did a coqpensatory saving mean a reduction in the 1erzel of
a particular activity? Did it mean deferral? ltas it intended as part of
an overall reduction in total expenditure in real terns, or was it intended
rnainly as a device which would reLease resources from one area in order to
pennit their reallocation, at the sarne Ievel, or with additional supply,
somewhere else?
Ttre argurnents, Tyler recalled, were strongly 5rut. perrnanent heads
argrued their need for resources because they saw thems;elves as carrying out
activities on behalf of the government; the CCEX argued, in contrast, tllat
the governrnent acts on behalf of ministers and their departnrents; that the
latter must therefore define their tasks, and tailor l:heir requirenents, to
the govrlrnment's e:<plicit gnridelines, both budgetary and as included in the
election Manifesto. "The guestion really was l{ho owns public money - ttre
government or the departrnents.,,
(b) The second factor in the'isuccess"of the I98O CCE;X reviews was the
departrnents' own eventual (albeit unwilling) recogrnition that "not only
were the rules changing 
- 
the game itself was differe:nt',. Hovrever, this
attitudinal change produced few tangible benefits - Tyler conceded that
"in general, rsuccesst this year must be read rnore as success in beginning
behaviour,/attitude rnodification 
- 
real e:<penditure or deficit reductions
were certainly not achieved overal-l". One solution for this, he suggested,
was probably only a fantasy. "Expenditure cuts can only be really effective
(and impressive) on big items 
- 
if the Rairways' $70 mirlion deficit for
L979/80 could be avoided, for example, there would be no great problems oyer
new policies for soIIE years ahead." Again, in departrnents like HeaLth and
Education there are "big items - and the main problem here is that ttre
only way to change these is to alter the actual basis of their fr:nding, for
exarnple, the formulae for grants to hospital boards.'" But here there are
institutional di fficulties .
gler considered that the lgBO experience, lerading up to the
impJ-ementation of a reformed financial system, was o:itical in changing the
environment in which decision-makers operated. Al-though change in spending
behaviour was not major, it was signrificant, and nohr rrrre need anottrer leg to
the stool- - an examination of the big items. This falls into two categories:
firstly, the rrelat,ively easy' group of policies, su,:h as Nationar super-
annuation. If funded on a different basis, many millions could be released."
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Others in Treasury agreed that this "financial albatross' couLd be modified
fairly painlessly by a change in party policy by the elected administratio*3l
The second category was more difficult, if not inviolable. Health funding,
for example, could be comprehensively reviewed. Such an internal examinat:on
would be costly, and any atterpt to ascertain wherel how and why hospital
boards spent their funds, and whether a proper basis for funding could be
maintained, was politically sensitive. Nonethel-ess, Tyler argued, a
change in ttre general e>penditure climate may be sufficient, wittrout rnore
draconian lleasures, to encourage Health authorities to examine and modiflt
their own behaviour, while every opportunity the Treasf,ry and the CCEX
could discover to close off easy options for increrrental growth was taken.
These comnrents by TyJ.er vrere recorded betwestJune-July 1980,
during the period when OCEP was preparing to report to the CCEX and the
Minister on the Quigley concept. By this time it had becone apparent to
Iller, as one of tJ:e architects of the proposed reforn., that what had gone
to ninisters six nonths earlier may have over-stated the case for tJ:e
abandonment of COPE. A variety of salutary experiences had persuaded Tyler
that the impression gained by some 
- "that the baby ccruld be thrown out with
the bath water" 
- had caused excessive alarm, alttrough, he added, it had
had the beneficial effect of focussing departnrental arrd ministerial
attention on tre seriousness of the current situation,, Now, however, Qrler
believed that "an evoLutionary not a revolutionary approacb is both
desirable and necessary 
- that is, individual departrents must determine,
in advance of the next [198L/82) new policy review phase, what they are
going to attempt ln the corning year 
- 
if Treasury givr:s them the gruidelines
(e.9. on pricing policy, or permissible price level clranges) early enough,
ttrey can declare their intentions earlier to Treasury." Although the final
direction of decisions about "Quig1ey", made by Cabin:t on the basis of
OCEP and CCEX recommendations, rdere not yet completely obvious, Tyler did
believe that if Treasury could provide the departments with a sufficiently
early indication of what their planning l-evels shoul-d be (for example,
through an upper aggregate limit or sone similar device), they coul-d all
avoid much subsequent "frothing at the rrlcuth". The benefits of this, he
anticipated, could be three-fold: (a) lowered levels of departtental
hostility and resistancer (b) longer lead tines. for departmentai e:<penditure
planning; and (c) better and rnore effective allocaticn 6f resources
amongst votes later, when Estirnates for L98L/82 vrere being drafted.
Tbe tining of Treasury information and direction in lludgetary matters to
the departrnents was all-important, in Tyler's opinion. OCEP discussiotrs
had indicated two lines of thought among the permanent heads. On tbe one
hand, it was argrued ttrat early upper expenditure lim.its, grouped on an
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aggregate basis, must, be tentative because in fact Treasury itseLf is not
in a position to know what departrents are actually lil:eJ.y to need. On the
other hand, sonre contended that any allocative limit, or information con-
cerni.ng a firm, reduced allocation, should be announcecl as early as possible,
with provision for a departnent to prepare and argue a case for e:<plicit
departures from this later in the budgetary cycle. Wh:Lle ly1er hirnself did
not see these two options as being too far apart, he was aware that different
permanent heads would interpret the choice of either one as a "softer
option" than the other. In any case, it was his view Etrat the first option -
tentative early limits - increased, rather than reduce,f uncertainty levels
ancng departnnntal financial managers. The greater the scope left in
announced. uPPer allocative limits, the greater the adjustnents which must
be made earlier in ttre budget cycle. Deficiencies in setting the limits
woul-d increase the likelihood that supplicant departrnents would continue to
return for speciaL consideration later.
Tension in the system depended on the extent to which Treasury must
Ieave the Minister of Finance "as much fLexibiLity as possible - the whole
thing can't be tied up too tightly far ahead of the Esti'mates, because in
any case politicians inevitably want to leave some decisions as late as
possible before announcing the Budget.r'
Associated with these problerns, was the choice of which particular
fiscal instrument would work best: if full PLC's were allowed only for
e:rplicitly approved levels of activity, departnrents could, interpret their
situation as being "rrpre roomy that we (Treasury) have got in mind". On
tJre other hand, whatever upper cash linits were inposed, difficult decisions
about allowances for inflation stiLl remained to be rrutde.
UnLike at least sone of his colleagues working on ttris problem \ller
remained close to his initial thesis: we must identif'y growth, and demand
a justification of growttr before it is funded. Ttre c'rmpeting viewpoint,
held, for exanple by Bertbold, was that growth must be discounted, and
where possible eliminated from the vocabulary of the would-be spenders.
Hence what must be justified were not additional_ resources, but existing
resources. '
fn retrospect, Tyler considered that COPE, over a decade, had served
a useful purpose in "maincaining the status quorr (that is, not letting thingrs
get conpleteJ-y out of hand) and in disciplining spencring agents. But "it
[haa been] a costing, not a priority-setting exercise". What was nolr
reguired was the incentive to force departments, and rninisters, to focus
on the total e:<penditure process, to cost both carefrrlly and adequately in
the first place, to identify areas of actual or prob:rble growth, and to
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accept the discipline of a changed finarrcial exper.ience, COPII was "an
essential building block" in an historical process in wirich Tr:easury and
the departments learned how to identify both crrrrent levels o1i activity
according to given indicators, and clesired areas of growth. "This is
essential for both departments and central government's overall planning
purposes." A combinaLiou of tit for tat , or Lhe compensato::y savings
principle, imposed cash ceilings, and a rigorous, consistent approach by
ministers to all reguests for additional funding could be add,:d on to the
essential base provicled hisotically by COpE.
l\ture conflict, Iay, as Tyler sarv it, in the necessity t,) educate
financial m:rnagers to manage with greater discretion, but continue to require
them to be monitored, their resource supply adjusted from time to time
according to government priorities. "As r see it", Tyrer concruded, "the
history of public finance is littered with brave new worlds - any system
has a sherf life of about 3-5 years. rt is the role of Treasury.to keep
on refurbishing the ideas for improved management and control systems."
In sunrnary, the Officials' Tale, as told by Berthold, Ilamilton and
Tyler ancl others ernphasises the education of other officials, and their
ministers, rather than coercion. The year-long journey from the early
discussions over the "Quigley concept" to the July consensus of OCEP over
the acceptabiLity of upper aggregate limits, the maintenance of a system
in whicli existing policy was cosEeti on a I July 1980 price b:rse, with only
one other annual opportunity for price uptating, and the earl.ier timing for
new policy submissions, bringing thern closer to the current financial year
and further away from the forthcoming Estimates, had begaun this educational
Process. There \das no!'t explicit Treasury-Permanent Head-FOAG-CCEX approval
for the following scenario (as sununarised by Berthold) :
(a) continuing policies = those existing policies which were not reduced
' or discounted
(b) continuing + new trnlicies = X
(c) the cost cf debt servicing = y
(d) X minus Y = sum available for aggregated Votes
(e) Estimates review thus would = X - Y + Jaruary priee adjustments
(f) Estimates themselves would thus = X ! A(where A = level of deficit prewiously agreed to by Cabinet).
It was Bbrthold's view that all lnlicies, evaluated in terms of
their content , outcomes, obje'ctives and achievement should compete, probably
before a Cabinet Corrnittee against all other policies. That is, he saw the justifi-
cation of the financial base of government policy as determi.ned in a
continuously adversarial situation. Tyler was less concerned with the base,
and more interested in qetting expl-icit justificatipns for rnarginal growth
and volume changes, with rigorous apprication of the principre that for
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every ne$t policy rtitr an existing policy rtatr must be exchanged. Hgwever
both nren, and their colleagues (realisticallyleccgnised that if
special cases, or crises (such as "an unforeseen outbreak of foot and
mouth disease, which rvould cost hurtdrecis of millions, both in direct
subsidies anrl revenue forgone ') were to be financed from within a previously
deternlj-ned allocative lirnit, theri' sufficient provision must be made
initially for, say, debt servicing, if the furl sum required to cover the
ttdisaster" were to be bortorto, 142
rhe prinary rntivation of this Treasury group was to ensure not only
that "hard decisions were taken", but that they were taken sufficiently
early in any budgetary cycle (a) to allow time for tolerance of justifiable
departures from the rules; (b) to allow the collective Cabinet to becone(as the CCEX had attempted to do in recent years) "the avenue of last
resort". Were the proposal for sector corunittees( disc,ussed lated,r eich
with its own special cabinet comrnittee, developed, the, group consid.ered
that probably battles now conducted before the ccEX arrd cabinet would be
shifted to these forurns.
Control over how frequently Cabinet itself !.ras aF'proached would
depend upon (a) how far the collective cabinet wished or \.,as willing to
adopt Lhe role of final arbiter and overseer which Trerasury men considered
it best fitted to ;rrforrn; (b) the rigorous nature of the rules defining
what constituted permissible justification for departures from t5e annual
budgetary rules and (c) the ministerial and official iletermination with
which such rules were applied. ryrer, for exampJ-e, srrggested that in
Canada and elsewhere it had been found tJ:at only economic crisis could
create the neeessity for ruinisters to take hard decis:ons, because otherwise
no-one would impose the pain of "hard decisions" on tlremselves, individually
or as a group. Further, the Assistant Secretary cons:Ldered that in at
least 12 months time (that is, by mid-l9gl) that necessity would have
becorne apparent to even the least observant, and a "compensatory increase
in political will must then deve1op".
$rler identified three critical factors of irnportance in any attempt
at expend,iture planning and control: the first was thr: personarities
involved- By this \ler reant not only the constitut:lona1 roles adopted
by different nen and wonen, but the "sty1.e, objectirres and personal ,iteter-
mination of individual participants". rn t98Or for example, erler considered
that he and Quigley, operating with the benefit of Thomson's style of
chairmanship on the cGx, combined to make an effective revier t""..143
lltre second factor was the economic environnent
within which the cost-poliry evaluation occurred, and the tlrird was tfie
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particular phase of the parriamentary. cycle 
- in r9go, for example, the
CCEX could be more effective ttran it night have been erither in the first
or third years of the electora!. round.144' of these three factors or
constraints, only t.tre second was peculiar to the end crf the l9?0s,/early
r980s. when coPE was established, growth was still arr idea in good
currencyr and so long as that was true, the bite of neeessity could be
avoided. Perhaps onry economic stringency could produce the Quigley
school. What remained to be seen was how educable wer:e their peers in
Cabinet and the spending agencies.
Redesi the structure: Sectors of Envel a1le1
rn early July 1980 (nearry a year after "the Quiqley concept" began
to assune its characteristic shape) several fundanental issues remained
unresolved. some 
- Like the pricing indicators 
- 
$rer(! matters which would
have irunediate sigrnificance; others, tike the nature of the relationship
between aggregated e:rpenditure levels, levels of depar:trnental activity,
and existing departnental policies had long term sigrn:Lficance; aLl sere
open to political interpretation. However resolved, tJ:ey would define ttre
emphasis placed by departments and Treasury on various; phases of t1.re
reforned budgetary systen.
Another outstanding problem related to the guest:Lon of sectors 
- the
"envelope systen" of budgetary control. rt was noted .rrlierl4u *"a
Battersby (Assistant Secretary to the Treasury) had suggested that
Treasuryr s knowledge about this structural concept corrld be enhanced with
tl:e return to New Zealand of de Jardine, divisional Director of ttre
recently-created Finance .l{anagenent section.146 Earll/ in l9g0 de Jardine
had attended an international seminar on budgetary natlagement. At the sate
tinre he had requested that a Nehr Zealand Treasury off:icial seconded to the
Embassy office in washington u.s.A.' go to canada, where the 'sector/enveloper
systetn had arready been established. The officer, p.T. Maloney, had
been closely involved in various budgetary inguiries ,:onducted in the New
zealand Treasury during the nid-1970s. A copy of his report on discussions
wittr the Canadian DePartrpnt of Finance and Treasury l3oard on their
envelope system of budgetary control is appended to tnis 
=tudy,r47
l4aloneyrs overall comments were not particularly encouraging. He
reported that the Canadian system was "a combination cf the top-down envelope
allocation with the forecast of existing policies". .Although tbere were
apparently soIIE advantages 
- such as the fact that l'linisters were closely
and alrrost exhaustively involved in considering allocations, the system
had been so recently put in place that in his opinion no firm conclusions
could yet be drawn from ttre Canadian e:q>erience.
52 3.
It appeared, however, that the first year of the forecast period
still- retained the greatest government interest. fn atld.ition, Maloney
observed, "the Canadians have not yet reached the stager where various trade-
offs are necessary within a comnr-ittee or wi'thin ttre totaL. fhey are unsure
of how discipJ-ined the system will rernain when this qrrcstion aris."".16
The Canadian systen divided the allocation process into five sectors,
each with an associated Cabinet Conurittee and a range r>f fi:nctions included
in its scope,/terns of reference. Ttre decision to act.[n this way had been
taken by the Conservative Governnent in L979, and was Fhe basis on which
the Canadian Budget was presented in October L979. Ih,3 go\rernment was
defeated, however, on the question of tax increases anil the Budgret wis not
actually passed.
llhe sectoral,/envelope system established at the tiue was retained by
the incoming Governrent. lltre Cabinet Conunittee responsible for the "Fiscal
Arrangements Envelope" was called "the Inner Cabinet". It was chaired by
the Prime llinister and comprised "the Minister of Finance,
the President of the Treasury Board,
the *rairmen of all the Envelope
Comrnittees,
plus one or two ottrers'r.
Ttris cornmittee set the total arnount of Governr€nt e)q)enditure and the
allocation to the envelopes: "It is the job of the connittee to decide how
each envelope is divided by department and programrre'.1€
The largest comrnittee - the Cabinet Cornmittee on Econorric Developnent
incluiled 17 Ministers representing various departrents. It was supported
by a Secretariat of 105 people drawn both from the Treasury Board and the
departnrents themselves.
Whenever a department was included in an envelope, the relevant llinister
automatically becane a rneniber of t}lat envelope conunittee. ltrus, for
instance, the Cabinet Comrnittee on Socia1 and Native affairs, chaired by
the Secretary of State and l"linister of Communications, included Ministers
responsibLe for a wide range of activities from electronic nehrs media and
broadcasting systens to environnental parks, social security payments and
the status of woinen. This Corunittee also had responsibility for tJre
ilustice and Legal Envelope, which included noi only the law courts but agents
such as ttre Canadian Tax Review Board.
The Cabinet Coruruittee on Foreignr Policy and Defence, chaired by the
Secretary of State for Foreigrn Affairs, and the Cabinet Conurittee on
Econonry in Governnent, chaired by ttre President of the Treasury Board, both
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had comprehensive sectoral responsibitities.lS0'
It \ilas de Jardiners view that Maloneyrs relatively pessirnistic
report. of the Canadian system, in conjunction with such criticism of this
tteans of allocative decision-making as he had encountered at the 1980
serninar, suggested that it may not be feasible for "transplantation" to
New Zealand. In addition, de Jardine believed that international
warnings he had recei'sed about the tine needed to prepare for the successful
adoption of an overalL budgetary scherne such as that being designed by ttre
Quigley school should be taken very seriously by ttre New Zealand Treasury.
In mid-July, at least, de Jardine appeared to feeL that there !{as insufficient
time to put. the proposed reforms in place in full, and insufficient evidence
to support such a lrcve, in time for the current financial y""r.Is$
Berthold, on the other hand, was not unduly disturbed by these
reports. It was his view, in July 1980, that the "inherent rational-ity
of the proposed envelope,/sectoral system (if coupled witJl technically
reliable pricing, and accurate cost forecasting systens") was persuasive.
He planned to develop a rore sophisticated and refined rnodel for sectoral
distribution of the existing functions of governnent, as these were defined
in terrns of Votes, portfolios and programres. He consid.ered that the inpact
on Ministers and Officials of examining related areas of activity, in
expenditure terrns, would necessitate a rnore consistent and corq>rehensive
analysis of the causal relationship between varied social and econom:ic
activities. If the only effect r*as to ensure that, in ttre name of econony
and efficiency, departnents and rninisters reviewed and justified the cost-
effectiveness of votes, activities and individual programrne collponents in
terms of their policy objectives, this would be worthwfrite.l?'
Bertholdts views were shared, to a greater or lesser degree, by
Iller, whose overall responsibility it rvasr otl Quigley's
behalf, to investigate and prornte the restructuring proposals.
By October L980 no firm decision had been made on how to proceed on
this matter. Eowever, the nature of the discussion indicates that in ttre
central planning networks a fairly comprehensive reorganisation of the
existing structure and processes for resource allocation was being contenr-
pJ.ated.
SUMMARY By mid-I980, selected pernanent heads and the
in principle to certain proposals for the reform of the
budgetary systern:
(i) the examination and approval of departmental
Cabinet, had agreed
CoPE-based
spending plans and
in terms of theircost estimates not in terms of their desirability, but
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necessity and priority in the liEht of the Government's poliry objectives
and ttre resources available:
(ii) ttle earliest possible annual estinute of the costs of existing
and new policies consistent r.rith the conventional phases of the budgetary
cycle 
- 
that is, as defined by the Parliamentary timetable;
(iii) the determination by the Governnent, in the light of these
costings, of an aggregated 1evel for pr:Jclic sector spending - that is a
prescribed upper lirLit for the share of GDP to be absorbed in any one year
by tJ:e publii sector, with an expenditure growth rate which was the same
as, or somewhat lower than, the anticipated rate of growttr for GDP;
(iv) the first charge on the aggregated enpenditure total would be
the servicing of tJre pr:blic debt, then from the rernainder allocations
(or cash envelopes) would be made to the various departmental Votes;
(v) replacernent of the CoPE-based system (cost-plus forecasting in
whictr Year I became the basis for the next yearrs l"lain Estimates
appropriation) with a system in which all fiscal allocations must be contained
within annual departuental cash lirnits, separate from the forecasts of
policy costs for srrbseguent years. Cash limits would not be the same as
e:<penditure targets. They would c.omprise the current year's allocation
(i.e. as approved by Parliament in the 1980/8I Estimates) r adjusted in the
light of 1 JuIy prices and amended in terns of any new polici.:s apProved
by Cabinet and its control agents. Since all departmental spending would
have to be contained within the allocated annual cash limit, a decision to
put a new policy in place, or significantly exlend any existing polic.y,
would have to be taken in the light of its irpact on existing resources
available ttrat year.
(vi) the estabtishnent of an "additional spending pool" which would
be created by any increase in governnent revenue, savings made possible by
stringent existing policy reviews, and the "expected increase in GDP'|.
lfhe.first charge on ttris fi:nd would be expendittrre required by changes in
ttre population affected by an approved existing policy' or by "changes in
the economic climate". Any bid by a department for resources trapped in
the pool would have to compete for consideration with all such others, and
allocations would be consistent with the government's overall policy
objectives;
(vii) the now-familiar constraints of lowering staff "ceilings" and
compensatory savings ( tit for tat ) would be maintained. That is,
pergonnel employed by tbe State rmrst be reduced by a given proportion in
each department each year, and new policies would be approved only if it
could be shown that their cost could be sulcstituted for tbat of sorna
existing activity.
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Altltough both Cabinet rnembers and OCEP had the opportr:nity to consider
two other reform proposals - the establishment of slncial Cabinet level
machinery to perform a pAR [eot:-cy Anarysis and Review] function (',4 ra
lhatctrerr', as tJle original euigley paper put it), and the grouping of votes
along functionaL lines for control purposes (f, fa recent initiatives in
canada) - neither proposal. had been adopted, even in principre, by August
1980. By that t5-ne, preparations for ttre production of the Lgg2/93
Estirnates were well nnder way, and a machinery ctrange of this rnagnitude
obviously could not be in place in tine for the corning erpenditure reviews.
llhe New Structure: Acceptance in principle of what ttre euigley reforcrs
proposed was sufficient to enable Treasury to implerent the new systen in
time for the 1981r/82 fiscal year. lhis was announced to departnents by
the distribution of "restricted" circulars from 9 J,r1y.153 lltre timing of
sorte announcmenLs dernonstrated horrr far the system was still, rnder con-
struction as the budgetary crycle actual.Iy progressed,. In earLy JuLy it was
confirmed that coPE had not been set up for 1980. Honevex, while extrrloratory
discussions as to its replacement went on, departments should go ahead as
for the current year to prepare their three year fo:mrard forecasls of
existing policy costs. At the end of september, Berthold drafted, and
distributed (with lylerrs approval), a circular whictr defined the new
structure for "Public Expenditure pranning and Budgetingi:
[coee] has been d.issorved. Departments wilr however
continue to prepare forecasts of the cost, in constantdollars, of conli-nuing existing policies over the nextthree financial years. The three-year forecasts remain
an essentj-a1 part of the expenditu:re planning process.
Each forecast will be reported on by Treasury (and the
state servicres conunission as appropriate) and exaninedby a panel of the Forecasts Review Authority (whic*r
replaces copE) . Ttre Review Authority, whictr wil1. operatein a similar manner to the forrner copE working party, will
verify the forecasts and report to the I'tinister of Finance.
unlike coPE, the Forecasts Review Auttrority (FRA, later FRc) whictr
first ret during Augrust, exclu<ied permanent heads, and corrprised:
lryIer (Assistant Secretary, Treasury) as Chairman, and tvo
other senior Treasury officers;
Itrree senior officers of ttre SSC;
1ltrree senior departmental finance officers: rn t]re first year,
these would corne from Education, MOViD and Healttr.
had
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
fttis group ttren subdivided into working parties called panels 1-4, t1.e
first three of whidr were responsible for exarnining individual forecasts
for each of the "larger Votes", in conjunction with Treasury officiaLs.
The fourth Panel would exarnine al.1 other votes, and would be chaired by
one of the senior Treasury officials.
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After recorunendations from the panels, the FRf. would ,,determine the
three year costs of existing policy" and report on this to the Minister of
Finance - some two nonths earlier than COPETs previous December deadline.
New lnlicy bids and items of existing policy which could/should be reduced
or discontinued would be examined by the CCEX during October and November,
i-n contrast with similar inquiries conducted by the CCEX later in the current
fiscal year.
Although there vtere no other structural changes, it was stated that
the CCEX would in future have somewhat ilifferent terms of reference. After
Ministers had presented to the CCEX their new policy proposals and proposals for
savings in existing policies, in order to accommodate alL departmental activities
within the prescribed cash limit, the CCEX would make recommendations on these to
cabinet. rf however, "a Minister's proposals lwere] insufficient or
considered inappropriate; the Corunittee [would] subnnit its own protrnsals
to cabinet".I54
The style of these circulars, and of the ottrers concerning L98O/8L
Supplementary Estimates, was quite consistent with the intentions of the
Qgigley reformers, i.e. to impress upon departmental spending agents the
sericusness of the fiscal situation, the determination of the controlling
authorities, and the rigour with which all stated. rules would be applied.
Any lingering hope that selective financial retief would be available was
quashed. Departments were informed, for exampre, that supplenentary
Estimates for the current year would be arrowed only under the most
stringent conditions :
The only increases for which provision will definitely be
made ... are the 4 percent General Wage Increase and certain
Social Welfare benefits announced in the Budget. Departrnents
will be expected to absorb al-I other price increases which
have occurred, or will occur, after the setting of the lilain
Estimates allocations. This includes the 1 October l98O
increase of postage rates (announced in the 1980 Budget),
increases in freight costs, and increases resulting from
exchange rate changes. OnIy in exceptional circumstances
should departments submit a claim for any of these increases
and then only vrhen the department can demonstrate that it
has revier.d it= e*istirq poli
c""n"t be;BSORBED THRoUGII RESPREADTNG allocations from lowerpriority programmes. As indicated above, the Supplementary
Estimates do not serve as an opportunity for a generaL re-
opening of items for which the original allocation may, in
the department's view, have been insufficient. 155
In the same circular, permanent heads were inforrned that "unLess
there are exceptional circumstances, provision will not be made in the Supplementarl
Estj:nates for New Policies approved since the l4ain Estimates allocations, i.e. the
1980,/8I costs of such policies will have to be found from within existing
allocations. "
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In the Past, Supplernentary EsE.lmates had been excl-uc1ed from COpE
forecasLs (althouEh as tre saw earlier, not without dispute frorn members
of COPE itself, who had queried Tr.easr:ryrs expl-slstion r:f why this was
both necessary and desirable). under the euigley system, supplementary
Estimates weLe apparently to be regarded by Treasury and the CCEX w.ith
suspicion. Anything built into the current, allocation would comprise part
of the departrnentrs forecast for Year I of the next cycle, and could thus
becorne part of its cash allocation. The further inference vras that in the
liqht of this stern directive, departments would be slow to seek financial
support for new policies already formally approved. the sarne circular
directed that i:r any case all new poriry proposals would be subject to
"the same I compensatory savingsr requirements as were applied to this
year's Review". Tit for tat was be.ing settled more firmly into the adrninis-
trative framework, along with the equally mandatory rowering of staff
levels 
- "the sinking lidn.
The Reforned Allocative System. The allocative system itself was given
its first formal "public hearing" in the bureaucracy on 26 September in
the circular which announced the formation of t]:e FRC.156 tn the light of
the costs forecast for existing and proposed new policies, the Government
would determi-ne an "appropriate" aggregate level of total expenditure for
I9a7/82 fiscal year, with an aggregate planni-ng level of resource commit-
nent for the two following forecast years, al1 in 1 JuIy 1980 constant
dollars. Ttris would represent the Government's decision on the specific
proportion of GDP it intended to absorb orrer the forecast period.
After receiving departrnental retur--ns on debt servicing and otlrer
similar obligations (such as 'tcredit arrangenents with overseas suppliers
or contractors") , Treasury would calculate the overall anror:nE required for
debt servicing in eadr of the three forvrard years, as a first charge on
predetermined level of resources to be consumed by tl:e Government. A
further sum woul-d be creanpd off the total to cover "ltrrforeseen contin-
gencies", including any new policies "which have no other purpose tharr
to retain an existing poliry in plac-e by providing for price (including
salary) changes", and t'an amount" to cover discretionary adjustnents to
benefits or grants whictr were not automatically indexed, e.g. on a popu-
lation basis, but affected by inftation. This amount for unforeseen con-
ti-ngencies would constitute tJre "additional spending pool", (or as Treasury
preferred to call it, the ,'conti-ngencies fund").
The amount renaining after the deduction of these provisions (debt
servicing, and ttte "additional spending pool") would be divided between
departmental Votesr giving a "provisional allocation,' (or cash linLit) which,
after adjustnent for inflation and approved new policies (incorporated
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in any case only on a tit for tat basis) and conversion to I Janua-ry
pricesr would comprise the Estinates provision for I98I/82. The planning
levers approved, with adjustment, would then become the "rolled-over"
provisional allocation (or cash limit) for the two s::bsequent financial
- 
156forecast years.-
In July, departments had been instructed to present their new policy
proposals for L9BL/82, with a brief description and three-year forward
cost estirnate of each, by 3O September. Four days before this date a new
deadline for new policies was allowed by Treasury, which suggests that the
accelerated timetable had been somewhat beyond the tolerance of departmental
finance manalters, and certainly more urgent than their colleagues,
geared in the past to December dates, could meet. Depaxtments were given
an additional month for this preliminary task, although finn details of
proposed compensatory savings to accommodate new policies, and a schedule
which ranked the departments' preference for new policies, were to be
subrnitted to the CCEX no later than 28 November, 1980. At this atage,
the CCEX would begin its reviews of new and existing policies, The
Conmittee would approve them only when compensatory savings could be
specified in order to accorunodate any new departure, and it was authorised
to reject or ruodify deparLment offerings in favour of its own view of
what should be done. Presumably this additional lnwer would enable the
CCF to discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate departmental
tt offerings rf .
The overall structure of the Budgetary cycle would remain the same,
insofar as it was tied to the Parliarnentary cycle, and existilg reguirements
for certain budgetary matters, including examination of the Estimates by
the PEC and their debate in the House. Specific Auidelines r*ere outlined
both for departments now operating the FFS, and non-FFS areas. Forecasting
assumptions were specified: (a) only "observed price level" changes between
I January and I July 1980 !{ere to be included; (b) it was to be assumed
that there would be zero population growth over the three forecast yearst
(c) it. was to be assumed that the labour force would increase at a growth
rate of 1.2 percerrt.159
Concluding remarks
The appJ-ication of the "Quig1ey concept" of fiscal nanagement to the
New Zealand budgetary system marks something of a watershed in the history
with which this chapter has been concerned. The reformed procedures had
two predominant features; cash spenging ljmits as opposed to volune
158 
-
budgetingi a prescribed upper aggregate tinit for overall government
spending as a proportion of GDP.
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rn a nurnber of respects, the euigley reforms and their manner of
introduction demonstrate sorne important considerations raised by planning
theorists. The system desigmers, notably the handful of rnen inside the
Treasury, where the expenditure plans were hatched, were not onJ-y acutely
conscious of "the political. nature of ttre planning act"I59, but continually
asserted that their own behaviour derived its legitirnacy frorn its relevance
to political objectives currently pursued by the Covernment: reduced pgblic
depend'ence upon the welfare state, e:<pansion of ttre private sector at the
expense of the public sector, greater economic flexibility, more discrimin-
ating and selective forms of public assistance to approved economic and
social activities.
fn obtaining t.l.e direct, personal participation of such significant
executive agents as the Associate Minister of Finance. E
small group of the most powerful permanent heads, and infLuentiaL depart-
rental financial nanagers, the Treasury officials who wanted to refono
the coPE-based system attempted to avoid any subsequent charge of
"autonomous professionalism".160 Much of their past e:<perience had shown
tlat planning, unlike politics, is fragiJ.e, vulnerable 
- and ultinately
dispensable unless "connected with powerful allies",16I By consulting
the views of those perceived as having power in the budgetary process
(while acutely ar^tare that sone, like the Prime lrtinister/Minister of Finance,
could not be directly co-opted to the reforrn proeess), the Quigley school
attenpted to take along with them as nany potential "dogs in the manger"
as possible.
The ettros of the Quigley school derived fron its nembersr perception
of the political culture of central government. Ttreir overt objective
was to provide the structure for a systematic educational experience in
which spending agents would abandon the view that politics (and potiticians)
constrained their intended behaviour, and adopt the view that politics
(and politicians) \^rere part of. a creative process of collective planning
and integrated expenditure policies. Alongside this aim, however, was
the necessarily harsher intention to encourage, if not force, self-restraint
upon those principally responsible for generating and authorising public
expenditure proposals,
Andreas Faludi emphasises a number of distinctions between various
aspects of planning. On the one hand, he likens planning to certain forns
of budgeting, which aim to "constrain action or... express ttre firn L62
intention of taking action of a specific kind rather than guiding it".
Ttre imperative nature of the Quigley system derives from the extent to which it
under-emphasises t$e processes through which planning occurs and plans.
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are implenetlted, and stresses behavioural 
_rgle:. This is partly explained
by reference Lo New Zealand's current econornic position, so straitened
that necessity became the mother of virtue. If the government was unvrilling
to massively accelerate its revenue-gathering capacities, and when there
vras compeUing evidence that past attcmpts at control over volume growth
were relatively ineffectual in overall terms, a more asserLive style of
expenditure management appeared inevitable.
During the 1970s, considerable effort had been put into anaes-
'l A?thetising--" the political content of resource bids:
- standardisation of expenditure submissions;
- the system-wide adoption of computerised .forms of information exchanget
- the global treatment of common items which for ttre deparftents involved
may have rviclely-differing purposes, such as international and domestic
travel, the use of motor vehicLes, and investment in physical plant
such as buildings, machinery and other equipment;
- 
uniform training experiences for financial and other advisers from
dif fe rin g departmentsrzback grounds ;
- 
the requirernent that all deparbnents, regardless of their social or
economic function, submit themselves and their resour@ cl-ains to a
conrnon form of examination by one small ministerial committee (the
CCEX) . ft rvas hoped that through such a filter r:niformly effective
rules would be consistently applied, and generally consistent
indicators of perfornance consulted in policy assessment -
these were among the "across-the-board" devices which, along witJl ttstaff
cellings", were aimed at neutralising the individuaListic and idioslm-
cratic qualities of diverse claims for public rpney.
Such attempts at behaviour modification may be seen as part of art
uncomfortable transition by spending agents and expenditure controllers from
one historical phase to another. In his recent work on public spending
behaviour in gritain, John Stewart has pointed to the impact of two nrodels
of public expendiiure on the structure and processes of governmental
organisations. The first model is tJlat of growthr the second that of
I'standstill".164 In New zealand tJle growth model provided tlre behavioural
paradigm for allocative behaviour until the mid-1970s. Confidence in the
expectation of econornic growttr supported assumptions about how, when and
to whom public resources would be rnade available. Spending "was predicated
upon an assumption of the continuance of growth, the expectation that
annuaL increments of resources [would] continue to be available." The
behaviour of politicians and officials was characterised by 'bidding
strategies based upon nonns, standards and national guidelines. They
[represented] the aspiration to growt]r. t]niforndty of provision [becane]
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the organising principle, and consensus rather than conflict [prevailed].
The building of consensus [was] helped by the increased scope for
bargaining whieh the expectation of adclitional annual incrernents [provided]
With time, it [was] assunred that uesources [would] be available; the
principcrl task of allocation [was] one of ordering developrrents over tir,E.
Choice [was] less concerned with the alternative use of re
timing. "165
However, the validity of the growth rnodel became incre ingly difficult
doubts aboutto sustain as ttre decade passed. With serious and sustai
the model cane equalJ-y profound anxiety about the extent to
characteristic forms of aLlocative behaviour were any longe
which established,
tenable.
politicians,
departnents responsible for planning, spending and control
resource use were prepared to face, or accept, the threa
of "economic standstiII". Their power, electoral, profess I and
adninistrative depended, as they saw it, very largely on rr ability to
satisfy rising, and indeed, expanding, social and economic
thernselves fuelled by t}re continuing recession.
e:<pectations,
In the stressful situation in which Treasury offici
John Stewartrs "standstill-" nrcdel was vigorously rejected
and by many of their official advisers, during ttre Labour
L972-?5. Although the National party tJlat took office in
declared its sensitivity to the changing nature of the a1
by establishing the CCEX, neither the rninisters nor the
individualj-y and collectively, found themselves by I-978-79
economic pressure to define radically different toLerance
sector spending increased. Deficiencies in e>rpenditure
existing procedures for fiscal control were highlighted w
insufficient overall econornic growth to mop up, mask, or
manoeuvre in conditions where annual incrernents have been
removed".166 Under the Quigley system control strategies
inpact, such as staff ceilings, vrere to be reinforced by
cash limits and a prescribed upper aggregate limit for
resource consumption.
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ify them. Yet
as politicians and officials were awarer in a country li
where intervention and all-ocative support by the welfare
New Zealand,
pervasive, if not donuinanQ infLuence in alnrost every area f social and
econornic life, the range of activities directly and indi ctly affected by
changed levels of spending would be extensive. The polit
adapting public spending behaviour to a "standstill" npde
Hence, Treasury officials rpst imnediately concerned wittr
inside central governnent began a "search for ways of ing room for
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Without attempting much more than a token inquiry into current
political and administrative understanding and acceptance of the implications
of these control strategies, nenibers of "the Quigley school" e>rplicitly
endorsed the view that ttre key guestion was no longer that of aliocating
the increnent, but of re-apportioning tt" b."".167 A reformed system for
fiscal managenent would replace the existing procedures for uniform
treaEnent based on consensus (what Wildavsky has described as tacit
agreement that "you provide the scratch for my prograrn and Ir11 provide
the scratch for yoursr').158 Principles of selective discrirnination would
now be applied, and fiscal prefernent given only to those po).icies and
activities which could, if fi:nded, demonstrate their positive contribution
to the Governnent's announced econoraic and political objecti'ues. Anytiing
else wouLd have to be found by ttre spenders themselves from within a
linited alLocation, itself sulcjected to critical review and supplerented
only when specific indicators (approved price changes, changes in the
derographic basis for an existing poliry, or certain economic eventualities)
signalLed the need to do so.
On the other hand, the e>rpenditure plarmers in the Quigley schooJ.,
ttre systern ttrey desigrned, and their style of behaviour nay also be regarded
as demonstrating another view of ptanning. Faludi suggests that "any
pJ.anning system [shoufd] occasionally review the type of pJ.anning which it
undertakes for its appropriateness to the problerns at hand. These reviews
[would] in turn lead to the establishrnent of higher-leve1 planning bodies
wittrin gruidance systens which give a permanent institutional base to the
continuous review of specific planning activities. OnIy such systenst..,
i.e. such that engage in sone form of planning of their own planning, will
be able to act in a rational way. Rational planning systens are' therefore,
rather complex, i.e. consisting of at least tllo levels, which will be
called toperational' and rgeneralr. On the operational lenel, one finds a
nunber of action programmes addressing themselves to diffenent sets of
variables in ttre environnent, with the sum total of these action Programnes
spanning the whole space of a gnridance system. On the general level, tlrese
action progralsnes are reviewed for their effectiveness' resulting in their
occasional rrcclification" . 169
If, as Faludi proposes, the essence of such a "planning nuethod" iS
that specific tlpes of planning (gruidance or constraint) "be themselves
subject to purposive thought and action", it coulate argrued that the
developrnent of ttre Quigley plan derrcnstrates the adoption of this nethod.
While the Treasury investigating divisions and Finance I officials, the
CCEX and other sub-committees of ttre Cabinet were concerned with specific
operational activities, it was within the capacity of Treasury's skills
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and interests to initiate a review of the COPE.-based buclgetary systen,
after that system had been operaLinq wit-h rnodifications for nearly a
decade
The serninal Quigley paper-, circulated between November 1979 and
March 1980 proposed an institutional- means to ensure the continuing over-
view of specific plans of action 
- 
a sort of pAR-like function, established
at cabinet 1evel.I70 Machinery at this high levet, with responsibility
for applying'rpurposive thought and action" to expenditure problems and
trends in spending would, it was inferred, improve overalL decision-rnaking
and ensure greater consj.stency and a more comprehensive oversight for
administrative and political action. Cabinet itself, freed from direct
responsibility for a1I but appeals of final resort, could assess information
and analyses about e>rpenditure in the light of the @vernment's agreed
econornic and social objectives: a reduction in PE as a proportion of GDp,
reduction and control of inflationary pressures, and ec-onomic restructuring
in the direction of productive, export-.led growth
Apart from regarding the Quigley scherne, and its proponents, as
illustrative of sorrn aspects of planning theory, however, vre may aLso
considor the refornist rnove in the light of conternporary theories about
the difficuLties, and consequellces, of restraining public enpenditure. It
has already been noted that the proposed behavioural changes derive from
their authors' recognition of a new paradiguu 
- economic standstill, in.
contrast to the long-accepted nndel of growth. Many of the discussions,
forrnal and informal, rnenos and papers exchanged by mernbers of the euigley
school illustrated their authorsr familiarity with the international debate
on budgetary planning and fiscal control. AII members of OCEP and the
FOAG, for example, agreed that there hras a lamentable dysfunction between
stated political intention (vis a\ vis fiscal economy) and the actual
experience of applied "political will" (which, outside Treasury, was
invariably regarded as a chronic deficiency of (a) ruinisters rat-her than
departrnental managers, or (b) other departmental managers and over-
conciliatory or insensitive Treasury investigators, rather than oneself).
Further, nost agreed that the influence of particular techniques and
methods, such as PPBS, SfGl"lA, regular errpenditure reviews, computerised
infornntion systerns, or coPE itself, may have contributed to, rather than
red^uced, Ievels of activity and expenditure. fhe Quigrey school found
itself in reputable international corpany.
Many of the criticisms and comrnents made at a British syrnposium held
in Bath in 1979, for example, vrere echoed during the developnrent of
1?1
"Quigley".^'' Like Cedric Sandford and Rurlolf Klein, the New Zealand
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reforners considered that although "the continuing influence of the relative
price effect"; the growth of public sector ernploynent (particularly the
growj.ng number of temporary and wage workers who appeared only poorly
accounted for by the SSC, but costly on the public purse), and the influence
of externaL factors like the balance of payments problem and the strictures
issued by international nnney-lenders, had been afwork in New Zealand, as
in other countries, j.t was also the case that upswings in e:g>enditure could
"be e:qrlained in large lleasuxe by reference to procedures and nrethods and
their Limitations, rather than to positive changes in pubLic policry.nL72
With Klein, many New Zealanders agreed that "the history of the. debate
about pubric expenditure control 
- in the sense of decisions about
priorities, [haa been] one of progressive disil"lusiorr."l73 The attractively
"sensible" rejection by xl"inl74 and, elsewhere, wildavsr.rlts of conspiracy
theories about the duping of hapless ta><payers by "fisca1ly irresponsible"
politicians and bureaucrats was placed alongside the New Zealandersl
sonpwhat regretful awareness that as in Britain and the United States
progriume budgeting could "no longer be seen as the key to progress".176
Some of those who had been rpst directly and. personally involved over
ruIny years in detailed investigation and eval-uation of depa=tmental
spending Patterns r:ndoubtedly shared lda Hoos' cynicism about technolo-
gically-derived techniques for budgetary pl.rrrirrg.ITT Hoos arg'ued that
despite the widespread approval for, and adoption of, methods Like systems
analysis and cost-benefit techniques, certain basic weaknesses in governrnent
had not been overcotne: 'rOn the cost side, costs [are] underestirnated, with
calculations limited to visible dollar announts, opportunity costs [are]
onitted, spill-overs overlooked, and ttre range of present and future social
costs ignored. On the benefit side, cor4lutations lrave been found to be
over-optiraistic, not adequately supported and lacking in consistency".
Hoos went on 
- 
and clearly members of the Quigley school agrreed with her
position 
- to suggest that "'technical adjustments of the npdel"'would
not alone overcome these deficiencies, which were inherent in the very
nature of the techniques themsel.r".,I78
Reservations widely expressed in international circles concerned with
the politics of national allocative systems were by L978-79 shared by nany
New Zealand Treasury and other informed officials. tindblom, Heclo and
Wildavsky were part of tJ:e received wisdom of those with power over the
e:<penditure proces="=.179 Publications circulated, for exangrle, via the
Treasury library, reinforced the academic view that budgeting was essentially
an incremental process, and that even witi accoryanying economic growttr
and careful, systernatic trationalt manageren+-r the room for nanoeuvre at
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any time htas severely linited by historical and immediate, eJ-ectorally-
determined, factors. Arnerican, Canadian, British and Australian experiences
vrere coqPared with those at home. The fortunes of scientifically-based
systems were assessed arongside those wirere ,'flying by the seat of the
pants" was the dorninant ncde of budget management. Neither worked on its
own. At any tinre, unforeseen or wildcat factors (such as ad hoc rninisterial
Iargesse or abrupt changes in emptoynent trends) could prove detrirnental
to attempts to restrain budgetary deficits within acceptable linits. It
was increasingly difficult to cater for actual spending rates during any
one fiscal year, to acconunodate unexpected pressure on different sectors.
or to account for inconsistencies in pricing pol-icies, and forecasting ttrese
sone years ahead.
Aaron Wildavsky had addressed an OECD serninar on Controlling public
Ercpenditure in May 1980 on "The fheory of Expenditure Limitation,,.l80 His
anaLysis was circulated in Finance I Division with'in days of its delivery.
Ite outlined ttre farniliar situation in which there is a public will, but
not a public way, to rimit governnnnt expenditure, and suggested tlrat
continuing lack of success in effective expenditure control inevitably
points to "a lack of correspondence between the causes of growth and ttre
ue'-hods heretofore employed to contain them. " His theory - that "we-ttte-
people are doing it to ourselvesr' 
- 
was tlrat tlre cost of mutual support for
each ottrer's preferences is continuous upward growth in governrent.
citizens, poriticians and bureauerats all share in maintaining this
corLective pressure. "r.egislatures, or cabinets (singly or togeth€r)...
enjoy spending rnore than saving. Like the rest of us, they enjoy eating
except when they weigh it all together".
Wildavsky argued strongly that the transference of private costs and
preferences to the pubi-ic treasury is a characteristic of elected legislati.rrc
systems. Moreover, the larger government grows, "the nnre policies becorne
their ohrn causes..., Ttre larger government gets, the less it responds to
events in society and the more it reacts to the consequences of its past
policies..'. Tttus big government exacerbates the spending pressure it, has
difficulty overcorning. "
The effects of these pressures are additionally difficult because
governn-onts cannot accurately predict the effects of their actions. Ttre
response to this, wildavsky suggested, is "cybernetic. They tacitly agree
to cope with the consequences caused by other agencies just as the others
agree to cope with theirs." The operation of the various poliry sectors
are too conplex and special-ist, in any case, for others to grasp, hence the
tacit agreenent to avoid each othersr patch in exchange for ndeferenoe
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in adjusting the economy" by central governrnent agents (e.g. Treasury and
Cabinet) requires a uniformity of provision,ltl f"ir shares for aII, and
the application of rules only where they have generally-felt irnpact.
The inc:cenrental pressure towards "expenditure creep" created by this
systematic relationship of government actcrs is exacerbated when (as in
New Zealand) budget deficits become an accepted component of fiscal
management, and aLLocations are made on the basis of the approved Vol-une
of activity for each spending agent or set of agents. As Wildavsky pointed
out "budgeters lose controL of rpney because they have to supply whatener
is needed.... What budgetingby volume says, in effect, is that the pr:blic
sector will be protected against infl-ation by getting its agreed level of
services before otber needs are rnet....
inflation. "182
It is a form of indexing against
In bottt Britain (wittr PESC) and New Zealand (with COPE) this type of
public sector budgeting, international theorists suggested, reinforced
conventional assumptions about incrernent"l grortt . l83 Continual acc.eptance
of an annual budgetary deficit annually belied poLiticaL rhetoric, in
published Budget speeches, for example, about the Governmentrs firm
intention to control and restrain its own consumtrltion of resources. In
L967, for exarnple, imnediately prior to the adoption of PPBS, the New
Zealand Minister of Finance had stated that "the level- of Government
e:<penditure is one of tbe principal factors which determine the level of
national e:<penditut"."I84 That year, he announced, "because it is essential
to restrain the rate of increase in national spending, tbe Governnent has
taken action to augrnrent public revenues and to Limit the growth of @vern-
rent expenditure.... The principal airn [of nreasures taken] is and must be
to induce a slower rate of increase in total erq>enditure. While this
necessarily in5rlies a sorrEwhat slower rate of economic growth, there is
no al-ternative if we are to stabilise the econoqg and maintain a firm basis
__ 185for expansion."--- Ten years later, when government e>rpenditure had risen
to about 41 percent of GNP, the same Minister reported that the C.overnrnent's
Iong-term objective had been consistently (albeit relatively unsuccessfully)
pursued.:to reduce public spending as a proportion of otp,186 rn the 1980
Budget, it was stated that "the @vernment's redium term aim is to reduce
the size of tlre Budget deficit and the growttr of public sector expenditure
consistent with rhe need to sustain reasonable levels of economic activity".
Nonetheless, net er<penditure had risen by 18.2 percent over the previous
IA?financial year.--' As Witdavsky observed, there appears to be a pubLic will,
but no effective pr:blic way to translate this particular @vernment objective
into actual and continuing experience.
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Some of the e><planations for this were obvious to all- those involved
in developing the Quigley system. Permanent heads, Treasury analysts, and
the Associate Minister of Finance were all aware of the v'ulnerability of
good intentions. Few bothered to justify this on the grounds of economic
theories or objectives. l'lost were explicit about the inpact of electoral
ambitions on po].iticians, and. the readiness of departrnental officials to
further these ambitions so long as the organi.saticnal-professional objectives
tley had developed with ttreir ohtn poliry "constituencies' were catered for.
Treasury officials were guite familiar with ttre Lindblom school of
analysis. They l/tere conscious that political bargaining at e:recutine level
was at least as real in its inpact on spending patterns 
- and their
"lurq>iness" - as deficiencies in organisational managerent and managenpnt
techniques or the general effects of sluggish economic Arowttr. Their
response to apparently inevitable incrernentalism.was to emphasise the
necessity for collective agreements arnong ministers.188 They acknowledged
that.not only had permanent heads engaged in CoPE found it extrernely
difficult to punish each other in all.ocative reviews; nr:inisters themselves
had individuat spending ambitions which were tailored cr nogrished by
exchanges of favour.
with the enthusiasm of rnoral reforrners, they proposed ,;o convert
ministers (and hence their senior advisers) to the advantages of cooperati.rrc
decision-rnaking, and a collectively-agreed self-denying ordinance. Not only
did they erploy the uncomfortable technique of rraking explicit the extrlenditure
implications of the Covernnent party's ideological preference for the private
over tlte public sector. Ttrey also adopted the then-popular cry of "back to
the basics" which many in the governrnent already propagated or endorsed in
their own departrents or el-ectorates. Further, they identified, an "almost
moral revulsion" against continue<i spending. They encouraged ttre view ttrat
the poritical party endorsed by business, professional and corporate
comnercial interests could not tolerate fiscal sloppiness. A party whose
response to econornic decline was to initiate a rnassively expensive programre
of energy developrent and progressive "restructuring of the econolly.l
literally could not afford such laxitlr.
rn a public address in Augrust 1980, the Hon. Derek Quigley stated ttre
refornersr position:
unress the day-by-day decisions of covernment recogrrisethat self-inposed spending constraints are in fact binding,
then all the statements of best intent will be for nothing.It is also a fact of human behaviour that rnost spending
ministers will be less incrined to accept poliry priorities
and expenditure limitations which are imposed on ttrem than
those which are developed collectively. our purpose then
shoul-d be to l-ook for npchanisms that will controL the lirnits
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of government expenditure by in.rolving all ministers in the
develepmsnt of those l.imits. This 
-chould inhibit indirridual
ministers from seeking to increase Lotal expenditures, .tnd,
equally, ministers as a group fror,r approving them. I89
The Officials Committee on Expend.iture Planning (OCUP) had been
relatively cynical about the likelihood that all ministers would adopt this
high moral tone - particularly (as was, in fact, to happen within *u.kr190)
should there be any reverse in the party's electora.l fortunes. The senior
public servants who in August heard the Associate Minister of Finance
expound his hopesrwere irnp."=iru.191 Nonetheless, the clear reformist
statement remained. The new system was not deliberately punitive, at least
in the sense thaL the full load. of responsibility for finding savings,
holding the line and living within prescribed lirniLs would not be carried
by officials al-one. Ministers were publicly implicated. Any reservations
about their probable future behaviour could be interpreted then by officials
as the failure of the Cabinet collectively. Under the new system the
principle of selective discrimination would be applied and fiscal prefer-
ment would be given only to those policies and activities rr'hjch could
demonstrate their contribution to government's economic objectives. Although
it was intended to smooth out the "Iumpiness" of expenditure patterns by
respreading allocations and providing better coordination between the
varior:s Eenerators of costs, it was also intended to provide spending
agents with an assurance of security: approved activities could be regarded
as having a stable resource supply so long as departments accepted the
_ L92rules.--- ft was thus acknowledged that there would be some rewards for
acceptabl-e behaviour to compensate for the more severe disciplinary aspects
of the new syster.I93 significantly, however, neither those in the departments
at about director level and below, with budgetary and cost control responsibilit-
ies, nor authorised agents in numerous bodies in receipt of public funds, such as
Hospital Boards, lrere d.irecLly invited for comment or evaluation of r.rhat
was to replace the COPE-based system for brdget preparation and management
The central t'cliguett lvas a ttcommunication group", negentropic in
character insofar as its funcf ion was to order events, reduce their randomness
and increase the central network's capacity for information retriev.l.l94
It was also the central control agent for the Government. The activities
of the Qqigley school constituted an attempt to gain improved control
over the behaviour of other persons - notably senior departmental staff and
spending ministers. The effectiveness of the Qqigley concept, in cybernetic
terms, will in future be demonstrated by the extent to which the expenditure
system, for which the CCEX-Treasury-FRA group is specifically responsible,
keeps "within specifiable limits [i.e. upper aggregate expenditure limits'
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and cash and staff ceilings] despite the inr5ract of noise from outside
dis:turbances or f,rom inside unreliability, breakdcwn and decay,'.
Tttus, over the next few financial years, there must be quantifiabLe
evidence that
departmental spending is restrained to the point of contairurent
within prescribed expenditure lirnits;
- ministers accept and act in accordance with collectively-dete:mined
e:<penditure restraints ;
special, or exceptional circumstances (such as might be clained
by pressure-group importr:ning, or via r:nfair or deviant bidding
tactics by spending ministers) are denied financial :response'
- maverid< or wil-dcat outb:reaks of ad hoc departmentaL or ministerial
spending (suctr as a last-minute decision, in 1979, to alter the
family benefit rate) are avoided;
cryclical patterns of erratic behaviour in anticj-pation of events
suctr as general electionsr or in response to unforeseen disasters,
sudr as a by-election defeat are given no special or extra
financial consideraLion;
volume growttr is shonm to have been funded only where there is a
change in ttre demographic basis for a policy provision;
- 
prices are strictly as prescribed.
lltrese sorts of experiences would demonstrate ttrat ttre reforred
expenditure forecasting and budgetary management systen was effective. In
other words, planning control and regulatory agents in the central netrporks
would have shorr'rn t.l.at the system they had designed was capable of
"stabilising against disturbance an internal representation of an external
state of affairs'196 and, as Krippendorf added, capable of stabilisation
"agoin=g ttre effects of internal r:nreliabilities. breakd,own, and conflicts
as weu.".197
Realisation of ttre explicit objective of the system planners 
- tJlat is,
the containment of levels of activity within predeterrnined parameters 
-
night' in future, suggest to Treasury and others that whatever information
was by then avaiLable was adequate to tJ:e budgetary systemr s reguJ-atory and
planning needs. Further, tJ:is would probably :reinforce ttre generally
Iatent view held by the planners of themseLves and by ottrers, particularly
cabinet members, ttrat as a specialist eLite, Treasurl,z and t}te ccEx are
critical components in a negentropic system: information retrieving, order
imposi-ng, uncertainty reducing, capable of irAribiting fragrnentation and
promoting systematic stability.
Hcnrever, as it was initialJ-y established, the educational-communicative
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aspect of the Quigley system remained Sonewhat ernbryonic, while the major
emphasis was placed on rules and structures for fiscal control. Nowhere,
for example, in the varlous Treasury circulars on ,'public Expenditure
Planning and Budgeting" or in pr:blic statenenEs by members of the Cabinet,
was the relationship between macro-econorn-ic considerations and the
individual conqronents of public sector resource allocation carefully
delineated, authoritatively established, or publicly debated ]g%".r.tut
factors central to this thesis may e:<prain why this was the case.
Firstly, ttre planners were continuously aware of their responsibility
to ensure that some viabl-e fiscal system was maintained. Battersbyrs
reminder (27 May, I98o) that even in tlre I'darkest hours,, of the past; when
Treasury had continued to fulfil the governmentrs constitutional and fiscal
responsibilities despite grave political and economic uncertaintyr200 r""
a necessary restatenrent of the professional planner's credo: to serye his
political mastersr needs. Ihus, from 9 July onward as Treasury circulars
were issued, calmly instructing departments to proceed on specified lines,
to c611ect and collate certain data, to evaluate those data according to
specific criteria, to present their analysis in a given uanner, to conforru
to a mandatory time-table, every financial manager and perrnanent head
cou1d, in a sense, relax. There was a system that worked. The ministers
would not be embarrassed. Puture tire could be constructed around the
prescribed rules ano regrulations for acceptable behaviour. There seerred
to be no question that the Estimates, for example, would not appear in ttreir
familiar form, that apPropriations would be markedly different from those
' allowed in the past, that arlocations to satellite agencies, such as
statutory and other boards, would not be rnade rmrch as they always had.
Treasury had redefined not only the symbols of order and security, but the
anticipated directives were couched in farniliar terms of economy and
efficiency wittr a reassuring and optimistic nod towards the cpntinued
inportance placed on tJ:e longer-term perspective.
Secondly, the government needed a political sylnbol of its awarenesg of
the gravity of the nation's econornic situation. Linitations of knowLedge
neant that economists could not categorically assure the governrrent that
inflation, for exanpler \das predominantly the result of expansion of the
pubLic sector. Hobrever, in recent years sufficient discontent witlr the
existing system for budgetary management and financial forecasting had been
channelled through COPE, the CCEX and Cabinet to suggest that constraining
public expenditure might be presented as a serious, rational attenpt to
modify the irryact of inflation on society.
But finding some credible symbol of inflation control was only one of
the Governmentrs political imperatives. Ideologically, the party in office
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was committed to reduction in Lhe sccpe of t:he pr:blic sector and, in
particular to limiting the proportion of ct'lP which was consumed by the
public sector. Although macro-econornic justifications for this belief
were rarely publicly provided or deb.ll-ed, it was asserted by the Govefnrent
that the econornic system woulcl be healthier if resources now channelled
into governfi€nt consumption \rere redirected tor^iards the private sector-
Thirdly, the government was in a politically excruciaLing position
caused by the. loss of traditional export markets, rising unemployment and
gross uncertainties about future supl:lies of energy, particul.arly oil
products. A "solution" to these problems which had long been advocated
was to expand New Zearandrs e:<porb capacity through manufacturing and
processing' basing industrialisation on massive capital investrnent in
indigenous sources of energy such as hydro-electrieity and, nore recently,
off-shore supplies of gas and oi1. lt\^ro courses of action to carry out
these Purposes appeared nr,cst likeIy to succeed - and to be poLitically
acceptable: to encourage overseas investnrent in New Zealandts industrial 
d.development p1ans, and to redirect public resources away from sociaL
consumption towards capital investment in known or potential sources of
energy. C;overnlent consumption of GI.JP at around 40 percent was presented
as almost beyond electoral tolerance; yet increased taxation o= markedly
accelerated borrowing prograrTunes appeared equally unpalatable. The most
acceptable symbolic device was to aLtempt to reduce the capacity of all
areas of the public sector to grow, except where it could be claimed that
governllEnt spending would contribute either to export-led productivity or
to energy production and marketing.
How should this be done? Ttre Quigley system planners had adopted an
evangelistic style of mutuaL encouragenent in tackling this problem,
reinforced by their real responsibility to maintain a system that would
actually work. There was substantial agreernent anpng them that "planning
must prescrjlce fand is] ...essentially normative". TLre systern tJ:ey designed
emphasised cooperative collegial action by rninisters, consultative setting
of goals and relative priorities by rninisters and their speniling agents-
The fiscal policy goals 
- 
reduction of the public sector, restraint over
public spending, pronotion of the private sector, innovative use of
existing resources, even at the cost of existing soeial and other progrannes -
were aclcnowledged to be primarily political and ideological. However, it
was believed that given the salutary financial experience of npst spending
rninisters and officials since about 1975, and with continuing annual
emphasis on value for money , tit for tat , efficiency and economy,
compensatory savings and so forth, the actual economic e>rperiences of the
coming ncnths would be sufficiently severe to parsuade aLl those involved
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that this was the only viable planning approach.
As Faludi has pointed out, "planning systems, whatever else they may
dor. form an 'image' of their environnrentl and their specific set of
variables in ttre environrrent, naturally enough, forms a very prominent part
of ttris image. rhat is not all that there is to planning though, because
the pJ.anning process results in modifying actions aimed at the specific
set of environnentaL variables. To take such actions requires decisions
which in turn require a facility which [fatuai calJ.s] societal wil1...,'200
The "image" which the Quigley reforners had of tlreir environrnent vras
dominated by ttreir conscior:sness of sorne critical elements in the expenditure
networks: the Minister of Finance, the more arnbitious spending ministers,
the less tractable departrrental spending agents (soretimes perc€ived as a
sort of rnonolithic renegade like "the Education people", sonetirnes in the
shape of individuals such as particularly influential permanent heads or
ttreir financial managers). Further out in that environment was the Cabinet
itsel-f. In the shadow behind that lay the increasingly influential party
caucus. On the horizon, alnost out of sight and in many cases certainly
out of reach, were the satellite spenders: the boards and the fieLd managers,
the peopLe who generated policy costs and operated "cost control centres'l
in a manner which many in the Treasury, Cabinet and the Audit Office, for
exanpre, regarded as quite unsatisfactory, if not r:nacceptable.
Connected with this notion of an environnrental image is the plannerst
style, whictr Russell Ackoff regards as critical to pJ.anning effectiveness. 2CI
If, for example, we substitute for Faludi's "societal wiIl" that much-
lanented capacity "political wi1l" (i.e. ministers making an allocative
decision and sticking to it, regardless of internal Inoiser or external
disturbances), it night be argmed that more effort should have been placed
by the Quigley reforrners into examining the political and ideological
structures within which the would-be spenders operated. Ihey night have
made rnore rigorous attempts to identify deficiencies in those corrnunication
networks which, it was hoped, would transmit planning information from the
small clique of ttre FOAG, Treasury and the ccEX, to other ministers and
their departrnental advisers; to ensure that srrfficient numbers of persons
already threateneil by public expenditure restraint and allocative re-
direction, and hence Iikely to be rnost antagonistic, were comm'itted, in
advance of implerentation of the reforned system, to its success. Ttrey
might have tried to ensure that the whole exercise was seen, from the horizon
of the planning environnent, as economically mandatory, rather than part
of yet another fiscal e:rperirent by professional Treasury planners and
decision-rnakers, or an el-ectoral bid by politicians.
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Ackoff considers that both the style, and the ideals of planners in
any system of managernent are crucial, They must "understand the style and
ideals of not only those who are to be in control [in t]ris case, ministers
and Treasury.l but also those who are to be controlled if [they are] to
desigrr or plan a system that will work effectively". Acl<off further
suggests that since style is rnultidimensional,, and no system planner can
calL upon sufficient knowledge from behavioural scientists to enable him
to satisfy ttre styListic-idealistic needs of all those in the proposed
system, he must adopt another technique. That is, the 'involveupnt of
those who wilr control, be controlled, or othe:*rise be affected by the
system being designed, in the desigm of that system'r. Ttris nnans that "a
system desigmer who is aware of the relevance of style can learn about tJ:e
stylistic performance of stakeholders [in ttris case ministers, individually
and collectively, and officiars and their "pubrics"] in the system by
making its redesign as participatirrc as possible. Participants in the
desigrn cannot help but put their stylistic preferences i.nto.ttreir designs.
Nor can they refrain from incorporating their ideals into ttrose designs". 242
The political and constitutional context in which the Quigley school
operated precruded ttreir adopting a broadry participative styJ-e. The
imrnediacy of the Governmentts econornic difficulties appeared to justify their
preference for a virtually closed-shop, inward-rooking style of system
desigrn. Ihe system designers were asked, for example, what consideration
they had given to the impact of the proposed system on the existing
distribution of potder and influence amongstCabinet, Cabinet corrunittees and
officials comrnittees, ttre Prime [inister/M'inister of Finance and his
colJ-eagues, the State Services Corunission, the Treasury, and any new PAR
fimction. Almost invariably their short anstrer was: None. When asked
what specific systematic steps would be taken to stiffen ur-inisterial
resolve against cyclical decision-making which focused on general elections,
or to ensure that officials below the most senior departnental echeLons
ful-ly understood the objectives and means intended by the planners, ttre
answer was much the sane.
The characteristic style of the Quigley school was that of moral
evangelisrn. Sone considered that excessive or poorly controlled public
sector spending was not only financially undesirable but to be regarded wittr
"sonething like revulsion". The Associate I'tinister of Finance had publicly
comrnented that he was "appalled" by ttre rate at which ttre public sector now
absorbed available resources. Another Treasury official, reviewing nrinistersl
attitudes towards expenditure, considered that "they treat the public purse
Iike some gigantic private slush fund". ile was morally, as utell as
professionally, outraged, Despite the rhetoric however, atterpts to transrn-it
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this sense of aversion to spen<ling, and inculcate a preference for avoiding
poIiry and cost expansionism, were directed not so much at ninisters
(whose final responsibility it was to 'hol.d the line') as at officials.
Atnong tJ1e ministers on cGX itself, only the Associate Minister of Finance
had a passionate interest in reform. For reasons of personal a:nbition and
ideological and politicat preference, he sustained that interest despite
his own and TreasurT's reservations about how far other ministers, nost
notably the l'tinister of Finance/Prime Minister, would support and corply
with it.
rt may be ttrat at I'east trlo potential probl.ems for ttre "success,, of
the new system have been buiLt into its creation. Ackoff's inperative 
-partj'cipation so far as possible by alL who are affected by the system,
and Battersbyrs caveat 
- 
that it is fatal to designn a system on ttre
run 
- may prove to be critical deficiencies. Those who are now reguired
to operate under ttre strictures of a system which declares the importance
of collegial action while employing an increasingly, centralised, Treasury-
based system of control devices and strategiesr rndy prove intractably
obstinate. Except insofar as the Government's intentions can be gleaned
from the sparse prohibitive edicts of Treasury circulars and closely
confidential ministerial staternents, departnental policy generators nay
remain alienated or feel themselves distanced from r]re rneans to debate,
across the public sector as a whole, the implications of corrtrlrehensive
e:rpenditure planning. Collective Cabinet consideration of the irnplications
of the new system for ministers individually and as participants in cabinet
sub-systems has been virtually non-existent. The inevitable conflicts
between needs and objectives pursued by those responsible for servicing
and taking decisions on the cabinet Economic committee, the cabinet comnittee
on the state Servies, the Cabinet works Committee, the Cabinet Conunittee
on Expenditure and other less crucial bodies vrere barely touctred upon by
the Quigley school
Nonetheless, apart from its considerable symbolic significance, and
its partial relianc€ uPon contemporary knowledge about the causes and
influences on pr:blic sector spending patterns, the development of ttre
Quigtey system has another dinrension. COPE no longer exists in its previous
form' rt has been replaced by a series of control devices which have
implications for both rninisters and their official,s. Their choices may no\t
be severely limited. Their ability to generate large scale future develop-
rents based on almost innocuous "new poricy', beginnings rnay be reduced.
Nonetheless, the Quigley schenre provides them with an essential means of
elite survival. Permanent heads are not now reguired to present to the
545.
Minister of Finance a joint report on.their expenditure ba-se, As public
knowledge of the existence, 
€rnd the significance of CopE increased, it
becarne increasingly difficult for permanent heads, unaccustomed to the
light of public scrutiny, to tolerate tjteir uneven exposure. As one senior
public official rernarked, he was constantly called upon to explainp
justify and defend the activities of his department, which is a major
consumer of public funds. Unlike him, the Secretary of the Treasury was
nevr/er called upon to defend the state of the economy, but renained
relatively anonymous, protected not only by his Ministerr.but the entire
Cabinet system of collective responsibility.
The establishment of the lower-leveI FRC and its associated panelsl
providing the basis for highly confidential inquiries by the Treasury
and the CCEX into existing and new policies will take sonE of the heat off
tllre top managernent level-s of public service. rtre pressure towards
collective decision-making and coLlective restraint by ministers performs
the sane function. An erite which is in jeopardy, its decisions and
choices threatened by pressures which may expose their falLibility, bas
litt1e option, given tl:e political culture in which it exists, but draw
closer together, ernphasising its internal cohesion and the collaborative
nature of its future objective".203
rrippendorf notes that "it is sornetines argued that the conspicuous
absence of valid theories of social control stems from the tendencry of
power elites to suppress all knowledge that would diminish ttreir power,,?o4
Further, he comrents that "the success of regulation, the ability to control,
is [trrereby] in fr:ndanental ways rerated to overalr information,,.205
If the particular structure, procedures and rules for allocative
behaviour demonstrated by the developrrent of the euigley concept are
evaluated from t.}tese standpoints, we may detect in ttrat history a series
of politicaL truisms: the confidential., hierarchical administrative system
of the New Zeal-and Public Service is inextricably d.ependent upon the
elected poritical elite of ttre cabinet-centred parliarentary system;
togetherr at the highest status l-evels, the blo systemst - executive and
administrative 
- 
constitute an inforrnation network shaped and activated by
electoral and other pressing political forces. lltre costs of revealing
information sources, tbe criteria for decisions, and the influences upon
outputs (such as allocative decisions) are high, not only in tcrms of time
and money, but even higher in terfis of professiona]. and electoral
reputation. The kind of "political will'r ttrat is bottr required and (on
many occasions) exerted to promote, block, thwart, decelerate or redirect
other spending agents' intentions demands is acutely sensitive to individual
s4'1.
and group consciousness of the risks of loss or diminution of power - real
or symbolic.
The Quigley approach ilIr-rsiratcs that under pressure, the survival
technique adopted was to turn, not outwardr'but more intensely inward.
The information networks engendered by COPE over ten years were perc-ei'rcd
as defective, with leakages, open to pressure at weak pointsr susceptible
to unauthorized, unobserved or inadequately npnitored entry from outside.
Ttre reformed system is based on a politicaL desire for greater economic
and fiscal control, which " [coincides] wit]r hopes of planning the econory
better.. . Itre implications of pr:blic e:rpenditure policies [shoulcl] be
examined in the light of all other ca1ls on the econorqf (the balance'of
payrrents, investment by industry, and consunpr spending); it [is] also
hoped that [improved] projections of different deparHnents' plans will help
206in the choice between priorities." Keegan and Pennant-Rea used these
words in relationship to the British situation of the early 1960s. llhey
are directly applicable to New Zealand still. As in Britain, the elite
whose pohrer and influence is being greatly strengthened by the centralist
direction of the Quigley system is tJ:at which centres on Treasury. Over
recent years (as in Britain since 1976) Treasury has gained an increased
nurnber of Cabinet-based allies. There is now, in addition to the l,linister
of Finance, a deputy Minister and an Associate I'tlnister of Finance. In
addition to these three there is the three-person CCEX, staffed and serviced
by Treasury, essentially serving Treasuryts onerous and complex needs.
The COPE group of permanent heads (an apparentty ineffective elite in terms
of Treasury's political functions) has been replaced by a cornmitEee-based
network which is directly accountable to the chief financial officers and
the Finance Ministers. The "operationaL discipline" of the "contingency
fund... - a lirnited fund, not a bottomless pool" is to be nrcre directly
exercised on the joint discretion of Treasury and the three Finance Ministers.
The innovations introduced with the Quigl-ey system have a pulclicly-
announced purpose: to make explicit an actual or intended change of
rninisterial (i.e. political) heart about the seaning of "the active State'r.
The responsibility for sigrnificantly dampening dcrwn or redirecting "historic-
ally rising" public e:<pectations is so gra\E that virtually only the
Treasury, stiLl a closed shop to direct extra-governrnental Pressuresr could
be comrnandeered to carry it.
tlhe modified system will probably continue, like ttre British PESC, to
be "Iess a system of control than a method of gathering together the
>o'7
impLications of existing and planned policies."-"' It wi11r however, require
of the political etite considerable foresight and flexibility, if Treasuryrs
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survival at the apex of t}te public sector bureaucracy is to persist.
Should the centralist forces continue to fail important electoral and
macro-economic tasks, the political executive and its party-eleetoral
suPport groups may turn to other elites, so far relatively excluded or
emascuLated, such as the New zeaLand Planning councir. Arreadyrthe
location of members of the Treasury-centred elite in the Council and
other potential danger spots has occurr"dr2oB in almost unconsciorrs
anticipation of the future. The competition between diverse networks
for control of critical information wilI, in a context of struggle for
el-ite survival, undoubtedly provide the greatest political interest and
econornic significance over the coming decade.
Keith Ovenden has observed that if we are to understand the function
of political elites, hte must not only admit that there are small unique
groups of influential. individuals whose power orrer policy processes marks
the political outcomes of those processes as peculiar to that elite. we
must arso observe and record "the currency of poJ.itical life itself -
their problems and solut,ions". This means not only asking which individuals
were involved, participant and influential, but inquiring into "the precise
nature of [t]re] political decision... [and] whether that decision would harrc
been different if it had been taken by some other individual",,.209
The institutional setting, the cybernetic nature of the information
networks, the impact of international opinion about public e:<penditure
planning and management, the historical development of COPE-based procedures
inside central governnent and exogenous economic influences suggest that a
Treasury-centred elite wouLd have made the sarne kinds of policy decisions as
the Quigley school - even without euigley. Nonetheless, with Quigley (as
pro:<y for the particular ideological and potitical ambitions of the National
party in office), the pl.anning-controlling elite which dorninates the
central informational neLwork co-opted, and was in turn actively ernployed
by, a determined group of politicians. Their sources of information, their
political e:<periences, their style of approach to "futures management" and
"gmided national- developnent" - i.e. to planning - are crucial elements in
ttris fiscal policy pro"."".210
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GIAPTT:R SEVtsN
CONCLU.SIONS
Exp-epdj-ture Planning as a Eorm'of. GovFrnment.e1 LeagJj:r-g
Itris study has fostrsed on one aspecE of government planning in New
Zealand 
- 
the planning of public expenditure. There are a nu:nbcr of possible
explanations for recurring difficulties in fiscal management, These iriclucle
the vulnerability of tJ:e New Zeatand economy to fluctuations in external
demand for najor exports and uncontrollable shifts in the international
prices for essential imports such as oil and petroleum products. Signifi-
cant dranges il the balance of payments i-nevitably affect dorrestic policies
on the provision of subsidies, tax concessions, and financial support for
activities such as internal transport, export marketi-ng and land use develop-
rrenL. Internal econornic conditions, partictrlarly ttrose affecE,ing ttre
availability of credit and private inrrestment capital, as well as trends
in wages and employr€nt, have direct implications for the governrentrs
alLocative policies as welf as the regulatory neasures it adopts.
Resources are allocated to a wide variety of dorestic purposes.
RenediaL activities, often undertaken because of some earlier planning
failure in, say, tlte relevance or availability of social services, are
costly. Short term activities financed by the C€vernrent for a specific
purpose may generate sufficient demand to harre unintended long-term future
cost implications- Programnes deliberately designed to actrieve longer term
objectivesl or in necognition of major charrges in, say, tJ:e derographic
structure of the conmunitl', acquire near-permanent status in the Govern-
rent's annual budgetary considerations.
It night, be concluded that economic r:ncertainty would have a positive
constraining effect on governnental confidenc.e in the future availability
of resources to rnaintain such astivities. ft appears, however, that this
effect is inconsistent. Public expenditure planning, at least as that process
has been docurnented in this study, is highly sensitive to historically-based
demand and much less directly influenced by assessments of futrrre resource
supply.
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Uncertainty about environrental influences on goverrunental decision-
making and public policy choice is constantly atleviated by political
confidence in the propriety of democratic obligation. It is assumed that
electoral support justifies the allocation of resources to politically-
determined purposes. Yet the factors affecting that support, including
tbe level of public knowledge about the consequences of past policies or
the inplications of alternative poJ,icy droices are so influenced by the
State itself tJ:at t}re competing intenests implicit in electoral. support
are crudely assessed and often inadequately analysed. On its own,
political controL over the major services for pubtic education and
information exchange has a Long-term effect on the way the conmunity
itself recognises and reacts to probable future developrents, and adapts
to these eittrer by articulating a demand for alternative pr:blic policies
or tolerating transitional- adjustments in ttre interests of irproved
social or econorn:ic conditions.
Direct involvement by the State in the najor sectors of the econontrl
has been a characteristic historical feature of New Zealandts development.
fn the energy sector, transport and cormnunications, forestry, the
insuramce industry and tourism and so forth, capital investrnent and
operational funding by central government are major structural elements.
AJ-though sone public enterprises are effectively self-financing. many
corunercial and industrial organisations owned and/or operated by ttre
Governnent are run as conventional administrative or trading departnents.
Ttrey are funiled by annual Parlianrentary appropriation for their no:mal
operating costs as well as their capitat expansion. lltrerefore c-onmritrnent
to suclr activities is highly sensitive to political pressure and
electoral considerations.
Inadequate evidence of the social and other effects of these activities
is compU"cated by difficulties in predicting and preparing for the abandon-
nent of such financial burdens. Ttris increases political unwillingness
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to recogncise significant changes in the necessity for or efficacy of suctr
structural elements in the public e>rpenditure progranune, and reinforces
confidenoe in the importance of electoral considerations implicit in any
proposal for a basic change in fiscal policies. The immed"iacy of
corununication between the Government and ernployer-errployee organisations
ensuries that any proposal is quickly elevated to the public agenda, Lts
costs identified as a political rather tl.an a national econonic or social
problem. There is very little distance between government financial.plan-
ners and power:ful interest groups 
- ttrus very littre room for dis-
passionate consideration of fiscal policy options. PoliLical responsive-
ness is a typical surrogate for other forms of governmental Learning -
which ttremselves have cost implications, as r.reLl as threatening established
elites.
Social services in the education and health fieLds and industrial
or conunercial subsidies involve massive e><penditure in te:mrs of capital
deveJ.opnent, the maintenance of plant and equipment, a-nd for all operating
costs including staff salaries and wages. The payment of rnoney transfers
direct to private consuners constitutes a major item in tJle Governrnentrs
annuaL expenditure progranme. Few business interests in New Zealand have
the p:edictive or research capacity to support their adjustment to changing
economic circumstances. Tedrnical advisory services and comrnercial invest-
rent in technological development ane heavily funded through government
agenct-es.
ResponsibiJ-ity for financing environrnental protection, housing,
roading and community services 
- the infrastructure of new industrial
and cosmercial developments 
- falls heavily on the State. In recent years,
increasing unemploynrent has put considerable pressure on central Govern-
ment to sr:bsidj.ze ttre surplus labour force, Ttre historical commitment to
cornpensate for failures in tl1e labour market effectirrely cancel_s out the
possible political advantage of more selective support for short or longer-
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term market deficiencies. Expendi.ture planners accept an obligation
(in the case of unemployment) to fund a demand whose future leve1 is
urrknown and not necessarily justified in terms of a corresponding future
increase in political support.
Electoral sensitivity means that most welfare payments are difficuLt
to manipulate or reduce. In planning of expenditure they consitute botlr
a rgiven' factor, and an unc.ertain erement, since the degree of support
for them is typically politically deter"rnined.
Nearly forty government departments with satellite clusters of
statutory boards and advisory bodies (sorne 600 in aII) comprise a large
public bur:eaucrac,Y in the central governrnent sphere. their maj-ntenance
is a constantly rising cost factor in the financing of goverrunent
poJ.icies. The voting power of government enployees is a pol.rerful con-
sideration in e:<penditure planning and allocative decision-rnaking. llhe
maintenance of poliry fr:nding at levels that justify continued pgbLic
service staffing (based on a hierarchical, career-service model of,
permanent emploYment) inevitably distort assessments of the adrninistratirre
merits or economic and financial efficienqg of for:rvard policy plans.
Growth in the size and cost of the pubric sector far exceeds ttre
Government's ability to finance its crrrn activities out of annual revenue.
Deficit budgeting and debt servicing are now typical features of e:<pen-
diture planning. The Government is constantly reacting to the consequenc\es
of its own earlier allocative ctroices, so tJlat scope to accorurpdate demands
not already incorporated in the financiaL base is severely lirnited.
irtte inpact of such factors on pubric e:<penditure planning is
particularly apparent during a period of economic rec.ession, whiclr has
been the background to most of the period covered in this study. lttre New
Zealand governnent has had continuing financial difficuLty in a situation
of little overall econornic arowth. The range and political intensity of
demands on ttre State to alleviate the effects of recession have been
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difficult to contrel. At the sanp time, the Government has undertaken
capital investment in industrial development aimed at major changes in
the st-ructure of the economy. These investments irnply massive long-
term supplernents from Government as a major shareholder or instigator
of such programmes as energrlz farming.
With hearry politicaL commitments and few apparent opportunities to
shed any major part of its financial burden, the Government has Little
room to manoeuvre in allocating scarce resources through the annual
budgetary proc€ss. Thus, whatever other function pranning fulfiLs, a
major attraction has been the possibility that improvements in prediction
and managenent may indicate ttre availability of uncotnmitted resoures.
Financiar control 
- tlrat is, contror by the Governrent of its crm
financial base and the grovrth factors within it 
- depends on hawing
access to resourcres that are not irretrievably enbedded in ongoing
expenditure Progralnnes. Failure to gain this sort of control is clearly
influenced by external denands on the national economy and political
responsiveness to explicit electoral preferences. However, this study
ind.icates that deficiencies in the C,overnmentrs internal connunication
and control systems may be equally important in effective planning, if
this is defined as a form of adaptive learning.
1, Iooking for limits to expenditure
Ttre evolving budgetary process described in this study was based on
the establishment of COPE. That corunittee system was intended to provide
key decision-makers with accurate forecasts and a definitirrc account of
t}te cost of existing poJ-icies. Inforaation about ttre cost of the policy
base would provide a stable elernent in the annual allocative plocess,
adjusted in an orderly fashion for inflation and other price factors,
modified where existing policy reviews indicated ttris could be done,
adjusted to take account of the governmentts annually-approved new spenaing
proposals, and restyJ.ed for presentation to parliament as the arrnual
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Estimates of Expenditufe.. Intornatien generated by the three*fear forrrard
forecasts would provide a reasonably reliable guide to future comnitnents'
in time for the necessary adjustrnents to be prepared and irnplemented ln
Iine with the C;overnmentrs longer term economic and sociaL objectives.
Over a ten year period, economic disorder related to balanoe of
payments crises and inflation severely discredited the plaruring aspect
of COPE. Its control function predominated. lltre comparbnentalisation
of financial allocations into separate departmental Votes and, within
those, further fragmentation into standardised classes and itens of
e:<penditure, w€rs a constraint on any corprehensirre view of the typical
growth-inducing elements of the annual forecasts. Success in retaining
resources, or avoiding detection during any search for uncomnitted funds,
became detrnndent more on officialsr behaviour than on the dernonstrable
econornic efficiencry or effectiveness of their departmental e:qpenditure
policies. CCIPE became less a neutral instrurnent for assessing ttre future
financial realisrn and justifications of ongoing policies than a forun
where the exercise of political muscle by contending officials was aimed
at nraintaining tlre status quo.
The fact ttrat the results of tJle COPE exercise were never published 
-
and neither the Budget strategy nor the annual mles for liniting fore-
casts within specific expenditure ceilings lras ever fuJ.ly discLosed to
spend.ing departments 
- meant that the systemrs controL function was tenuous.
Once departrents were geared for the annual task of preparing forecasts for
subnission to COPE, they rapidly perc-eived that despite ttre risk that sone
established programres could suffer financial losses for whictr new policy
approvals might not compensate, there were other advarrt4ges. Expenditure
approved by COPE \ilas more or less inviolate. Ttre bureaucratic rule of
precedent appJ"ied. Desul,tory er<periments in carrying out special post-
COPE reviews of existing policies rarely succeeded in identifying a pool
of resources ttrat coul-d be redeployed elsewhere. Since there was very
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littLe interest in any other review outcome, rigorous analysis ained at
identifying policy effectiveness or managerent efficiency in the light
of explicit objectives had little to reconnend it. Neither departnental
managers nor control agents !'tere pxepared to direct resources to analysis
and, review on a systematic and regular basis. Suctr reviews as were con-
ducted, whether Existing Policy reviews or nanagement reviews, were in
any case highly confidential and lacked the potentiaL to attrast sustaf,ned
public or rninisterial attention.
Although tJ:e accounting system introduc.ed in tJ:e late 1960s (SIG{A)
provided the info::nation necressary for Treasury to exercise regruLatory
control over annual cash expenditure, up til1 the end of the L97Os it was
not e:cpJ.oited so as to generate the regnrlar and reliable information
deparfunental managers and ministers needed to identify inefficiencies in
financial performance or po1iry fail-ures. rn any caser few departmental
activities were fu1ly costed, either in terms of ttre total life of any
particurar poliry or project, or by the inclusion of all ttre indirect
costs. In the absence of pricing signals suctr as the market provides for
private business managers, and without reliable measures of deparfirentaL
performance, financial efficienry was extremely difficult to assess -
and thereby control.
Over the sane period, the evolution of a new system for srrlc'Cabinet
exanination of expenditure policies took place. As we have seen, the
most stable institutional development has been the Cabinet Cornur-ittee on
Expenditure. llhe necessity for departments to subnit ttreir finalcial
forecasts not onry to their peers, but also to specially empovrered,
ministers, was a potentially powerful addition to the networks of conmuni-
cation and control inside central government. Itre C(EX not onLy added
considerabJ-e welght to Treasuryrs influenc€ over e:q)enditure proposals;
it also affected tJ:e flow of information formerly ctranneLled through ottrer
cabinet conunittees and Cabinet itself.
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ft is, horvever, difficult to conclucle that the new conunittee sysLem,
which provided for improved coL-Laboration between control agents and
finance nr-inisters, has significantly improved the gover-nrirent's ability
to control the direction and impact of its own spending policies, or to
identify the uncomnitted resources neecled for adaptation to changing
circumstances.
. 
Spending proposals have been better coordinated through the adrn:inis-
tration of the CCEX system, but not necessarily better controlled. On
the one hand, many financial commitments have unavoid.able legal justifi-
cation, or are explicitly indexed to demographic trends. on the other
hand., information about actual poliqT effects has never been reg,qlarly and
systematically reviewed and coordinated across departmental boundaries.
Concern over tlte volurne of activity and the cost of programmes sr:bmitted
for examination, review and approval to spend has been expressed mainly
in terms of their inplications for the annual budget deficit. Even this
concern has been more closely tied to threatening electoral reactions
than to any sustained, anxiety oner economic failure..
Preoccupation wittr a budget deficit has provided a crude gruide to
the Governrent's tolerance for constant increases in annual expenditure.
By the beginning of the 198Os, the obligation to service rising debts
incurred. as a result of earlier financial approvals had begun to bite
'into the budgetarlr process. Ttris added urgency to a grcnring reliance on
other similarly r:nsophisticated control mechanisms. Over the past ten
years, as we have seen, failure to find any politically acceptable way
to restrain spending and the lack of persuasive evidence as to horrl
expend.iture policies 'S:r individually be pruned, had led the Governrnent
to adopt sucfr devices as across-the-board suts in specific items of
expenditure, the imposition of a sinking lid on employnrent nuibers (a
mandatory statistical readjustuent dcxrnwards of annual staff ceilings)
and, more recentlyr refusals to allow annual adjustments for inflation
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in departmental Estimates. Such measut:es, imposed because of rninisterial
conc€rn over the forecast Estimates or chronic but apparently unrestrain-
able growth factors, are draracterised by their lack of selectivity and
efficaqg. Few sustained, systemat:-c efforts have been made, horeverr to
predict, monitor control or review the policy and operational effects of
sudr generalised reasures. Feedback appears to have been Lirnited to
executive interpretations of preferred interest group reaction to specific
poliql adjustments.
2. Plaruring for elite survival
Over tlre past 15 years, much @verrunent energy has been directed
towards refining and stabilising an allocative system that is (a) largely
incapable of controJ-ling the factors driving financial demand,
(b) deficient in its tedrniques for evaluating new spending proposals
and their relationship with ongoing activities, and (ci inefficient in
monitoring the impact of allocative decisions.
Reliance on disciplinary measures imposed by control agents has
proved to be inadequate as a tool for encouraging consultation and oo-
ordinated plarrning by the diverse proponents of spending policies. Recent
deveLopments suctr as the substitution of buLk financiaL allocations
(bu1k budgeting) for traditional annual appropriations enhanc.e the relative
autonomy of departnrental poliry planners and financial managers. rhls
nay encourage greater self-discipline, better expenditure planning and
more efficient managen€nt at the operationaL level. But for ttrese to
occur with greater public accountability as well as effectiveness in
policy te:turs, ttrere must be an overall strat€gic planning framework
wittrin which pr:blic spending agencies operate.
To date, formal planning has mainly taken the form of denand pn-
dictions by spending agents. Ttre financial capacity to satisfy fonrard
dema-nd has been inadequately forecast, so that gaps between political
approval for demand-based policies and the provision of supplies of
appropriate resources to inpJ.erent these frequently occur.
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Ttre purpose of financial planni::g processes developed in recent
years appears to be to impose some kind of predictive order on.otherwlse
random info-rmation. However, ttre purpose of controlling the random ff-ow
of information into central government appears to be to mainl-ain the
status and decision-rnaking power of key elites at critical points in
central allocative networks.
Under the COPE/FRC system, as that operated in L9BO/9L, departnents
prepared and submitted financial forecasts in which major factors sudr
as staff and capital works were controlled by separate decision-rnaking
systems. A similar division occurred for items such as notor vehicle
purchase/replacements, offie equiprnent (including EDp systems) and
office/project accomrnodation. Procedures for exarnining personneJ.
forecasts, authorising staff level changes and reviewing and approvilrg
capitaL works and maintenance forecasts were not only conducted largely
outside the detailed. scan of COPE; the criteria against r^rhich they were
assessed were different. The staffing of departmental policies was
controlled, in nunerical terms; capital works forecasts $rere approved on
a cash and planning basis, and covered a different tine horizon froni that
applied to other financial commitrnents.
llhere appears to have been little economic logic in ttr"is. Sinoe the
varied bases for decision-rnaking exaggerated rather than nininrized other
problens of obtaining an accurate real-cost arralysis of the financial
implications of exisLing and new policies and, progranmes, it appears that
t].e anomalous system !{as retained largery in order to reinfore the
status and power of the principal control agents involved - Treasury, the
State Servic.es Conurission (SSC), the lrtinistrlz of Works and Developmgnt
(ltl'lp): *d the major Cabinet conunittees: CCEX, ccss, and c'{C.
For many years it appeared ttrat any serious nove to control staff
expenditu:re/financial terms would have an apparently intolerable affect:
could undermj.ne the control function of tJle SSC, whictr depends fbr its
the
tn
ir
- 
-
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power on tlte manipulation of persomel nunbers, occupational grades and
entrlt restrictions. Further it would remove a po].itically-convenient
indicator of the size of the public service. It was considered ttrat
nrinisters, for example, preferred to control the numerical size of the
Pttblic Sector by statistical reductions sudr as the sinking Iid, without
explicit consideration of public justification for the wage and sa1ary
implications, the productivity lerzels, or the indirect costs associated
with every employee. Any significant change in ttre role and fgnctions
of tJle SSC woutd inply a conplenentary ctrange in the utility and status
of ttre Cabinet Corunittee on State Servioes 
- and ministers regard urember-
ship on any of the rnajor cabinet committees as sources of prestige and
Pohrer.
A sirrilar situation prevailed in relation to the Ir|WD, over the past
few years, as political patronage for tie Ministry deteriorated and demand
for the construction of traditional pr:blic works requiring civil engineering
and large-scale ardritectural design lessened, the role and fr.urction of
the ltr{D has been guestioned. Demographic ctranges reduced t}re earlier
demand for sdtoolsr hospitals and other pr:blic welfare institutions. I?re
conpletion of a national network of major highways neant that maintenance
rather tltan construction would become an important role for the lrlinistry
of Works. fncreasing emphasis on econonic efficiencry in resour€ use
brought into question the previously r:nchallenged costing and operating
rethods of M'fD &ivisions responsible for planning and constructing
iruigation and other long-te::nr developnents. Natural reductions in the
workforce enpl-oyed by t'[dD, as a result of rururing do.rn some of its major
activities' hlere accelerated by political preferene for private rather
than public sector enterprise.
Ttre rise to prorninence of the l[inistry of Energy (a combinatj.on of
the forner l4inistry of Energy Resourc€s, the New Zealand Electricity
Departuent and the t4ines Department) seriously ctrallenged ttre position of
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the l'ffiD. The admission of the !4inister of Energy to the prestigious
Cabinet Economic Comrnittee (.on which MIJD is not represented). symbolised
political preferment for this recent coniender for the investment and
operating capital fornerly tnder the more or l-ess exclusive command of
MI^ID. Resistance to these changes has been strong, sine any fornal
change in the status of the Cabinet Works Comrnitteer and the patterns
of consultation and decision-making by lrl!{D and the Treasury over capital
works financing, threaten the Ministrlz's position as a control 
.agent.
On the other hand, the evolving system for financiaL planning ancl
budget management has constantly reinforced the predoninane of Treasury.
The normal c.onvention of Treasury reports on every departrenta} e:<pen-
diture proposal or amendment subnr-itted to Cabinet, Treasuryts partici-
pation in every major officialsr committee or inter-agencry system where
public finance or investment fi:nds are involved, and Treasu:1rs nanage-
uent of the Estimates have depended on its right of access to the
financial records of every agency in government. rnvestigation and
information provided the energy tJ:at sustained IYeasuryrs continued power
in the central systen. A relatively small cadre of welL-trained, highly-
motivated professional investigators, their confidence based on the fact
ttrat money talks, have long understood that tJ:e theoreticaL dictrotoury
bebveen Policy and expenditure is largely symboL:ic. !{it}rout noney, policy
has no staying power.
Every significant developrnent over the past 15 years has either been
initiated by Treasurr or, where successful, clairred by the Treasury as
part of its r:nigue but ubiquitor:-s sphere of influence. lllre preparatory
work on PPB in t]:e late 1960s was carried out by Treasury officials 
-
and atrophied as a formal tectrrique largely begause Treasurl neither
planned for, provided nor approved the resources necessart/ to ensure that
predicted poliqg outcomes dictated expenditure inputs. rhe brief
experiment with the Cabinet Corrunittee on Government Expeniliture in 197L
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was initiated by Treasury. a nuinisterial challenge to Treasuryrs
hegemony with the establishment of the Cabinet Conmittee on Policy and
Priorities (1972) was quid<ly discredited with the discovery that r.urless
Treasury was admitted to the closed irurer circle as a major colleague,
not rerely a detached servicing agency, the innovation could not survine.
A striking illustration of tJ:e sucessful diversification of Treasurlrs
interests, and its abiLity to coopt ministerial j-nvolvernent in its
statutory and other functions, was ttre establishment of tlle Cabinet
Committee on E:qrenditure in L976. Itris sub-system rationalised Treasuryrs
dual roLe as financial controller and economic adviser, augmenting tlre
ah:eady considerable pcn*er it exercised through the Officials Econonic
Conunittee arrd thence tJle CEC.
Treasury has constantly supported the confidentiality of central
goverrunent. Ehe department itself, alone anong its peers, makes no arnual
report to Parliament. Ttre practie of publishing an annual Econonic
Review was discontinued shortly after the recession of ttre late 1960s,
purportedly because the National Developrent Conference was better suited
to provision of an overall scan and analysis of tlre state of ttre econoqf.
Since 1977 t the New Zealand Planning Cor:ncil and other guasi-governnent
bodies have had the unenviable task of econornic comrentary and public
analysis of expenditure planning. During a period of econorulc recession,
Treasury has had no d.irect obligation to analyse, evaluate or pr:blicly
record either its own activities or ttre general thrust of its policies.
Since most policy advice, and the econornic and other criteria
applled by Treasury in its fi:nction as filter for expenditure proposals,
remain secret, Treasury's positlon in the networks of conununicati.on and
control is rarely directly affected by pubJ-ic criticism or the se\rere,
irsnediate externar pressure experienced by other departments. Highly
selective public announcements of certain Treasury rules, such as ttre
rate of return nequired on all capital investments in pubtic works or
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developmental. prograules, are in discreet accord witJl rreasuryts inter-
pretation of any infLuences that may tlrreaten its own position. Cocooned
by the confidentiality and privilege of predominance in a closed systern,
for most of the past decade Treasury has enjoyed the additional prestige
of reporting to a Minister of Finance who has al-so occupied the offioe
of Prime t(inister, and been supported by trvo additional finance rninisters.
The division of labour anong three Cabinet members and the patronage of
the Prime !{ihister have greatly enhanc-ed f?easury's acoess to Cabinet,
and reinforced its pre-errinence as adviser to all ttre main Cabinet
cormnittees.
In its role as servicing agent for the COPE system, which allorved
direct Treasurlr input during ttre examination of departmental forecasts
as well a.s a later opportr.nity to report separately to the tr[inister of
Finance on ttre COPE review, Treasury had a considerable advantage over
other control agents 
- including ministers - in this critical phase of
defining the expenditure/resource base. Itre nomination of areas for
special post-coPE review was largely a Treasury fi:nction. As we hanre
seen, that exercise appears to harre been relatively futrlle as a rethod
for locating unjustified or unconunitted resources. Howener, the polver
to recoumend that sudr reviews should take plaae, and the right to vet
the results, neinforced Treasurlr's disciplinarry po\rer.
lrhe sensitirre phase of the budget ryc1e in whictr new policry proposals
were. submitted, investigated, challenged and, where possible, diluted, has
always been obsessively secret. Ihis is not only a matter of political
convention; it is necessary in order to retain the myttr of fiscal dis-
cnetion as a ministerial attribute. After t]le establishment of the CCEX
in 1976, rreasurY gradually introd.uced ttre nor.r-established convention of
coq>ensatory savings: a nehr policry woul-d be firnded only if the required
resourc€s could be substituted for sose existlng expendj-ture. Ttris srakes
sense, of course, if the objecdive is to restrain aggregate gror.rttr i,n
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in overall spending; it also makes sense as a demonstration of Treasuryrs
po\rer to discipline its departmental colleagues and their nr"inisters.
Yet the inevitable d.istortions caused by poIicry sr:bstitutions are
onJ.y modestJ-y identified and justified by departurents and rninisters
arxious to secut€ approval for new spending proposals. Treasuryrs
investigating staff have few means and littLe obJ.igation to deyote
detailed attention to the flow-on conseguences. It is a matter of tactical
power without operational responsibility. So long as the departrents
themsel-ves fail to ensure that they institute and operate rigorous
evaluative systems of po1icry and performance review, tlrey will remain
unaccountable for the effects of I tit for tat' . while rteasury fails to
use its pre-eminense and pcnrer to reguire such systems, it too nay escape
responsibility for expenditure grcwth.
As we have seen, where ttre interests of rninisters are institutionally
separated (as between the Cabinet and the CCpp in Lg72-7Si cr when tJrere
is a significant shift in t}e influene of caucus vis i vis the coll-ective
polrers of nuinisters, the difficulties of managing a closed system
increase. Recently the government, caucus has begnrn to seek a more direct
role in alllocative policy decisions. ordinary uernbers of Par].iarnent have
begun to take up opportr:nities avail-able through participation in the
Public Expenditure Cornrnittee and other seLect corurittees to intervene in
the exSrenditure planning pxocess. Yet even reLatively m:inor declarations
of back-bench interest appear to have threatening implications for the
executi've alliance and its power over criticat information.
3. Planning for information management and syrnbors of control
Altttough New Zealand politics have been characterised by fairly
stable electoral preference for ttre National party since 1945, Labour
did win a brief period of office in the period under review. Ihe nature
of tlte executive system for controlling information about alLocalive
pollcies was sharply illustrated at ttrat tire. Constitutional conrnntions
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meticulously obserrred by Cabinet officials dictate tJlat informalion
available to and used by tJre outgoing administration is noL made
avaiLable to an incorning party. I'tinisterial papers held in the Cabinet
office records are differenliated not only on the basis of the type of
data they contain, but accord.ing to the political affiliation of those
who auttrorj-sed or required then. A party that has enjoyed a dominant
position in politics over tiue has a significant advantage orrer a party
which is Qrpically in Opposition. Ttre information reported to an in-
coraing Go\rerrunent on the performance and assumSrtions of its predecessor
is, on the whole, selected by official-s. Ttrey maintaj-n permanent con-
fidential records of all- past decisions and the advice that supported
t}em. Again, this gives officals power wittrout operational responsibilitlz.
Ihe appJ-ication of suctr constitutional conraentions, alongside
official secrecry and J.egal sanctions against pr:blic disclosure, is an
inportant limitation on the range and detail of information available to
different generations of nr:inisters. However, a much more serious problem
Iies in the susceptibility of decision-makers to information overload.
Retrospectire policy and performance analysis is not only Line consuming;
it absorbs resources that politicians prefer to di:rect towards rcre
imtediateJ.y rewarding tasks, such as the promotion of electorally-popular
new policies. Any limitation on information about anottrer partyrs
allocative ctroices reduces t].e clutter on the agenda of an incoming
administration. lltris may, of course, encourage creative problern-solving
and innovative pj-anning simply because new rninisters have different per-
ceptions from their predecessors about the way resources rnight be allocated
to achieve particular poIiry puryoses.
On the other hand, feedbad< about actual, rather than planned or
anticipated performanoe is crucial. Politicians not only need to know
where they are at present and where they want to go; they also need to
know where they have been, and the implications of ttrat for current and
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future choi'ces. A more rigorous analysis of the allocative preferences
of the preceding goverrrment ruight have tempered Labour ministersl
behaviour, for example, in L972-73. A more discerning appreciation of
the problems of identifying and controlLing unconunitted resources, which
at that Lime only officials could prepare and provide, may have resulted
in a more responsible nrinisterial attitude towards financiaf constraints
and ttre need to apply strict allocative ruLes in a period of obvious
econornic crisis. In the event, the creation of the CCpp as an inner
Cabinet attracted surges of complex information and was not a sufficientLy
&iscriminating filter for decision-rnaking. The concentrated energrl; of
officials seeking ministerial endorsement for existing policies and
new proPosals, in competition with the demands of organised r:nions and
other major interest groups with whom the CC?P negctiated directly, proved
unmanageable. Neither control nor effective communication was possible.
Ttre networks of essential polici' and perfonnance information became so
clogged that there was no opportr:nity for adequate consideration of ttre
future cost-s of fiscal commitments. Hence the irrner Cabinet was showrt
to present little real threat to established officials. Itre incomlng
National party restored the conventional balance in favour of ttre Prine
ltinister and the Cabinet Economic Comnittee, and officials developed and
encouraged ninisterial collaboration with them through the CCEX.
Karl Deutsctr has suggested that:
the ability of any political system to invent and carry
out nelr pollcies to neet new conditions is... related
to its ability to combine items of information into newpatt€rns, so €ls to find new solutions that may be
inprobable in terms of their likelihood of being
disc-onered, but relevant once Lhey are discovered and
appIied. l
Ttris adaptj-ve learning capacity is an essential characteristic of
planning. Over the period under revievr, efforts by the executive we:ne
made to re-design ttre patterns of information, re-organising what was
known in ttre hope ttrat tJlis would illuminut" [rJ"'was not known. aowever,
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ttre ene.rg'y and deternuination required to sustain innovative re-arrangelrents
of information constantly conflicted wittr the interests of elites in the
Government decision-naking system. Ttre expenditure planning process is
essentially an allocative system. Ttre organisation of knowledge sc as
to expose the causal relationstrips between financial allocations, ottter
resource allocations, and actual policy outcorres threatens not only tbe
power of individual spending agents (departments, nr.inisters), but in
sorrE cases their formaL existence
ftre COPE system generated far more information than coul.d be processed
during tJlat phase of the arulual budgeta:n1z rycIe. Hence, any 'new
solutions" for dealing with the forecast costs of activities approred
under the prevailing rules were likely to appear only by chance. Any
innovation in the cabinet corunittee systern rapidty attracted so much
information tJ:at decision-makers (treasurT, SSC, ministers) could deal.
witlt it only by using familiar and fairly conventional- tools of analysis,
reliant on codes of honour and confidentiality, avoiding evaluatirre
tecfiniqr:es that required scarc€ resources but could not guarantee
politicalJ.y acceptable find,ings.
In a closed system, where elected politicians are extr€reIy sensitive
to any policy change with implications for their electoraL pcmer, onew
solutions" are assessed on ttre narrow basis of potitical self-interest.
Economic efficiency in ttre use of resources is palatabl.e only where it
has demonstrable political. advantage. The extrere confidentiality of tlre
expenditure process, with feedback narrcn*Iy interpreted at the centtre,
has made most formal planning procedures relatively inpervious to creative
inteLJ-igence.
Ihe 1ag between sensing changes in dernand and evaLuating the long-
te:ror impact of allocative decisions, and consequent adjusEnents to the
al.locative rules, is considerabl-e. LacJ< of organisationaL flexibiLity in
the central structure of, goverunent, the dominance of pemanent officiaLsr
tJle sensitivity of the tr*o-party systern, ttre increasing pqiler of the
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Prime I'tinister and Cabinet committees, the relative inertia of Parlia-
nent arrd the straitjacket of ttre three-yearJ-y electoral. cycle combine to
suppress aLl but the most irresistable new solutions.
As we have seen, economic decline and harsh financial necessity
(revealed, of course, by information transnitted to the central aLlocatine
system) generate more negative power than creative positive solutions,
Information essential to tinely adaptation and potential sources of
innovative intetligence nay be neglected, ignored or deferred for con-
sideration under some later, more convenient, mo[e.nt.
Even when improved tectrniques or the gror.ring knowledge base of
government encourage officiafs and ministers to adopt a more open approactr,
their tentative approaches towards the conanrurity, seeking more rational
public debate, may be rebuffed. Political efforts to ctrange the nature of
public demanC, as in the 1968-74 National Development system of indicatiw
plarrning, for example, or the Labour. governnentrs commr:nity leadersr
conferenoes, vtere ineffectual in terms of slowing down demands for public
expenditure. Stnrctured opportunities for public debate about the demands
that fuel d.epartmental bids for resources appear to have nret wittr hlgh
Ievels of electoral ambivalence. At the beginning of the 1980s, tlrree
years after the Planning Corrncil and Commission for the Future had been
established expressJ.y to foster public information and debate, this ?
public confusion was emphasised in an electoral result that tec*rnically
returned a minority party to the Governnent.
SeLf-motivated initiatives by Parliament to benefit frour more corF
prehensive technLcal knowledge have been insignificant. Serious develop-
nents to involve Parliament in expenditure planning, or in ttre provision
of infonred guidanoe to the executive aLliance on broad-based reactions
to proposed developments, have been disappointing. Members of parJ.iarnent,
where the finaL authority for financial approvar Lies. are severely
handicapped by the rigiil party structure and their own lack of sustaired
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initiative. EnergY that could be channelled thro.ugh existing systens
for poriry and perforinance review, such as the public Expenditure
Committee, is increasingly contained within ttre politically-secure party
caucuses. As an institution, Parliament has no effective nearrs to assess
t]-e econonric efficiency of xesource allocations it approves.
Improvements in the management of knowledge have been noted. Attenpts
have been made to reconcile the inflor,s of fragrrented information witlr
often conflicting theories about ttre econornic causes and social effects
of shifts in resource supply and demand, inflation and surpLus Labour.
Ithe language of plarurers and decision-nakers, for example, ilJ.ustrates
their alrareness of the need to synttresise resourc€ availabiLity, govern-
ment consumption, productivity and a desire for orreraLl econornic gronrtS.
Hohrever, conflict over the rel"ationship between such factors arises when
information relevant to the pursuit of irunediate political Eoals (sucl
as wiruring an election) suggests choies that are at odds wittr otfrer
options whictr may harre long term social or econonic benefits for the
country a-q a whole.
The internal struggle to define the rpst effective allocative u€ans
to ensure electoral preference is intense. However, i:here is a coupeJ.ting
politicdl need to contain such ccnflict wittrin a closed system in order to
maintain a pubric irnage of discipline and po]-iry consensus. rorrnar
pranning machinery, such as t.he plaruring cor.rnciJ., provides slnmboric 
,
evidence of political control over conqrlex and apparently iriherently
contradictory knowledge.
rn New zealand little detailed financial data used by or avaiLable
to governrnent decision-makers are prrblished. fire specific objectiyes of
annual expenditure strategies and the assutptions on which such strategies
are based' are confidential to a small elite of officials and even fewer
rninisters- lrtre secrec,y of financial forecasting and other pred.ictive
inforrnation used in conpiling ttre annual Estimates is an inportant
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tactical instrun nt in the relationship betreen officials and ministers,
and between control agencies and spending agents.
The risks entaileo in a more open public exarn-ination of the couponents
of aggregated Votes or disclosure of the accounting methods used, Erre on
ttre whole strenuously avoided. l"larginal adjustments to tJ:e financial
base of public policies avoid abrupt or threatening ctranges for the major
beneficiaries of tbose policies. Ttre continual but varying iqpact of
allocaLive decisions - that isr the unforseen, unintended effects - are
not systematically incorporated in ttre formal review ftrnctions of
expenditure planning.
Both the insLitutional structure and forrnal information systeurs of
central governrpnt are designed to ensure tJlat conflict in illocative
decisions is contained wittrin and, as far as possible, controlled by tJ:e
executive alLiance of ministers and key officiaLs. Power derives from
being able to define ttre rules. Competition for dorninance over the ruLes
for allocatirre preference i.s intense and prolonged. Prestige and status
inside ttre confines of central goverilEnt depend on the successful
maintenance of symbolic, as well as Legal, auttrority.
Instability inside centfal government nray be precipitated by tech-
nical faiJ.ures in communication or random changes in the quaaity and
rate of information received for processing, by ctranges in the capacity
of key decision-makers to interpret, process and transmit information
selectively; and by changes in t.lle percepLions and overt demands of ttrose
s.ignlficantly affected by tlre rules. Information about outcoms is fed-
back into central go\rerrunent through a variety of retworks, only some of
whiclt are directly susceptibte to controL by the executive alliance.
Ihis feedback proce,ss is managed through the adjuslnent of controls such
as forecasting and pricing rules whiclr are designed to avoid disruption
to the estabLished allocative patterns.
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4. Failures of leadership: the need for a strategic policrr frameworF
Although developrents noted in this study clearly represent govern-
nental attempts to inprove ttre efficiency of resource plaruring, few 'new
solutionsf to difficuLt problerns have emerged. fn fact, over time the
growth in spend.ing and its relative signrificance in terms of GDP has been
the subject of increasing controversy. llre difficuLties of applying all
but fairJ-y crude restraints have not dirninished. Concerns about ttre
effectiveness of plarming, and the allocative behaviour of central
goventnrcnt decision-makers have increased. Public poliqg fr:ncling appears
only poorly related to tJ:e econoni-c efficienq,r and social cbjectives of
many of tbose policies.
ltre:e is scope for a deliberately innovatirrc cha.nge in the reLation-
ship between Treasurl, the SSC and other control 
.agents, and the najor
spending agencies. lhis should aim to focus their attention on alLocative
plaruting as a collaborative function of joint officials. Ttre economic
efficiency and social effectiveness of all resources managed by public
officials at all Levels should be subject to jointly-defined rules that
make systenatic review and evaluation mandatory. At present ttris is
Iargely a m&tter of discretion and individual rranagement style.
Suctt systematic output-oriented reviews imply the availability of
a reliable, agreed policry framework incorporating the major econonric and
social priorities of the government. Itrerefore rninisters al-so need to
:e-think and rearrange ttreir Cabinet committee system i-n order to provide
and regularly update an overall strategic policy pJ-anning frarework.
ttti.s in turn irnpJ-ies an active, innovative and sustained effort to
o\terconrc the more outdated and damaging features of ttre two-party systen.
Tvro aneas call for urgent attenlion: the extremely detrinental pre-
occupation wit} a three-yearly electoral cycle and the unsatisfactory
system developed to manage the business of a modern Parliament. A
recurring soLution suggestcd for ttre first of these is to extend the
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period between elecbions. On its own this may be inadequate, since
behind tfre electoral system i6 a party system that is poorly developed
in orderEo provide elected politicians rvitJr sound econonic and social
analysis. ttre combinaLion of voh:ntar1' r.rorkers and aclministrative staff
who manage the two major political parties j-s an outdated and' amateurish
approach to policy analysis anci evaluations of, political performance. The
research units firranced by the Legislative department to service the
parliamentary pa.rty members are necessarily devoted to short term
considerations. Constant breaking of party ranks, with sporadic rebellions
by party nembers, reflects ad hoc concern over the appropriateness of
present party management systems.
In consideration of ways and means to reduce the behavioural effects
of a constant need to seek re-endorsement at the ballot box, and a
sirnilar effort to adopt more realistic and positive methods f-or parLia-.
mentary control over exesutive power, innovative leadership and political
risk-taking are necessary. The econornic arrd social costs of failing to
deal with fiscal planning problems.are increasingly intol-erabLe to a
sigrrificant proportion of the electorate. Ifinisterial failure to
extricate key elements of the Cabinet system from the operational manage-
rnent of affairsr and apportion responsibility for the preparation and
systematic review of a strategic policy framework for allocative decisions,
is politically reprehensible.
Officiatsr failure to introduce active, systematic management
planning, with rigorous self-criticism and sustained po1icry review as
its distinctive characteristics, reflects poorl-y on those who occupy
l-eadership positions in central government, particularly the Treasury
and tlre State Services Commission. In most situations, rninisters' choices
and knowLedge of the parameters of their own decisions are guicled anil
inf,Luenced by officiaLs! advice. fhre quality of t}re former depends
critically on the liatter. Ttris responsibility, formally entrusted to
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an autonomous, career public service, does not appear to have been developed
to the best nationaL advantage.
If plaruring is defined as t}re learning capacity to giuide and control
inevitabLe historical changes so as to ninixnize the damagre of both
predicted and as yet r:nforeseen events, the value placed on sudr learning
appears to be fai*ly lcm in the New Zealand central go\rernment system.
This nay be a function of national character, the quality of public
education and economic experienc'es, and the narrow range of political
interests wittr povrer in central governnent. sxpenditure by t}re State on
pr:blic policied and politicaLly-approved progratrues is still very nuctr
oriented tolsards contj.nuous consurption rather than self-controlled
devel.opuent. Over tlre next decade. whictr offers few prospects of economic
relief, ttris clraracteristic attitude say harre to drange, or be dranged
involuntarily.
*******t***
Notee
1. Karl Deutsch, Ihe Nerves of Governnent: Models of political
cosunrnication 
.163.
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APPENDIX 1
Obtaining access to confidential data in central governrnent
Ihe formal framework
At the time research for ttris thesis was being carried out, con-
fidential data, such as Cabinet records, departmentaS. policy papers,
government financial records and so forth, were controlled by:
(i) restrictive legislation, nainly tJ:e Officiat Secrets Act(1951) and the Ardrives act (1957);
(ii) restrictive procedures, such as ttre Standing Orders of tlre
House of Representatives;
(iii) restrictive practice, governed by the Public Senrice
Regulations (1964), and applied in different ways by
different departrnents ;
(iv) constitutional and a&uinistrative convention, which rnay
vary over time and from agency to agency depending on
factors such as tJre political climate, the perceptions
and prejudices of individual officials, ttre poJ-icy
objectives of the political party in officre, dnd so forth.
Even with the passage of the Official Information Act (L982) the
student of government, seeking direct access to primary sources of
data in officiar sources, mu.st have regard to suctr constraints, and
the varied emphasis placed upon them during the progress of researchin the field of pr:blic a&ninistration and governnent.
Factors affecting ease of access
3. Tttis study of pubj.ic expenditure planning in New Zealand indicatedtltat there are several" ways in which these constrai.nts may be
regarded and, in sone cases, overcome. lltre first of these is
rather like advice that the wise child will choose its parents
very carefully:
(i) [he initial selection of ttre researdr supervisor is crucial:
In the Adcnowledgements, the contribution of Professor Ralph Brookes
was recorded. rt was apparent earry on in the initiar inquiries
about access to official rec-ords that the identity of the researctr
supervisor htas a major factor. In many cases, Professor Brookesl
reputation was critical in whether or not the inquiry got past thefirst danger point 
- an immediate refusal to perrnit acoess - and
went ou to a nore extended discussion with officials as to the
actual methodoloSa and the uses to which the data might be put.
(ii) lltre degree of willingrness to comply with current restrictions
The personal decision to accept the force of tJle various restrictinepractices noted in 1. above was difficult. A student in a siniLar
situation would. have to be aware at ttre outset that compliance, whichin Lhis case meant accrepting the restrictions of tie Official SecretsAct' carries with it both advantages and costs. Ttre major benefit of
such acceptance (which became increasingly obvious as other matters
discussed below proceeded), is that access is likely to be appro'led.
The main disadvantage is that ttrere is both an immediate and a long-
term restriction on the subsequent readership of a study based on
current or recently-filed official data.
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It is a Catctr-22 situation. If the student does not agree to have
full and continuing regard for tkre relevant restrictions, access
will not be a1Iovred. If access is permitted, authorities other than
the author and her/his academic supervisors will gain sr:bstanLial
control over the work itself.
In this case it was a matter of assessing tJle relative costs in
terms of the anticipated gains to scholarship, against the possibility
of changes in restrictive practices. During the course of tJlis
research, a major review of official information was being carried
out for tlte Government, leading towards the introduction of freedorn
of information legislation; at the sanre time, another student was
pertruitted access to official data in a similar field, and officialsl
general- satisfaction with his behaviour and the quality of his work
suggested a favourable disposition torards other such reguests.
(iij) The degree of care taken in Lhe process of requestl.ng officiaL
approval fgr access
The student must accept that the central goverrurent system operates
not only on the basis of informal codes (so that who you know is
irnportant) . rt is arso sensitive to the norns defined in fo:rral
protocor 
- 
tie ability to behave appropriately in a highly formarised
system with codes of etiquette is regarded as a matter of over-
riding importance. The student must understand and compLy with ttre
correct forms of address, the normal codes of practice, and the
formal channels of communication witir those responsible for tJ:e
maj-ntenance and supervision of official data. Hovrever, despite the
ritualised nature of such initial exchanges, once the studentrs
credentials have been acoepted, there is very considerable latitude
within ttre system and the 'outsider' is pennitted to develop asinformal or casual a relationship as t}le ordinary organisational
norms arIo,.r. Ttre essential commodity is mutual trust, As in other
situations, latent ethical imperatives are at least as effective in
constraining the individual as any explicitly coercive limitations.
In the authorrs experience, however, it is unwise to depend on
informar approval or endorsement. one must also be able to produce
the formar docurnentation that establishes credentials. The factthat such 'passportsr are almost never required is irrelevant. Theinformal lines of consnunication inside central goverrurent are most
efficient, and it is quickry known among officials whether or not
the routsiderf has the required proof of identity.
(iv) Ttre degree of inlerest shown in the task for which official
data is necessary
This factor is tlro-dimensional. Wtren officials themselves regard
the proposed work as irnportant (i.e. useful to thern or their rninisters)
they are more likery to take a favourabre attitude towards in the
student seeking acc€ss. on the other hand, the student must demon-
strate that her/ris interest is not only serious but persistent. lltredata must not be regarded as subject matter for social- discourse orthe object of personal amusement or whim. officiaLs tend to becoue
more open in their exchanges witJ: tire researcher, and more wilJ.ingto suggest fruitful lines of inquiry, not only when they are farniliar
with t}|e information but. nore importantly, in the light of thepersistence the student shows in regard to accuracy and breadth ofinformation.
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(v) Researsb style and persenal chamcteristics
There ar€ a number of other factors, sore of which may seem trivial
but nonetheless appear, on the basis of the autiorrs experience, to
be important. For example, the age and experience of the researchetr.fn this case' it was apparent that some officials were l-ess cautious
and more assured in dealing wii:lr a rdddle aged suburban housewife
who appeared to then unlikely to risk betraying confidence on
igrnoring official restraints, if only because she had a farniLy, a
mortgage and a stake in the local communityl One tentative indicator
of success in gaining access to official sourc-es, therefore, nary be
whether the researcher is an atypical student i.e. not particrrlarryyouthful, not a male, and not overtly threatening in ttre sense that
officials perceive her as either a political or a professionaL threat.
Associated with tl:is is another apparently irnportant fastor: ttre .
ability of the researcher to interview official_s in a way and at
a pace whictr exhibit neither impatience nor overt judgerrent. lbst
officials have very little spare tinre. When they are prepared to
taLk, they regard this as a privilege, both for themselves and ttreinterviewer. Hence, the researctrer must make it o,bvious that she
has more than enough tirne to acconmodate the officialts workload
and other demands, not the reverse.
In the authorrs experiencre, it would be difficult to work to a
tightly scheduled programme of interviews. Officials who feel
confident in the researcherrs wirling:less to persist in seeking an
interview usually ensure 
- eventuarly - tJ:at tlle time is found, and
then armost invariably find other opportunities to forlon up on
matters raised in tie initial rneeting. With care, offieials
themserves may be encouraged to invite aecess to personal fires or
scrapbook records which sornetimes contain items unavailable else-
where, or extremely difficult to retrieve from large departmentalfiles. In a very real sense, the researcher mlst rcultivate. the
official, recognising that even in a well-docr:mented information
system, the most valuable repository of data is inside peoplers
heads. this process cannot be hurried, and officials should be
treated wi-th respect and syrnpathy if they are to provide the insightsfor which they are often the only source.
Ttrere ane, of coursel costs associated wittr rgetting alongsid,el
officials. Proxj"mity r-urdoubtedl.y distorts objectivity to sone
extent; at the same time, the researciher may becorne associated with
the purposes and functions of the organisaEion being studied.
rt is worth rnaking an effort to avoid an orrertly partisan style. rnparticular, the fine line between sharing information gaineil from one
sourcer with officials elsewhere (in order to test their reaction,
the validity or truttr of f}te information, etc) and becorning an
unwitting messenger, used in turn by officials (who are very quickto take advantage of any situation to score off or educate theirpeers) must be maintained with considerable delicacy. fire author
cannot claim to have been entirely successful in this, but on the
whole the most useful rule-of-thumb is stiict adherence to theinitiaL terms of access in each area. Quite apart fron the obviousdistortion caused by intervening in ttre situation under observation,
the researcher runs the risk of losing the confid,ence, indeed thetrust, of officials who generally ccnform meticulously to theprevailing 'rules of the garne,.
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The methodology used in this study
4. Six aspects of the nettrods used to obtain acc€ss are discussed
briefly below: time, status, special convenlions, personal standards,
ttre value of a rpatronr and farniliarity.
Tire
The procress of setting up this strrdy, in terms of gaining access
to official data, was protracted and, in the authorrs opinion,
could not have been hurried. fndeed, on the one occasion in whictr
enthusiasm and lack of care led the researcfier to neglect the usual
procedure of seeking written approval, interviewing the official
concerned, and then taking r:nhurried steps to obtai-n pennission to
observe an official working party in actionr a varuable opportunity
to record a series of exchanges hras Iost.
Over the period of more than a year, the author made formal approadres
to various officials, including Cabinet ministers, seeking to
encourage their inte::est in the project and, then, over tiue,
returning to request official approval for access. It appeared to
be important to al1ow a tdecent intervalr to elapse between contacts.Officials sometirnes need time to consider their decision, without
overt pressurei sometimes they appear to consult eadr ottrer, on aninformal basis, and any haste or anxiety would have been intertrlreted
as unduly assertive or premature.
Status
It was nec€ssar:f to demonstrate one's status. fhis was almost
entJ.rely related to the official or potitical status of the officials
approached, and tl:e J-evel at whictr permission lras given. For example,
once approval had been granted by the pr:bric Expenditure committeefor attendance at its neetings, ottrer officiars took this as a sort
of benchmark, and were prepared to be favourabry disposed to other
requests, including a request to attend and observe Cabinet comnrittee
rneetings. Neither ninisters nor senior officials wished to appear
more generous than anyone e1se, and once the first stage of approval
had been gained, the rest of the process was relatively straightfonrard.
rn one department 
- Treasury - ttre approvar of the permanent head
was sufficient. In another - Education - the permanent head suggested(in such a way that only tie foolish would ignore the advice) that
the I'tinister be approached as well. Although t}re l4inisterrs advice
was to return to the permanent head for approval and supervision,
the formal ritual lras necessary.
Access to cabinet material carries special probrems. Not the reast
of these is the fact that ministers in one administration do not have
access to the records of their predecessors (when they belong to adifferent political party). Ttris convention is strictly observed by
Cabinet office staff, and means, for example, that on its own ttre
serving Prime I'Linister's approval is insufficient. lltre Ieader of tlre
opposition must arso be asked for any material rerating to his partyrsperiod of administration.
This part of the process was not carried out personally by the
:researcher. A sytrpathetic secretary of cabinet suggested that tJ1e
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matter should be left to his discretion, and in the event he gained
formal approval from both ttre Prime Minister and the Leader of the
Opposition to allow the author quite extensive access to Cabinet
committee documents. (ft is ironic that under the current rules,
neither of these persons would be able to read research relating to
their counterpart's period in offic"e, although other officiaLs suctt
as Cabinet office staff are free to do so).
Setting persoLal Linr-its
It was decided early in the exercise that confidentiality would be
strictly maintained. Apart from the somewhat ovenvhelming personal
difficulty of selecting anong the riches of varied official infor-
mation, the student is constantly confronted by data of intense
interest to academic colleagues and others. Once access was obtained,
the researcher had to face up ttre prcblem of how widely information
should be shared with others, mainly academic colleagues. In
general , the rule applied was ilrat rxrless the person concerned had
been 'cleared' for access to the sane class of official information,
and could be relied on for absolute discretion, it would not be
shared. At times this imposed burdens of responsibility on super-
visors, tlpists and otlers directly involved in the completion of
the study. In each case an explicit arrangement was made and there
were no problems in ttris area.
Obtaining tl:e support of a nrentor or rpatrcnr
It was founC necessary to obtain the support of at least one official
in each agency who had fairly close knovrledge of the nature of tJ:e
research in hand, the ne',earcher's credentials and the rules applying
to access. Not only d.id this enable the researcher to refer other
doubtful officials to an authoritative source; it also protected ttre
student from tlre peculiar vulnerability of tJ:e outsider in alienterritory.
obviously, the droice of such a person will not arways be reft to ttre
researcher herself. In sone agencies, such as tJle Cabinet Office,
only one official - ttre Secretary - is enU.tted to take such a role.In other cases it is probably better to avoid too frequent contacts
with tlre most senior official (say ttre permanent head) and find an
ally somewher= else in the system. Permanent heads are not only
extremely busy; they are best rsavedr as a special resource, ttreirgoodwill not openly traded upon before other officials whose hos-pita]-ity and patienc€ are essential in a protracted search for records,
In most cases, the actual rank of the 'patron' is less irnportant ttranhis/her own reputation in ttre organisation. For example, sone very
experienced officials may not have risen past middle managenrent Ievel,
but may have extensive knowledge of ttre organisational netr*orks of
conununication, or precise memory of events observed from the sideline.
Becoming part of the wallpaper
Possibly t]1e ncst effective method of obtaining access to official
data (and being permitted to observe officials at work) is to becorne
as faniliar and habitual as a piece of furniture. Among the surprises
which abound, the autltor for:nd that on occasions when she did not take
up her usual 'observation post', officials or members of parriament
would later inguire what had happened, and whettrer she was rosinginterest or starnina. It appeared particularly important to derpnstrate
sore kind of loyalty to the task, if only to justify the approval
often granted without precedent.
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Future research usinq official information
5. The researcher seeking access to official sources of data in future
will confront a rather different situation from that outlined aborre.
The passage of the Official Information Act (1982) Cemonstrated not
. only the changing climate of approval for such requestsr Brid goveln-
mental appreciation of tJ:e value of research using primary sources.
More ilportant, it rnay also allovr for sonewhat less arbitrary control
over access to such sources.
Under ttre legislation, each request for access will come under the
scope of the Official Information Act, and will therefore have to
conform to the explicit provisions of the Act. llhese are not
particularly onerous, but inquiries must be specific in ttreir tdue
particularity' 
- 
i.e. the particular provision under whidt information
is withheld/approved. Ttre official to whom sucb reguests are nade
will have to consider his,/her response in the light of the legis-
Iation, and will be able to refuse access only on tJ:e grounds
specified in tl.e Act. If tJle researcher is refused access on sudr
gror:nds, ttrere will still be anottrer avenue to re-consideration. lthe
legislation allows for an appeal to be made to the Ombudsman,
altlough ttris situation has yet to be tested. On ttre one hand it
suggests that in future access may be easier or less hephazardt on
the other hand areas of interest to tl.is study may noqt be explicitly
prohibited,
rn any case, the informal influences noted above, whidr had an
important bearing on acc.ess gained for this studyr €IJr€ likely to
remain important. officials will have a formal opportwtity to
weigh up the respective merits of the j.nterests to be served by
releasing data. Recognition that ttre prospective user is willing
to abide by the ru1es, to act with conventional discretion, to
avoid over-stepping the bor:nds of pernulssion and so forttr are
likely to remain irnportant.
While it may be easier in future to obtain approval to carry out
research based on official government information, it will be of
interest to observe the lines along which current initiatives
proceed, in relation to academic study.
A.
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APPEIIDIX 2
The documents on which much of this study is based are located
in ttrree sources.
(i) Treasury records [see also Appendix 3A-J]
Ttrese are housed in the Treasury (I The Terrace, Wellington 1.
Refer: the Secretary to the Treasury).G{inctuae(a) Treasury series in Treasury files, prefixed T;(b) Treasury circulars in Treasury files, prefixed Iy.
E.g. fy 1975/32 = Treasury circular, year of distribution
L975, number 32;(c) Treasury papers, prefixed T. e.g. T35I = a special docunent;(d) numbered Budget reports to tJle l4inister of Finance,prefixed BR.
Note: I'lany of these documents are also rocated in cabinet office
records and departmental records.
(ii) Parliament records [see also Appendix 4A-D]
These are housed in Parliament Buildings (Wellington 1.Refer: The clerk of comrnittees, legisJ.ative Department, parliament,
Wellington) .
They include agenda papers or papers tabled by officiars appearing
before the Public E:cpenditure Cormnittee.
Note: A nurnber of these papers are probably also located in
departnrental records.
(iji) Cabinet records (housed in the Cabinet Office records,
Parliament guild.ings, Vfellington. Refer: The Secretaryto the Cabinet).
These include(a) Cabinet series, prefixed CAB;(b) cabinet committee agenda papers, prefixed separately for
each conunittee
e.g. EX = Cabinet Conrnittee on Expenditure
PP = Cabinet Corunittee on policy and priorities
SS = Cabinet Conrnittee on State Services;(c) Cabinet t4inutes, prefixed Ctt.
Note: A nurnber of these papers, and copies of cabinet l"tinutes r 41€
also located in the Treasury, The state services commission
and other departmental records.
B. (i) Copies of some documents referred to in this study are includedin Append.ices 3A-J and 4A-D. They are available only to readers who
have previously obtained written permission from the author and the
relevant official (see a(i) 
- 
(iii) above.
(ii) By arrangement wittr ttre Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr p. ui1len)
these copies have been boxed and stored in t]:e Cabinet Office recordg.
They are numbered as they appear in the Notes to each Chapter in ttris
study.
e.g. r'Ctrapter 2, note 149. See also Appendix 38" = lppglgi:!-Q,document nunrber 149.
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6i[] 4ny reader wishing to obtain access to the od;glrrait palrers
e.,9. a Cabinet Conrni,ttee paper, a Treasury circularT of a papef
tabLed wittr ttre Public Exlnnditure Comittee, miiy be able to do
so, under the te:nns of the Offieial fnfomation Aetl by approachlng
the relevan-t off:icial (see A(i) (iii) above).
(tv) Srlbject to the d,Lseretion of the sectretalJZ to tl.re Cabln€tr
oopd.eo of pa5lers included ir:r Appendices 3A-J and 4A-D, rnay
ev.entuaLly be re-housed in, sa!r, tbe Nati.oriaL Arelrlves ot Seiibrary of, Victo:rLa Urdversity. UntiJ. suctr tirre tlrey are sestrieted
i"ta ag@sE.
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In troduction
There are a number of functions which a popularly elected
legislature Iike the New Zealand parliamenL may perform:
rule-making, the granting of approval for such executive
actions as changing taxation levels or the appropriation
of public funds for specific purposes, and the provision
of a public forum for debate upon matters of national
signific.ance. trlhat iS less clear is whether Parliament is
capable of effective participation in public expenditure
planning deveiopments.
Recent British commentators such as S A Wal-k1and have
expressed concern that "Lhere is nov, very little recourse
to Parliament as an arena for the accommodation of
conflicts of economic interest r ot for the sanctioning of
economic policy". 1 ,hi= is a serious charge, not
susceptible to easy resolution. It is complicated by the
rigidities of the two-party system in both fhe British and
New Zealand legislatures. The likelitrood that Cabin'et
would refe.r signif icant plann.ing decisions to the House
for anything more than formal ratification along party
Iinesr oE that parties in office would be prepared to
admit any merit in the bi-partisan development of pollcies
for economic and social development, is still remoLe. The
conventions'and rigidities of the Westminister model
appear to preclude the involvement of New Zealandrs
elected legislature in government planning in even the
limited wiry that 'has occurred, f or example, in indicative
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planning developments in F'rance.
Nonetheless, in the New Zealand Parliament, two
developments are significant in relation to the question
of planning: the first is the work of the public
Expeirditure Committee since 1962; the second (and more
recent) appears to be assuming greater importance - the
acEivities of the caucuses, pErticularly the Government
caucus. Both developments have offered the opportunity to
appry a more or less gffective brake on the tendency for
all signficant executive decisions about the planning and
management of public sector resources to be absorbed into
the protected sphere of technocrats, public servants and
ministers.
The effectiveness of government planning of the type seen
recently in New zealand, such as energy deveropment based
on indigenous resources, almost certainly depends on the
generation of public consent. A considerable degree of
political approval must be extended to planners. As other
writers have observed, where broad-based agreement as well
as sectional co-operation is required, the parliamentary
system rnust provide more than the mere opportunity for
exploitation by fninisters and planning technocrats.
Political consent will not necessarily ensure that plans
will be'realised. Nonetheless effective planning in a
democratic state almost certainly requires more than
formal political compliancer ES expressed through the
balfot box. There must not only be sufficient stability
for the community to adapt to changes indicated by the
planners, and adopted by the executive. There must also
be confidence in particular plans and the planners
themselves, if either is to'be effective.
' An executive planning system that is not responsive to a
wide range of information and opinion, but refers as a
.matter of political convenience only to executive elites
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or selected sources of approval outsirle central
government, may find all fornts of social and economic
management, including expetrditure planning, increasingly
difficulb. This appears to be the recent experience of
the New Zealand Government.
It is probably true that certain phases of the planning
process such as techtrical forecasting oo not Jend
themselves to the continuous and active involvement of
Parliament. However, it does not necessarily follow that
Parliamentrs role in fiscal planning should be that of a
cipher. Brief mention has been made in this study
to the changing role of caucus iri the management planning
system, but detailed analysis Iay cutside the immediate
focus of this research. Therefore this
Appendix briefly reviews only those aspects of
Parliament's role as this is performed on behalf of the
legislature by the Public Expenditure Committee (PEC).
The review suggests that there is considerable scope for a
higher 1eve1 of involvement by Parliament. Evolutionapy
developments in the history of the PEc over the past two
decades demonstrate that as an element in the information
network of the Government I s expenditure planning system,
this Committee could perform an invaluable feedback
function, improving both the executive's future scanning
capacity and its abitity to control and re-direct the
behaviour of spending agencies.
$s- lesl g:egl9- !g-!sr llsrslleJv-llvelvsrs!!- I n- J:ese-l
P,le!!l!g
The most clearly defined opportunity for hrliamentary
intervention in the pubtic expenditure planning Process
occurs during the annual fudgetary cycle. The New Zealand
'legislature has a constitutional role in the Budgetary
process, since its formal approval is necessary when the
expenditure of public funds is undertaken by the
Governmentl or existing rates of taxation are changed. It
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has the pohrer to review past government expenditure, and
comment publicly on this, with recommendations on any
action it believes should be ctrawn to the attention of the
executive or the electorate at Iarge.
This formal task is performed principally through the only
real instrument available to Parliament for executive
review - the select conrnittee system. Attempts have been
made by successive Parliaments to strengthen the means
available to the House to influence budgetary procedures
and the allocative decisions of the Government. In 1962,
for example, Parliament replaced the Public Accounts
Cornmittee with the Public Expenditure Committee, directing
it to examine the annnal estimates of expenditure, review
past government spending, and report on these matters to
the House. The State Services Act, passed in the same
year, required that the permanent head of.a government
department be accountable not only to the relevant
ministers and t,o TreasurY, but also to Parliament's ohtn
officer, the Controller and Auditor-General' The Public
Finance Act passed in L977 states that "no expenditure of
public money shall be ma<le except pursuant to an
appropriation Act of Pbrliament" (s.53); the same
Iegislation extended the powers of the Audit Office to
include revision of the procedures of government financial
accountability 1s.25). Since f981 all bi1ls with
financial implications have been referred to select
committees for consideration prior to their second reading
in the House.2 Among these developments, the most
significant have been those associated with the Public
Expenditure Committee.
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Commi ttee
1962-I979
The Public Expenditure Committee (hereafter PEC) bras
appointed by the House of Representatives in 7962 and
given permanent st.atus as a select committ.ee of the House
under Standing Order 3202
At the commencement of every session a Select
Committee shall be appointed consisting of 12 members,
to examine the estimates presented Lo the House and to
report what, if dry, economies consistent with thepolicy implied in those estimates may be affected
therein; to examine the public accounts of such
corporations, undertakings and organisations as are in
receipt of any money appropriated by Parliament, in
such a manner and to such extenL as the Committee
Ehinks fit, and to have regard to matters in relations
thereto raised in the annual reports of the Controller
and Auditor-GeneraI or elsewhere and to report thereon
to the House or the Government; and to examine any
report to any other matters referred to it by the
Ilouse; the Committee to have power to sit during the
recess and to adjourn from time to time and from place
to place and .to have power to appoint sub-committees
and to refer to such sub-committees any of the matters
referred to this Committee.
Parliament clearly intended that these terns of reference
would enhance its own capacity to monitor and influence
. trends in public spending. Ho\"rever, there are three
significant exclusions from the Committee's powers under
this Standing Order: "ft may not question the policy
choices behind expenditure, it may not adrnit the public to
any of its proceedings under its own motion, and no
specific reference is made to the expenditure of public
money by local authorities. " 3
In 1968 the Standing Orders were amended to rul-e that the
CommitLeefs report would be deened to have been made when
the relevant class of Estimates was called in the
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House. 4
the Committeer Est
r,lritten comment or
Three further amendments were made to Standing Orders in
L972: first, the Cornmittee was to be appoinbed for the
duration of every Parliamentr rdther than at the
commencement of every session; second, its membership
should be not more than L2i and third, the committee
should not be required to examine any class of Estimates
referred to another sel-ect committee for examination. 5
One observer considers that these changes granted the
Committee "continuity, and flexibility in its membership
and Estimates procedures". 6
Other procedures mooted or adopted since J-972 suggest that
the Committee has been engaged in a more or less
continuous effort to improve its ability to carry out the
task entiusted to it by Parliament. In 1973, for example,
the PEC chairman reported that in future the Committee
woul-d report to the House as and when investigations were
completed, instead of deferring these until the
publication of a single annual report. 7 although fcr
several years reports continued to be tabled annually,
interim reports vrere presented each year from I976 oDr and
in L979 three such reports had been tabled within six
months of the new committee taking office. In L973, the
Government initiated a debate on the PubIic Expenditure
Committee's annual report - regrettably this innovation
has not been repeated.' 8
Since L972, the size of the PEC has been redtlced from Lz
to 10, appointed triennially, 9 although membership of
the Committee at any one meeting has varied. Members are
substituted for a variety of reasons, with inevitable
effects on the value in their contribution to the ongoing
work of the Committee. Estimates have been referred at an
increasing rate to other select committees tO, although
However, once passed by formal resolution in
imates are passed to the House without
accompanying report.
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this practice was modified slightll in L976, when the
Committee decided to return to each class of Estilnates at
least once every three years, thus providing for a broad
overview of all departmental votes at regular
- 1rtnterval-s.
Doubts have been expressed as to whether' even with a
monitoring agent Iike the PEC, Parliament in fact
exercises effective Iegal control over the governmentrs
annual budgetary decisions:
Combined ...trends (such as the fact that expenditure
commitments are adopted for periods exceeding the life
of a parliament and far exceeding the annual cycle ofparliamentary scrutiny, the improbability that any
member of Parliament coul-d understand fully the
sophisticated techniques now applied to policy
analysis) have seemingly removed the effective
control of public expenditure from the competence of
tire New Zealand legislature. The evidence cited forthis having been the case is the substantial variation
in amounts appropriated for actual expenditure in
recent years. In the I974/75 and I975/76 financialyears over-ex1>enditure represented 5 percent and 5.7percent respectively of the annual appropriations and
in L976/7?^voted supply was under-expended by 1.7percent. L2
Although elsewhere in government since 1962 growing
attention has been paid to the planning of public
expenditure, Pdrliament's scrutiny of government spending
has altered relatively little despite the modifications
noted above. Parliament still has no machinery for
examining long-term economic priorities and the resource
implications of public expenditure. The House itself
concentrates on the annual supply of money for resourcest
such as personnel, to the government. Unlike the practice
in the United Kingdom, there is no annual white paper in
which' the Government publishes a statement of its
financial intentionsr dDd identifies the future
implications of current resource use. There is no
economic select committeer I'to special procedure by which
the Ne.w Zealand legislature can examine the economic and
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other advice given to the government by the Treasury, or
its other principal adviser.s, such as the Reserve Bank.
Although both major parliamentary parties have caucus
committees which study and advise MPs on economic matters,
the House itself has no all-party procedure for making a
comparable study. For many years, Cabinet has had special
committees responsible for economic affairs and, more
recently, public expenditure survey, but the House itself
has only an immature systen for economic and fiscal
review. The one occasion on which the House, as an
institution rather than an arena for party contest,
undertakes a formal inquiry into the published budgetary
proposals of the executive is in the annual examination of
the Estimates of expenditure by the Public Expenditure
Commi t.tee . r3
The PEC as an information network
Every political system, however simple, has some
normal framework by which messages flow
Essentially, the flow of information of all kinds in apolitical system is called a Inetworkr because its
lines or paths cross: there is, therefore, often more
than one way in which a particular message or fact can
travel from its source to a particular recipient. fts
recipient (for example, the member of Parliament) may
receive this message in several ways - and perhaps in
several versions - becqqse he is exposed to so manylines of the network. 14
Peter El-se, looking at the information network of the
British government system, suggested that in terms of
controlling both the rate and the complexity of the
information which passes through government, certain nodal
points can be identified as having a gatekeeper role in
the reception, analysis and transmission of
'lqinfornation.'- The Public Expenditure committee may be
viewed as one such nodal point in the information system
of Parliament. It is activated in order to perform two
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formal parliamentary tasks:
a) to conduct an annual examination of proposed
government spending for the current financial year
(the annual- Estimates) (see A!p!f,9fgtJ_4_:_g); and
b) to initiate special ad hoc inquiries and
post-expenditure reviews either on its own discretion,
or on the recommendation of the Controller and
Auditor-GeneraI or Partiament itself . (€Sg_ApPgltgll
3el
The pressure of the budgetary timetable allows litt1e room
for the first major task - the Estimates examination,
which is a prospective survey of forward estimates made by
departments of tbeir spending over the next financial
year. However it is during this phase that the Committee
has the opportunity to intervene in the fiscal planning
process. The following section describes some of the
factors influencing the PECrs participation, on behalf of
Parliament, in that process.
I!g-ESIJ!AIE9-EI4yJI4Il9Ir:4Lgl,l,ue-1-39:-r-iggs!Je:v-esJvsv
9E-!!9-grsggllvsjg-J::ss-1-r!!s!!] els
The Estimates examination occurs about Lhe middle of the
calendar yqar. It invariably takes place after
departmental spending on forecasted estimates has already
begun. The PEC's involvement is provided for after the
presentation of the annual Budget by the Minister of
Finance, and the introduetion of the Appropriation 8i11.
The Estimates of expenditure, described in the
Appropriation Bill as Votes to specific departments for
specific purposes' are introduced to the House with the
Budget and detailed as schedules to the Appropriation
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Act. Annua1 reports from spending agencies are tabled as
they come to hand, and referred with the Estimates to the
PEC (or other select committeesr ds decided by the PEC).
After this examination and approval, they are then
referred back to the House, as nearly as possible in
reflection to ministersr order of seniority , for debate
and adoption.
Each Vote is examined individually by the PEC. (See
Appglgll_3B). The departmentrs annual report and any
additional subrnission made by the department to the PEC at
its request are discussed. Senior departmental officials
attend the PEC (and other select committees to which
Estimates have been referred), for guestioning by MPs on
any matter relating to the Estimates. In 1978, for
example, this exercise lasted from June to September, by
which time spending of bhe forecasted I978/79 Estimates
was already well under way and the Supplementary Estimat.es
had been tabled. The prospective survey of forward
Estimates is limited Eo the current financial year - the
future cost implications of the policies and activities
for which funds are required are not spelt out for the PEC.
Since departmental reports have tended to come later
rather than earlier in the Parliamentary session and since
they vary greatly in content, complexity and sensitivity
(a11 of which have conseguences for parliamentary
consideration), time becomes a very scarce
16commodity. There is a considerable obligation on the
Public Expenditure Committee to approve the Estimates and
return them to the House for debate. There is often sharp
pressure ori officials to return written replies to oral
and written questions put to them by members of the PEC
and other selec.t committees in time for these to be of
some use during debate in the House . L7 The
opportunities for careful research and detailed
examination are more limited during the PECrs formal
participation in the Estimates phase of the budgetary
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cycle than el-sewhere in i ts. wor k ,
Over the past 20 years there have been chanqes in the
inf ormation f lowing into the PEC neLwork, the "actorsr' (or
processors) involved in the reception and transmission of
information, and the form in which information is passed
to the PEC and from it to Parliament, the executive and
the public as the "audience" or receivers of financial
information. For example, by the end of L970's, what had
earlier been only informal sources of information had
become structural elements in the PEC networkt in other
cases there had been a shift in the relationship between
various actors, and a variation in their relative poweri
further, there were changes in the type of information,
such as the documenbary evidence' available to the PEC
from various sources.
The following section describes the PEC from several
aspects in dramaturgical terms:
(1) dramatis personnae: participants in the Estimates
examination, and influences on them;
(2) the scr ipt : changes from 1962 1979; and
the information, and(3) the audiences: Lhose who receive
prov.ide feedback to the PEC.
(f) Dramatis Personnae
At the end of
netvrork were
the 1970's
essentially
the principal actors
the same as they had
in the PEC
been in L9622
(a) a small group of politicians,
from both sides of the House
comrnitteer but always chaired
appointed bY Parliament
to serve on the
by a governnent MP;
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(b) an official (or officials) from the Control-1er and
Auditor-General's office, initially with minor status
only, but by the end of the 1970's a formal
participant in the network;
(c) an Estimate clerk from Treasury (the department which
is responsible for the production of the published
Estimates);
(d) the Clerk of the Committee, a member of the
Legislative Department which provides the basic
secretarial servicing of the PEC;
(e) departmental officials and others required to report
annually to the Committee in its examination of the
Estimates, or at any other time when matters arise
which the Committee believeo should be investigated
and drawn to the attention of the House.
Over time, however, there have been sorne additions to this
list of formal participants:
In 1967, a Treasury study group on Financial Planning and
Control recommended an extension to the specialist
advisory services available to the PEC' preferably through
the secondment of another Treasury officer t ot by the
referral to the Treasury of any rnatters which the
committee considered required the attention of
professional investigators. 18 otthough this
recommendation was not taken up for several years, in L973
the then-chairman of the PEC (Jonathan Hunt, MP) chaired
an ad hoc interparty committee which endorsed Treasury's
view that additional assistance be provided for the
Committee. However, it was recommended that this
assistance should come not from Treasuryr but from the
Legislative Department. The then-Clerk of Conmittees'
Adrienne von Tunzelmannr collsidered that the subseguent
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appointment of an additional professional Adviser from the
Of f ice of the Cl-erk early in L97 4 was an important
development: "ft represented a first step in the
employment of Ispecialists] who could assist the Committee
in dealing with an increasingly complex system of
government and provide a balance against the information
supplied and analysed by the departments being examined,
on which formerly the Committee had to rely entirely. " 19
The responsibilities of the new appointee were to assist
the PEC in assimilating the information it received from
government and oLher sources, and to prepare draft reports
for its consideration. The provision of extra staff
aopears to have resulted in more comprehensive reporting
of both fu.ll committee activities and sub-committee
investigations than before, and nore debailed explanation
of the reasoning behind the PECrs recommendations to the
House.
In Ig76' Treasury and the Audit Office, working in
conjunction wiLh a newly-appointed chairman of the PEC (W
Birch, MP) suggested the appointment of another officer,
in this case to undertake investigative research for the
Committee. fn its I97? report to the House' the PEC
commented that:
The involvement of the Audit Office in assisting the
Pub1ic Expenditure Committee has increased
considerably over the last few years, in pqrticular in
L976 and L917. The committee has found this
association fruitful and is keen that it should
continue and develop further. Accordingly' it has
been decided in consultation with the Controller and
Auditor-General and the Clerk of the House that an
officer of the Audit Office be seconded to assist the
committee on a fuIl-time basis. The officer will be
responsible to the Clerk of the House but will return
to the audit office for duties during any recess or
other time when not employed in assisting the
committee. While tne btf-icer wiLl continue to have
access to the resource of the Audit Office' the
inquiries undertaken would be on the discretion of the
coimittee. 20
ulo
An appointinent was made, and in 1978 a junior officer of
the Audit Office took up his duties. This officerrs
initial assessment of the value of his contribution to the
PEC was relatively negative, but by 1979 it was apparent
that there was potential value for the PEC in this more
intimate link with the Audit Off ice. Not on.ly was the
seconded officer able to draw on the resources of the
Audit Office in preparing his contmenLs and reports for the
PECts deliberationst he also provided a convenient
justification for the regular attendance of more senior
Audit officers at the PEC. These officials were kept
constantly in touch with the interests and concerns of the
Committee, and were able to offer discreet, if leading,
guidance to the MPs, not only when other officials were
present, but when the PEC was deliberating uPon its
?'linquiries. o^
In lg7g, the chairperson of the PEC, Marilyn Waring, llP
(who had previously served on the Committee in L976) ,
embarked,with the support of the fuII Committeer oI1 a
further attempt to increase the number of people formally
serving the PEC as consultants. After an unsuccessful
approach to such sources as the Legislative DepartmenE
(which vtas' in the event, constrained by staff ceilings).
Waring, went to the Planning Council as an alternative
source of expert advice. Again this was fruitless.
However the exercise did indicate that at least some
members bf the Committee considered that their work could
have real inpactr and had tried hard to develop the
capacity foreseen by Treasury in L967, when it recommended
the establishment of a larger secretariat. 22
The formal- co-operation of the Audit Office and the
Legislative Department, in their provision of professional
advisers, was a double-edged tool. First, the presence of
such officers undoubtedly reinforced the confidence with
which the Committee approached its task, and the precision
with which it selected among the information passing
-r
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through the network. On the other hand, it also deepened
the penetration (and, by implieation, the possibilities
for influence of the Legi.slature) by professional
advisers, technocratic experts, and permanent pub,lic
servants. By 1979, for exarnple' use made by the PEC of
the services of the deconded Audit officer vTas tending
towards dependence upon his parent office. This
dependency suggests not so much the symbiotic concerns of
the Legislature and the Controller and Auditor-GeneraIr ds
the relative impotence of the House in taking any step
which has not been previously recommended gnd-gPlJgygg for
it by better-informed, non-elected officials.
Second, the preference of the PBC for engaging the
services of the Audit Office, rather than Treasury (as had
been recommended in L967) points to the character of the
political relationships of these departments: with each
other, with the legislature, and with the executive.
Treasury (despite its own partial disclaimer) is perceived
by politicians as being first and foremost the servant
of Ministers and, in particular, the Minister of Finance
who from 1975 on was also the Prime Minister. The
legislaturer ds represented by the PECr appears less
convinced of Treasury's reliability as a servant of the
House. Observation of the PEC in its relations wiLh
Treasury suggest that this lack of confidence is mutual.
Treasury officials, dt the senior levels at leastr apPear
to tolerate the PEC because of its usefulness in
legitimising formal rule changes in the budget system but
have tended to view its operational difficulties with
little concern, and even some cynicism. 23
fn contrast, the Audit Office not. only has the advantage
that the Controller and Auditor-General is the
constitutional servant of Parliament, but is perceived as
its faithfut political'al1y. However, although the PEC
may believe that during the 1970's it stimulated and
encouraged the Audit Office into greater effectiveness by
6t2
adopting as many of its recomtnendations for financial
management and control as it could justify, l-he Committee
itself may have become in effect a tool of the Audit
Of f ice
In the bureaucratic community of central government, the
Audit Office must be Egg! to be effective if it is to
maintain its strategic advantage over the spending and
control departments. The PEC offers an authoritative
entree to a number of areas which r ol'l i ts own, Audi t
Officers could have some difficulty penetrating. Under
the banner of the PEC, old curiosiLies inay be explored;
new anxieties, such as the effectiveness or desirability
of much public sector spending, may be voiced through the
mouthpiece of an enthusiastic committee which, in the late
1970's, was dominated by MPs committed to a significant
reduction in the growth of the public sector. What may
appear to be unanimity of purpose between the executive,
the legislature and the Audit Office - to eliminate waste
and restrain total government spending - may in part have
been manipulated by the Audit Office through its
increasing influence over l4Ps in the PEC network.
A further recent development in expansion of the PEC
network has been its willingness to use the poachers to
catch the gamekeepers. rhis has been done by encouraging
senior public servants to act not only as respondents to
MPs, but as interrogators of other officials on behalf of
the Committee.
For example, in June I979r prior to their examination of
the I979/80 Estimates, the PEC invited several senior
officials from the Treasury, the Audit Office and
elsewhere in the public service to "indicate what sort of
guestion (they) would like to have been asked'r 'vrhen
appearing before the Committee during the Estimates
examination. 24 The Treasury men approached this meeting
with some scepticism. No discussion paper or set of
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written recommendations had been requested by the PEC in
preparation for this novel exercise, and Treasury offered
none, relying in the event on oral responses to questions
put to it by the Committee. Audit Office officials
entered into the discussion lvith some zest - but, like
Treasury, without specific written recommendations or a
prepared discussion document. It was clear that for
Treasury and the Audit Office, the objective of attendance
at the meeting was to establish horv t.horcughly the PEC
intended to pursue its inquiries, to find out what steps
it had taken on its or,tn account to improve its data base'
and to identify the tactics the Committee intended to
employ in pushing departrnents to make more information
available to MPs.
However, three other officials, including J Robertson'
then permanent head of the Justice Department, also
attended. Robertson had only recently joined Justice
from the lvlinistry of Defence, where he had been the
civilian Secretary for Defence. On one earlier occasion
in I97? he had been called before the Committee after he
had commented publicly on the deficiencies of the
disclosure of information to the PEC. It had then been
Robertsonrs view. that most financiaJ policy matters should
be made available to the PEC unless they were unusually
sensitive and required a ministerts specific aPproval for
wider discussion.
After discussing this matter with Robertson, the
then-PEC had requested the Clerk of the House (C
Littlejohn) to comment on the disclosure of information.
While from the Conmittee's viewpoint Lit'tlejohn's
opinion was disappointingly negative, in that it endorsed
the lirnitations imposed on the PEC by Standing Orders' the
affair did suggest some innovative possibilities to the
PEC.
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At the June meeting in 1979, Robertson tabled and spoke
to a paper that suggested varior:s lines of guestioning to
the pEC. 25 He reiterated his earl-ier arguments urging
the PEC towards the lirnits of its authority' firstly by
oescribing why past lines of questioning of departmental
officials by the PEC had yielded so little "pay dirt", and
secondly by ident.ifying the considerabl-e range of
possibilities that were available to determined MPs even
within the current Iimitations of standing orders.
Robertson inferred that what was required in this
seemingly inhibited situation was the exercise of
parliamentary wi1l. He recommended that Lhe PEC adopt the
widest possible interpretat.ion of the task laid on it by
Parliament, if legislative advice and consent for fiscal
plans and budgetary decisions were to have any real
meaning.
Further research will be neecied to establish how far the
PEC is prepared to take this tyPe of informal expansion
of its advisory services - and the extent to which it is
capable of acting upon the advice it receives from such ad
lSS sources without obtaining a change in its formal terms
of reference. Nonetheless, the incident signalled an
important. development in MPs' determination to play a more
effective part in fiscal planning.
_II'_f _lgSI'9S!_9Ir_!!r9_g_Eg
von Tunzelmann has suggested that the post-I970
establishment of parliamentary party'research units may
have improved MP,s performance in select committeesr 3t
least "to the extent that members can make use of their
research staff, (and so) be better inforned on any
particular issue,'. 26 However, by LgTg there was Iittle
indication in parliamentary debates that this alternative
SoUrce had provided more than occasional insights Eot
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individual PEC MPs, in their search for expert or informed
advice.
C1early, if Parliament is to participate effectively in
the fiscal planning processr dcc€ss to relevant
information is crucial. rn their discussion of the
sources of information available to an IqP in the British
House of Commons, Anthony Barker and Itlichael Rush found
that "for a politician, rinformation on public affairst is
a very broad concept indeed... he needs 'informationr only
partly for its own intrinsic saker drd, beyond that,
judges it in the practical political terms of what good it
does him and his political position to take the trouble.to'
absorb it.u Barker and Rush argued, however, that "unless
MPs are nothing more than political eunuchs, they need
information whatever their role. Tf, for example, their
role is to sustain, or oppose the governnent of the day,
they need information to do this effectively i ot if their
role is to scrutinise the activities of the government,
they need information; orr if their role is to represent
their constituents and defend their inberests' once again
they need information. " 27
These multiple roles are related to a number of other
factors, such as l{Psr attitudes towards parliamentary
reform, the constitutional arrangements for consultation
between the political elites and other powerful groups in
socrety, and the role of the news media. The MP is always
a public actor - she or he cannot regard information j-n the
same r,tay as a private citizen, a Minister or a public
servant may do. As a participant in the Public
Expenditure Committee, the MP not only is a consumer of
information. He or she knows that at least in the
presentation of the annual PEC. report to Parliament (and
any controversy there may be over specific aspects of that
report), she or he will inevitably contribute t'o the fLow of
information in the government system and, through the news
media, to the electorate at large. Observation of the
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Committee at work suggests that this awareness markedly
affects the manner in which the political acEors (MPs)
receive, analyse and transmit informaLion in the PEC
network.
Barker. and Rush point to several other factors which apply
to the New Zealand l4P on the PECr ds wel-l as to his/her
British counterpart. F'irst, although an MP inay have a
strong interest in a particul"ar subject, such as capital
investment, the exchange of expertise between the public
and private sectors, education planning or agricultural
development, it does not necessarily foIlow that she orhewill
have a correspondingly strong desire for factual
information on the matter.
Second, the proposed level of future expenditure by the
Government on a particular item or activity is not
necessarily an indicator of what attracts an MPts
attention, since the financial estimate may bear little
relationship either to his or her electoral interests,
personal or professional experience, immediate party
concernsr or current public interest.
Third, the nuts end bolts of policy or departmental
expenditure plans may not interest l"lPs. Although they nay
be intensely concerned over the dismantling or reforming
of some advisory structures (such as quangos) r they may
not necessarily see themselves as responsible for
prohibiting or even supervising such government action,
particUlarly when it rnay have local rePercussions in their
ovrn electorate.
Fourth, MPs are frequently less interested in what tng
!e9l-gf-ylll-!g-gPg!! on activitf ttran in whether glyA
spending on X would mean that there h,as more or less money
available for activities Y or Zt for which they have some
particular concern.
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Fina1ly, while an MP may favour the genelg_1_llgllg! of
rigorous parliamentary scrutiny of executive activity, and
approve of the theoretical concept of parliamentary
participation in the government planning process, she or hemay
not necessarily feel that the operations of committees
specifically establ-ished to carry out such work afe "among
the sali-ent issues of their parlianentary working
Iives".2B rn any case, in New Zealand as in the United
Kingdom, "it has never been part of the case for
establishing specialised committees that they would
discover and reveal state secrets. u 29
with these caveats in mind, it is helpful to refer to
various characteristics of the PECr ds these bear directly
on its capacity as an information network, and as an
active participant in the planning of public expenditure.
E:: pg g-!-i Egr- APP r-999!t
First, although PEC rnembership has always been strictly
along party lines reflecting the parl-iamentary majoritY,
its members are conscious of opportunities to act on
behalf of the whole House. Here modest cross-party
activity does occur. Ivlorgan has observed that in the
British House of Commons there are procedures allowing for
bi-partisan activities which are followed by MPs and offer
more opportunities for co-operation than is possible in
the debating chamber itself. "Composed of representatives
of all parties in the Commons' (such committees) seek to
influence government by building up consensus and by
trying to disentangle the technical from the political in
a particular field." The growth of this sort of activity
may be interpreted, Morgan suggestsr ds "an assertion of
... consensus in the face of party direction and executive
?npower". Jv
A similar phenomenon can be observed in the New Zealand
PEC. Although the Estimates examinat.ion does relatively
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l.ittle to modify the ouLcomes of fiscal proposals, this
exercise and other activities such as the PEC I s special
inquiries and post-expenditure reviews do allow for a
considerable relaxation of party Iines and a submerging of
party political differencLas. One Government member,
summing up her three years' experience on the PECr
stated: "In the fu11 Committee, hearing the Estimates,
you have to be watchdog of the minister; on a
sub-committeet oE during special inguiries, you are the
watchdog of the public."
Absence of Ministers
A second characteristic of the PEC is that, unlike most
other select committees, it does not normally have
rninisters among its members. Exceptions to the rule of
back bench as opposed to front bench membership
demonstrate the significance of this. For example, in
1978, during the examination of the departmental Estimates
for Trade and fndustry, the Minister in Charge of this
portfolio.attended the PEC meeting in substitution for
another National Party member. Legislative DePartment
officials later described this as runiguer. His presence
appeared to inhibit both members and officials. On Lhis
occasion, the Minister bras present for almost full three
hours. Questions and departmental responses were
constantly referred to him, At one stage he expressed
himself very negatively on whether or not the PEC should
be given the information which an opposition member etas
requesting. He added, somewhat belatedly, that this ltas
of course entirely a matter for the discretion of the
department, and that he would not make their decisions for
them.. Nevertheless, the officials decided to act as the
Minister had suggested, with a face-saving modification
which they hoped would allow both the Minister.and the PEC
to be satisfied. 31 It was clear that direct ministerial
involvement would significantly affect the confidence with
which backbenchers and officials operate in this forum.
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A recent study of the membership of New Zealand
Parliament's from 1954 - 1978 claims that "the New Zealand
Parliament (now) contains a high level of intelligence and
ability". This is based on von Tunzelmann's analysis of
the changing patterns in MPs occupational background (e.9.
more lawyers, fewer farmers alnong MP's), improved formal
educational qualifications (e.g. in 1963, 50 percenb of
MPrs entering Parliament had had some form of tertiary
education; by 1978 this proportion had risen to 81
percent); age on entering Parliament (younger in recent
years); and the range of experience MPrs had had in
community and interest grouP activities prior to entering
the House for the first time. The combination of these
and other factors prompted von Tunzelmann to suggest not
only a higher level of "professionalism" among recent
generations of new MPrs, but a greatly increased interest
in, and use of, existing Parliamentary facilities such as
the party research units . 32
The observed performance of tertiary-educated' younger
IvlPrs appointed to the PEC (particularly those with
professional qualifications in 1aw and accountancy)
appears to support von Tunzelmannrs findings. In I978/79,
for example, the PEC included a number of MPrs whose prior
training'and education directly qualified them for
appointment to this Committee, and appeared to enhance
their understanding and interpretation of the fiscal and
other data presented by officials. This not only improved
the quality of the PECrs reports to Parliament (eg the
Kaimai tunnel and Government Printing Office procedures
reports tabled in 19791i it also enabled them to
demonstrate their skills to taLent-spotters for new
Cabinet materia]. Derek Quigley, for instance,
entered the House in 1975 and was soon appointed to the
PEC. His obvious talents in this forum quickly identified
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him for fast-track promotion, and within three years he
held portfolios in both ltousing and Finance.
g!s- JlgJyslss- gJ- lguel_ tL !!s_!E9_ls!ysrl
During its first 12 |ears of operation, the pEC system was
an exclusively male affair. In L974, a departure from
this homogeneity came with the appointment of von
Tunzelmann from the parliamentary Office of the Clerk as
the Committeers Legislative Department Advisory Officer.
Her appointment has been significant. Her formidable
academic gualifications, administrative experience and
report-writing skills contributed in no small way to a
general improvement in the standard of reporting by the
Committee to the House from the late 1970s on.
A second development took place in L976, when the National
Government appointed two women Ir{Prs, Colleen Dewe and
Waring to the PEC. Dewe lost her
Lyttleton seat in 1978, and her electoral successor,
Hercusr wis appointed by Labour to the PEC in 1979.
Hercus, Iike the two other women MPs before her, hras
highly-educated, and had had considerable experience as a
government appointee to the Commerce Comnission. Her
legal and commercial experience made her an obvious
candidate, just as Dewe's pre-parliamentary work as an
accountant had been seen as a desirable qualification by
her party managers. Waring had worked as a university
tutor and as a research officer in the National Party
parliamentary research unit prior to I975, and her
academic background and widely publicised interest in
parliamentary reform and legislative efficiency no doubt
recommended her for appointment to the PEC.
Observation of the PEC at work over 1978 and 1979 sessions
(during which time all four hromen were involved in this
network) suggests that when women are in a competitive
work situation with men they have high expectations of
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themselves and different attitudes from men to their
work. Hercus and Waring, for instance, selected for
fiscal slaughter different sacred cows and they reacted
differently from their ntale coLleagues to the customary
liniiLations of party discipline. Dewer Waring and Hercus
were consistently (and unusually) thorough in their
preparabion for PEC meetings and, unlike most male
members, they appeared to be regarded by officials as
persistent and aggressive during examinations.
There is no reason to suppose that women MPs are any less
anxious than men to attract the favourable attention of
party managers looking for potentia'I Cabinet mernbers.
However, obserrlation of t.he activities of the MPs
associated with the PEC in recent years suggests that
vJomen are particularly concerned over parliamentary
efficiency, have qualitatively higher expectations of
themselves and Ehe PEC's task than most of their male
colleagues, and dernonstrate considerable interest in
Parliamentrs taking a much more active role in expenditure
planning and budget control.
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A further influence on the PEC over the years is that of
parliamentary generations: the effect of waves of
Inewconersr or the told-timersr. As we noted earJ-ier, an
MPrs sources of information, and hisorher attitudes towards
this information, its analysis and user are varied.
Barker and Rush suggest that the t"lP him orherself ntay be the
main determinant of how many people bring what kinds of
issues, troubles, opinions and other information to
his/her attention. 33 An ltP who has had considerable
political experience2 and lengthy exposure to information
from various sources such as the local party br.anch,
nationa.l party headquarters, regional and national party
headguartersr E€gional and national party conferences,
parliamentary party caucus, oifferent party leaders, the
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research scrvices available
the party research units of
the news media and so forth,
attitude towards information
in Parliament itself (such as
the General Assembly Library),
will have a very different
from a new and younger Mp.
If in aodition the MP has served as a Cabinet Minister,
his knowledge of the pEC network and his actual or
potential role in it will be quite different from those
who have not held a ministerial portfolio. 'Old-timerst,
particularly ex-ministersr Ray, covertly at least, support
the view that exchanges of information between departments
and backbenchers should generally be kept to a minimum, or
referred to them indirectly through a Minister.
Long-serving members, even when in Opposition, ildy regard
backbenchers as obstacles to be got around, rather than
useful recipients of information. 34
Conversely, newer I"tPs may f ind the maze of charrnels
through which informaEion flows in the pEC network
confusing, even threatening. They may either rely heavily
on more experienced MPs for guidance t ot become
frustrated, feeling unable to extract what they believe to
be important informationr drrd not knowing which guestions
will produce the.desired repJ-ies. If the new MP's primary
objectiver in his/her first term of office, is to seal his
1ips, listen and watch (advice given by an ex-Prime
Minister to parliamentary newcomers) in order to secure
his position in the party hierarchy, then his attitude
towards the PEC will reflect this.
On the other handr appointment to this prestigious
committee is widely regarded as a tap on the shoulder.
The new MP may feel obliged to demonstrate hisr/her
particular skills as interrogator, analyst and
transmitter, and ensure that these come to the attention
of the party managers. The facts of expenditure
investigations may be less important to this MP than
his/her actual "performance" when expenditure policies are
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discussed by officials and the PEC. The ambitious MP may
use the reputation of the Comrnittce to get close to (or
remain anrong) the more infl.uential members of the party.
Like other senior people working in central government,
t"lPs are granted litt1e respit.e f rom the demands of their
office - demands which are as often in conflict as in
accord. They therefore need to discipline the
miscellaneous flow of fact and information which passes
through the parliamentary networks. The pressure of
business and the many demands on an Mp's attention may
cause him/her to neglect or ignore aspects of public
expenditure which seem riveting to officials or
I outsiders I such as the news rnedia
Research in Britain has shown that lenglh of parliamentary
service and ministerial experience do not necessarily
increase lvlPs! desire to improve the quality or the form of
information reaching them. 35 rndeed, it has been
suggested that ex-ministers are particularly cautious
about changing the information flow t oE increasing
parliamentary control over thisr oD the grounds that this
could affect the "doctrine" of ministerial responsibility;
or because "it has been accepted that confidentiality
Iin certain key select committee procedures] is necessary
in order that exchange of information and ensuing
discussion can be f ree and uninhibited rr. 36
Observation of the PEC at work tends to confirm the view
that length of service is the main indicator of whether an
MP will react conservatively to proposed parliamentary
reforms or such innovations as making budgetary
information more freely available to select committees,
requiring ministers to front-up to MPs, expanding the work
of select comnittee and so forth. As a result, elections
which throw up numbers of new younger MP t s tend to have a
marked "generational" effect a phenomenon which can be
seen in the history of the PEC.
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The most notable examples of PEC activity occurred dr:ring
1966-67, Lg76-77 and in the post-197g period . 37 During
each of these periods a rginger groupr of young, usually
ambitious, MPs was appointed to the Committee. While
undoubtedly serving their ovrn and their parties, political
ambitions, these politicians extenoed and enriched the
PECrs impact on the executive and the llouse itself ,
In the British House of Commons, such members tend to be
younger university graduates, graduate Labour MPs or
'coming' Conservative backbenchers. Much the same is true
of the New Zealand legislature. Energetic PEC groups
included such MPs as Muldoon, Mclntyre, Gill,
Gordon, Gair, Quigley, t'taring, Birch (a11
National) and Freer, Kirk, Tizard, Douglas,
Burke and Ilercus (all Labour) . At one time or another
all these parliamentarians have been known variously as
"young Turks", "radica1s", t'young hopefulst', t'f uture
Cabinet material"r or just plain "stirrers". All
subseguently held ministerial office, were 'shadow
l'linistersr in opposition t oE acquired a position of
prominence in party leadership. But of more direct
importance for the purpose of this study is the fact that
the PEC is seen to be activated and influential, or
relatively inert, in direct reflection of the
parliamentary generations passing through the network.
While there is undoubted advantage for political parties
in deploying their more experienced members in areas which
are information-rich, observation suggests that the
effects of familiarity and long service tend to blunt,
rather than sharpen up, the manner in which ex-ministers,
at least, work 
.on the PEC. Prior knowledge of procedures,
reservations about the deterrent and promotiona.l impact of
PEC recommendations and reports, and, in some cases even
boredom with the repetitive business of government, appear
to lower the expectations of ex-ministers.
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In L978-79, when all the ex-ministers on the pEC were
Opposition (Labour) members, two further maLters became
apparent, AII parliamentary party l-eaders are in constanb
demand for a range of caucus duties and public obligations
which are less pressing for newer backbenchers. This
obviously affected the consistency with vrhich Labour I s
senior members applied themselves to fiscal examinations.
Labour party cau.cus leaders appeared somewhat dif f ident,
in the context of the PEC, about probing too deeply into
the policy and resource proposals of officials they once
controlled (albeit briefly) as ministers. Ex-ministers
who sustained the political optimism of a party in
Opposition hesitated to establish a precedent for intense
Parliamentary scrutiny of executive action. This could
presage future embarrassment for themselves, should they
re-take the Treasury benches.
Most ex-ministers demonstrated this diffidence in a number
of ways: they arrived late and left early, attended PEC
as infrequently as possible, took few positive steps to
ensure that OpposiLion members presented themselves as a
well-disciplined, thoroughly preppred and assertive team,
encouraged little in-caucus debate or discussion of PEC
matters, and took little part, if dny, in subsequent
debates in the House on the wide range of topics brought
to their attention during PEC examinations.
This behaviour may, of course, be peculiar to Labour
representatives on the PEC. Their long experience as the
Opposition partyr and their ennervating disappointnent at
being rejected by the electorate in 1975 probably
influenced their attitude to parliamentary select
comrnittee work. von Tunzelmann has suggested
that in L972 (which she regards as "something of a
watershed" in the history of the PEC) the incoming Labour
government couLd be assumed to have spent its long time in
opposition in preparation for executive office, devising a
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confident approach to the possibilities of the pEC in
which officials could be directed to table information
dif f icult to obtain e-lsewhere. rf Labour Mps dicl this,
and if they r./ere then prepared to apply rvhat they learned
in GovernmenL to the work of the pEC after they lost
office in 1975, it wbs not obvious to the observer.
The development of an active, probing, publicity-conscious
PEC appears to depend, among other factors mentioned
earlier, upon:
(a) the personal attributes of ir:dividual MPs, such as
those demonstrated by l"1u1doon;
(b) the extent, to which MPs perceive the pEC as a route to
ministerial office - which itself depends on how far
MPs see their party as the typical party of government;
(c) the rspecial' political experience of such groups of
MPs as the tcomen nrembers of the pEC, mentioned earlier;
(d) the willingness of party m.lnagers to select and
support as PEC members any 'ginger groupsr within
their rank e.g. l,tuldoon and others in 1955;
Hercus, Douglas and others in L978-79i
(e) the effects of parliamentary generations, who pass
through the legislature in erratic waves. Younger,
well-qualified, graduate members benefit from their
experience on the PEC, and use this to rise to
positions of importance in government, leaving the pEC
under-nourished until the next injection of relative
youth and enthusiasm for greater efficiency in public
expenditure planning and management.
There is a further dimension to the generational
differences between young/older - new/Longer-serving MPs
in the PEC network. It is not, on the whole, in the
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interests of senior MPs and Cabinet ministers to allow too
much backbench aLtenLion to be paid to executive buciget
decisions and economic planning, and they deal with this
in two ways. First, they ensure that PEC backbenchers who
indicate a vigorous reforhisb desire are given an
increasing load of responsibillty for caucus and other
committee work. For example, dt the same time as she was
appointed to the PEC, l',laring was also appoin,ted
chairperson of the government Caucus Economic Committee
and Eiven a number of other formal and informal duties
not the Jeast being her assumed role as the "resident
Parliamentary f eministr'. Second, rvhere possible, Cabinet
avoids the undesirable or problematic consequences of PEC
recommendations - a topic which is referred to later.
p_f 
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OId-timers and newcomers are not, however, lirnited to the
MPs who participate in the PEC network. The departmental
officials servicing and appearing before the Committee
form another distinctive group of participants. The staff
which services the Committee, and the officials who appear
before it, include men wiLh a long history of association
with thi.s branch of government. The constitutional
convention of democratic propriety, which is part of the
mythology of the public service, demands a parliamentary
ritual of the kind practised in the PEC. For example, dt
the beginning of the L97B/79 Estimates hearing, and again
in J-g7g, there vras a palpable air of expectation among the
officials, a tension which had almost invariably
evaporated by the time the Estirnates hrere passed, and
farniliar lines of inquiry and response evoked. One senior
official, who had appeared before this and other
parliamentary c.ommittees over many years, described this
complex situation:
"Usua1ly, our Estimates go before the Education select
committee, and this is preferabler since they tend to be
628
less partisan and possibly better infornred about
educational matters. On the other hand, the PEC has more
senior members on both sidesr oinor! its membership, and in
any case has rather more standing and prestige among
departmental officials. The permanent head and f have to
front up, and we, of course, urrderstand the Iimitations of
the Comnittee. But the junior people (that is, at about
director level) we take wi.th us regard the PEC very
seriously......
The PEC members are more quizzical (at least, the
Opposition ones are) and regard bhe pEC as demanding a
greater effort from us than does the Education select
committee. The PEC rnay begin in a very searching nanner
for example, this year Mr T- began as though he intended
to go through line by line, and we felt we would undergo a
very close grilling. But they soon become sidetracked by
partisan considerationsr dnd lose the thread of their
d iscuss ions
While we don't regard the PEC as much more than a
generator of work, and a bit of a distraction in the whole
budgetary process, it does provide a necessary means by
which governments can be seen to be examining and
assessing the performance of departments in terms of
previously all-ocated funds. Without it, we would have
much less work to do. For example, the Notes to the
Estimateb, which are time-consuming, go only to government
l'lPs. f asked the t'linister a couple of years ago if they
could also go to the Oppositionr but he was opposed to
that. This means that if we refer to sonething in the
Notes and an Opposition member says rf canrt find thatr he
is referring to the Notes in the Estimates themselves,
Part E, and f have to refer to some other part of tl"
printed Estimates to let him in on what is being discussed
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The provision of written answers takes a lot of t.ime
there were 60 or 70 this year. But I myself have
suggested to Russell Marshall (Opposition spokesperson on
Education) a couple of years ago that if the Opposition
wanted information, iff they had to do was ask a guestion
in the House and make sure they got the ans!'rer - I I ve been
a bit iroist on my oln petard in Lhis, since the number of
questions this year has been phenomenal.
The PEC certainly does not act in any way as a rod, or
measuring stick for us on our ovrn performancer but it does
fulfiI an important formal function in government;
There is usually little relationship between what is asked
by the Opposition on the PEC, and vrhat is debated later in
the House. This year I think only one of the 60-odd
written ansvrers h,as evsn ref erred to in f ive hours of
petty bickering. Yet sonetimes you can be very busy
sitting there behind the Minister, rea1ly working flat,
out. You never really know what they're going to do' but
on the PEC, even for their most searching questions, you
know that they are seeking information for the House' or
reference to their or^rn electorates
There has been absolutety no noticeable difference in the
range or pressure of questions since the PEC got its new
(Audit secondment) research officer. fn many ways the
whole hearing depends very much on the tone and manner of
its conduct. Itrs almost like a ritual chore they have to
go through they krrow that by five minutes to one it will
be all overr and they canrt actually affect anything
anyvray.
l,lhile the sort of questions they ask do give us a sort of
a steer (as to how the public is reacting to our forward
policies) we get even more information on this from the
debates in the llouse.
feel.
6 3.0
They do reflect public opinionr we
We take care to protect the Minister. Buildings are
always a popular area for questions - 7C-80 percent of all
questions are about capital works - so before the
Estimates $re get a report from the regions and give the
Minister a potted reply on this. But no, I donrt think we
could or should dispense with the pEC - it does have a
vital role in our kind of democracy.,, 38
Contained in this statement are many of the myths, and
some of the explanations, for tbe problems of linking
parliamentary oversighL with finance management and public
resource planning: the unexamined myth of parliamentary
control; the 1itt1e-questioned determining power of the
executive; the uncritical observation that a select
committee responsible for a specific area (such as
Education) is likely to be nore expert than a generalised
select committee - while at the same time preferring to
retain a formal link with those bodies such as the pEC
which are believed to be more prestigious through their
closer links with the executive itself; the denial of
certain realities (such as the fact that most members of
the PEC are relatively inexperienced backbenchers, and
only the minority have had extensive experience as "senior
members") i the sentimental notion that maintenance of the
fgggs of parliamentary consultation and participation is
suf,ficient to justify the present systemr Do matter how
ritualised and hollow it has become.
Not all of f icials share this t old-tirner's I view. This is
particularly so in the case of officials from the control
departments of Treasury and the SSC. In its discussions
with Treasury people, the PEC appeared more inept and much
Less confident than with any other single group of
officials. During the I978/79 Estimates examinations, tor
instance, Treasury officials adopted the role of the
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featured players, *ian the PEc as an inexperienced and
under-rehearsed supporting cast. Discussions about the
l-erms of reference of the PIC, its authority under
Standing Orders to press of f icials f or inf ormatr,on, and
the nature of its relationship with Ministers were both
more acrimonious and'more ambivalent during these.hearings
than others.
For example, during one hearing on Vote: Capital
Participation in Crown and Other Organisations (I978/79) ,
PEC members engaged in a very lively debate amongst
themselves (stoically observed by the Treasury men) on
whether or not the PEC was in fact. eligible for a report
by Treasury on the gross net involvement of the Crown in
"aI1 other organisations". The Chair asserted that the
PEC could discuss only what was specified in the
Estimates; the Opposition claimed ttrat anything arising
anywhere in the Public Accounts or the Budget, which
affected the forward Estimates, should qualify. The Chair
was unwilling to rule on thisr dnd a Government member.
suggested that the PEC should "ask the l"linister of Finance
whether he would approve an investigation into the
historical part.icipation by the Crown in the complete
range of capital and other organisations". To this the
Opposition retorted that "It doesnrt matter where el-se the
information appears (e.g. in the PubIic Accounts). This
committee must have ful-I statements of accouhts in order
to determine the extent and efficiency of the Crownrs
involvement in organisations other than those listed (ie.
on p. 34 Estimates 1978)'. The chair commented; 'rBut rve
can't discuss poIi.y, and some of these questions relate
to policy", to which the opposition replied "Yes' vre can
discuss policy now, though we couldnrt in the past.r' A
government member then moved that "in future the l'linister
of Finance should be asked to rule on whether Estimates
prepared by Treasury . . o . cou.ld show all movements of
Crown investment." This was accepted by the Chairman with
the final ruling that "that information could not be made
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public, though it could be nade available to the PEC. " 39
At another (Ig7B/7g) hearing, opposition members expressed
their dissatisfaction with Treasuryrs written reply to a
question. They cl-aimed to want "much more specif ic
replies". while what Treasury had subtni bted v/ere only "the
most general and unspecific". "The departtnents need a
shaking-up"r one member stated, "and if we don't get
satisfaction from them we will take the matter to the
House,,. Treasury vJas again asked for a satisfactory
reply. Later discussion by the author with Treasury
officials revealed that immediately after this hearing
Treasury asked the i'linister of Finahce f or a ruling, and
he had adamantly denied the right of the PEC to have the
information its members sought. Officials added privately
that ',since ii's only old tMPl who wants it, they wonrt
push,,, and suggested that the matter would probably be
dropped. (As a sidelight on this, a paper which contained
the information requested was forwarded confidentially to
the Chairman of the PEC, but owing to a secretarial error
it was distributed to one of the opposition members
earlier demanding the rright to know'. This member
apparently did not recognise it for what it was, much to
the relief of the Treasury officers, who had been a little
discornfitted at the possible repercussions from the
Minister. )
During discussions of Treasury's own Vote for 1978/79,
conflict between the officials and the Opposition members
vras more explicit. Not only was the propriety of
Opposition questions challenged by Government members, it
was also openly disputed by the officials. In every case
the o.fficials and Government MPs supported each other
against one particularly persistent (though inept)
opposition member. The chair was under considerable
pressure, and on two occasions turned fot assistance
directly to the officials, suggesting that their greater
experience on ',this sort of . thing" might allow them to
. 
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indicabe whether Opposition members oughlr to ask, and
receive an answer to, the information they sought. The
Treasury official leading the team commented on one
occasion during the hearing that if the present line of
questioning continued "it would become very difficult for
us to co-operate wibh the PEC while we give advice
(which we are not prepared to discuss here), the final
decisions are up to the Ministers
proper, or possible, to give some
sometimes it I s
things to you..... "
Part of the problem of the PEC in rel-ation to this group
of officials is the psychological attitude of MPs towards
Treasury, which complicates other difficulties they have
in areas of ministerial sensitivity. For instance, in
L978/79 Estimates examinations, Vote: Prime Ministerrs
Department, officials \,rere led by an ex-Treasury senior
official. FIe briskly announced at the outset that he had
a plane to catch, rnrhich meant he had to leave in 30
minutes. The PEC was extremely deferential and at
considerable pains to accommodate what was hardiy couched
as a request. Another senior permanent head with whom
this incident was later discussed claimed to be
"astonished", since, he said, "we always assume t.hat we
are entirely at Lhe disposal of the Committee, and do not
expect to be permibbed to leave early for any reason
whatsoevert'.
In the cbntext of the PEC network, Treasury appears to
represent the Establishment: uncorruptible, unassailable,
highly-trained, well-inforned servants of the Minister,
before whom the PEC are callow amateurs. This phenomenon
may however, be limited to weak phases of PEC history,
since in 1966-67, I976-77 and L979 stronger leadership
for the PEC apparently gave the l,lPs considerably more
confidence in fronting up to Treasury officials.
not
40
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Finally in this range of PEC actors there are the
bit-players - the Estimates Clerk and the Legislative
Department clerks who provided basic servicing functions
in much the same way in IgTg as they had done sixteen
years earlier. Indeed, in two cases, these positions had
been held for most of the period by the same men.
Committee clerks, like the secretaries of Cabinet
committees, form a distinctive class in the bureaucratic
Parliamentary hierarchy. The Clerk of Cornmittees (I979)
was probabiy atypical, not only by virtue of her sex, but
her academic qualifications. The other clerks,
accountable to her, were generally older men of the same
generation as most of the MPs. Whatever private
reservations they may have had about individual MPs, the
clerks not only had a strong proprietorial interest in
"their" select committeeIs performance, but a firm belief
in the meaning of "public service". Rarely officious,.and
Ioyal by conviction rather than ideology, the PEC clerks
vtere courteous, deferential without being obsequiousr and
formally neutral in providing for the needs and demands of
the main actors.
UnIike their Cabinet office counterparts, the PEC clerks
and the Estimates clerkr all nearing reLirement, vrere less
concerned with immediate political crises than to protect
the confidential.ity of 
.their committeers work. Although
initially intrigued and privately amused, for instance, by
the novelty of a young woman as PEC chairperson, in 1979
they were prepared to find a great deal to interest them
in the resuscitation of "their" select comrnittee under
Waringrs style of leadership-
The clerks demonstrate something of the policies of those
responsible for recruitment ahd selectior: for secretarial
and other services for Parliament. At this level,
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personal flair is apparently not raled as highly as
modesty and reliability. Personal ambition must be
constrained by an appreciation of the ritualistic aravity
of the work being carried out - regardless of any actual
evidence to the contrary. IntellectuaI skills are less
Iiighly regarded than rather more old-fashioned virtues of
diligence, discretion and loyalty to the institution of
Parliament. These virtues, cultivated here as elsewhere
in the "service divisions" of Parliament and the Cabinet
office, ensure a stable infra-structure for the complex
networks of influence and pob/er in the centraL government
system. The principal players frequently appeared unaware
of importance - and even the identity - of these
Parliamentary servants. As the Estimates Clerk (who had
held this position for 15 years) rather stiffly observed
to the author half way through L979: "f havenrt actually
been introduced to the Committee this year - I bet half of
them donrt have any idea who I am or vthy I sit through all
the Estimates meetings". 4L
sg ggg:y_i 
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The actors in the PEC network constitute a varied group.
This variety shapes the meaning of their Parliamentary
instructions and affects not only the rate and complexity
of information flowing through the network, but its
transmission and reception by other networks - principally
Parliament and the executive itself.
From among the many and complex messages reaching this
Committee, both from within and outside Parliament, the
MPts and the officials must rnake a selection. The
messages may repeatr confirm or contradict each other.
Some informatiqn may appear capable of affecting the basic
facts of executive po$reri some may be ignored because its
value is not recoghisedr ot is simply not seen as relevant
to the !{Prs personal view of his parliamentary task. The
MP requires to have certain facts at his/her disposal. ff
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the PEC provides these, the CommiLtee is useful tq him;
even if it does not, it may still enlarge his
"appreciative framevrork", and inform him about certain
situations or relationships. The MP on the PEC must live
off his,/her intellectual and experiential capital which
may be both supplemented or starved by serving on the
PEC. 42
The regular participants in the PEC network sometimes act
as stage-managers for other people's dramas as in
conflicts between Treasury and the Audit Office over
proposed changes in the financial cyc1e. On other
occasions, they provide an audience for certain kinds of
semi-public performance by senior public servants - as
when Estimates are examined, and officials have an
opportunity to observe their peers or their subordinates
enacting an unusual role as supplicants who, given the
constitutional rules, cannot loser let must be
interrogated by laymen with no polrer to alter the
allocative plans put before them.
Significantly absent from the list of actors described
above are the news nedia. 43 Attempts to open the PEC to
public hearing have been unsuccessful. If the PEC is, at
bestr ;tn imperfect receiver and a faulty transmitter of
information, this rnay be partly because this particular
channel for direct feedback is not built into the
parliamehtary system.
In the formal examination of the Estimates' the PEC
appears to have few effective means (or even the desire)
to facilitate the flow of inforrnation either into or out
of the government system. Yet among experienced officials
there is motherhood-and-apple pie ag,:eement about the
necessity for this parliarnentary task. They see the PEC
as desirable in unspecified "democratic" terms but filling
a role which neither MPs nor officials can actually define
in qualitative (or quantitative) terms. Apparently the
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PEC satisfies a need for some formal ritualistic
demonstration of legislative concern about the planning
function of the adnrinistration - essentially a symbolic
value. Yet, it may, almost incidentally, proviQe some
marginal gains for astute or ambitious Mps:
'Itrs frustrating on the main committee because there are
all sorts of questions you, as a backbencher, would love
to ask, but yourre frightened because you might be feeding
information to the Opposition. you don't want to expose
the Minister to public criticism. So you have to temper
your own desire for information with knowledge of the
political reaction rvhich could flow from an open debate on
that information.... .Yes, it is a good way up. Several
other MPs have commenEed rather wistfully that 'you PEC
people have far more idea of what I s going on than we do on
say Land and Agriculture or Loca1 Billsr.....Itrs not just
Lhe prestige, itrs the information you can get for
yourself." IGovernment member of the PEC.J
9!elgse-r!-gs- gsrlPli 
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There have not only been changes in the "cast" of those
involved in the PEC network since L962 there have aLso
been amendments to the script - that is, the documentary
basis for the Estimates examination.
In L962 none of the documents to which members had access
was specifically written for the Conmitteer and only two
htere used directly by Committee members in their task of
Estimates examination. The relevant documents were:
(f) the audited Public Accounts;
(21 the annual g!gg-g! statement;
(3) the annual 
_E!!lgg!gg of expenditure (the formal basis
for PEC inquiries into proposed government spending);
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(4) the annual departmental, reports to the House of
Representatives (used by the PEC as a supplement tot
and partial explanation of, the annual Estirnates).
fn addition to this information, the PEC, like the public
at large, also had available to it:
(5) the annual reports to Parliament of the Controller and
Auditor-GeneraI.
By 1979, other documents had been added:
(6) the annual reports of all Public Expend-i.ture
Committees since 1963;
(71 occasional reports and commentaries r,rritten for the
PEC by any of its specialist advisers from the
Legislative Department or the Audit Office;
(8) an annual, supplementary paper (submitted in response
to instructions from the PEC) from government
departments in receipt of public funds, including
comments on matters such as over and under-expenditure
of the previous yearrs allocation, major changes in
departmental policy in the previous year, and so forth.
The last two itens included material written "for the eyes
of the PEC only". Various developments of the past 16
years have contributed to their production and to oLher
changes in system through which the PEC carries out. its
examination of the forward spending proposals of
government departments. The most notable developments
include the following:
q3e
1962
In L962, the same year as the Public. Expenditure Conrmittee
was set up to replace the old Public Accounts Committee, a
Royal Commission of lnquiry into the State Services in New
Zealand reported to the governrnent. fn its report. the
Commission stated that while constitutional responsibility
for financial control sti11 rested with the legislature,
I'Parliament had been compelled to restrict its direct
control to a system of appropriation which does no more
than fix overall limitations and the general direction of
expenditure. For the rest, there has been by convention a
transfer of control to Cabinet, and by specific delegation
from Cabinet to Cabinet Committees, Ministers and
departments. Delegation has led in turn to a greater need
for, and a greater reliance on, control departments (then
the Public Service Commission, the Audit Office, the.
Treasuryr and the Ministry of Works) ". 44
The Commission reported that this process of transfer and
delegation had been increasingly rapid since 1939, when
Parliament had been able to rely on itemisation of
estimates and on full Cabinet control. Since then
however, the presentation of the Es_tigg_tg! had been
simplified, with far-reaching consequences, in the
Commission's view. Many separate items were grouped in
block sums, such as capital works projectsr dnd under
general headings. fnclusion of a particular project in
the Estimates had "thus come to involve no more than
tentative approval, and approval in principle. The
principle is re-consideredr dnd the detail and timing of
the project determined (in the light of fuller informaEion
and of any changes in conditions) either by the Cabinet
itselfr of, by a subordinate authority exercising delegated
,Rpower". :J
The 1962 Commission had noted that while either the
comments or the concurrence of Treasury was almost
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invariably obtained by Cabinet when planning the
allocation of funds, the same concurrence was neither
expected nor required from Parliament. The growth in
public business, and the rapid pace of devel-opment in
governmentrs invoLvement in management of the national
economy sharply emphasised the significance of the Budget
and the annual Estimates, the Commission stated. However,
the time available to Parliament for scrutiny through the
Pubric Accounts committee, and the kind of attention the
House and iEs committees could give to these financial
documents, was increasingry limited. The consequence of
this situation the declining ability of parliament to
exercise meaningful contror over the allocation of public
funds was, in the Commission's view, to intensify the
importance of the control departmentsr BS advisers to the
Cabinet . 46
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In 1967, a working party was set up in the Treasury to.
investigate aspects of the increasing burden of management
and control of government finances. The study group $ras
asked to examine, with a view to their reform if
necessary, the current procedures for approvals,
delegations of expenditure authorities, and investigation
of financial proposals by Treasury. The financial
management system (which incorporated aII existing
procedures within the government sector for the allocation
and expenditure of public funds) was defined by the
working party as follows:
a set of organisational arrangements by which
Government makes decisions on the use of financial
resources, communicates these decisions to the people
responsible for acting on them, receives acivice andinformation on policy and performance, and ensuresthat its directions are being carried out. 47
Since the basis of the government's power to obtain
control over public resqurces, ano allocate these
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according t-o given prior ities, lay r-rItimaLeIy with
Parliament, it h/as apparenb to the Study group Lhat the
PEC must be incj-uded in any comprehensive survey of the
financial management system:
Government administration is a pyrarnid of
responsibility, and at all levels the problem is todefine and develop a management information system
which provides the information appropriate for control
and review at dif f erent l-evels of thl pyramid. 48
In the opinion of the Study Group, a satisfactory
information situaEion did not exist, dt least insofar as
Parliamentary control was concerned. Their report
described in some detail various techniques such as
accounting procedures employed in the financial management
Aqsystem. The first aspect of public acounting was
described by the Study Group as "authority accounting" - a
cash control system intended to ensure that expenditure
appropriation and disbursement was carried out in line
with statutory reguirements laid down by Parliament. The
effectiveness of this (through the Vote system of
appropriations to authorised government agencies)
depended, it was argued, upon information: at very leastt
information must be available in an appropriate form and
at an appropriate time to permit corrective action to be
taken. Seen in this light, the PEC, for exampler was part
of a learning system in which feedback was the critical
element of control.
The second aspect of public accounting described by the
Study Group was that of "responsibility accounting" - a
qualitative assessment of the uses to which the funds vtere
Put, and the persons designated to use them. It involved
setting job-standards to perform - and controlling those
activities on the basis of periodic information on costs
and performance. The form and control of such data
depended upon the nature of control to be exercised. The
Study croup suggested that white this sort of data and
other information (such as the efficiency with which
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resources are drawn from the private sectcr and used by
the Government; the impact of governmentrs financial
activities on the distribution of private incomes, and the
economic growth of the nation) was "mainly relevant to
central Government in its function of overall economic
policy-making", there were obvious implications here for
Parliament itself, both directly and indirectly. For
example, the Study Group commerrted that:
Although we have discussed this whole guestion in the
light of the needs of managernent, the general public
should not be neglected. Since planning and
policy-making are part of the polil_rSg_f Isic]
mechanism, information must be*EiEiIEEf.e to the public
as a whole to promote informed discussion on and an
awareness of the means and ends of public policy. At
the review end this has the desirable effect ofincreasing the accountability of Government to
Parliament, ang^the public, for its stewardship ofpublic funds. f,u
The Study Group recommended that:
if at all possible, the work of the PEC should be
expanded in depth and scope to include more extensive
examination of departmental programmes and performance
and inEerrogation of officers responsible for them.
Some consideration should be given to increasing the
investigative capacity of the Committ.ee. This would
require an improvement in the scope and quality of
information available to such bodies as Parliament and
the Committee. 5l
In the Study Grouprs view, there were important
' deficiencies in various aspects of the existing system of
financial management and control, such as the form and
context of the Public Accounts (by which they meant "any
published financial document of Government") - On the
basis of their investigations the Study Group appeared to
see any increase in the effectiveness of Ehe PEC, as part
of the financial planning mechanisms of governmentr ES
dependent on several developments:
643
(I) the availability of relevant information-, in an
appropriate form for use by what was essentially a lay
body (MPs) :
(2') the provision of 'supporting services, whether. f rom
Treasury or from some expanded secretariat and
research unit;
(3) acceptance by government departments (and the
Government itself) of the genera-l desirability of
closer Parliamentary scrutiny of executive performance.
Clearlyr the third point would depend on the polit,ical
will of the ministers, and their permanent advisers
while atl three were related to the specific information
processed through the PEC network.
The Study Group reported that the Estimates presented to
the PEC were in such a form that detailed attenlion g9J-19
!g!_!g_glvgn to the allocated sums. The consequences of
this, it was stated' were adverse, not only limiting the
usefulness of the select committeers work, but reducing
Parliamentrs control over the executive fiscal planning
decisions. For example:
(a) Estirnates of under $100 appeared as 55 differently
coded items; estimates of over $40r000'000 appeared in
20 differently coded items.
(b) fn individual Votes there was substantial variation in
classification (with items ranging from $20 to
$72,000'000 in the Health Vote alone).
(c) Although expenditure was roughly described by
function, insofar as classes of Votes' Votes
themselves or subdivisions of Votes reflected
functions performed under these headings' this was
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only a very rough guide to the aclual .purpose of a
proposed allocation. The total cost of a specific
function (such as soil conservation) was not available
from the Estimates, since the salaries of persons
engaged in this activity, for example, would appear
only under the general rtsalaries" heading.
(d) Estimated costs coul-d not, through the published
Estimates, be related to responsibilities for
controlling them, ie to specific tcost centresr. 52
1968
In 1968 the Minister of Finance announced changes in the
format of the Estimates.53 The first of these was the
introduction 
";--til-;orrur unit, and the adoption of
thousand dollar units for the forthcoming Estimates: nA
result of this has been to remove about 300 minor items
from the Estimates", The second change was the
amalgamation of smaller items of a similar nature, such as
grants and subsidies, in a general simplification of the
presentation of the Estimelee: The third, and the most
useful from the PEC's viewpointr vras a move towards
functional and activity costs in several departments, in
some cases with an accompanying description of the
programme to be funded by the proposed financial
allocation. The t"linister noted that this form of
presentation would be expanded to ot.her departments in the
future.
1969
The following year (1969), the Estimates for the new
Ministry of Transport were presented in a revised formt
and the government stated that, after referring the matter
to the PEC for comment, it intended to adopt the new style
of pre.sentatton as the standard form for all
departments. un
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These changes in the format of informabion presented to
the PEC vrere part of the general movement tovrards
establishing a PPB system in the financial management of
the New Zealand government. 55 A system of integrated
government management accounting (SIGMA) had been
developed during the late 1950sr 6nd this influenced the
style of presentation of the Est--imates, with a ref inement
of the forrn in which activities were related to their
immediate expenditure amounts. 56 There were stiIl,
however, significant deficiencies in the information
availabl-e to the pEC.
r973
fn I973, the Controller and Auditor-Generai reminded the
House of extensive changes that had been made to the form
and content of the Public Accounts in 1964-65 as a result
of recommendations of a special comrnittee set up by the
government in 1961 to simplify those documents. He
reported that since then Treasury had again reviewed tbe
format of the Public Accounts, with a view to adapting
the:n to changing administrative circumstances. The Audit
Office had itself undertaken an inquiry into the progress
of such developments as SIGI4A and ppBS r dnd the effect of
these on the annual Estimates, and Parllamentary control
over public spending. The Controller and Auditor-General
stated h'is reservation as to how comprehensive the
adoption of SIGMAT ds the sole accounting system of
government, should be, and how far the advantages of ppBS
could be realised while departmental staff b/ere not yet
fully trained in the new techniques.
However, he gave most attention to whether the financial
management system provided for the maintenance and
strengthening of Parliamentary control: "There is not at
present available to Parliament the feedback necessary to
judge programme effectiveness" he stated: "There is also
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l-ittle basis for determining whether a specific policy or
programme is being implemented properly, or how well it is
serving the public".
The Controller and Auditor-General pointed out, firstfy,
that current Estimat,es were presented in a "two ti.er', form
of expenditure, by programme and group activity (part C of
the individual Estimates), and b), objects (Part D) , which
included standard expenditure groups (SEGs) expanded to
incrude items which departments considered particularly
relevant or significant to Parliament. Secondly, the
presentation of the previous yearrs actual expenditure
(outturn), included in the Estimates, was.the only public
accounting record of the financial transactions of
administrative departments.
Most of the Auditorrs criticism centred on the
deficiencies of Part D, which was, he said, both too
selective and too general to convey any meaningful
information to Parliarnent or the select committees
"Ideally, the inclusion of targets of performance stated
in physieal terms, where these can be so expressed,
together with an accounting in those terms, would do much
to improve parliamentary control; however, it appears at
this stage this will not be possible in the immediate
future, and until the introduction of such a feature,
Part D should be retained in its present form. "
The Auditor stressed that any pressure for changer o!
improvement must come, primarily, from Parliament itself:
reform of the information system, in which there was
detailed disclosure of the activities and iterns of
departmental expenditure, would have to be initiated by
the legislature, as it became avrare of the effects of the
developing PPB systemr and saw the possibilities for
itself in this development. 57
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In the same year, (1973, , the Treasury published a booklet
describing the newly-developed system of planning and
control of government expenditure. This publication
described the "model"format of the Estimates developed
since the 1968 Budget announcernent, and recently adopted
by the ministers and Parliament. It was derived from the
Ministry of Transport forrnab (based on its 1969-70
Estimates), and was divided into five standard sections
(or reports), as follows:
(a) y9!s_-9ggggjy:
programmes.
grouping the Vote by major activity
( b) 
_EJgJl_S_t:Sl,g_t!r__e_!g__gglggl99j add itional information
on the type of sbaff employed, and on staff ceilings,
(c) 4g_$y_i_ty_pJgg-lg4$g_gj major activity programmes broken
down into SEGs (standard expenditure groupings, of
which there h'ere eight.).
(d) Exp9ng_rlg:g_f_tS!_s_: additional detail, written at the
discretion of the department, of expenditure iterns of
particular interest to Ministers of Parliament,
narraEive statements on each major acti'vity
programme. 58
By this time therefore, the PEC received:
(i) in the Estimates, details of actual expenditure
for the previous financial year (actual outturn)
compared with the amount voted for a particular
activity progranme, and a list showing the
estimated amount to be spent on the same category
of expenditure in the current financial year;
(ii) the audited PubIic Accounts; and
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(iii) any supplenentary information provided
departments to explain variations such
over-or-unoer expenditure.
the
121!/7t
In L974, however, the Controller and Auditor-General
pursued the topic of the form in which information was
made available to Parliament. He again referred in his
annual Sgpgg! to the form and content'of the Public
Accounts, the accounting system associated with these
accounts, and other developments connected with EDp
services and internal audits conducted in departments as
"a means of improving accounting and administrative
efficiency. " 59 The following year (1975) , the
Controller and Auditor-General pointed ourt that the
current form of the Public Accounts was the result of the
findings of a special Treasury committee which had
included some persons from the private sector
Recommendations for change, made as the result of a
further Treasury committee review, had implications for
Parliamentary control. The Auditor urged that the PEC
should be consul-ted fully before any changes were nade, in
order to safeguard its own interests. The complexity of
the issues i.nvoLved suggested to the Audit Office that
reform rheasures cou.ld take some time to implement. 60
fn the sbme report, the Controller and Auditor-General
returned to the question of the timing of the Budget a
matter which had been raised in 1966, again in 1967, in
the Treasury report, and yet again in the Audit Office
report in 1971. The main problem here, ds the Controller
and Auditor-General saw it, was the effect of a change in
the timing of the Budget on the amount of information
available to the House. An earlier presentationr for
example, would not only affect Parliamentary scrutiny, but
increase the existing difficulties faced by the Audit
Office in its auditing task The question of timing
by
as
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was to recur - pursuit of this issue raised some
fundamental questions for politicians and departmental
officialsr dnd their inter-relationship with each other
and the executive.
197 6
By I976, nore specific Treasury instructions required that
when Departmental gstimates went before the PEC, detailed
written reasons for any significant over-expenditure of
individual items in the Vote for the previous year were to
be provided. This represented a response to the
Controller and Auditor-General's observations over the
previous two years, and a reacbion by governmentts
financial advisers to the gross over-spending which had
occurred in the previous financial year, when' overall'
over-expenditure represented 5 percent of the amount
appropriated by Parliament.
Although, by 1975, the PEC had been able to benefit to
some extent from general improvements in financial
management information with the development of PPB and
computerised accounting systems' it stiII had some major
problems. Despite the urgilg of the Controller and
Auditor-Genera1, and the re-bommendation of Treasury nearly
10 years earlier that the investigative capacity of the
PEC should be improved, little had been done in this
field, either by Parliament itself on its ovtn initiative'
or by the executive in the interests of legislative
scrutiny. By 1976r the research capacity of the PEC had
expanded only slightly from its traditional Treasury
adviser (the Estimates clerk) and the secretarial services
of a Legislative Department clerk to include the advisory
assistance of an appointee from the office of the Clerk of
the House. In the interim period (L967-751 the scoPe of
government spending had widened, with increases not only
in the range of goods and services provided 
' 
but in the
costs of those activities. In addition, the process of
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governnent had become more complexr and the tools used by
financial controllers more sophisticated. Ilowever, the
pEC had only modestly improved its own ana-lytical
capacity. The nev/ accounting techniques were probably
beyond the comprehension of most MPs. Lay people who had
generally had litt1e personal experience in the
administration of public funds were attempting to perforrn
an essential control taskr o;l behalf of Parliament' with
few supporting services, and liLtIe interpretive
assistance.
In its 1976 report to the House, the PEC stabed thatl
as a result of the cornmittee's experience this year in
examining deparbrnental expenditure and Estimates'Treasury-and-Audit Office have been requested to
liaise on the issue of a standard format r'vhich couldbe used by departments when supplying to the committee
details explaining their expenclitures and Estimates.In addition to explanations of expenditures and
Estimates, the conrmittee will reo,uire a statement of
-ignificant changes in policy by each departrnent. The
committee will also in future require departments togive details in their reports to the committee of any
funds aPPropriated by Parliament. which have been
reallocated. oz
The pEcrs attention to its own limited ability to
understand, interpret and approve information placed
before it was closely related to the general economic and
political circumstances of the time. The new National
Government (1975) was, by necessity, taking a hard look at
its financial capacity. It had established a new Cabinet
Committee on Expenditure (the CCEX) to review all existing
and proposed financiaL commitments with a view to reducing
public sector spending, limiting the amount of borrowing
needed to cover deficits between income and expenditure'
and cbntrolling the extent to which government became
committed to po'licies with signif icant cost implications
for the future.
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Gross over-expenditure by departments in L9'74/75 had
caused considerable adverse public comment, and
strengthened the determination of the new government - and
the new chairman of the PEC - to improve the control
mechanisms in government. One area which seemed to lend
itself to special attention $ras the data presented to the
PEC as part of its Estimate.s exarnination.
The new Controller and Auditor-Generaf (snailes L976) 
'
recruited from the senior ranks of Treasury, had chaired
bhe 1-967 Treasury investigation into procedures for
financial planning and control in government. His first
report to the House clearly demonstrated where his major
interests lay.53 Shailes emphasised his intention
to seek ways to increase the legislaturefs control over
expenditurer dS his predecessor had done, Pdrticularly
those areas which had hitherto been permanent).y
appropriated and thus outside the immediate scope of
Parliamentary influence. Although the Auditor considered
than'ron the whole" the administration of public funds was
"satisfactorily conducted", he pointed out that good
financial management depended, ultimatelyr oD the
willingness of management (which, by implication, included
ministers themselves, as well as departmental and other
officials) to learn from past mistakes and correct the
existing. system when deficiencies were discovered.
I"lembers of Parliament and the executive were aware of
dissatisfaction over the ability of the legislature to
make the best use of improved rnanagement information
systems. ft was repeatedly drawn to their attention by
the Controller and Auditor-General. Associated with this
was another problem - the extent to which technical
advances in planning and estimating the costs of specific
programmes had been accompanied by parallel improvements
in internal departmental controls over spending. COPE'
for example, had carried out its surv€y of the costs of
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existing policies for some years, with numerous attempts
to separate out the unavoiclable costs of past. commitmenLs
from the discretionary costs of proposed new policies.
However, the Controller and Auditor-GeneraI was not
confident about this aspect of governmentrs control
system. In his report to Parliament in 1976, he
commented: "rnstances of breakdowns in internal controls
in departments came to notice during the year
(1975-6), indicating that this aspect of management is not
receiving the attention from departmental officers that it
warrants". 64 It was obvious that if neither Treasury
nor the Audit Office was yet sufficiently well informed by
departments of such breakdowns in time to recommend
corrective action, then Parliament itself, through the
PEC, hras like1y to be even more seriously disadvantaged.
WhiIe the assistance of an expanded secretariat could
hel-p, the departments themselves were urged to improve the
information they providedr particularly in the format of
preliminary papers submitted to the PEC under Treasury
fnstructions. Nonetheless, the L976 circular from
Treasury f-o permanent heads on this natter vJas somewhat
ambivalent. There was no sense of ultimatum;'a'suggested
format was available "on reguestl from Treasuryr but
Treasury (through the Estimates Clerk) indicated that
departments would probably prefer to adopt their own style'
of reporting. The main purpose of the exercise was
modest. It was described as enabling the PEC 'rto adopt a
more consistent and uniform approach in its discussions on
the Estimates'r. 65
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It soon became apparent that not only MPrs, but also
departmental officials appearing before the Committee,
tvere anxious for some more explicit directive for this
particular exercise. Another similar circular was sent to
6s3
permanent heads in ,June of the f ollowing year (I977) 
.
This time, the departnrents were requested to present their
supplementary information in a standarciised form, in order
to achieve "greater uniformity" in the papers going before
the committee. Not onry did the pEc require preriminary
papers, and written ans$rers to questions askeo during
examination of individual votes; iE arso wanted a short
2/3 page summary of the major variations in Vote
expenditure. A standardised format was appended:
(i) a Vote summary, by programme and total sum,
showing the esbimated expenditure for the past
and current financial years, the actual outturn
for the past year and the variation between
anticipated and actual expenditure for the
previous year in both cash and percent,age terms.
comment on significant and undes-expenditure, and
unauthorised expenditure due to overspending;
In addition, the PEC wished to see a record of
significant over or underspending in individual
programmes, and any internal variations within a
given programme in terms of under or overspending
on individual SEGs which had taken place, but not
materially affected the programme tota1. Nev,
items of expenditure were to be noted;
(ii)
(iii)
(iv) other comments were asked for - for exampler dny
significant changes of poli.y; any funds
appropriated by Parliament but consequentty
reallocated; and an assessment of the total
' amount (if any) of commitments carried forward
from t.he previous year into the current financial
year t
finally, a brief
departnental rece
summary of changes in
ipts veas requested. 66
(v)
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fn its L977 Report to the House, the Public Expenditure
Committee emphasised the attention it had given
(presumably as a result of the additional information
requested from departments) to trends in over and
under-expenditurer and to the actual 1)utturn of spending,
as a background to its consideration of the current
Estimates. It.claimed that the more rigorous application
of controls to departments the previous year had had a
marked effect.
The PEC noted that "in L976/77, out of 59 Votes only 14
were overspent, and the amounts by which individual votes
were in excess v,ras in most cases not very signif icant. n
On the other hand r although a number of votes were
underspent by large sums in proportion to the whole vote,
in each case mosL variaLions were not material. Auditorsl
reports showed that on the whole expenditure Curing
I976/77 had been kept under restraint and that any
under-expenditure and over-expenditure had resulted from
"factors which to a greater or lesser extent were outside
the abitity of departments to control". 67
The PEC had itself examined 27 out of the 45 Votes
Main Estimates, plus the SupplemenLary Estimates
other Votes had been referred to other select
committees. With "increased confidence in Lhe abil
departmehts to apply internal controls to their own
spending patternr', the PEC had therefore decided to
more attention to detailed special investigations,
at the wider and more general question of financial
management and controL overall. 68
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Towards the end of the 1970s, the PECr like other review
agentsr wds increasingly aware that financial management
planning and control required more stringent analysis than
could be provided by aggregated cash totalsr the familiar
details of annual deparlmental intentionsr of by
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post-expenditure investigations int.o changes in spending
patterns. rt was the decisions upon which policies were
based and the degree of future commitment to those
decisions which affected the information passing before
the PEC. But it vras in this area that the pEC felt least
confident of its knowledge.
A former Secretary to the Treasury (H Lang) had commented
pubricly that there were clear limits to what Treasury
could do to control gror*th in spending, even when there
was political will to do so. The Treasury was still
experimenting with procedures which would enable it to
isolate the causes of spending growth, and "set out
clearly the degree to which foward cornmitments are
involved in the adoption of poricies and the variety of
associated costs which may otherwise be hidden in a
departmentrs total Vote". 69 If Treasury itself was
having difficulties of the magnitude implied by Mr Lang,
then control and supervision by the pEC - I0 members with
a small handful of assistants - was likely to be curso.ry.
_1919
Earlier in this chapter, mention was made of the
June L979 invitation to various senior government
officials to discuss the question: How should we
our business on this committee ? We examine this
in further detaiL
PEC's
go about
neeting
As was the case in all PEC meetings till August I979r r1o
official verbatim record was kept of the discussion, and
individual MPS took whatever notes they felt hrere of
relevance. A11 PEC rnembers $rere present with the
exception of Hercus who was repl-cedr orl the Labour
side, by s Rodgers Hp. Two senior officials atLended
from the Treasury, along with the Deputy Auditor-General
and the permanent heads of the Departments of Justice and
Customs. PEC adminisLrative staff present at the meeting
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included two members of the Audit Office a.nd the CommiEtee
Clerk. It is worth reporting this lengthy meeting in some
detail since it illustrates the dynanics of power (as weLl
as the suggestibility of ltlPs) in this network, where
information is the key to influence.
The chairwoman invited the officials to instruct the
committee cn what they considered to be its area of
responsibility for Estimates examination. "This", she
recommended, I'is a classroom exercise for members of the
Committee. "
The senior Treasury official began with an account of what'
he saw as the main forms of control over public sector
expenditure:
(i) parliamentary examination to ensure that money
had been spent as intended on things such as
staffing;
(ii) parliamentary investigation to ensure that the
proposed use of public money was not extravagant
when spent on items such as school buildings and
jails i
(iii) parliamentary control over the achievement of
departmental objectives.
"And I am not clear", he added, "on where the role of this
Committee ends and the Government takes over. For
example, f remember about 15 years ago when three year
teacher training came in. This Committee could examine
the objectives of that scheme - or could it ? If it
didnrt, it could not ask: what were the objectives at the
time? Were these objectives achieved ? How long would it
take to achieve them? Could they ever be achieved ?'
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During the subsequent discussionT Treasury continued to
emphasise its ambivalence as to how far and in what
direction the PEC coul.9_ggr drtd how far, and in what
direction it g!gg]9 go before intruding upon the role of
Government. Other officialsr dnd members of the Committee
itself, had differing views:
gJEfSlgl-JJgS!1991.: rhe role of the PEc is wider than
(Treasury) says. I an a strong believer in constitutional
rights, and I think you should be able to ask about
objectivesrandtheirachievementrrightacrossthe
board. Permanent heads appear before the PEC and this is
a real disadvantage, because the Permanent ltead
necessarity speaks for the Minister ...fn L977 I suggested
that if necessary the PEc should be entitled to examine
the Minister if the permanent head canrt answer policy
questions.
-9!9-J9gyS:IgSItJ): Doesnrt this guizzing of the Minister
properlY take Place in the House ?
9JJ-r9-le-l-lggglggS): r am annoved bv the sillv little
questions the PEC usually asksr and I would like to see an
examination of objecbives, procedures, changes to
procedures, what the department is trying to achieve and
why . o.
9-fJ:S-igJ-JJg-g3jggL: Yes, there are many lines of
questioning here which usually lead nowhere the PEC
tends to concentrate on Part B (staff strengths and
salaries) of the Bstimates, rather than on activities and
programmes - and on which of those have demonstrated
growth in real terms. Permanent heads have already done
this for Treasury by the time they come before this
committee. concentration on only one area has serious
conseguences ...
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gJJjSjg-]--(lg9:JL-i Yes, the PEC must concentrate instead
upon Part c (Programme). Part D (Expendibure Items) is an
anachronism nowadaYs
9JJ-iSfg_l_JJgSlfSS)j The Estirnates are not verv good or
very useful yet becairse the departments are not yet
cranked up to provide a statement of objectives, and
costs. Treasury and Audit have a long way to go in
getting a useful format. custons will be in a new format
this year I and the construction of annual departmental
reports (to Parliament) is being looked Et, and reviewed
nOVit.
gJJ-ig-ie-]-JlgSeSg:y): But it is verv dif f icult to set some
departments to define their objectives in operational
terms, and even more difficult to measure progress towards
thern. Departments can be as precise as possible (though
not all are), but there may be difficulties later"
The permanent head of the Justice Department then
described, dt some length, his exPerience in taking over
his present position. He had asked for a statement of
objectives from officials in one section of the
department, and had found very l-ittle understanding of the
meaning of 'objectivesr and very Iittle evidence that
these had ever been made explicit. speaking to his tabled
paperrhethendevelopedanargumentformovingpermanent
heads around the state services in order to provide a
regular infusion of "nevJ blood" at the top administrative
leve1s. The PEC, he suggested, nust itself examine
departmental objectives - not just ask the permanent head
to state what he believes these to be at any given time'
and accePt these at face value.
The chairwoman of the PEc then suggested a revised
schedul-e for the supplementary information forwarded by
departments to the Committee' Fbr example, she would
require a statement of:
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(a) the statutory authority for specific items of
expenditure;
(b) the objectives and social justification for any given
policy;
(c) the costs of policies over four years to date;
(d) the duplication of activities within a departrnent;
(e) conflicting functions within a department;
(f) duplication of activities between departments.
An official (justice) added that, the PEC could also ask
departments to suggest alternative agencies which could
carry out the same functions. The chair agreed, since,
she said, she had observed considerable duplication in
activities - fresh water, for example, was "looked at by
the Departments of Agriculture and Fisheries, Internal
Af fairs, I"linistry of Works and Development, the DSIRr and
the Commission for the Environment". The chair questioned
whether this was either desirable or efficient. officials
added that one could also ask whether there were
alternatives to the administration of certain activities
by state departments - it might, for example, be better to
have an activity run by a limited liability company with
proper statutory authority. The Computer Services
Division of the SSC, for instance - could its work be
carried more efficiently by a different kind of
machitrery? The purchase of uniforms for the government
services could this be done better by a single
governmenL agent, rather than by a series of government
departments? Officials suggested that the PEC could look
at these sorts of options.
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The PEC chairwoman agreed with this line of argument 
-
although she herself was inclined to call such options
"lost opportunities" which needed identification. The
problem, however, was what questions could/should the PEC
ask of officials to obtain the ansh,ers they needed?
Officials assured the !4Ps that it was quite possible to
persuade other officials to suggest alternative forms of
machinery for the provision of certain services - although
they might baulk at telling the Conmittee their particular
preference, or that of the Minister. One government MP
inguired, with some apprehension, whether the machinery of
government was properly within the Committeers terms of
reference - to which the chairwoman replied thaE they were
concerned with anything on which a dollar of public money
was spent.
The PEC then pursued the question of how it should
estimate whether an activity or programme should be run
down, and, eventually, phased out. One official (Justice)
commented that, from the viewpoint of a permanent head,
this could be done only by examining the social
environment surrounding the activity/activities: "You
(MPs) can then look at the given objectives, and apply
your o$rn political judgement as to whether that activity
is, in your view, still justified." Another official
(Custons) added that one indicator of whether an activity
should be run down was the length of time that had elapsed
since it had last been reviewed.
Treasury agreed that there may be a need for a review, but
that Treasury itself could not provide any rnore informtion
to the PEC on this than I'the level of activity and changes
in activity over time. There are no problems in the
departmenLs providing you with a statement of their own
objectives, but f am still concerned about the line
between this committee and the Government. I rm not sure
what is proper for the PEC to ask the public servants".'
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other officials agreed tharb rr,i= 
"u" a 
problem, but
suggestetl that the PEC could stiIl "geL behind the facts
and follow through".
Discussion moved to the associated area of the PEC t s
advisory services. The PEC commented that "we have looked
for additional research staff, and we have been told that
it canrt be done, although we have asked for a regular
stenographer for aI1 oral examinations. But written
submissions from departments vary greatly in quality' and
most just look at Part D when rnaking suggestions on what
they see as (areas of interest) ".
The pEc and officials then returned to the long-standing
question of the tirning of the financial year, and whether
changes here could reduce existing wasl-e of time' If
parliament were to take an enlarged role in public
expenditureplanning,tlriswasavitalareaforchange.
one MP (Labour) asked whether there would be any advantage
for the comnittee in changing the time schedule so that
,,we get all the stuff in from the departments early in the
year, and caII in what we need on an 39-!t99 basis laler"'
officials agreed that there could be scope for the PEc to
examine departmental objectives and the past year t s
activities during the early part of the year, so that they
vrere fully briefed prior to the Estimates examination
Mps differed however r ds to whether the proper time for a
parliamentary inquiry into departmental objectives was
before t oE after, the Estimates examination. some
Government members clearly wished tO avoid any suggestion
of pre-Budgetary investigation by MPs of ministerial
policies. others, including opposition members, felt that
a post-expendiLure examination robbed Parliament of some
of its "proper controlling power"' The difficulties of
co-ordinaEing the timing of various sorts of reports and
budget-related activities were canvassed - for example'
the tirning of annual departmental reports, the timing of
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the Budget, the publication of the PECrs o.vrn report, the
pressure to ensure that Estimates fl-owed on smoothly and
quickly back into the lfouse from the PEC in Eime for
adequate debater the complicaeion of printing reports, and
relating the return of the Estimates with the seniority of
Ministers.
One official (Justice) suggested that the format of the
Estimates needed revision: "Departmental objectives dontt
change very much at all, but the emphasis on different
objectives doesr ES is demonstrated in the level of
activity in any one year. Two documents are needed by the
PEC, if it is to examine this sort of changing emphasis:
(a) a statement of objectives, by programme; and
(b) a statement of current and past levels of acLivity in
relation to these objectives".
Finallyr the PEC and the officials discussed alternative
modes of parliamentary examination - for example, the
current New Zealand practice of sending Estimates to other
select committees t ot the establishment of a systern along
the lines of that proposed for the British House of
Commons, where specialised select committees each examined
their ovrn class of Estimates. Officials differed as to
whether the present New Zealand system of "farming out"
certain classes of Estimates to other select committees
produced morer or less, competent parliamentary review.
One official suggested that select committees such as
Defence conducted deeper and more detailed inguiry than
when that class of Estimates came before the PEC. Other
officials disagreed, since in every case so much depended
upon the time l'1Ps were prepared to put into study and
consideration of the papers and Estimates prior to their
examination of officials.
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ft vras, hovrever, recommended by off icials that when
Parliament approved of a particular expenditure item, it
should be satisfied that some kind of review machinery'
existed to evaluate the work of the agency responsibl-e.
For exampler the Human Rights Commission was funded under
the general heading Vote: Justice, but the permanent head
of the Justice Department had no povrer to satisfy himself
that the objectives of this agency were being acl:ievedr oE
to accept responsibility for any spending by the
Commission. Treasury agreed that despite its concern for
the limits of Parliamentary inquiry and control, it could
foresee no difficulty in the Committee requiring a
statement of deparbmental objectives, and more extensj-ve
quantitative information as to the components of various
pr09rammes.
Officials from the departments of Justice and Customs then
withdrew, and the PEC, with advisers from Treasury and the
Audit Of f ice, drew up a new sclredule, to be circulated by
Treasury to departments prior to their appearances before
the Committee for the Estimates examination.
A Treasury official provided an extremely simplified
outline of the mechanics of the budget cycle - the timing
of the existing policy and new policy reviewsr the
introduction of the Financial Forecasting system ( FfS) and
the type of computer printout available to Treasury in its
investigations of departmental rbidsr. For most menbers
of the PEC this was elearly new information, although very
few questions were asked. The ma.in principle stressed by
the Treasury officials was that ,t.he Estimates simply
updat.e COPE figures - that is, they are the publication of
an update of th.e COPE forecasts.r' One official emphasised
that "the principle is, that what goes into the Estimates
is already approved policy - there are no speculative
sumsr no speculative, future policy arnounts of money".
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The chairwoman of the Committee inquired, not entirely
seriously, whether the Committee could at any stage change
ttre Estimates, and asked whether a paper could be
subnitted on this. The Audit officer commented that on
this matter the committee should work out how much
information it could cope with. In an apparent attempt to
head off this rather ticklish line of inguiry he then
moved quickly on to suggest that Treasury should
immediately draw up a new schedule of info'rmation, limited
(to avoid overload) to selected ares of expenditure.
Another Audit officer added I'better still, do not only a
few departments, but examine specific programmes only, in
some sort of depth".
It was agreed, after Some rather strenuous differences of
opinion between Labour and Government MPrs over the
possible range of their new inquiries, to allow the
Opposition to select three departments for trial
examination in the current year. In any caser ds
officials pointed out, the existing schedule had already
been circulated by Treasury, and a new circular would be
too late for some of the early Estimates.
AI1 previous instructions r,vere to be incorporated in the
nelr instruction which would be "as precise as possible"'
The format of the new schedules, agreed to by MPrs and
officials, was as foIlows:
I 4]-]-9spegJssljei
definition of policy object'ives in each programmei
social and econonric need b'ehind each policy;
justification for current level of activity' with
reference to physical measures, such as farms
still to be settled;
al-ternative ways to meet the same policy need;
conflict or overlap with oLher departments which
provided Lhe same or similar service's;
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statutory authority for the policy;
the date at which the policy was instituted, and,
if possible, the ant.icipated date of completion.
2 
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programme statementi
breakdown into staff in each progranme or
activity;
operational staff numbers in each progranme or
support staff numbers in each programme or
activi ty;
costs :-n dollar terms in each sub-groupi
reasons for any increases or decreases in sLaff,
relative to the last financial year . 70
On the 22 June L979, Tteasury presented a new schedule, orl
the lines agreed, to the PEC for approval. 7I A
circular was distributed immediately to alL permanent
heads.
Departments responded with little difficulty the new
instructions required only minor adaptations to
already-existing data prepared as part of the COPE and
Estimates reviews. Given the way in which the earlier
Existing Policy Review had been conducted by the Cabinet
Committee on Expenditure, departments were well placed to
field any parliamentary investigation, even where this vtas
conducted with the benefit of improved documentary
information. T2
Other factors, however, such as the willingness and the
ability of tvlPrs to follow through during oral examination,
remained constant. l'he I979 PEC included members who, for
a variety of reasons, .were anxicus to improve the
intensity of select committee investigation into public
sector spending, and there lras considerable
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cross-pollination of ideas among members, regardless of
party. For exampler otr both sides there were members who
hrere particularly concerned that th: full costs of
delivering current and proposed services should be
identified. This interest gave additional point to their
examination of officials on matters such as the planning
and construction of public buildiDgs, or the availabitity.
of private sector sources for the provision of similar
services at less cost to the government.
The two women members of the Committee, one from each side
of the House, regularly consulted each other and planned a
bi-partisan strategy of approach to the oral examination
of off icials. However, only a few other llPrs pursued
their inquiries with this vigour t or with the same
intellectual grasp of the issues involved in any
particular departmental activity. A11 MP's demonstrated
the characteristic variation noted earlier, in their
receptivity, and differing ability to handle certain types
of infornation.
Despite the active encouragement and interest of their
specialist supporting Audit and Legislative Department
staff, by the time it began the 1979 Estimates examination
the pEC stilt had not been successful in extending its
research capacity. Pressures of time, inter-party
rival-ries and continuing departmental resistance to
intettsive examination by parliamentarians combined to
Iimit the value of the improved documentation available to
the PEC.
I{oweverr one factor, reported to the author by the senior
Audit officer associated with the PEc, was probably more
significant than any other:
"This year, because some of the questions tlrey Ithe PECJ
have asl<ed in the past of permanent heads and other
off icials have beett fairly naiver w€ [Audit] got them to
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ask about the assumptions behind items of expenditure.
Whattheyfoundinalmostallcaseswastherethere
lrerenrt any assumptions. The it'em is explained simply as
Iast yearrs figure plus I0 percent' That is' there is a
base figure, and the only explanation for it is
historical. DePartments can only say: We have
provided thisr or lfe have historically done this
vray. Itf s good for MPs (we11, those MPs who are
interested)toaskthissortofthingrbut'itfs
pretty hoPeless." 73
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In Ig7g, Pierre Trudeau, then Prime Minister of Canada'
described the policy-making process of central government
in cybernetic terms which placed parliamentary parties in
a ngoal-seeking and error-correcting information system
that [coutd] learn how to learn We are like the
pilots of a supersonic airplane"' he saici' "By the time
an airport comes into the pilot's fietd of vision, it is
toolatetobeginthelandingprocedure.Suchplanesmust
be navigated by raclar. A political n;:tt' in formulating
policyr can act as societyts radar"'
If a political party adopts this cybernetic model of
politics, it may view any Parliamentary agent such as the
PEcasagatekeeperforcriticalinformation.onthe
other hancl, a consLi tutional- model which descr ibes
government largely in terms of checks and balances may not
allow for this perspective. Indeed, much of the noise
whichappearsinthePECnetworkispreciselytlreresult
ofdifferingconceptualapproachesbyofficialsandMPsto
the task of government.
To pursue Trudeauts analogy, dD official or MP who
understands Parliantentrs proper task Lo be that of
providing the legal authorit-y for a landing strip ' ot the
668
registration of landing craftr maY regard any radical
attempt to expand the scanning capability of Parliament as
invalid. on the other hand, officials and MPs may see
parliamerit and its select committees as components in a
complex information system. in receipt of strategic
politicalandotherdatawhichmustbeefficiently
processed and relayed elsewhere to provide essential
feedback for planners and decision-makers. Their approach
to handling sLrategic information will differ
according}y.Thetwomodelsarenotmutuallyexclusive
indeed it is part of this argument that they must be
complementary, if the liberal democratic parliamentary
system is to remain viable.
The pEc has a clear, if retatively ineffectual, role in
the constitutional model. Its role in a cybernetic model
may be less apparent, Particularly during the Estimates
examination phase of its annual activities' but it is
potentiallY very significant'
The Commit.tee occupies a gatekeeper position in the
informatjon netrqorks of central government because it has
the power to activate certain information flows (such as
supplementary documentation to the Eistimates' oral and
written ansh'ers to questions put to officials by MPs
during Estimates and other inquiries) ' to interpret such
information, and to report publicly on its findings
throughanextensivenetworkofparliamentaryandother
channels. This nodal position is unique insofar as the
committee is placed to receive information in a form not
available to Parliament t ot the execuLive. Ministers, for
exarnple, ffidY avoid or fail- to provide a full range of
stratcaic information for their own party caucus;
guestions asked by I'lPs in the House may not elicit all the
clesirecl inf ormation, and are Iimited in both number ano
scopebythecaveatsqfconventionandStandingorders;
the Opposj.tion does not have regular, direct' formal
channels for consultation with clepartmental advisers to
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government; the symbiotic relationship of ministers and
senior officials may lead either group to withhold certain
kinds of information from the other, although they may be
prepared to disclose it in another setting.
The bi-partisan PEC, closely involved with the budgetary
cycle, has two unique functions: first, it is itself an
audience t oE receiver of certain classes of information
not otherwise released outside the executive; seco[d, it
transmits information to other audiences, actual and
potential, which may provide feedback to the Committee and
the executive planners and decision-makers as wel1.
Although the PEC is still defective in both respects,
largely because it operates in a closed setting, there is
substantial scoDe for improvement.
Financial management and control procedures of the
executive came under increasingly intense scrutiny during
the 1970s. As a result, any authority with the right and
the power to audit these procedures, and call. members of
the executive to account, acquired potentially greater
significance in the budgetary and planning process. fn
the past, 
€ffective parliamentary investigation of
executive policies - and their proposed costs - may have
depended upon the vigour of particular individuals (such
as Muldoon in 1966-67, or on small cel1s of
aggressive MPs (such as the tyoung Turks' of the later
1960s). Since 1976, however, this approach gained a more
formal character.
In recent years, senior officials and ministers have been
geared to expect regular and sometimes searching reviews
of their budgetary decisions and planning proposals. When
government departments prepare their Estimates of
expenditure, for example, they know in advance that among
the nurierous audiences before wlrich they will have to
justify their proposals is the Public Expenditure
Committee. In terms of its traditional constitutional
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power to alter executive decisions, the Committee might
constitute only a minor hazard. Nonetheless, it has
specific authority, powers which senior public servants
themselves believe capable of wide interpretation, and
reputable allies such as the Controller and
Auditor-General.
The significance of its dual role as audience and
transmitter to other audiences !'ras probably greater in
1979 than in, sdy, L967, when the Treasury study Group
recommended better provision for parliamenbary and public
participation in the budgetary process. The fact that in
both respects the PEC was and remains defective - an
imprecise receiver and a faulty transmitter - does not
preclude the possibility of improvement and certainly
ought not to obscure its unqiue role in the expenditure
planning process.
fn L979, for example, departmental officials mounted
special "command performances" for this PEC audience.
During Estimates examinations, the style of their
presentation hras generally deferential and as
accommodating as their interpretation of the rules
alLowed. Any occasion on which their unseen "producers"
the rninisters - might be embarrassed was avoided. Every
attempt was made to escape a bad press laterr when matters
under discussion could againbe raised in the House. Some
departmen{:s, such as Treasury or the State Services
Commission, less dependent on the box office than others
such as Maori Affairs or Education, may be relatively
cavalier. But in general the PEC v,'as assumed to be a
serious audience, and tiresome interjections, demands for
replays, threats or recriminations laLer in the Houser orr
more rarely' recommendations, were treated with equaniniLy
wherever possible.
Officials appearing for the Estimates examination not only
had to keep the I"lPs in mind. They were aware that
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parliamentary "backers", such as officials from the
Treasury, the Legislative Department and the Audit Office
were also present, fornally entitLed to participate in
greenroom discussions later. Although such officials may
remain silent throughout an entire Estimates meeting, they
might make critical assessments of each departmental
performance, and could even be instrumental in instituting
some subsequent, and less at.tractive, form of audit on the
basis of what they learnt here.
The PEC also provided a forum for inter-departmental
changes. For example, during discussions on the format of
information required from departments in support of their
annual Estimates, MPs took relatively little part in the
proceedings. The officials were more concerned with each
other than with the group which had called them togeLher.
Exchanges of certain kinds of information, specific (if
covert) bargains, exploratory forays into new ground
these were enacted before the PEC because the committee
provided a relativeJ-y neutral set,ting. Of f icials knew
that there would be few immediate conseguences as a result
of MPs "eavesdropping", and in any case the occasional
direct costs would probably be outweighed by the signals
officials received about their public service colleagues'
intentions or current actions.
g9rrsry
Since there are no published notices, departmental-
officials have few means to gauge the reception of their
performance before the PEC except through the range and
difficulty of questions and debate later in the House. If
a very intense grilling has been experienced during their
PEC appearance (for exanrple, in 1978 Education Department
of f icials r,''ere aslied over LI2 oral guestions, and given
over 60 guestions f or 
.vrritten reply) , but there is littie
carry over from that later in the House (in 1978 only five
of the questions asked by the PEC were even alluded to
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during the debate on Vote: Education) officials may feel
cheated. On the other hand, when massive funding
proposals, as for Health or Energy, are dispensed with in
the same wdy, officials may feel virtuously that they have
done their constitutional duty and protected the minister
with few scars to show for the potential ordeai.
Some departments use the PEC "audience" as an opportunity
to introduce managerial and administrative trainees to a
new aspect of high-1eve1 government work. The. Education
Department permanent head, for example, is almost always
accompanied by a large team of subordinates. This is
justified not only on the grounds that several experts may
be required to cover all possible questions asked' but
also because the permanent head and his senior colleagues
can demonstrate negoLiating and ottrer skiIIs to younger or
less experienced colleagues by direct example. Some
departments, such as Energy or Health, attend in
formidable numbers because of the range of programmes
included in their Voter or because of the complexity of
aspect,s of their adminisLrative tasks. Other departments,
such as Socia1 Welfare, may be proposing massive
expenditure, but in relatively simple categories, such as
transfer payments, rdhich can readily be explained by the
permanent head and one or two senior colleagues. A
spending agency may har,"e a star player t ot a specif ic
expert wlrom it anticipates may be needed "on tap" because
of immecliate political interest in a given area. fn L9781
for example, the Accident Compensation Comrnission includeo
an ex-mi-nister in the team it brought to the PEC - not, it
appeared from the oral discussions, because of his
par:ticular expertise in the area, but because his
familiarity Lo o1d political colleagues created an air of
good-humour which mollified MP anxieties about aspects of
this Vote.
On the otfuer hand, tfie PEC itse]f has a diverse series ot
audience-receivers for the information it processes. Once
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the Estimates are referred back to the Houser EDy
information derived from examination by the Committee is
assumed to have been re-circuLated throughout party
caucuses. fnquiries about the Labour Party in L979
suggests that this recycling process has not always been
satisfactory. UntiL I979, the longest-serving member of
the PECr dD ex-minister of the Labour Party, was
responsible for the very occasional reports on PEC
activities to the Labour caucus. Early in. the J-979
Parliamentary session the chief opposition whip informally
invited the author to comment on the PECr and later to
discuss with new PEC Labour Party t"lPs how the party might
improve its use of the available information. Given the
conventions of the party, it was difficult for the whip
and his 'ginger group' to devise a procedure for reporting
back which would not offend older members, but would
ensure that the caucus nade the best strategic use
possible of the data available through this particular
network. While Estimates debates during the I979 session
did not demonstrate any marked 
-gy_gI_g_U improvement in thepreparedness of Labour MPs (as a result of what they might
have learned through their colleagues on the PEC) 
' 
there
$tere indications that informal feedback from the PEC to
the parliamentary party had increased.
Caucuses, and the House itself, are not, however, the only
perceived audiences for the PEC information, fn 1979 the
chairperson of the PEC took up a number of opportunities
to publicise information gained through her association
with the Committe. Atthough on the whole officials
dismissed her attempts as futile, ot r t{orse' i1l-informed,
they no doubt heighteneo the executive's awareness of the
poterrtial difficulties which an aggressive parliamentary
select comniittee could create.
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Conclusion
There are a number of justifications for maintaining
parliamentary control over how public money is to be
spent. Lord Diamond, for example, asserts that "the
accretion of power'to the executive which would result
from Parliament ceasing to have the final control of
expenditure wourd be so substantial that what .remained of
the system of self-government would no longer justify the
description of Parliamentary democracy. ,, -15
Diamond also argues that the extent to which parliament is
involved in the controL and al-location of public
expenditure is 'a measure of the extent to which members
of the community are involved in decisions about how
resources should be allocated, and can satisfy themselves
thaL they are getting value for money. 76
Michael Rush suggests that given the general accretion of
power to the executive, and the degree of responsibility
for forward economic planning this entails, the Government
reguires considerabl-e political support in its task of
managing and controlling public expenditure so that it can
more effectively realise national objectives . 77
Parliament, through its committee system, can provide a
significant part of this support.
In his analysis of the impact of ppts in the United Kingdom
Peter Else examined the complexity of information, and the
rate at which it passes through the government system, and
suggested that certain nodal points can be identified as
having a gatekeeper role in the reception, analysis and
transmission of informabion. 7B parliament, through its
committee structure, provides one such nodal point.
In her account of the.Brit.ish Bxpenditure Comnittee,
Robinson points to some'significant deficiencies in this
gatekeeper role. Stre concludes that although the (UX1
Committee has "increased the flow of information from the
civil service to Parliament and between pressure groups
and Parliament to some extentr " 79 its effectiveness in
modifying (Iet. alone controlling) executive
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decision-making and planning is severely limited.
(fndeed Robinson suggests that it not only makes
sense to think of the British Parliament as being
control of public spending patterns - it is also
80
1i ttle
in
unrealistic to imagine that central government itself is
the "final determinator" of spending, since it.is
invariably reactive and makes decisions not in the light
of prior plans but in response to influences from such
agencies as the IMF', the TUC and local authorities.) 81
In a report to the Canadian Royal Commission on Financial
Management and Accountability 1l-977') , PauI Thonas arqued
that it makes sense to talk of Parliamentrs legal control
of expenditure: the House legitimises Cabinet decisions,
ensuring that the amounts spent do not exceed the amounts
voted and deterrnining whether the funCs are used for the
authorised purposes . 82
However, Thomas goes on to suggest that it may not make
sense to ext.end the notion of Parliament's legal control
to that of managerial control, a role which involves
assessment of the efficiency of goverttment spending
Q?
agencies. eJ Further, Thomas denies any likelihood that
Parliament or its instruments (such as PEC) should have
strategic control, which is "the allocation of
expenditures among the various areas of government
activity and the assessment of the results of programmes
in terms of reaLising stated objectives. " 84
fn his analysis of Parliamentary participation in
governnent, J Lovink avoids the notion of control and
examines insteacl the effectiveness of tne electoral
tegislature in terms of its influence over the executive.
He su.ggests three possibte inCicators of ef fective
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influence : the select committee as a "spur to political
responsiveness", as "a spur to administrative competence"
and as a "political educator and stimulator". 85
In New Zealand, von Tunzelmann has 9emonstrated
that althorrgh Parliament, through the Public Expenditure
Cornrnittee system, ilay be able to stimulate scrutinise,
advise upon and influence certain aspects of executive
action, these polrers are Iinked. "Publicity" she states,
"is the natural corollary to criticism" - and it is in
this area that the Committee is weakest. 86 This is
partly a result of problems inherent in the select
committee system, partly inadequacies in the PEC itself,
in parb a failure in its relationship with the House' and
partly because of the lack of consistent, appropriate
executive response . B7
Given its own self-denying ordinance of public exclusion
during Estimates (and a11 other) hearings, the PEC loses
almost entirely one vital channel for expenditure planning
feedback. The news-rnedia are excluded from all but
Estimates debates in the House, PubIic awareness of the
nature and range of parliamentary scrutiny of the
Estimates is promoted obliquely through the parliamentary
press gallery and other forms of news-media. Public
broadcasts of debates (even if matters raised during PEC
examinations were fully reporteo) are Iimited, in that
only t5 days are given to Estimates examination.
The PEC remains heavi.ly reliant on other agencies, such as
the Control-ler and Auditor-Genera1, to report to the
electorate on the concerns which may have surfaced during
Estimates examination, such as the availability of
essential planning ancl management skills in the public
service, identification of the actual size and proposed
future deployment of the state-funded workforce t oY the
reLationship between current spending and proposals for
future finarrcial commil-menL to projects such as
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power-generatlng plants. 
,
Despite 
.its undoubted authority to identiflr and eomrne,nt on
a wide rahge of information, includlng policy matters, the
PEC operates in w.hat iS esserntidlly a closed slrstem' trts
netnerks of corunun.ication are potentially f ar-reachlng,
but in practice they lack the,refinement and sustained
vlgour necessary to pJ,aee Parliainent, nearer the eentres of,
controlr otr to enable to Hous€r as an institution to
contribuLe more effecL,ively to the s:xpenditure p.l,anning
procesg.
Using the unique location of the Fublic Expenditure
Comnittee, IrtPs could actively and openly contrib'ute Lo the
neans by which governrnent beeomes a "g,oal-seeking and
error-co,rrecting informat.ion syslem that [canl learn how
to learnr'. 88' Non.theles,s, it is this criticaL dinension
of ttre FEC network whtch is the weakest, in cybernetis,r if
not in co,netituti-onatr, terms. In its second major
f,unction - post-eNBenditure reviews and spe,ciall one-off
inquiries, - t'he PEe is possibly morre eff,ective'. But
eNpendibure pJ.anning is esser,rtialty forward-looking, and
it i.s in Lhis task of forward ggJJggJgg exafitination that
Pa.rliamentrs relative. impotence is still most apparent?
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S A Walkland, Parl-iarnentary_4fJglgs, Winter , J.g7g, p.9
The Public Expenditure Committee replaced the publicAccounts Committee, which had been established in187I. R)r discussion of the reasons behind the change
see J P Egan, V J Wakelin and J Yuillr parliamentaryControl of Public Expenditure in New zeE-fEn-dl
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New Zealand Public Expenditure Cornmittee in TheParliamentarian, LfX No. 4, October 1978 anA-TThe
F-ubrrE-ExFEnair,-ure commi ttee and parliamen'tary control
of_public expenditure" in Victoria University ofWellington Law_Igvfgy_r Vol. 10, lJo. L, trebruary LgTg .
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of the Committee) New Zealand ParliamenLary debatesVol. 330, 1962. fn 1976 the pEC reporred need for
permanent heads' accountability for expehditure to beformally defined: see BI (pt II), 1980, p 70-7I. The
Government accepted the PEC and Audit Office
recommendations and directed bhat permanent heads
should be identified as the'principal accounting
officers' in each government department, CO Circular,
approved 14 August, 1978. CM 7B/3I/8 refers.
A F Von Tunzelmann, op cit. I979t 24.
Standing Orders 336,
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A F von Tunzelmann, Ioc. ci t, 1,979 z 28-29.
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ttre New Zealand Public Expend i tur e1) 36, notePolitical Science (No.
New Zealand Parliamentary debates VoI. 382, 1973:45.
PubIic Expenditure Committee I976 fnterim Report NewZealand. Parl.iament. Ilouse of Representatives.
Appendix to the journals, VoI. 4, L976 I 12 A : 3-10;
Public Expendi ture CommitLee 1977 Interim Report New
Z eEIE nA . - - FA rf 1 a mE nE:--Io u sE- aT- REp?E s enteEf v e s:
Appendix to the Journals, 1977 I 12A.
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A P von Tunzelmann, loc. cit. 1979:30.
Public Expenditure Committee I976. New ZealandParliament. House of Representatives. Appendix to
the journals. vol 4, L976, I. 12:15.
L2
13
A F von Tunzelmann (L979) Ioc. cit: 2J".
In L962 the Standing Orders Committee recommended that
special post-expenditure and other investigations
should take place during parliamentary recesses.
However, in practice this part of the PECrs activities
has gradually extended into the sessional period.trThe practice has now been taken further with
sub-committees continuing to sit during consideration
of the Estimates. Indeed in 1977 two new
investigations vrere initiated after the Estimates
programme had begun." A von Tunzelmann (L979) Ioc.
cit. 34.
Re the latter point made by von Tunzelmann:
Consideration of the Est.irnaSes began on 3 August
1977. A PEc sub-commfttEE-EEEan investigation intothe f inancial rna.nagement of a television programme 
,
'The Governor' on 7 September L977. Another
sub-conmittee examination of aspects of the
construction by the lr{inistry of Works of the Kaimai
tunnel began on 28 September L977 i the report on this
was eventually tabled in July 1979 by which time a new
select committee had been appointed with a near
complete change in menbership but still chaired by a(National) government appointee.
The Committee operates in and around the Estimates
examination with considerable flexibility in
scheduling special investigations. Such meetings are
arranged, for example, to accommodate electoral and
other demands on members; with regard to the
strategies decided upon by boLh the sub-and full
committees for the timing of their investigations; thepreparedness of different PEC members to apply
themselves to a given task ancl the need to avoid
conflict (which can arise particularly if Opposition
members feel that too much time is being taken up by
special inquiries to the detriment of their attention
to the Appropriation Bill and other ongoing debates).
The Committee is conscious of the need to avoid abuse
of the porvers to summon officials to attend hearings,
and to reduce wasLe of officials I time through
prolonged hearings. Most of this is at the discretiotr
of the PEC chairperson and is general srlhe adopts an
attitude of considerable delicacy in encouraging the
Committee to approach its special inquiries with
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con-sistency and vigour but avoiding any suggestionthat of f.icials are being railroaded.
14 Anthony Barker and Michael Rush,
Parliament and his Information,
a nd-E nwi n;- I970t -,- p .32-
The Member of
T7
I5
I6
18
19
(tondon: George AIlen
Pe te r E 1 s e, 3g!_1_ig_BpS!9_i_tg :g:_39g_1_ieg9lt!_ g_!9_3!E_r
PEP BroadsheeE 522, November 1970. See especially pp.
84-92.
A F von Tunzelmann (f979) loc cit. z 28 and 35.
Comments from PEC members during their L978/79
meetings included freguent reference to the problems
created for the committee by late tabling of
departmental reports (Author I s records of PEChearings, I978/79'). See also Government Notices of
Motion re select committees. gg9-ts_ly_g_gflglllt, No. 25
- Nov ]3, 1979, NZHR p.7. AIso see AppelglI_J} for
Treasury Circular to Permanent Heads on Depar_tgglt-tgJ
4llggl_3Sp9I!Er_l9ll and memo from A c shailes to H GLang (Treasury) on same - L4 May 1971.
Officials occasionally have barely 24 hours to return
ansvrers to the PEC. This not only increases existing
strains on senior public servants but probably
exacerbates the complaint freguently made by menbers
of the PEC in their deliberations and in public that
officialsr answers are inadequate or too meagre for
any real value to be derived from them. See, inter
alia, Ivlarilyn Waring, Chairperson of the Public
Expenditure Com:nittee, L979 in a Iecture given at
Waikato University, Hamilton reported in Lhe Evening
!g5_t 29 July :-.979. See also I. L4 AJHR,_ L979 r PPt0-11.
Treasury Study
December, 1967
of conf l-ict of
Group, l!1a1cia1 BJeg'f Ir9_ _el'g_ gglr!_f _9lr
- p.46 and p. 98. See also discussion
Treasury loyaltiesr pp 2I-22.
A F von Tunzelmann. p. 31; See also Appelrgl5_j4 foranalysis by E E Winchester of Parliamentrs information
needs.
2A r.I2,L977 AJHRp24.
2I The following notes are takerr from discussions between
the author and the pnC research officer (Ian LeggeLt,
Audit) on 12 September 1978:
fn his first year as research officer it was necessary for
Mr t,eggett to establ.ish the nature his relationship withthe Conrmittee and Lheir expectations of him.
Ile "expected a fairly low level of activitlrr ds it is
election year, and since the gross overexpendltures of the
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Lg75-77 period no longer appear." However, he did have
much higher expectations of the investigative capacity andinterest of the PEC than were realised.
The Audit office recommend.s certain departments for
special consideration by the PEC. fn 1978, Education,
Government Printer and MWD were recommended - the latter
was already due for special consideration by the pECduring recess. PEC may at its own discretion decide to
adopt these recommendations or choose its own. Decisions
about which Estimates go to other select committees is
made entirely by the PEC itself.
Virtually no work for the Audit officer whatsoever wasgenerated as a result of t ot in anticipation of, theEstimates hearings as such. From time to time the
research officer himself would take up matters which he
considered required further questioning in that they had
been unsatisfactorily answered by departmental officials,
or were not dealt with satisfactorily in the Departmentrs
written reply to a question from the pEC e.g. a replygiven by Govt. Pr j-nter in 1978 hras referred back to tne
PEC and thence to the acting Minister for furtherquestioning and discussion. r'Such discussion occurs,
however, after the total allocation has been approved as amatter of form by the pEC.r'
Matters which were adopted for special reces3 inquiry,
such as an inguiry int.o f oreign aid, generated
considerably more work and interest for the research
officer. Indeed, he claimed that the advisory and research
officers from Audit led the PEC to precisely the pointthey wished the Committee to reach.
The provision of a research officer was expected to make a
significant difference: 'f donrt know hovr on earth we
managed before" (Opp. member of PEC). But in 1978 aLleast, the research officer himself felt that theinfluence of the Audit office (which is necessarily theinfluence of public servants) predominatecl:
"On the foreign aid inquiry we (Audit) generated thequestions vrhich the committee then asked the foreign
affairs people; then we went away and did the researcn to
answer the questions; we then reformulated the guestions
so they could be put again at the second hearing, and then
we wrote Lhe recommendations for the PEC to approve. The
PEC wanted to see the officials (although this was
entirely superfluours, buL they like to have the officialsbefore them, it gives them a sense of pob/er I guess) butin fact the whole thing was done from here.
"On the whole the way thedisappointing 
- they failthe questions we provide
triviaL questior-rs and so
PEC treats questj.ons is
to see the relationship betweenfor them, they ask additional
forthr drd they fail to see the
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underlying structure of the questions.
Another major inquiry begun in 1978 arose from an earlier
report of the Controller and Auditor General on the
Ministry of Works and Developnent. The decision to'carry
out a review was made by the PEC at the beginning of the
year. It took the research officer three weeks to gain an
appointrnent with the Chairperson (his sole direct contact
with the committee) to establish the nature of the inguiry.
The Chair and subseguently the PEC decided to adopt
suggestions put to them by the Audit officer;
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
1iv)
the inguiry should not be categorised as an
investigation into the ItlWD, but as the PublicSector Construction Procedures and Resources
Review;
the inquiry should seek information regarding
their manpov/er and plant and equipment resources
from all departments other than the MWD
i n i t i a I ly, Lhe n e s t abf.f-sl--ttrE- I e la t i on s h i p
between these departments and the MWD in terms of
capital works planning and construction and
maintenance;
the Research officer should draw up a suggestedquestionnaire fqr circulation among all
departments for the purpose of obtaining the
reguired information;
the PEC should then request selected informationfrom the IviWD, and should visit the department,
fuIly informed, to discuss its findings with the
officials.
A questionnaire was drawn up and circulated. The research
officer then left Wellington for a week. During that time
the PEC visited the Development and Planning Division ofthe MI,ID - precipitately, in the official's view:
"They got lost on whaL they were sold over there landfailed to see thatl those people are really just another
branch of Treasury. They all got interested in the
capacitl' of the l"1WD computer, without really knowing what
on earth they should be asking about."
By June 2I the Estimates had started to come through, and
the trlI,JD inquiry was set aside unti.l that task was
cotnpJ-eted. The PEC specif ically asked the ResearchOfficer to "carry on with the irrquiry on his own' in
whatever way (he) thought best". Tlre off icer was somevrhat
hesitant to do this, but arranged that all communications
with departments go through the Clerk of the PEC
Commitlee. He saw the gathering of information from the
departments as havlng at least one important f unction:
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they could see that the PEC was interesting itself in
certain specific sorts of information, and seeking quite
specific ans$rers. The officer began putting together the
responses, and suggesting questions which should be asked
by the PEC. He anticipated that this exercise would be
completed before the end of November (by which time he
would have been in Niue for a month). He added that to
work much longer for the PEC would "send him round the
bend." He did intend, however, to write a report on hisfirst year with the committee, noting deficiencies in
their procedures as he saw them, and suggesting possible
improvements.
He identified the main problem as one of definition: whatis the proper function of ttris committee ? Should it
regard itself as a research body (and would this even bepossible); or should the PEC have a fully serviced
think-tank which provided it with data which would thenform the basis for more selective investigations, and
decisions from the PEC ?
See also: Alan D McRobie, Parliamentary rControlr of
Publ-ic Expenditure in Politics in New Zealald, S Levine( . ) Georse Allan and-uiiln lI378T:------
In 1979, a 4-man sub committee of the PEC' chaired by
Mr D Jones (Govt MP) carried out an inguiry into thequestion of additional staff requirements. This
inquiry arose "when the present Chairwoman raised thepossibility of t-ne Committee reporting formally on its
examination of the l;stimates." See I. L2, 4SIIB 1979.
This comment is baseC on observation of the
relationship bebrveen officials and PEC members andinformal discussions held by the author with bothparties during f978-79.
See Append_l_I__!4 for transcript of notes of PEC meeting
20 June :--979.
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Ibid. p. 64 .
rbid.
45
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46
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48 rijg,
49 Lbj.4. PP 6-7'
50 rbid.
5L 1b!|, p.98.
' 52 rbid, p.5g.
53 999gS3, 1968 4ggg p.15.
54 8.6 AJ93, 1969' p,38. See also Bl (PtII) 4993, forrefeIEiEE to changes in the atrdit, reports.-
55 Bl (Pt 1), ASIB, 1974, p.39 and BL (Pt 1) gggg; J.971pp 5-6. see also $ppS!9Jg_-!:
56 Bl (Pt II) , AJgBr L972. See aLso gppg3_g$_4.
s7 BL (Pt rr), 4{!Br l.9z3r pp 5-9.
' 58 The Treasury, 3!S-S]SJrlrfgg-glg-g9$I91.-9E_-Ggyernent
Espseg:lg:s-iwe-r-r-iilg1Enl-13-?:t-F:31,:--
59 BI (PL II) AJEL.r._rg7A, pp 62-53.
60 Bl (Pb [f ] r AJEF! 1975, pp ,5-6.
61 lbid. pp 58-59.
62 r.LZ , AJFI+ J.97 6 r p. 16 .
63 El (Pt rr) , 4_qg3r, 1976,
' 64 fbid. p.53. Se,e also Afpg
supplementa-ry information F?-oiT,EEa to PEc by
ndix 4A for exampJ,e of
departments.
65 Treasury circular L976/35 T3/9/76. Treasury records
see also Agpg$-l3_jA:
66 Treasury cireular L977/2L. T 3/9fi"l. Treasury
records,. S,€€ also Agp€ggll__A}:
67 r.I2 4gIBr 1977, p. 13.
68 r.qi$.
69 l{ G liang, The RoIe of Treasury - Controt and Advice,
Egg1g$ig_Ellletin, Cant,erburlr Charnbe,r of Commerce,EI0;-No:-v7T971 .-
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72 SppSlg_iI_3A includes a selection of documents, and thetranscripts of two PEC meetings, which indicate the
range of the Committee's interests in expenditureplanning and control, the manner in vrhich MPs pursued
these is formal meetings with of.f icialsr the ad'riceprovided and instructions circulated on the basis of
the PECrs approval:
(i) Comment to PEC by New Zealand Forest Service on
Audit Office Review of Financial Management and
Control. Undated' 1978.
(ii)
(iii)
( iv)
(v)
(vi )
(vii)
Transcript of PEC discussion with Messrs M S
Morris and R D F Pyatt, members of the team that
reviewed financial management and control in
administrative Government departments. lleetingheld in room 30 on Parliamentary Annex on
Wednesday 14 June, L978
Comment to the PEC on behalf of the Clerk of the
House on two recommendations in the Controller
and Auditor-General-'s Report (8.1 (Pt IV) :
SgyS!g_e__e$_!_tr_e__eg9gS!_93J9, 26 June' 19 7 I .
Submission to PEC by Education on C e AG Review
and transcript of meeting betvreen PEC and
officials from the NZ Forest Service and
Education department on their submissions on theController and Auditor-General's Report on
Financial Management and Control inAdnrinistrative Government Departments, 27
September, 1978; and transcript of meeting on
same subject bebween PEC and officials from
Government Printing Office on 4 October, L978.
Submission to PEC on Controller and
Auditor'GeneraI's Report from the Audit Office:fnternal Auoit in covernment-depgIlgsn!s. 2
oEroEA;--I5tt .--
Comment to PEC on A Change in the Government's
Jlnalg:gl_Igel f r o-m-J--n--eE-ttEi sbvl-a==f -s-tenE--Secretary to the Treasury, 12 October I978. See
also T40/L85t Treasury records.
Joint comment to the PEC on progress made by both
the Task Force on Financial llanagement and by the
control departments in respect of the 30
recommendations contained in the Controller and
Auditor-General's report on financial- management(BI Pt IV, 1978) 
' 
submitted by J R Batl-ersby,
Assistant Secretary to the Treasury and J T
Chapnan, Deputy Controller and nuditor General,
15 October f978. See also T. 3/L8, Treasury
records.
Comment toBattersby,
10 January,
Transcript of
officials on
April, I979.
687
PEC on le\,'!,_h,'_1_!g-Elrgg from J R
AssistanT-3eE;eta;y to the Treasury,
1979.'
(vii)
( ix)
(x)
(xi )
(xii)
(xii)
(xiv)
(xv)
(xvi )
Submission to PEC on alternative methods ofpresenting departmental receipts for the Public
Accounts (81. Pt 1), from J R BatEerSby Assistant
Secretary to the Treasury. Includes comment on
why a ne$r fornat had not yet been introduced, 15March, 1979. See also Ty 1766, T 3/2/78-79,
Treasury records.
Submission to PEC recommending pilot projects in
Maori Affairs and Custonis departments for new
financial techniques, for the Task Force on
Financial Management, from R de Jardine,
Treasuryr on 22 March, L979.
Comment to PEC on cash versus accrual accounting
and the information that would be available to
Parliament and to the Public Expenditure
Committee under proposals made by Treasury on 12
october 1978 (see (vi) above) . 9!gruS__in_!beGovernmentrs Financial Year, from R de Jardine'
T? e a s u; y; - -l9-Ep;lI; - Tglfi -- -
discussion between PEC
General Means of Staff
and SSC
Control, 24
Comment to PEC on benefits as seen by AuditOffice to financial management by departments and
departmentsr reactions to a change in the balancedaLe of government from 31 March to 30 June.
Chanqe in Balance Date of Government f rom P Iv1
ei o s-s;- A-s sf sE a nt- e onti of T e-r- E nd-E-udi t o r G e n e r a I
30 April 1979, Also Audit records, A 35/40/79.
Transcript of discussion between PEC and
officials from the Treasury and the Audit Office
on the Budget cycIe, 18 l"lay 1979.
Notes of meeting betrveen PEC and Audit and
Treasury officials on the 1978 Joint Task Fbrce
on the C and AGts report, and subseguent
developrnents in financial management and
control. 27 June 1979.
Introductory report to PEC on Management Survey
of Legislative Department by Michael Cox' MP lBJuly 1979.
Comrnent to PEC on Report of Controller and
Auditor-General of 3l- March L97B from W Renwick,
(xvii)
73
74
688
Director General of Education on 30 March L979.
S T Keaner Assistant Controller and Auditor General.
Comment to author, September 26, L979' Wellington.
P Trudeau, Office of the Prime Minister, Notes for
remarks by the Prime Minister at the Harrison LiberalConference, Harrison tlot Springs, British Columbia,
Nov. 2L, 1969r pp 2-3 in P Aucoin and G B Doern (eds)
rhe S t r uc tu r e_o f_3gllgy:!lglj!g_l!_qang9ej_JI9I9l!9-:
sess! ir sE: i !s : et'.; 
-1 211t 
- F: 6 t : -
Lord D iamond, !!!_I_i9-Epglrgl!gJ_9__i-B_3fgg!lgg ( London :George Allen and Unvrin, I975) , 131. See also whitepapers on PubIic Expenditure 1969 (ClvlND 4234) and 1971(CI-IND 4829) i G Elruce Doern, !g!l:g_Eglg!Uy_gJCanadian Government Spending (Rideau public eolicy
Eels eETEf e r- o-u p; -f 9?€l ; - E- W: -F'r a s e r, trt h o C o n t r o 1 s
Government Expenditure ? : PubIic Service Control of
Government S1:ending, lecture to the Victorian Division
of Austral"ian Society of Accountants, I97 7 lecture
series (Australia); the First Report from the Select
Committee on Procedure, VoI.I, Report and l"linutes ofProceedings, House of Commons (UK) 17 JuIy 1978.
Diarnond, loc cit. : I32
Michael Rushr The Development of the Comnrittee System
in the Canadian House of Commons in The Parliarnentarian
Else, PlbJls_Elpglqllg:S, Ioc. cit. See especially,pp 84 -92:----'
Ann Robinson, Pdrliament a{rg_Ig_pl_}S_EpSl'9:Irgj The
Expenditure comn,lEtEe-oT-tle HouEe o-aEommons1970-76. (Heinemann Educational Books, 1978): 54.
Ibid: 156.
I-bid: 158.
Paul G Thomas, Parliament and the Purse Strings, a
study prepared for the Canadian Royal Commission on
Financial Management and Accountability, Canada,1977. pp 2A3,
rbid.
rbid.
75
76
77
7B
79
80
81
82
B3
B4
J A A Lovinl<, Parliamentary
effectiveness in Canada, in
AciminisLration, Vol. 4, No.
T-Celnoo?;--ReT-orms o f Publ ic
Britain, in Canadian PubIic
reform and governmental
Canadian PubIic
2, L9732
Expend i tu
Administra
43-47. See also
re in Great
J_iglr-r VoI. 12,
B5
No, 2, SummeT*I915..
85
8.7
589
See von Tunzel"manR p. '226 ,loc. cit (1978);
See A 'F von Tunzelmann (1979) loc. cit: 27, n. 'ZLi
Alan D McRobie, Tt-re New Zealand PubLic Expenditure
eornmit,tee (1s74) e0 IglilJSgf-ES!$SS ('No. 1). Fbrdiscussion of leqislative c,onsent for nubl.icEi l ti  on p L,
expendit,ure mandg,€tnent see alsg I.I4 AJH.E, L979r pp1,0,-11, 
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